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Abstract 
This work responds to the question of community at an ontological level before 
notions such as identity and subjectivity have been assumed. I ask the question of 
community in terms of the principles that give rise to the being-togetherness of people. 
Modern philosophy’s responses are famously a version of Laws, social contracts, 
universal definitions, ideals, and values. Post-enlightenment philosophy assumes such 
categories as laws, norms, and religions across the board, applying them to all gatherings 
of peoples. Especially with respect to the Islamic community, and more particularly 
during the colonial era, categories such as religion and religious laws were used by 
orientalists to define Muslims, non-Muslims, and different sectors among them.  
Against this background, this work attempts to study the gathering of “a people” and 
the genesis of the laws at an ontological level. This approach will ultimately show how 
one’s interpretation of the existence of beings in general reflects one’s reading of the legal 
or political gatherings in particular. 
I will argue that Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian phenomenology can serve as 
allies since they have already initiated this line of questioning by their radical critique of 
the authority of the subject. Heidegger separates his way from the mainstream 
phenomenology by formulating his critique of subjectivity by way of reviving the Greek, 
especially Aristotle’s philosophy. Through what he calls Destruktion, or deconstruction of 
the tradition, he shows that the above-mentioned modern formulations of the self and the 
world are ultimately based on a certain scholastic reading of Aristotle, which reduces all 
meanings of being to a categorial one.  
Derrida carries this critique of identity over to the ethical and political realm. He 
investigates human beings’ interpretive relation to “otherness” by replacing identity or 
self with “following.” The “otherness” that we are in “following” can be a god, another 
human being, the animals and the environment, or the tradition of the past. In all these 
relationships, the hermeneutic strategy towards “otherness” is principally the same. 
Derrida’s suggestion for the most authentic mode of ‘following’ is deconstruction 
itself. He shows that there are the same schematic formulations involved in explaining the 
coming-to-be and gathering of things in nature as are involved with “a people” in a 
community. The genesis and the function of laws are the same in the creation of events 
and bodies in a natural world as the actions and productions in a political and ethical 
realm.  
Following such a critique, especially through Derrida’s deconstruction, I try to reveal 
the forces in Aristotle’s text that can potentially lead to two different formulations of the 
gathering of a people. For Aristotle, the notions of hylomorphism and teleology explain 
the genesis of multiplicity and difference. In the political and ethical realm, these 
principles give rise to the constitution of a just “exchange community.”  
The critique of these notions opens the door for alternative modes of gathering. By 
questioning the predetermined end (telos), I will suggest that the generation of 
multiplicity and gatherings become “nomadic.” Thus, deconstruction as the most 
authentic attitude towards “otherness,” when applied to Aristotle’s teleology, turns into 
“nomadic distribution” and “nomadic following” of the other.  
As an example of the effect of this critique and its actual ethical and legal 
consequence, in the history of philosophy and among actual communities, I examine the 
genesis of gatherings and laws in Islam and among Muslims. I explain what it means to 
“follow” the other in nature and in human society in Islam. Finally, I examine what it 
means to be a nomadic follower of the laws of Islam. I argue that the rituals of Islam, like 
Hajj, illustrate the being of Muslims as the followers of otherness in the most explicit 
way. The analysis of Hajj reveals the conflict of laws and justice because the ritual is not 
about mere obedience to laws. Instead, through performing it, Muslims are led to 
contemplate and wonder about their relationship to God, nature, and their fellow human 
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PREFACE: The Trajectory and the Existential Ground of the Work 
viii
Background and Aims  
 The overall aim of this study is to understand the notion of community as being-with-
others-in-the-world. Considering human beings in their hermeneutic situation, always in 
relation to others in tradition and “before the laws” and the logos of others, this 
investigation turns into how one interprets and ‘follows’ the laws of tradition and society. 
Borrowing the term from Derrida,  I call this particular perspective on community 1
‘following,’ which is one of the phenomenological moments of being-with-others, 
besides being-before and being-along-side.  
 In a sense, other moments of being-with can be understood from the perspective of 
‘following’ as well. When one follows another, she can be before or after the other. But 
before taking what is followed into consideration, the principles of this ‘following’ are 
the focus of the investigation. I will look at different modes of ‘following’ a tradition 
which shed light on different moments of being-with-others through time. This approach 
problematizes the community in its temporality as an already made product and 
investigates it in its genesis. While community as an institution or product defines self 
and its responsibility in accordance with the laws and principles of social contract, 
questioning the institutionalized form of community from the angle of ‘following’ sheds a 
new light on these well-worn notions as well. Thus, the answer one gives to the how of 
being-with at the transcendental level, then, will give a fresh meaning to being a self, 
identity and responsibility. 
 There are two sources of inspiration for why I chose to approach community as 
“following” the other rather than, for example, a dialogue or social institution of some 
kind. I have been drawn by two simultaneous concerns: one personal and existential, the 
other, methodological. Firstly, as a Muslim, I am existentially inclined to answer the 
pressing problem of Islamic community. Secondly, I have a long-standing interest and 
 For the notion of being-oneself as following, I am deeply indebted to Jacques Derrida and his essay 1
“l'animal que donc je suis”, in which he introduces this notion in regard to the relation of man and animal. 
He point out that “suis” in French means, “I am” and “I follow” at the same time. Nevertheless, beyond the 
accidental similarity between the verbs, “following” as “being-after” or “being-before” underscores 
different moments of being-with which seems to be co-originary with being-self. Such a formulation 
mainly targets the Cartesian identity as a pure thinking-self, but, on another level takes on Heidegger’s 
Dasein, whose “originary existence” is the product of the rejection of others and public. 
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training in phenomenology. In fact, the idea of the project has originally sparked in 2011 
when I did a sabbatical at University College Dublin, working on the phenomenology and 
hermeneutics of religious experience and during a seminar on the “Hermeneutic of the 
Gift” by Professor Richard Kearney. I have ever since been making myself more familiar 
with Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian hermeneutics and deconstruction as avenues to 
study Islamic community.   
 After reading a lot about anthropological and philosophical studies of community and 
law in Islam, I realized that most of them are either too broad or too narrow. It has been 
the most frequent and commonsensical understanding of Islam to reduce the colorful, 
ambiguous, paradoxical and exploratory nature of Islam to a rather straightforward 
essentialized depiction of it as a religion just like Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, etc., 
in contrast to secularism. In short, it can be argued that these post-enlightenment 
distinctions are not necessarily applicable to Islam. In fact, in the history of Islam there 
has never been a similar distinction between the secular and the religious, such as the 
domain of science as separate from metaphysics of Islam, or politics as separate from 
religion, etc.  2
 In all these definitions and categorizations, scholastic and modern, the becoming of 
these communities and their relation to what has come before and after them are reduced 
to a systematic, synchronic mold or construct, as if all elements and series that gave rise 
Shahāb Ahmed in his seminal work, What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic, argues that any 2
definition of Islam has to be addressed from within the terminology of Islam itself and not through the 
terminology that is devised by western orientalists in characterizing Islam as a religion (as if like 
Christianity and as opposed to secularism), culture, law, orthodoxy, philosophy, Sufism, etc. Ahmed claims 
that the underlying assumption of such a category of religion, despite every recent effort in the study of 
religion to uproot the field from the soil of enlightenment modernity, is that all religion everywhere models 
itself off the archetype that is Christian Religion, and functions within the following binaries or dualities: 
religion vs. science, sacred vs. profane, religion vs. secular, ordinary acts vs. extraordinary acts, natural vs. 
supernatural. He contends that such a category as religion assumes religious authority to be fundamentally, 
and at its core, the proscription and the prescription of ethical acts in their particularities. Aḥmed does a 
fantastic job in examining all of these studies in an attempt to provide the most inclusive definition of 
Islamic community. According to Aḥmed, such perspectives and methodologies have gradually led to two 
major routes in Islamic studies that are either too reductive or simply wouldn’t give us a unified definition. 
In the first case, the investigator tries to extract mainly from the textual sources of the Qur’an and Ḥadith 
(the sayings of the Prophet) as the original points of reference, some kind of normative claim, written or 
tacit law or cultural structure which constitute Islamic community as opposed to its others. He contends that 
in the first case Islam would be reduced to: (1) some kind of religious law (Shari’ah), (2) various forms of 
Sunni and Shiiat Sufism and Mysticism (Ahmed, Shahab. What Is Islam? : The Importance of Being 
Islamic. Princeton UP, 2016.) 
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to “a people” happen at the same time. Most of the anthropological or historical studies 
are about the behaviors, lifestyles, beliefs and troubles of existing communities and 
cultures, or the communities and cultures of the past, trying to show how multitudinous 
Islamic community is. Meanwhile they do not consider the locus of the genesis of such 
paradoxical and different forms and the forces of their becoming from the same ground. 
Given the dominance of laws and political, national, or religious institutions over the 
daily life and body-politics of “a people,” most of the scholarship approaches the topic of 
community as some sort of construct, product or substantial content.  That is what I 3
would like to question and problematize through a phenomenological study of being-
togetherness as following a tradition.  
 One of the most recent ones of these studies is Alex Orwin’s political philosophy of 
al-Fārābī. He tries to show the Greek origin of al-Fārābī’s thought and how inclusive and 
tolerant he had been in defining what is Islam and Islamic community. Similar studies 
have been done about Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā, among others. While these studies 
demonstrate how scholastic thinkers formulate Islamic community, they are not 
addressing the forces that compel a Muslim to follow one interpretation rather than 
another. These studies do not explain the fundamental essential relationship between 
these interpretations at a philosophical level and the being of Muslim self that derives in 
 In most formulations, especially in the early modern political philosophy of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, 3
etc.,  community is looked at as laws of social contract, laws of reason, philosophical or political ideas of a 
scholar, or certain people or simply as habitus of “a people” in a certain geopolitical and historical 
situation. I would refer only to one example here, in which the author is influenced by the prominence of 
the laws in Islam and assumed that they are the same as the normative laws everywhere, like a social 
contract or a timeless sets of rules of conduct. 
“Normative Islam” is that form of Islam through which Muslims have access to ultimate norms 
that are valid for life, action and thought … In classical Muslim terms, normative Islam is the 
Shari’a. [Sharī’a, from the root ša, ra,‘a, means “a wide road or pathway”, referring to a 
general pathway of religion normally determined by orthodoxy.](Jacques Waardenburg, 
Islam:Historical, Social and Political Perspective, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002, p. 97)  
 Many non-Muslims, orientalists, and many scholars of Islam like Alex Orwin, interpret the 
community of Islam as comprised of followers of some basic rituals and laws of conduct, or some 
philosophical ideas. (Orwin, Alexander. Redefining the Muslim Community: Ethnicity, Religion, 
and Politics in the Thought of Alfarabi. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017. ) 
 Most of the formulations of community offered in Islamic philosophy, namely Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, 
and Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taymiyyah, derive their definitions and formalization in 
reference, for or against Greek and especially Aristotelian philosophy. In light of a Heideggerian 
retrieval of Aristotle, we can see that their formulation of what Aristotle might have meant only 
constitutes one form of community, while the history of Islam has witnessed far more variety as to 
what we call Islamic community.
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following them. They merely reduce being Muslim to a set of ideas and ideals which do 
not explain the multifarious modes of being Muslim throughout history.  
 My interest in studying community is sparked by this observation. I am interested in 
understanding how one is compelled to act in accordance with one interpretation of 
tradition rather than another, hence ‘following’ Islam. This will include providing an 
innovative take on tradition, that is a kind of ‘following’ which does not ‘follow’ any 
particular existing interpretation and considers to prior completed essence for Islam. 
Altogether, I am trying to understand how one keeps one’s precarious relationship to the 
others of the same background or history or others who are bound by the same public 
norms or laws (like other fellow Muslims or historical others) without imposing any 
essential content to them or to oneself. That is why, the question of community in Islam 
turned into an ontological question for me. Instead of asking what the essence of Islam is, 
or what a particular philosopher or mystic thinks about Islam or how an individual views 
the world as a Muslim, I ask a more ontological question as to the being of any ‘follower’ 
of tradition as such. Being as ‘following' a tradition is a ploy to go much deeper to the 
transcendental conditions of any gathering by considering individual action (praxis) and 
making (poiesis) rather than theoretical constructs and beliefs. 
 While the formation and formulation of different modes of community in Islam can 
be explained as for or against Aristotle’s philosophy as they received and incorporated it 
in Islamic theology, modern categories of community, laws, state of nature, reason, 
religion, etc., are far removed from and alien to the Islamic context. Therefore, the fate of 
Aristotelian politics and laws in Islam at the ontological level is in the background of this 
study.  
 With such a concern about the laws and the structure of religion, the categories that 
determine the body-politics of “a people” beyond the subjective, psychological, or 
historical categories, Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle and Greek philosophy against 
modern and idealist approaches proved to be very helpful. I found the resources for the 
critique of identity and subjectivity and at the same time the critique of scholastic and 
Islamic adoption of the Greek philosophy in Heidegger and his version of 
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phenomenology. Heidegger’s scholarship, especially his lectures on Greek philosophy, 
gave me the transcendental ground on which I could found the building of Islamic 
formulations of community beyond what Islamic philosophy, theology, politics, and 
mystical thought have formally formulated or failed to formulate as such. Heidegger’s 
destruction of the history of metaphysics while very helpful at the ontological level, does 
not give enough theoretical and conceptual apparatus for a political investigation. The 
task of the destruction (Destruktion) or deconstruction of the metaphysics at the ethical 
and political level has come to fruition in the works of Jacque Derrida. His close ties with 
Heidegger’s take on history of philosophy and particularly his critique of laws make him 
the final and most important point of reference in this work. In fact, destruktion itself as 
Heidegger’s approach to the tradition and its maturation in form of deconstruction in 
Derrida turns out to be the most authentic mode of following the other. 
 To figure out all the modes of community that can arise from Aristotle’s texts, the ones 
that he has acknowledged and promoted and the ones that he has tried to avoid, all at the 
service of finally getting to explain how Islamic community begins and multiplies has 
proven to be a very large project whose completion in a just and fruitful way would take 
volumes. That is why, I divided the project into several smaller projects to do over time. 
The present study is the first step, which prepares the ontological terminology I need to 
develop a critical understanding of the notion of community. However, to cast a 
provisional light on the significance of the critique in what comes below and at the end as 
part of the conclusion of this work, I will take the analysis to the concrete and existential 
context, which was the context of the questioning to begin with. The application of the 
analysis to the Islamic context, I hope, will shine a light on what is at stake in the abstract 
metaphysical critique conducted in the main body of the work. 
 For the present study, then, I take a phenomenological deconstructive approach to 
what I term the metaphysics of ‘following’ in Aristotle. I will look at how Heidegger 
interprets the natural constitution of community and laws through studying Aristotle’s 
basic concepts, especially in Physics and Metaphysics, as well as the Derridean 
deconstruction of the just community in Aristotle. This critique of what I call the politics 
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of nature, the critique of the necessary laws of nature that are extrapolated to human 
community opens Aristotle’s natural laws to alternative possible worlds, one that is more 
hospitable to more contingency in nature and strangers in community. Beyond rational 
constitution of the polis, the sovereignty is akin to a more bestial formation that is not in 
control of reason. The rational, just, and beautiful modes of community that Aristotle tries 
to establish through the laws of community raises problems regarding the nature of 
innovation or creative interpretation of tradition. Following Derrida, I will point to the 
places where he admits to this difficulty as a result of which the nomadic community 
comes to the fore in full force.  
 At the end of this volume, I give an example of how the same aporia of ‘following’ 
the laws is staged in following the Islamic laws. This discussion in the Conclusion, I 
hope, makes the metaphysical explanations of the previous chapters more apparent and 
more concrete. It also reveals how Aristotle’s metaphysics and politics have been read 
and criticized in Scholastic Islam. This will sharpen the critique and prove my inclination 
to read Aristotle the way I do.  
 Once again, in what follows, I would like to share the place where the question is 
raised and what is existentially at stake in asking such a question. I shall explain my 
sources of inspiration in posing the question in terms of 'following,’ and where I will be 
heading with this investigation as whole.  
Islamic Community: Being-in-Following, Being-in-Trouble 
 In order to illustrate the nature of community as ‘following,’ I would like to begin 
with an anecdote. The whole idea of the project is inspired by the vision that is described 
below.  
 Ibn ʿArabī, the great mystic Sufi of Andalusia, explains in the introduction to his 
masterpiece, Meccan Revelations, that the whole book is given to him by the prophet 
Muhammed himself in the state of a dream. He narrates the dream at the beginning of the 
book as an introductory speech (Khuṭba). He stages a mode of ‘following’ the prophet 
that has inspired generations of scholars after him, including myself.  
xiv
I climbed over it [the rock, where the prophet was standing], until I 
was in the same place and level of his standing position, peace be 
upon him, but a sleeve of white shirt was put for me on the step 
where I was standing, so as not to resume the place that he, peace be 
upon him, resumed with his feet, that was because of his high esteem 
and honor, and a warning and observation for us that the state from 
which he saw his Lord is not available for his heirs but only from 
behind his veil, otherwise we may witness his same revelations, and 
we would know what he knows; do you not see when you track 
someone for intelligence, that you do not see from his road what he 
has seen and you do not know how to tell about him but by negating 
his descriptions.    4
By positioning himself behind the veil of the one he is following, Ibn ʿArabi implies that 
understanding, for a follower of faith, is always mediated, partial, and can only be 
accomplished by first grasping it in its partiality. We can only explain the truth in its 
negation and as a ‘follower.’ While ‘following,’ as Ibn ʿArabi admits, our vision is always 
blocked by the one ahead of us, the same person that opens the landscape for us to begin 
with, or the captain  of the vessel. We can never directly perceive the landscape that is 5
stretched before the guide and is opened by him. The follower’s knowledge, then, is 
always associated with a kind of interpreting and at the same time not-knowing or 
impossibility of absolute knowing.  
 ʿArabi, Muhyiddin Ibn. The Meccan Revelations (volume 1 of 37) (al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya) (Kindle 4
Locations 1294-1300).  . Kindle Edition.
 Incidentally, to take the question of politics and authority in this spatio-temporal perspective is to ask 5
about the destination, leader, and the capital of Islam. Reading with Derrida’s web of concepts all 
associated with the head and heading in his essay, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe, we 
could ask such spatio-temporal questions as “where we are heading as Muslims?” or “where the Capital of 
Islam is?,” “Who the Captain of this vessel is?” Or, as suggested by Derrida, are we to replace the heading 
with the other of the heading towards a more open and divergent understanding of Islamic Community? 
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 This is a recurrent motif throughout Islamic mystic literature.  On the one hand, 6
of course, the story is simply meant to imply the priority of faith in the messenger and the 
revelation which is mediated by him. On the other hand, however, the story points to the 
significance of the position of being a follower. The being of followers as a community is 
determined by the sense  they make, or the way they deal with this problematic situation. 7
Their being-togetherness is characterized by their take on tradition. As a result, this sense 
of community, although it is spatio-temporal or directional, does not primarily occur in 
one place or time as a synchronic construct or institution. 
 On the significance of the modes of community as different ways of ‘following’ 
the tradition, especially the tradition of Greek philosophy, one needs to go back more 
than a century before Ibn ‘Arabī, to the works of Muhammad Ghazālī, the 11th century 
theologian, philosopher, and jurist. Ghazālī, in his confessional autobiography, 
Deliverance from Error, writes in the form of a response to an inquiry by a student: 
You [the inquirer] also want to hear about my daring in mounting from the 
Low-land of servile conformism to the highland of independent 
investigation: and first of all what profit I derived from the science of 
kalām; secondly what I found 
loathsome among the methods of the devotees of taʿlīm, who restrict the 
attainment of truth to uncritical acceptance of the Imam’s 
pronouncements; thirdly, the methods of philosophizing which I scouted; 
and finally, what pleased me in the way pursued by the practice of Sufism. 
(Ghazālī, 1999. 1) 
A couple of paragraphs later, Ghazālī mentions that the way to truth cannot be beyond 
these claimants. In the quote above, he primarily assumes two basic levels of being-
togetherness of “a people.” One is the level of blind “conformism” which is still a lower 
 The most famous of these stories which is based on a Qur’ān, is the story of a sage called Khiḍr and 6
Moses. God gives Khiḍr a knowledge from His own absolute knowledge and Moses wants to learn the 
secrets of that knowledge. However, he falls short when asked by Khiḍr to have patience and follow him on 
his path. In every juncture and every moment of decision, Moses chooses calculative reasoning over blind 
obedience or faith in Khiḍr, which leads to Khiḍr’s frustration and them parting ways. 
 Literally, in French, sens as meaning and direction7
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level of ‘following’ the authority or “servile conformism” (taqlīd, meaning “imitation,” 
also of the same root as qallādah, meaning a necklace and a leash). This level seems to be 
associated with the everyday economy of being-with-one-another, what I would 
ultimately call community as exchange. Yet, the moment the follower feels uneasy with 
his static situation is already the beginning of her ascent. There comes another mode of 
‘following’ Ghazali calls the “independent investigation (ijtihād).” He describes this level 
as follows: 
The aim of this account is to emphasize that one should be most diligent in 
seeking the truth until he finally comes to seeking the unseekable. For 
primary truths are unseekable, because they are present in the mind; and 
when what is present is sought, it is lost and hides itself. But one who 
seeks the unseekable cannot subsequently be accused of negligence in 
seeking what is seekable. (ibid., p. 5) 
In the second mode of ‘following,’ there is still no pretension of having the truth, or 
seeing the end, or attaining absolute knowledge; rather, it is depicted as an active 
comportment on the path of ‘following.’ He considers this search to be the same as 
searching for certainty and the truth. Yet, later, Ghazālī admits that his radical doubts left 
him in wonder and despair, and he found it impossible to reach absolute certainty. He 
admits that it was God’s grace which found him again and put him back on the path of 
seeking (Ghazālī, 1999. 4-5).  
 Altogether, one can argue that the level of creative investigation of truth for 
Ghazālī seems to be beyond philosophy, theology, and other claims to knowledge, and is 
associated with the ‘following’ and seeking itself, while admitting what is “unseekable.” 
Thus, by directly questioning Aristotelian philosophy as well as Islamic theology and 
actual sectors of Muslims of his day, he, in effect, opens the door for a transcendental 
study. It is in the light of such an opening that I will apply a phenomenological reading of 
Aristotle to explain essential modes of following altogether. 
 It is significant that Ghazālī considers all modes of comportment as actual and 
present and obliterates their relation to one another. He considers all these takes on 
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tradition as synchronic constructs or institutions. In other words, the question still 
remains as to the genesis of such gatherings in ‘following’ Aristotle or the Islamic 
tradition. One cannot simply dismiss the current interpretations of a text as wrong or 
deviation from the original without first explaining what is the nature of ‘following’ as 
interpreting. Ghazālī describes the experience without explicating the place (topos, hence 
topology) where such different modes of ‘following’ become possible and multiple at the 
same time. The answer to the question of the being of ‘following’ will determine the 
being of “a people” (in this case Muslim philosophers, theologian, mystics, politicians 
and the common people) who are in various modes of ‘following.’ That gives us 
conceptual apparatus to clearly understand what the problem is with the dynamic of 
being-in-a-community responsibly and creatively while having to abide the laws of the 
community as well.  
 Moreover, I will show in this work that Ghazālī’s critique of Greek and 
Aristotelian philosophy is in fact prepared and allowed by Aristotle himself and in the 
dialectical structure of his work. It is as if before Ghazālī, it is Aristotle himself who 
deconstructs his own metaphysical system. However, as Ghazālī does not read Greek, 
what he questions is already an interpretation of Ibn Sīnā and the scholastic tradition of 
the time. This is another reason to engage with Aristotle’s text albeit in a deconstructive 
way.  
 Moreover, I will be following Ghazālī in yet another way. Ghazālī’s formulation 
of Islamic community and the difference between its internal sectors is more accurate and 
advantageous than any of its post-enlightenment, post-colonial versions. Projecting post-
enlightenment notions (as in Rawls, Habermas, etc., following Kant) like secular, 
religious, laws, etc., does not in any way describe the relation of Muslims to God and to 
society. One should not confuse Ghazālī’s using of such categories as kalām,  philosophy, 8
laws (Shariʿa), religion, etc. to describe different sectors of Islam with the post-
enlightenment orientalists’ usage of the same terms. Ghazālī’s characterizations and terms 
 The science of proving the creed and the principle beliefs and tenets of Islam. The one who practices it, is 8
called mutikallimūn (theologians) who are distinguished from Islamic philosophers and jurists.  
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refer to “a people” within the Islamic community and the local idiom of Islam of his time. 
These categories do not have the same meaning as what post-enlightenment orientalists 
meant by laws, religion, and the like. 
 Although Islamic community per se is not the subject of this study, it looms in the 
background as the place in which I would like to see the results of this research be 
examined. That is what I will offer at the conclusion of this work, only as a blueprint of a 
more expansive study in future works. In light of the outline above, chapter one 
explicates the question, aims, and methodology of the work as whole. 
xix
INTRODUCTION: The Ontology of Community as ‘Following’ 
The Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study 
Purpose of the Study 
 This work seeks out the grounding for the sense of following the laws of a 
community, the meaning of identity, and our responsibility towards others. Before and 
beyond the actual divisions between people, be they political or religious, we need to 
seek the sources that attract human life towards being-with-one-another in general. 
Equally important are the criteria for exclusion, whereby some individuals are designated 
as ‘others,’ such as the divide between citizens and immigrants. 
This work has two major strategies, both of which take their lead from Heidegger. 
Firstly, against the modern conception of self, identity, and community, I look into the 
Greek and especially Aristotelian definition of man and his others (e.g, animals, or the 
natural world).  
 I argue, following Heidegger, that the conception of modern self and identity is 
ultimately founded upon a specific medieval interpretation of Platonic/Aristotelian 
tradition. Taking the essential, categorial understanding of Being as primary, this reading 
reduces human experience to a series of subject-object relations and reduces the 
relationship between selves to inter-subjectivity or empathy. 
 Heidegger, in Being and Time, ventures to critique the primary role of categorial 
understanding. He calls such an interpretation of Being, “forgetfulness of 
Being” (Seinsvergessenheit), which ultimately reduces “the multiple senses of Being” in 
Aristotle into the one associated with the available and familiar meaning of being as the 
present and actual. Therefore, in Heidegger’s view, if there is to be any original 
examination of different possibilities of being a self or being human, it has to be found in 
the critical analysis of the origin of western metaphysics in Greek philosophy. 
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 Following Heidegger and Derrida, I argue that the Greek interpretation of being-
in-the-world in terms of logos not only sheds light on the sources of political community 
(polis) and laws but also reveals the origins of their mistreatment and essential limitations 
in addressing the singular character of individuals. I perform this critique of Aristotelian 
metaphysics by showing that the program of political society in Aristotle follows his 
general strategy to establish the science of metaphysics. Finally, I propose that Aristotle’s 
philosophical diligence in admitting the mistreatment in his system puts his metaphysics 
on an alternative path beyond what he formally anticipated.     
 Thus, the retrieval of Aristotle does not mean to repeat what he proposed as the 
original relation of man to the world. It is not merely to celebrate what scholars think 
Aristotle offered as the best, most excellent, most just relations in the city. In my 
treatment of Aristotle’s philosophy, as I explain below, I find myself in the same 
hermeneutic situation before and in relation to Aristotelian scholarship as well. Then, I 
am compelled to enact what I believe will turn out to be the most ‘just’ and authentic 
‘being-with,’ or ‘following,’ of the other, in this case the Aristotelian tradition itself. What 
I will try to argue to be the most authentic community and ‘following’ informs my 
reading from the beginning.  
  This approach has made possible by Heidegger’s basic hermeneutic insight that 
“every inquiry is a seeking [Suchen]. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is 
sought” (BT., 5/24). What is sought in this case is the authentic treatment or the 
‘following’ of the other. Such a being-with-tradition for Heidegger in BT is tantamount to 
“a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology” (BT., 24/45). One can argue 
that it is this strategy which is adopted and radicalized by Derrida as deconstruction 
especially with respect to notions of justice as law versus responsibility. Destruction and 
deconstruction, as I will demonstrate in this work, are not merely a negative attitude of 
rejection or refutation. Quite the contrary, these strategies will reveal the hidden powers 
and forces of the tradition. Heidegger writes: “this destruction is just as far from having 
the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, 
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stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it 
within its limits” (BT., 23/44).  
 In this way, the principles and forces of Aristotle’s philosophy will be liberated 
from their pre-meditated context and give rise to an original treatment of the problem. I 
will finally argue that the origin of the alternative modes of the community is still within 
Aristotle’s text, perhaps in what he intentionally, systematically, or even unintentionally 
leaves out in order to produce a metaphysical system or the science of metaphysics.  
Background: ‘Following’ and the Critique of Identity 
 The most poignant critique of the modern notion of identity and self as 
independent and separate from others and the world can be found in post-Heideggerian 
philosophy, especially in Jacques Derrida. Derrida warns us against the notion of identity 
as already formed, present, and identical to itself, as a source of irresponsibility, and 
violence. He writes,  
Hope, fear, and trembling are commensurate with the signs that are 
coming to us from everywhere in Europe, where, precisely in the name of 
identity, be it cultural or not, the worst violence, those that we recognize 
all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of 
xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism, are 
being unleashed… (OH. 6) 
What seems to be the problem for Derrida is our obsession with identity as “identical to 
itself,” or altogether present to itself. In modern philosophy, following Descartes, identity 
is assumed to be a complete, independent construct which only then tries to know the 
world as its object or to empathize with others. In these modern formulations, like that of 
Hobbes and Locke, the community is famously defined as a social contract between 
independent subjects who have departed the “state of nature.” The “state of nature" for 
Hobbes and Locke is characterized by self-serving animal desires and emotions that need 
to be overcome by social contract or the authority of a sovereign representative. Even for 
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Locke whose state of nature is supposed to be run under the natural laws, as Steven B. 
Smith acutely observes, human qualities of peace and cooperation and duty very quickly 
degenerates to the state of license and war (Smith, 166-67). Smith underlines Locke’s 
numerous references to how human greed and desire would turn them into beasts of pray. 
He calls this “Locke’s bestiary” which looks like a thinly veiled and disguised version of 
Hobbes’ state of nature (Smith, 168). This brutal condition brings individuals to the brink 
of the realization that they need to come to an agreement or a contract.  
The subjects of social contract theories are characterized by universal categories 
like ‘reason’ and ‘will’ as a result of which they can decide to be part of a community or 
to follow the laws and abide by a social contract. In most of these formulations, there is a 
sense in which a central organizing principle defines and determines the relation between 
selves giving them a cultural, social, or religious identity at the expense of the singular 
character of the individuals. In this sense, Derrida sees no difference in putting God, man, 
or reason at the center as an authority.  
 Establishing this organizing principle inevitably leads to a universal construct, 
which imposes a proper or present character or trait to every individual member of the 
community. To be part of such a culture is to have something in common with everyone 
in that culture. For Heidegger and Derrida, at issue is the very character of this 
relationality with others which is always already mediated by tradition or given laws of 
some kind. According to Derrida, for a culture to remain a living culture, for cultural 
identity to exist, it has to claim its singular character (OH., 7). For example, to be a 
Muslim is to revive the very meaning of Islam and the very principles that constitute the 
identity of this culture and community.  
 There is then a precarious and problematic situation before everyone in assuming 
an identity or claiming to be part of a community. One is facing the situation of having to 
‘follow’ the same way of life to be part of a community while trying to assert the singular 
character of oneself as a responsible free agent. Derrida’s political and ethical works are 
largely about showing the problematic nature of this ‘following.’ He contends not only 
that the so-called subjects need to continually re-define their relationality to their history 
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and culture, but more importantly that “what is proper to a culture” is to not be the same 
as oneself (identical to oneself) in ‘following’ but to be “different” (OH. 8). Otherwise 
‘following’ falls back to the same ordinary and repetitive structure of the tradition 
incapable of giving an authentic character to the ‘follower.’  
…what is proper to a culture is to not be identical to itself; not to not have 
an identity, but not to be able to identify itself, to be able to say "me" or 
"we"; to be able to take the form of a subject only in the non-identity to 
itself or, if you prefer, only in the difference with itself (avec soit). There 
is no culture or cultural identity without this difference with itself in the 
history of culture. (OH. 9) 
What this means is, perhaps, that we can still talk about identity and a “we” in or as a 
culture only if we define it in terms of a “difference.” A community can be characterized 
not only in terms of what ‘a people’ share in common, but also as every singular original 
difference with others including the difference with the tradition. The choice of the term 
‘following’ explains this precarious connection with others of the same era as well as that 
of the past or the tradition alike. ‘Following’ is the term Derrida uses to investigate the 
modes of the being of humankind as already in relation with others while questioning the 
very mode of this relationality.  
 It is very critical to keep in mind that this line of questioning owes a lot to 
Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity, a main component of Being and Time. Heidegger 
strives to go beyond the present categories of object or subject by delving into the more 
existential character of the being who finds himself in the hermeneutic situation of 
‘following’ and asks about the meaning of Being. For the being of the questioner, he 
chooses the term Dasein, ‘there-being,’ to avoid all connotations and implications 
associated with the term ‘human.’ Dasein is the entity whose “being is an issue for 
him” (BT., 12/32).  
…and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that 
Being- a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further 
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that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being. 
(BT., 12/32) 
That is to say, Dasein is the site, the place (Da), where some interpretation of Being 
comes to pass. This place is, for Heidegger, where the historical ‘givenness’ of meaning 
and tradition is for the most part available to Dasein.  
In its factical Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is 'what' it 
already was. It is its past, whether explicitly or not. And this is so not only 
in that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along 'behind' it, and that 
Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is still present-at-hand 
and which sometimes has after-effects upon it: Dasein is its past in the 
way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes' (geschehen) out 
of its future on each occasion. (BT., 20/41) 
For Heidegger, and for Derrida, occurrences in the world make sense or are understood 
“proximally and for the most part” through their relation to the givenness of tradition and 
history. As the translators of BT, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, emphasize as 
well, the word that they translate as “historize” “ordinarily means ‘to happen’” (BT., 41).  9
According to Heidegger any understanding of the occurrences is accomplished through 
‘following’ the tradition. In effect, being-with-others-in-the-world is, in fact, the 
hermeneutic situation one, “primarily and for the most part” finds oneself in.  
Whatever the way of being it may have at the time, and thus with 
whatever understanding of Being it may possess, Dasein has grown up 
both into and in a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it 
understands itself proximally and, within a certain range, constantly. By 
this understanding, the possibilities of its Being are disclosed and 
regulated. Its own past-and this always means the past of its 'generation'-is 
 The translators write in the footnote: 'weltgeschichtliches Geschehen'. While the verb 'geschehen' 9
ordinarily means to 'happen', and will often be so translated, Heidegger stresses its etymological kinship to 
'Geschichte' or 'history'. To bring out this connection, we have coined the verb ‘historize', which might be 
paraphrased as to 'happen in a historical way' ; we shall usually translate 'geschehen' this way in contexts 
where history is being discussed. We trust that the reader will keep in mind that such 'historizing' is 
characteristic of all historical entities, and is not the sort of thing that is done primarily by historians (as 
'philosophizing', for instance, is done by philosophers). (On 'world-historical' see H. 381 ff.)
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not something which follows along after Dasein, but something which 
already goes ahead of it. (BT., 20/41) 
Heidegger distinguishes here between history as events occurred in the past with the way 
Dasein, as the place of the occurrence of interpretation, understands everything initially 
through the sedimented semantic network given by others before or alongside it. 
Therefore, the historicality of Dasein is not necessarily limited to events that the others in 
the past have undergone, but rather it refers to the way one’s being is always already in a 
precarious relationship with others. Accordingly, the question of ‘following’ becomes the 
central question for the meaning of the being of the self. 
 In BT and its summary, The Concept of Time,  Heidegger deals particularly with 10
the question of the “who” of Dasein. He mentions that this connection with others is 
existential and that, ontologically speaking, Dasein is always mitsein or being-with. The 
being of Dasein is co-originary with that of other Daseins. The challenge is for Dasein to 
find her authentic voice amongst the loud cry of the ordinary public discourse or the 
voice of ‘the One’ (das Man) (CT., 20-21). Thus, most of BT is the elucidation of the 
existential structure of Dasein in search of its most authentic mode of access to the 
meaning of being. We find out that it is only the resolved Dasein, facing his own death, 
who can finally re-establish an authentic (eigentlich) connection to other beings in the 
world and other Daseins. Despite the ethical and political implications of Heidegger's 
investigation into Dasein’s connections with its world, he does not directly address such 
matters in BT or CT.  11
 Perhaps inspired by one of the passages above, Derrida takes the meaning of 
being-with-others as ‘following.’ ‘Following’ for Derrida seems to extend Heidegger’s 
“Dasein” to an ethical context, focusing mainly on Dasein’s relationality with others. 
Derrida explicitly attends to this term in one of his pieces, “The Animal That Therefore I 
 In this work, I refer to this treatise as CT. 10
 When referring to the dominance of the public discourse, the language of CT, completely becomes 11
political, rife with political terms such as how the one and idle-talk govern the way Dasein finds oneself in 
“for the most part” or ordinarily. Or that idle-talk dominates Dasein’s expression of oneself in a way that 
conceals his being more than revealing it. 
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Am (More to Follow),”  where he underlines the ambiguity of the usage of the verbs to 12
be (etre) and to follow (suivre) in the French language. Both verbs would conjugate as 
suis for the first person singular, which makes the Cartesian formulation “I think 
therefore I am” (Cogito ergo sum) ambiguous between “I am” and “I follow.” However, 
beyond the coincidental similarity in words, embracing the association of self with 
‘following’ introduces an essential otherness to the structure of being a self. Being as 
‘following’ or coming-after in this way questions the very separation of the thinking “I” 
from its world. It brings the abstract independent subject back to its hermeneutic situation 
in relation to others and history. ‘Following’ indicates that the “I” is already connected to 
what it tries to distinguish itself from or what it ‘comes after,’ i.e. nature, the animal, and 
the tradition.  
 Derrida further elaborates that being-with [-others-in-the-world] comprises 
different phenomenological moments. It could consist of being-alongside or -near, being-
after or ‘following’, and being-before, or generating (Derrida, 2008. 10). That is to say 
that the “I” ‘follows,’ comes-after, comes-before, and along-side nature, the animal and 
tradition. But, the word ‘following’ already contains most of the connotations within 
itself and therefore problematizes the straightforward temporal structure of coming-after 
or before. “I am” as “I follow” could simply be interpreted as before and/or after. My 
interpretation of what I receive from others becomes the signature and the character that I 
leave behind from myself at the same time. 
 A community in this sense is not only about the way present individuals, pure and 
simple, empathize with one another. Rather, the problem is how our being as humans is 
always already constituted by our “being-huddled-together-in-the-world” through the 
mediation of history or tradition, which are in one way or another textual. Derrida argues 
that being as being-with 
express[es] a certain order of being-huddled-together [étre serré](which is 
what the etymological root, pressu, indicates, whence follow the words 
 Derrida, Jacques., and Mallet, Marie-Louise. The Animal That Therefore I Am. (l’animal que donc je 12
suis) New York: Fordham UP, 2008. Perspectives in Continental Philosophy.
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prés, auprès, aprés), the being-pressed, the being-with as being strictly 
attached, bound, enchained, being-under-pressure, compressed, impressed, 
repressed, pressed against, ….” (Derrida, 2008. 10)  13
What he means is that being-with as coming before (pré), coming after (aprés), being 
alongside or near (auprès) (“neighboring”), has an ambiguous and paradoxical character. 
It indicates at the same time two things which are different yet essentially connected to 
one another (pressu). Finally, the explication of community in this sense is the existential-
ontological analysis of this precarious relationality with otherness, the analysis of the 
place (topos) where different modes of otherness come to pass for Dasein.  
 In this way, we manage to take the perspective of the individual to talk about the 
community and not a general principle of a set of ideas. The question of community in 
this perspective is not about some central beliefs people gather around or the power 
relations that establish an institutional whole. Borrowing the word ‘following,’ I will 
address the mode of being of an individual in relation to the culture and laws (nomos) that 
come before her. 
  I argue that the decision to be in ‘following’ is not merely a conscious and 
psychological one; instead, it is the one that constitutes the being of the ‘follower’ and the 
‘followed’ at the same time. For example, ‘following’ Islam does not consider the prior 
existence of Islam as a construct which then Muslims consciously or unconsciously 
choose to follow in a certain way. Instead, it is the way of ‘following’ that determines the 
character of Islam and Muslim at the same time.  
 Now, my investigation is no exception in being historical and in ‘following’ the 
scholarly and academic discourse that addresses it. As I argue below, any 
phenomenological analysis of this kind begins with such an admission to its hermeneutic 
These set of metaphors and concepts that I will use as reference points all come in this book: Derrida, 13
Jacques. The Other Heading : Reflections on Today's Europe. Indiana University Press, 1992. In Derrida’s 
parlance, we need to question where one is heading in following, who is being followed and heads this 
movement (the captain) and where the place of the final or temporary gathering, if such a thing exists, is (la 
capitale in French which refers to the capital city as a central organizing principle of the movements or a 
place which attracts the movements of bodies). This is to ask about the organizing principle, authority or 
sovereignty, about the capital, which of course bears the same root as the cap, captain, etc., and is 
associated with the head (authority) and heading.
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condition. That is why the question of methodology as phenomenology is very much the 
most relevant question here. 
Methodology: Phenomenological Hermeneutics 
 In this section, to explain the methodology of my study I will apply Heidegger’s 
methodological insights at the beginning of Being and Time to explain why I choose his 
version of phenomenology and how my research brings me to Greek philosophy, 
particularly to Aristotle.  
 As I mentioned above, in studying different modes of community, this study 
examines the place (topos) where different modes of otherness emerge, before and 
beyond the constitution of a thinking self or the subject. We are dealing with the 
transcendental characteristics of the place of the manifestation of the other. Although 
“transcendental” in this sense bears some similarity with Kantian “conditions of the 
possibility,” before the actual experience, for Heidegger as for me, the very being of the 
place and its historical givenness is in question. In this sense, the notion of the 
transcendental as a mode of existence beyond human consciousness bears a strange 
affinity with the medieval rendering of the transcendental.  
  In order to avoid both Kantian and medieval connotations of the term 
‘transcendental,’ Heidegger elaborates on his methodology as phenomenology. As he 
admits in BT and CT, he owes his methodology to Husserl’s Logical Investigation (BT., 
38/62). One may argue that the turn in transcendental philosophy has already begun with 
Husserl. That is, instead of looking into the conditions of the possibility of the 
constitution of the world by a subject (a la Kant), the “transcendental turn of 
phenomenology” considers the world as given, and “inquires into the how of the giving, 
the manner of its givenness, the how of its acquisition of meaning” (Englelland, 2017. 13, 
my emphasis). 
 Ironically, however, phenomenology brings Heidegger closer to the Greeks rather 
than the mainstream phenomenological scholarship. This is perhaps because of the major 
shift of focus from the question of the manifestation of beings toward Being itself. For 
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Heidegger, phenomenology studies the being of the place where the manifestation of 
being occurs, that is the being of Dasein. The very being of this place, its historical 
conditioning its relation to the world and others are all still in question and problematic 
for him.  
 That is perhaps why his version of phenomenology is firstly the same as ontology 
(the study of the being of things) and secondly, it has to be performed hermeneutically.    
Ontology and phenomenology are, not two distinct philosophical 
disciplines among others. These terms characterize philosophy itself with 
regard to its object and its way of treating that object. Philosophy is 
universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the 
hermeneutic of Dasein…(BT., 38/62) 
Firstly, while unpacking the internal structure of the word, Heidegger explains that the 
task of phenomenology is the expression or the account (logos) of the phenomenon, 
“legein ta phainomena” (BT., 28/34). William Richardson explains the expression as 
follows: 
Legein has the sense of legion (to make clear) or, more precisely, 
apophainesthai (sc.“to permit something to appear of itself, make itself 
seen”) and phainomena means “that which shows itself as it is.” Hence 
phenomenology means apophainesthai ta phainomena, sc. “to permit that 
which of its own accord manifest itself to reveal itself as it 
is.” (Richardson, 2003. 46) 
Heidegger’s understanding of the whole project of phenomenology is very much indebted 
to his reading of Aristotle. In a primary sense as a method, phenomenology as the method 
consists in the commitment of the investigator to “let the phenomena show themselves as 
they are,” that is, to not let any subjective assumption and categorization interfere with 
this process. Such a turn makes this approach ontological, emphasizing the study of the 
being of things as they are rather than how one knows them. But then the emergence 
happens in logos. Heidegger elaborates on the historical and interpretive situation of 
Dasein by alluding to Aristotle's definition of man as life-possessing-logos. Dasein is the 
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place where the meaning of being comes to pass in logos. The latter consideration 
transforms the whole investigation to an interpretive activity with respect to logos. “Our 
investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a 
method lies in interpretation” (BT., 38/62). In this way, and with the subsequent critique 
of logos and temporality in Aristotle, “Heidegger gives a transcendental critique of 
transcendence…” (Englelland, 2017. 172).  
 Such a turn in the notion of the transcendental on Heidegger’s part leads to a 
major critique of the notions of identity and subjectivity and the very meaning of 
phenomenology as I mentioned. Through this ontological focus, Heidegger accomplishes 
both a critique of idealism and of the presence of truth in logos at the same time. For 
example, the question of ‘following’ the other is not merely the exploration of the how of 
the givenness of the other to a subject, but it is an investigation of the locus of the 
disclosing with regard to its being. Not only is the being of that which emerges in logos 
in question, but also the very process that happens in logos. The very fact that the locos 
of investigation is speech (logos) which is historically conditioned makes 
phenomenology in this sense fundamentally hermeneutic.  
 That is precisely why I call this investigation the topology of community.  An 
investigation of the topology of community in Aristotle brings to light all modes of 
otherness that are sanctioned by his metaphysical account, such as the modes of 
community that are allowed as a result of his account of justice, or how Aristotle accounts 
for or interprets the being of others, aliens, and outlaws in his city. 
Deconstruction of Logos 
 In an ontological outlook, therefore, the notions which are commonly associated 
with subjectivity and subject which are crucial to the question of ‘following’ need to be 
re-defined with respect to their ontological ground. Some of these crucial notions which 
are constitutive of agency and responsibility including judgment, decision, and measure 
are extensively used in this work. This is exactly what Heidegger does right at the 
beginning of BT. He deconstructs the tradition by revealing what it have systematically 
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left out and re-defines the problem in terms of the presencing of beings in logos. 
Heidegger accomplishes this critical re-definition by redefining Aristotle's basic concepts.  
 The merit of Aristotle’s philosophy for Heidegger is that Aristotle does not reduce 
individuals to independent subjects, nor does he reduce the world or other beings to 
hypostatized objects. For Aristotle, human beings are essentially connected to life (life-
possessing-logos) and essentially tied together in a polis (zōon politikon). Before the 
distinctions between selves, animals, and plants are formed, the same principle controls 
the generation and expression of different individuals as a whole. For him, beings first 
appear-as present (parousia) in logos. Thus, the critical understanding of logos in every 
realm explains the principles of the gathering of individuals in that realm.  
 Thus, that is how Heidegger deconstructs the history of metaphysics, by looking 
at the way logos as the constituting element of the being of human beings has been 
interpreted throughout the history of western philosophy. Logos has been the most 
overarching principle or measure that has defined the characteristic properties of entities. 
How one interprets logos, as well as its relation to human beings and all other beings in 
the world, leads to totally different accounts of beings and their relationship to one 
another. He acknowledges that “logos [in the language of the Greeks] gets 
‘translated’ (and this means that it is always getting interpreted) as “reason," “judgment," 
“concept," “definition," “ground,” or “relationship” (BT, 32/55). The way we understand 
logos determines the meaning of all these terms as well. As Aristotle defines human 
beings as life-possessing-logos, their relations and actions have been interpreted in light 
of all these renderings of logos which has led to different schools of philosophy and 
different notions of community, laws, and politics.  
 He argues that in Scholastic and Modern philosophy, logos has been interpreted as 
only one form of expression: rationality. Maintaining that man is a “rational animal” 
creates a measure by which every being that is not "rational" can be judged by contrast to 
man. In other words, it is reason that defines what is proper to individuals and their 
coming-together in time. Conversely, one needs to attend to the automatic presenting of 
beings in logos to figure out its structure before attributing one form or another to it. 
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 For Heidegger, Aristotle’s logos is more fundamentally and broadly related to 
speech or discourse (dēloun) rather than reason. Aristotle, he says, “has explicated this 
function of discourse more precisely as apophainesthai” (BT., 33/56). He further explains 
the structure of logos as discourse as follows: 
The logos lets something be seen (phainesthai), namely, what the 
discourse is about.…Discourse 'lets something be seen’ apo…: that is, it 
lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about. In 
discourse (apophansis), so far as it is genuine, what is said [was geredet 
ist] is drawn from what the talk is about, so that discursive 
communication, in what it says [in ihrem Gesagten], makes manifest what 
it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party. This is 
the structure of the logos.  
He emphasizes the function of discourse as “letting something be seen by pointing it 
out.” Discourse in this definition is precisely not one particular form of judgement as 
rational nor is it a natural language like English or German. Moreover, if logos involves 
synthesis, it is the synthesis of expression and what is expressed. The “syn” of synthesis 
refers not to the binding of representations in the mental sphere but rather the binding or 
the togetherness [Beisammen] of the expression with what is indicated. In this way, the 
problem of otherness is not the problem of the representation of the other for a subject, 
nor is it the how of this representation, but rather is the critique of logos and how 
difference as such manifests itself in its immanent plane. 
The Critique of the Presence in Logos and the ‘Address’   
 As Heidegger’s critique of logos implies, there is always a gap between the being 
of a thing and its manifestations. We can already catch a glimpse of a provisional 
understanding of the problem of the community as being-with-others in this 
understanding of logos. We glean that any appearance of the other in logos comes to pass 
in the background of a concealing at the same time (Richardson, 2003. 46). 
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 By highlighting the ontological difference and focusing on the power of 
concealing (the power of the negative), Heidegger’s phenomenology receives a critical 
power which can unsettle the immediate experience of the other and the world as 
expressed in logos. The introduction of logos into the problem of otherness puts the 
investigator in a hermeneutic situation. An interpretation of logos is always already given 
by tradition as a source of sense-making and complicates the authentic presencing 
(ousia) of beings. 
 ‘Discourse’ as logos for Heidegger does not simply and naively solve the problem 
of otherness. For ‘discourse’ as logos not only indicates what it is about but it also 
produces a gap. It cannot present the being of the other purely and simply. Therefore, for 
Heidegger, logos is the locus of the presencing of beings as this or that thing and at the 
same time the locus of the withdrawal of Being itself.  
 Heidegger owes this critical perspective to Aristotle. As he contends in BT, the 
most fundamental immediate experience of the world (noein) never completely 
surrenders itself to logos. It is experienced purely and simply (aisthesis) in a direct 
perception of the world. Hence, aisthesis as the “sheer sensory perception of something,” 
is always 'true' (BT., 34/57). It is always ‘true’ to the being of a thing that is perceived. 
The immediate perception or noein of things presents them in accordance with their 
being. In other words, noein as “the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being 
which entities as such may possess” always addresses the primordial experience of 
beings and can never cover them up as what they are not, it is always judged as true 
(ibid.,). It is only with the introduction of logos that the possibility of covering the truth 
of being emerges. Accordingly, logos can in fact cover the true being of a thing.  
 Throughout this work, I perform a critique of the emergence of otherness in logos 
as a result of the laws of nature, or the laws of society. I will follow Heidegger’s critical 
outlook to problematize the straightforward, immediate, and complete understanding of 
the other in order to examine the possibility of the expression of authentic difference in 
logos. We will see that we are always already caught up in a hermeneutic situation of 
being determined by our being-with-one-another in logos, where the very nature of logos 
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complicates our immediate access to others. I will argue that to ‘address’ the other justly 
and ethically, as well as to express one’s authentic voice, follows the same strategy of 
conceding that logos is ambiguous and problematic. 
 Heidegger, in his lecture courses, including Marburg lectures on Aristotle  as 14
well as his major work, Being and Time (BT) deconstructs Aristotle and the Greek 
tradition in general, revealing that such a critical stance has been left unthought and 
forgotten in the Scholastic as well as Modern readings of Aristotle. As a result, he reveals 
the internal forces within Aristotle’s “conceptuality” and thereby recycles what has been 
ignored or put away by Scholastic and Modern philosophy alike.  
Critical Reading of Aristotle 
 It is vital to notice that, unlike most of the Aristotelian scholarship, Heidegger is 
not merely after Aristotle’s intentions; instead, he is after the operative concepts in 
Aristotelian texts (what he calls Aristotle’s conceptuality) which can be taken in multiple 
directions and interpretations well beyond Aristotle’s intentions.  Heidegger's analysis of 15
Aristotle is a part of his critical reading of Greek philosophy, a project in search of a more 
authentic and originary sense of logos 
 This does not mean that all possibilities of sense-making are limited to the text of 
Aristotle or even Western philosophy in general. Quite the contrary, my contention 
following Heidegger is that such a critical look at the origin of Western thought will help 
us formulate alternative modes of being-togetherness that were not thought of or 
formulated as such in Western philosophy. In this sense, this study becomes part of a 
 This is published as Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 14
2009. 
 Especially after the publication of his Marburg lectures, Heidegger has been fiercely criticized for his 15
seemingly free or “violent” interpretation of Aristotle. For example, Gonzalez, Francisco J. (2006) in 
“Whose Metaphysics of Presence? Heidegger's Interpretation of Energeia and Dunamis in Aristotle.” 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (4):533-568]. What Gonzalez misses, however, is that Heidegger is 
particularly interested in what has been left unsaid in Aristotle. This has little to do with the author’s 
intentions and in fact is meant to reveal the directions of the author’s system beyond and in spite of his 
intentions. Heidegger calls this regime of sense in Aristotle and Greek life-world in general, 
“conceptuality.” In this sense, one can go as far as to claim that, before Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle, 
scholars like Gonzalez could not possibly have any more insight into Aristotle than scholastic readings of 
him. 
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much larger project in explicating the actual diverse modes of being-togetherness as 
anticipated by this critique of Western thought.  
 It is also in this context that the formation of the Islamic notion of community and 
the way Muslim philosophers formulate it is relevant. One can argue that the Islamic 
community and its philosophy have a peculiar kind of neighboring with western 
philosophy, most saliently with Aristotle. Muslim theologians have formulated the 
notions of Islamic community partly as for or against philosophy, including Aristotelian 
philosophy. A critical reading of Aristotelian philosophy could provide a gateway to 
understanding this neighboring and possibly non-western modes of community. 
 My contention is that, firstly, the source of such understandings is still in Aristotle 
himself, perhaps in what he has been systematically avoiding or mis-treating; and 
secondly, it is Aristotle who poses such problems with no theological or practical 
concerns at the ontological level. The very existence of such a critique in Islamic 
philosophy which is based on Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy points to the multiple 
interpretations and directions that Aristotle’s metaphysics could possibly take. For 
example, with respect tp the political significance of the natural philosophy, it is enough 
to notice the role of God’s will in creating events in nature and its effect on human’s 
actions and expressions in Scholastic philosophy. In short, one’s perspective on the 
natural generation of events and the possibilities that natural laws can afford determines 
the kind of impact human actions can have on the world. I will offer some of the Islamic 
controversies around Aristotle’s laws of nature in the Conclusion of this work.   16
 Thus, this work aims at using Aristotle’s original insights and limitations to 
prepare the transcendental conditions or places (hence, topology) where later 
communities for and against his formulations can emerge.  
 As I will argue, and I have already mentioned briefly in the preface to this work, Ghazālī’s philosophy 16
and the alternative laws of conduct (adab) he is proposing for a genuine follower, alongside the whole 
mystic tradition (including Ibn ʿArabi), are all shaped as a reaction to such Aristotelianism, but they either 
have theological and eschatological concerns (in the case of Ghazālī) or do not develop a formal 
ontological construct for the mode of following they are offering. Their writings mostly remain in the form 
of expressing their intuitive experience and poetry more than the ontological conceptualization of the 
modes of following. 
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Even a short glance at Heidegger’s works on Aristotle reveals that he reaches this 
particular critical stance by attending to the question of the meaning of Being in Aristotle, 
i.e., all the ways being is talked about. Being-togetherness, too, as a kind of being, can be 
talked about in different ways.  Aristotle attends to the multiplicity only to account for it 17
in different ways and bring a new form of unity to the multiplicity.  
 This study is interested in revealing different strategies Aristotle applies to deal 
with the problem of multiplicity and difference to make the science of the nature and 
establishment of a political community possible. I believe that Heidegger’s insight into 
Aristotle’s basic concepts reveal that, in fact, these strategies are similar. Aristotle is 
bound by the almost the same limitations in explaining the generation of multiplicities in 
nature as in his treatment of singularity and alterity in the community of human beings. I 
will suggest that, in what Aristotle leaves behind or marginalizes as alien or abnormal, the 
seed of a nomadic mode of distribution is already planted. 
 In order to define community and self, then, we need to clarify the organizing 
principles in nature in general and their relation to the modes of expression and man. The 
essence of community in Aristotle, like the essence of any other thing in nature (physis), 
depends on the understanding of its motion (kinēsis) within itself and also its borders or 
limits (peras) (Trott, 19). The coupling of these two principles with the definition of 
human beings results in several assumptions that guide a phenomenological reading of 
Aristotle. 
 Firstly, it is argued that things in nature, for Aristotle, are defined in their actuality 
(en-tele-cheia, translated by Joe Sachs as being-at-work-staying-itself which literally 
means that they are always already being towards their end (telos) where they receive 
their form (morphē). There is an essential relation between a body/material (hylē)  18
 For example, in BT, Heidegger problematizes the primary role of categorial understanding. He calls such 17
an interpretation of Being, “forgetfulness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit),” which ultimately reduces “the 
multiple senses of Being” to the one associated with the ‘present,’ or actual.
 In his commentary to Aristotle’s Physics, Joe Sachs mentions that he chooses the term “material” as the 18
translation of hyle to distinguish between a modern understanding of matter as independent of forms. He 
points out that “material” is already a teleological and relational term pointing to a sense or function to 
come.
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receiving its desired form (hylomorphism), a body or material being-towards-its-end 
(teleology), and its being actual in nature (entelecheia/ energeia). The Aristotelian 
neologism, entelecheia, for actuality is meant to emphasize a certain kind of being-at-
work which is always towards being-the-same-at-the-end. In other words, as Sachs 
confirms, Aristotle’s attempt to account for motion and change as such turns them into a 
new ideality, the repetition of the same in nature.  
 Secondly, according to Heidegger, for the Greeks, logos as legein is where the 
meaning of beings is uncovered (alethuein). This very movement inherent in logos, 
particularly in definition (horismos as logos ousias), is essentially related to the way the 
material of thing in potency (dynamis) is headed towards its expression in the form 
(morphē) or in its end (telos) (Trott, 22). For an entity to be what it is (to ti hei einei) 
amounts to expressing itself in its definition.  
 Thirdly, human being’s first definition as life-possessing-speech (Zōon logon 
echon) (Heidegger, 2009. 16) suggests that man is the place where the meaning of being 
comes to pass in its actuality, and in its being towards completion. For a human being to 
be what it is (to ti hei einei) is akin to be the place where such a movement of nature 
towards its end is uncovered.  
 Finally, Heidegger refers to yet another definition of man by Aristotle, as life-in-
the-polis (Zōon politikon) (Heidegger, 2009. 33). The coupling of these two definitions 
plus the former assumptions amounts to defining community as the natural end of man 
where the world in its actuality, in the city, is revealed. If we define happiness or 
flourishing of a being as the fulfillment of its function or definition, “life-possessing-
logos” finds its flourishing in the actualization of a polis. A result of this assumption can 
be that the world, in its actualization, is a matter of negotiation in logos. “….according to 
nature, both the human and community strive towards completion, through logos, they 
determine what constitutes completion for them” (Trott, 14). Accordingly, community for 
Aristotle is not simply a contract among pre-established selves, or a psychological state 
of empathy between minds, but the fulfillment, negotiation, and the perfection of the 
definition of man as political life (Zōon politikon). 
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 Hence, the formation of community in Aristotle is part of the same hylomorphic 
schema at work in his physics and metaphysics in general. The principles that account for 
the getting together of bodies and souls in community, as he underlines, for example, in 
the Nicomachean Ethics -particularly Book V - or the systematic hierarchy of the 
structure of society staged in the Politics, are similar to the ones that govern the 
generation of animals, or the coming-to-be of things in general. These principles explain 
not only the production of things and bodies in nature but also the genesis of the 
community as a natural phenomenon.  19
 As for the critique of this formulation, Heidegger examines the association 
between this telos, the ends of man, the limit (peras) and the form (morphē) which 
determines the essence of things.  Through such an association, one can see that what 20
defines a being as it is (to ti en einai), its form (morphē), is mapped on to what 
determines the border (peras), the end (telos), or the completion of the thing. In the same 
manner, different modes of community arise as a result of the interpretation one offers of 
the end and completion which subsequently gives rise to the temporality of the movement 
towards that end. Different treatments of the end and completion provide various 
directions to the way one understands the relation between parts that comprise the whole. 
That is where Heidegger brings up his critique against Aristotle.   
 His phenomenological approach reveals what is left unmentioned or is 
systematically left out because of Aristotle’s metaphysical commitments and general 
 One of the recent works that incorporates a lot of recent Aristotelian scholarship in this regard and will 19
be addressed here is Adriel Trott’s Aristotle on the Nature of Community, by Cambridge University Press, 
2014. In this work, he extensively argues about the natural origin of community. He contends that Polis for 
Aristotle is a natural development of his definition of man and a natural and necessary stage on his way to 
flourishing and happiness.  
Taking on the modern and enlightenment formulation of community as social contract separate and in spite 
of the state of nature, he argues that, for Aristotle, political community is not a break from this essential 
motion. There is no sharp distinction between nature and reason in Aristotle and there is no need for a break 
from nature for the community to occur. (Trott, Adriel M, pp.16-41)
 Heidegger, Martin. Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 20
2009, pp. 27-28
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principles.  Heidegger problematizes Aristotle’s metaphysics by underlying the 21
paradoxical nature of logos and the limit as well as the privilege of the actual. As 
Sheehan explains: “Man has access to entities only in terms of their meaning in the 
broadest sense, that is only in terms of some form of presentness-as in logos” (Sheehan, 
1983, 140). This is to say that man’s access to the presencing of beings is limited to the 
interplay and negotiation within speech (logos).  
 This is translated in political terms as the fact that the limits of the political 
community are determined in a dynamic interaction between constitution (general laws of 
the city) and deliberation (subsumption of alterity, individual cases, and newcomers) 
(Trott, 2014). He is assuming the actual community as the basis for establishing the 
distinction between normal and common (according to doxa or endoxa) and the 
abnormal, outlaw, and fringe. Deliberation is always already limited to the constitution of 
the city as actual. 
 It is in light of such a critique of generation, temporality, and the limit (the peras 
in logos) that Heidegger and post-Heideggerian philosophy investigates the possibility of 
freedom or originary modes of being-in-the-world. For example, Heidegger substitutes 
the actual end and completion of humankind with his being-towards-death, which is the 
end of all actual possibilities. Such a substitution introduces a new momentary mode of 
temporality which opens the sense-making power of there-being (Da-sein) to 
unanticipated and creative potentials. 
 There is also a tension within the structure of logos in Aristotle whose reduction, 
in one way or another, misses parts of the picture. On the one hand, logos is associated 
with the function of man, where the immanent movement of the material comes to light 
in expression, and on the other hand, the differentiations within speech (logos) are 
determined by the transcendent forces imposed by the communal nature of logos. In other 
words, logos is at the same time the expression of freedom and singularity as well as 
 This phase is left out by most of the commentaries, even the most recent ones (c.f. Trott’s Aristotle on the 21
Nature of Community, 2004). They seem to want to revive Aristotle against most modern and contemporary 
formulations of community. However, obsessed with what they think Aristotle’s intentions were, they miss 
the general operation of concepts in Aristotle which would later lead to the very modern formulations of 
community they are criticizing. 
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limitations of communication and commonality. Logos is pressured by the communal 
forces which are supposed to guarantee the communication of the meaning of things.  
 Different approaches to this aporia and the tension within logos with its singular-
plural nature constitute different attitudes towards the self, community, freedom, 
responsibility some of which are explored in this study. I will argue, following Derrida, 
how such an organic community (i.e., in accord with natural generation and motion) is 
not hospitable to strangers and foreigners. This community, I argue, takes shape at the 
expense of marginalizing alterity, as well as unforeseeable and innovative takes on 
tradition.   22
Overview of the Study 
 This study as a whole deals with natural constitution of community as exchange, 
the ontology of its laws, and the aporia it necessarily comes across. I will demonstrate 
how in dealing with the happiness of man in community, for Aristotle, ‘following’ the 
laws of community becomes inevitable and how the same laws make the consideration of 
the otherness of the other impossible. At the end of this dissertation, I will provide a 
conclusion in which I will also stipulate the possibility of an application of such a critique 
to an actual community, specifically the Islamic community.   
 In Chapters 1 and 2, I will delve into Aristotelian principles according to a 
phenomenological reading of Aristotle. In Chapter 1, I will focus on Aristotle’s treatment 
of multiplicity in nature and how it becomes hierarchical, evaluative, and political. We 
take a look at the principles and schemata that bring clarity to the structure of presencing 
in nature and how they become aporetic in the same process. In Chapter 2, I will look at 
the web of concepts constructed in Aristotle to deal with motion and generation in nature. 
I will argue that generation is explained and effectively accounted for in the relation 
between form and matter, potency and actuality, on the one hand, and in relation to a limit 
(peras), end (telos), and more importantly, speech (logos), on the other.  Finally, we will 
 Without really mentioning the reference or admitting the influence, Trott simply borrows the naturalness 22
of community from Heidegger, although he does not mention its limitations and implications the way 
Heidegger’s analysis does.
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look at Aristotle’s treatment of the generation of the abnormal. I will argue that the 
question of otherness is tied to the aporia of logos. These two chapters prepare the scene 
and provide the general principles that will guide the whole project within Aristotelian 
philosophy. 
 The next 2 chapters take the natural principles, temporality, and the critique 
offered in the previous two chapters to the level of the ethical ‘following’ (Chapter 3) and 
being-in-the-polis (Chapter 4). In Chapter 3, I will follow mostly Heidegger and his 
commentators to illustrate how Aristotle’s ethics are part and parcel of his general 
metaphysical concepts. I will explore the natural and immanent constitution of 
community and how ‘following’ this community is beset by the same aporia of logos and 
the limit. In Chapter 4, I will mostly implement a deconstructive reading arguing that, for 
Aristotle, the end of human community as happiness is tied with justice as the end, which 
is implemented by the enforcement of laws. We will see that the same way that logos acts 
as the means of expression, medium, and equalizer in communication, laws act like 
money as the medium for equalizing the differences in a reciprocal exchange in 
community. Through an original reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, especially 
Book 5, I will explicate how the constitution of a just society is bound to enforcing the 
laws while laws themselves share the same paradox as logos. Following Derrida’s 
treatment of justice as law, I will argue that Aristotle ends up admitting the impossibility 
of justice being based on universal laws, which means that in adhering to justice as laws 
one is bound to do injustice of some sort.  
 This brings us to Chapter 5, the Conclusion. After giving a summary of the 
discussion, I will provide a roadmap of how this work can be continued. In the 
conclusion to this volume, I will also take the discussion to Islamic philosophy and the 
Islamic understanding of identity and laws. By taking a concrete example, I hope I can 
sharpen and clarify the distinctions of the previous chapters. I will perform this through 
the interpretation of the pilgrimage and the negativity that it injects into the structure of 
ideological laws of religion as a whole. 
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 For this work, I will end here with the admission that there are solutions within 
the Aristotelian corpus and model for the problem he comes across in politics and ethics. 
By itself, however, this does not undermine the argument I am making. 
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1. Chapter 1: ‘Following’ the Multiplicity to Unity 
“And indeed the question 
which was raised of old and 
is raised now and always is 
the subject of doubt, 
namely what being is, is 
just the question, what is 
ousia.” (Met., 1028 b3-5) 
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1.1. The Proto-Phenomenology of Aristotle 
  Before attending to the question of being-with-others as ‘following’ in a political 
realm, the very ontological meaning of ‘following’ should be investigated. In this 
approach, as I explained in the previous chapter, ‘following’ the laws of community or a 
culture, for Aristotle, is part of a more general question of the natural gatherings of beings 
in logos. That is what captures Heidegger’s attention in Aristotle.  
 Against notions like transcendental ego, self, subject, first person perspective, 
etc., he adopts the Aristotelian understating of the human (life-possessing-logos) as being 
always already in an immediate understanding of the world. Heidegger aims at grasping 
the being of entities as they give (es gibt) themselves. He owes such an insight to 
Aristotle’s proto-phenomenological approach to reality.  
 At the center of the constitution of identity and subjectivity is a substantial 
understanding of beings in the world. One tends to presuppose the presence of the self 
and/or the world. It is only then that the question of relationality and community is asked. 
However, using Aristotle’s original treatment of nature and motion, Heidegger aims at the 
forces that make the emergence of the world possible. It is worth remembering from last 
chapter that, Heidegger deals with Dasein initially and for the most part as Being-in-the-
world. Thus, the question is Dasein’s access to the most original givenness of beings in 
the world including itself and other human beings.  
 This original givenness of being in the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle is 
rendered as substance or essence of something which is the translation of the word ousia 
in Greek. Such translations do not capture the movement in the structure of ousia 
(Brogan, 47). Heidegger believes that following the scholastic translation or 
mistranslation of ousia, modern philosophy’s fixation on subjectivity or identity is due to 
a forgetfulness of that initial Aristotelian insight. Even today in scientific discourse, 
entities are not interrogated with regard to their being (BT., 94).  
 In order to find Aristotle’s most significant contribution to the critique of self and 
identity, Heidegger goes deeper to the Physics, where Aristotle explains the origin of 
nature (physis) in its presencing (ousia). After initially keeping ousia untranslated, 
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Heidegger translates ousia firstly as Seiendheit, beingness, which is his strategy to keep 
the relation of beings to Being under scrutiny before they are hypostatized as present 
beings (Brogan, 47). He tries to capture the temporality and becoming in the very 
existence of things in nature. Aristotle’s understanding of things as being-at-work-
presenting-themselves helps him unsettle the stable and theoretical presence of beings we 
consider actual. Heidegger thinks that this introduces originary temporality in the very 
structure of the repetitive, organic, and orderly coming-to-presence of beings in nature. 
 According to Heidegger, ousia means presencing, the coming-to-be of the beings 
already present. He mentions that ousia, which in the ordinary use of Greek meant 
possession or property, estate, etc., gained the meaning of the “how” of the presencing 
when it entered Aristotle’s terminology (BC., 36). He later translates ousia with a word 
that has the same ambiguity in German, An-wesenheit, between possession and being 
(Brogan, 48). Altogether, he thinks that Aristotle’s original insight was that things in their 
presence, in their looks and the way one has them in their immediacy are always already 
indicating the how of their presencing. Aristotle pictures a world in which more often 
than not one is silently in relation to the presencing of beings. Thus, although in everyday 
engagements one is only tacitly aware of the being of things, she potentially has access to 
the originary character of them.  
 This automatic giving  force which runs the presencing, in Heidegger’s reading 23
of Aristotle is nature (physis). In his reading of Aristotle’s Physics, Heidegger finds out 
that for Aristotle the principal mode of ousia is nature (physis). Physis is the way things 
are in their beingness (ousia) as opposed to when the beings are somehow manipulated 
by an agent through technē. Heidegger comments that, according to Aristotle, what we 
normally consider as naturally present and familiar (Vorhandenheit) is already 
contaminated with technē, the way we manipulate things or categorize them. This 
manipulation does not let beings in their nature (physis) show themselves (Brogan, 56).  
 Heidegger uses the expression es gibt, for ‘there is,’ implying that every present thing is a givenness 23
which owes its existence to Being itself. However, in one breath, every giving for Heidegger amount to the 
withdrawal of Being as well. 
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 In order to emphasize that by physis he does not mean natural beings or events, 
but the automatic force of motion accompanying the giving of the gatherings or the 
assemblages, Heidegger initially does not translate the word physis. As Brogan observes, 
Heidegger finally renders physis as Aufgang which means the appearance as well as the 
way, the steps, towards this appearance. The word Gang from gehen means movement, 
flow, passage. It can also mean the passageway itself through which something moves 
(Brogan, 46).  Consequently, like ousia, physis initially unsettles the understanding of 24
natural beings and instead reorients the investigation toward the automatic ‘giving’ of 
life.  
 Heidegger focuses on the very problem that Aristotle is grappling with, 
multiplicity and motion (kinēsis), to delve into the very coming-to-be of beings before 
they freeze into present and actual categories. In this way, he hopes he can catch a 
glimpse of the very force (dynamis) that makes the gathering (legein) of beings possible. 
This force is revealed in the way things are and should not be imposed like mental 
categories. Therefore, the first proto-phenomenological Aristotelian insight, Heidegger 
underscores, is that nature (physis) is not equal with natural beings, but is instead the very 
force involved in making natural beings.  
 Aristotle’s treatment of nature (physis) and its principle as motion (kinēsis) was 
already a critical stance towards the Greek thought of his time that considered motion 
either impossible (a la Parmenides) or not intelligible (a la Plato). Conversely, Aristotle 
underscores the multiple ways “being is said” which initially unsettles the unity of being 
and logos. Such a stance opens a scission in the structure of sublunary beings and 
introduces multiple modes of being as opposed to just a substantial being.  
 Physis as the principle behind the original expression of diversity and otherness 
constitutes that which is classically known as the causes (aitia). Again this has become a 
source of misunderstanding according to Heidegger, as if nature is some force or a being 
 Brogan translates physis as upsurgence which has little to do with nature as the animal or plant life, let 24
alone the biological study of plants (Brogan 47) . Physis, in this view, is not even about the movement in 
heavens and earth; rather, it refers to the coming-to-present of gatherings per se. This entire intervention 
means that physis names the activity of appearance of natural beings as well as the “how” of the 
appearance.
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present before or behind the present familiar natural beings (Brogan, 46). But, as I 
mentioned, physis in terms of ousia, the presencing, is nothing present and actual 
(Brogan, 57). Thus, the independence and transcendence of the cause from effect is 
challenged drastically. In this way, Aristotle establishes a plane of immanent change and 
transformation, which is run automatically by nature and come to the fore in logos.  
 So far, using Aristotle’s original insight, Heidegger shows that beings in their 
actual categories are always in-the-making as a result of the immanent principle of 
motion and rest in them and not the judgment imposed by a subject or a categorization 
applied by an ego. Therefore, as for the critique of the ideal categorization of the world 
and the self, Aristotle’s approach provides the necessary means for the Heideggerian 
critique against idealism. By attending to the beings in their appearing, Aristotle is a 
pioneer in the path of phenomenology the way Heidegger understands it. After using 
Aristotle against the more modern and ideal depiction of self and the world, Heidegger 
delves deeply into Aristotle’s own basic conceptuality to demonstrate the necessary 
conflict that it is dealing with, and the prices Aristotle has to pay to establish the science 
of metaphysics.  
1.2. Multiple Senses of Ousia and A-letheia in Logos 
 Aristotle’s proto-phenomenology seems promising as it tries to capture the 
authentic character of individuals through their presencing in nature. We need to further 
investigate how Aristotle explicates the access of human Dasein as life-possessing-logos 
to this original presencing of beings from the depth of material mixture to their looks on 
the surface. Aristotle explicates the presencing (ousia) in nature, that is, how things 
express their individual gathering in logos. He accomplishes this by explaining the 
immanent emergence of the look (eidos) of beings from an underlying being 
(hypokeimenon). The challenge is to account for the genesis from being to beings while 
accounting for the sameness (hama) of the thing throughout the process. This is the 
function of a particular kind of logos, Heidegger calls the ‘address’ and Aristotle calls the 
definition (horismos as logos ousias). 
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 Aristotle attempts to address beings in their singularity, demonstrating how they 
come to expression from an underlying level while they remain the same in keeping with 
the generic sameness. In the language that I have adopted in this work, every being, for 
Aristotle, appears to have a singular mode of ‘following.’ This means potentially that 
every being in nature should have a singular comportment to being in its presencing. That 
is, in coming-to-be, things have their particular path. Nonetheless, the otherness/
difference does not seem to be totally free to appear as it is. The multiplicity of 
expressions comes to the fore only within the boundaries of the unity of a focal point 
(pros hen), the analogy of being, or by the pre-established genera and species. 
  The limitations become more manifest when we look at the genesis of logos itself. 
That is due to “the there” of the manifestation of being which belongs to humans as life-
possessing-speech (zoōn logon eckon). Insofar as humans are also political life (zoōn 
politikon), the immanent singular ‘address’ has to be in keeping with the general and 
public speech to be altogether comprehensible. That is to say that “on the way to 
language,” the original expression of things, their singular voice, their ‘address,’ becomes 
contaminated with the look or familiarity of the things given by history. In almost the 
same meaning, Derrida, too, uses ‘address’ particularly with an ethical tone of 
‘addressing' as being just or “juste” and accurate with regard to the singularity of things. 
For the ‘address’ has the manifestation or treatment of ‘the other’ within it and to 
recognize a being in its definition (logos ousias) is already a response to the call of a 
being to be ‘addressed’ in its singularity. It can be argued, then, that Derrida owes such an 
ontological formulation of justice as the ‘address’ to Heidegger’s understanding of logos 
for example when Heidegger writes:  
On the basis of this natural way of being in the everyday arises the 
characteristic possibility of a peculiar speaking that addresses being-there 
in its genuine presence, in the character of its [limit] (peras) . It addresses 25
it in such a way that being-there is addressed in its limitedness (BC., 28)  26
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According to Heidegger, the very immanent movement and the originary ‘address’ in the 
language of Aristotle (logos ousias or definition) turns out to be pressured by what is 
already available and present at the surface, with another kind of logos. The already 
available genera are established by what we are “speaking about” and the communicative 
aspect of logos itself (CT., 21-22) 
1.2.1. From Multiplicity to Unity 
 In order to capture the original experience of the being of things in their 
presencing, Heidegger begins with the immediate, silent experience of ousia in its 
multiplicity, described by Aristotle in Book V of the Metaphysics. Heidegger interprets 
Aristotle as striving to demonstrate how in the process of coming to the determinacy of 
their limit (peras) and the clarity of logos, beings keep expressing their originary 
character as the same (hama). On the other hand, Heidegger contends that the process of 
coming-to-expression in logos becomes necessarily conflicted and pressured by what is 
already there on the surface.    
 In his reading, Heidegger lists different senses of ousia, and shows how Aristotle 
keeps the unity between them. There, Aristotle demonstrates how from the most 
independent and underlying material elements of life, earth, and fire, a genuine 
expression of logos (definition (horismos) as logos ousias) emerges on the surface or the 
look (eidos) of things (Met., 5.1017a 10-11). In effect, Aristotle explains this immanent 
process of generation of beings in their multiplicity from an underlying material 
(hypokeimenon) which is already familiar and available at hand (BC., 25). While 
explaining how beings become varied in different genera and species, Aristotle shows 
how their expression is in gestation at the same time (hama). 
 Heidegger summarizes that discussion in Book V about different meanings of 
ousia, by maintaining that in all the ways being is talked about, from an underlying 
independent element (hypokeimenon), to that which determines the beings as a this (tode 
ti), the emphasis is on immediacy, familiarity, particularity, and limitedness of beings in 
their being. He writes: “It [ousia] designates the being in so far as it is at-hand as “that 
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there” such that this “that there” is visible, determinable, apprehensible, in its 
beingness” (BC., 23).  
 Heidegger maintains that in different ways we talk about ousia, there is already a 
movement from what determines a being materially and immediately in its being towards 
the way it comes to be known to us in logos. Ousia implies the being of things from 
where it is known in itself to the ways it is known to us. Consequently, Aristotle gradually 
prepares the silent immediacy of material to come to the expression immanently and 
naturally without losing its unity and sameness. That is manifest in the fourth and fifth 
kinds of the way being (ousia) is used. The fourth kind is “what it is for something to be 
(to ti ēn einai).” This fourth kind is where Aristotle’s system is finally ready for the 
‘address’ and logos: “[ousia] also means to ti ēn einai, the articulation of which is a 
definition (logos ousias) (Met., 5. 1107b 21).   27
 Unlike other meanings of ousia, then, to ti ēn einai does not introduce a new 
meaning of being; rather, it is a new perspective on the things that appear in everyday 
familiarity and prepares them for the clarity in definition.  
Being in the character of to ti ēn einai, is the genuine topic of logos that 
we are now discussing as horismos [definition]. This being-character is 
that of hekaston. Every being that is there in its particularity is determined 
through to ti ēn einai (BC. 25). 
Heidegger indicates that this expression was not invented by Aristotle and that he 
inherited it from the Greek tradition. This is a level of the being of things, that part of the 
material constitution of things that reaches the surface and is available to the definition 
(BC., 23). It is the being of a particular (ousia hekaston), (Met., 5. 1170b 22) in its 
genuine level of coming-to-be. In this sense Dasein is in an originary mode of ‘following’ 
the being of the other, ‘addressing’ it to its being through a definition. That is to say, the 
definition is immanent to the natural presencing of a being and it is addressed as such.  
 Heidegger underlines that ekas means “far.” Thus, he interprets ekaston as a 
particularity of a thing that is grasped at a distance or by holding at a distance in its look 
 Heidegger’s translation27
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(eidos)(BC., 24). It is noteworthy that we are getting ready for a genuine ‘address’ and as 
a result inevitably we confront a distance, a gap. “What is particular is precisely not what 
is seen initially and directly, but is accessible only when I take a distance from it” (BC., 
24). The other senses of being are associated with the things we are engaged with on a 
daily basis immediately but not in logos, the ones that are not seen in their particularity, 
only grasped tacitly as if in the background. On the contrary, to ti ēn einai is the result of 
some kind of interruption of that full engagement and the flow of everyday experience. 
“Taking a distance is required to see everydayness in its being-there, to have it 
present” (BC., 24). For Aristotle, this movement brings about the ousia of a thing in its 
genuine singularity. 
 Heidegger points out the role of time and history in the constitution of the 
structure of to ti ēn einai and the significance of such a temporality. The literal translation 
of this phrase is, according to Heidegger, “what-being as it was already” (BC., 23). As 
Heidegger contends, this movement is still in-the-world, a movement from an unclear 
determination of a being in the ordinary engagement toward a clear, particular givenness 
of a thing that is still given as what-it-was-already (to ti ēn einai). This is what Heidegger 
and later Derrida will refer to in terms of the paradox of logos as ‘address.’  
 The fifth meaning of ousia emphasizes this very movement. Aristotle summarizes 
all meanings of ousia in two general categories and introduces yet another category. He 
summarizes the above definitions as follows: 
It turns out, then, that ousia is meant in two ways, both as the ultimate 
underlying thing which is no longer attributed to anything else 
(hypokeimenon) and whatever is a this and separate and of this sort is the 
form or look (eidos) of the thing (Met., 5. 8. 1170b 24-25).  
Heidegger is altogether in agreement with Aristotle about the movement he puts forth in-
the-world as from the immediate familiarity with the surrounding world towards a clear 
expression in logos as definition. This movement calls for an interruption or a detour in 
the flow of everyday experience. The fifth meaning of ousia is the look (eidos) (Met., 5. 
1027b 26), and according to Heidegger, Aristotle has the particular species in view (BC., 
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26). In this sense, the particular being of a thing becomes available through the everyday 
engagement with a particular being.  
 Heidegger clarifies this with an example: “As a master builder builds a house, so 
he lives and operates initially in the “eidos” of the house, in the way it looks” (BC., 26). 
The movement from unclarity to clarity which determines beings in their original 
particular determination is a temporal movement which is guaranteed by to ti ēn einai. 
This movement results in what Heidegger later calls the discovery (Entdecktheit), a 
semantic network of everyday familiarity with the world that we inherit from the tradition 
and the public (CT., 27).  
 In this way, Aristotle seems to have managed to ‘address’ the unveiling (a-
lethuein) of the sense in a particular this. In order for things to appear originarily to me as 
a particular “this,” there must be some interruption in the flow of everyday dealings and 
familiarity with the world. The emergence of the “this” is revealed in “to ti ēn einai.” 
That is because “to ti ēn einai” is connected to ēn as being-there of beings as it is given in 
history (BC., 25).   28
 Aristotle’s claim is that things as hypokeimenon are complete or constitute a 
whole on the background of which a new determination can take shape. The 
completedness of the background as opposed to the limitedness of the “this” is the key 
for the formation of a definition.  
The being that is there in this way, [to ti ēn einai], [is] coming from out of its 
history into being. This being that is there in this way is complete, it has come 
to its end, to its completedness (BC., 26). 
 Joseph Owens confirms that the structure of the phrase, to ti ēn einai, looks like a past 
tense which makes it “the genuine topic of that logos … as definition (horismos)”(Owens, 
180). Owens shows that there is also a stable character within the structure of to ti ēn 
einai. He observes that “the literal rendition of the phrase would be “the what-was-
Being,”(Owens, 181) which leaves a mark of past on its meaning. On the other hand, in 
 Paul Ricoeur explains this relation in terms of sedimentation and innovation. Any particular and new 28
determination of being or sense comes in the background of what has already been sedimented in the 
discourse. 
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this particular phrase, the copula refers to something “still present”. Yet, it seems that it 
might as well be applicable to "timeless separate Forms”(Owens, 183). Therefore, the 
phrase is at the same time (hama) associated with the generality of something fixed and 
with the singularity of a unique and present determination. In this phrase, through its 
constancy as well as being past, Owens notices that there is a “necessity” attributed to the 
being of a thing which is of course “implied rather than expressed” (Owens, 184).  29
 This phrase by itself, as Heidegger also confirms, captures Aristotle's 
philosophical problematic as a whole. It refers to the stable, universal character within the 
manifestation of some individual thing in speech. Something happens during this process 
of sense-making that turns the contingent character of a composite to a timeless constant 
form. This phrase suggests that somewhere along the process of the expression of 
indeterminate matter for Dasein, the genuine ‘address’ turns into what has already been 
determined as necessary and stable. Owens even suggests that a more elaborate version of 
the sentence would be "what (essentially, necessarily) is Being" (Owens, 184). He goes 
on to explain that the character of the phrase, referring to a “timeless being,” can only be 
captured in English by using an arbitrary symbol like: “what-IS-Being” (Owens, 185). By 
referring to being as to ti ēn einai, Aristotle presents “the formal, intelligible perfection of 
a thing” (Owens, 185). 
A thing is its generic nature, its matter, and the composite. They are "what 
it is.” But what it necessarily and unchangeably and definitely is, is its 
form… …only its form can be its what-IS-Being (Owens, 186). 
Thus, even things in their particularity only make sense because of the constancy of a 
form implied by their very presencing. Heidegger concludes that in this way things in 
 The same necessity is produced by the necessity of the hylomorphism in natural presencing.29
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their look (eidos) do not have to be produced but are derived as constant and complete 
from history.  30
 This has two paradoxical consequences: on the one hand, Heidegger stipulates a 
kind of understanding in everyday dealings with beings in the world which is non-
representational and immediate. He associates this with affects, mentioning that: “What 
one thinks of affects [Affekte]…must be understood via discovery [Entdeckheit] as the 
state one finds oneself in attunement [Befindlichkeit]” (CT., 27). Affective understanding 
in this sense seems to be individual and personal. It refers to a silent attunement with the 
world. On the other hand, in the same statement, he refers to the “discovery" as that 
which comes from history and looks public. What “discovery” seems to be giving the 
individual experience is an “interpretedness” which comes from history, sedimented and 
fixed in public usage. “Dasein which has come into the world through birth, grows up 
into such ‘interpretedness.’ This ‘interpretedness’ entails a self-interpretation of 
Dasein” (CT., 28). This means that this sense of a being for Dasein is not immanent to the 
internal constitution of the thing from an underlying being. It is a givenness on the 
surface and not from the depth. 
 In conclusion, Heidegger underlines that all these modes of being-there as ousia 
can be summarized under two major principles: “1. primarily presence, present, 2. being-
complete, completedness; [such are] the two characters of the there for the Greeks. In 
these two characters, all beings with regard to their being are to be interpreted (BC., 26). 
Heidegger associates this meaning of ousia with what Aristotle himself calls entelecheia, 
something’s holding- (or maintaining) -itself-in-its-completion- (or limit) (IM., 65). 
 Thus, Heidegger is in accord with Aristotle in his suggestion of the movement 
from  unclarity to clarity which shines a new light on the correspondence theory of truth 
against the idealist constitution of objectivity and subjectivity. However, Heidegger 
 Heidegger captures this notion again, this time by referring to the being of an entity as "es gibt" which 30
means ‘there is’ and also "it gives,” in which “it" is the source of the meaningfulness of the thing. “It” is 
implicit in the existence of everything and is the source of being of a particular being. For Heidegger, this 
means that in every presencing of an entity in its contingent composite, namely es gibt or givenness, the 
formal structure of being in general is implied. Every giving in its particularity (hekaston) in logos is only 
made possible because of the distance it takes from its Being. 
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complicates the process by showing how Aristotle, at the end, makes this immanent 
movement head towards what is already available as the look of the things given by 
history.  
 The paradoxical nature of the completedness is highlighted when we take the last 
step and meet the surface structure in definitions (horismos). There, one can see beings at 
their end, where their heading, i.e. final destination, is determined. It is this paradoxical 
nature of the look that creates the paradoxical character of being-with as well. Things 
which are there for ‘me’ in their look and availability are always already given by history 
and the public. One is always in the precarious relationship with others, in ‘following,’ 
others even in the most immediate perception.   
1.2.2. Being-in-Clarity  of the Definition 31
1.2.2.1. Being at the Limit 
 The being-there as present is for Aristotle “obscured,” “covered over,” 
“unarticulated”  (Physics, 1. 184a 22; BC. 26). Perception of the present is a process of 32
learning and recognition. It consists in the movement from ordinary logos where 
otherness exists in an obscured manner to the definition (horismos as logos ousias) where 
the genuine presencing of the other is ‘addressed.’ In different contexts, Aristotle 
describes this movement as a path of learning to be taken from what is immediately 
known to us to what is known in itself. He writes, “Learning, becoming acquainted with 
something, is accomplished for everyone by proceeding from what is more familiar to us 
 The expression “clarity” is chosen advisedly, having Aristotle’s Poetics in mind. Regarding the number 31
of metaphors allowed in a poetry or tragedy, he underlines that it should be done in moderation not to hurt 
the “clarity" of the language. Altogether, he believes that the wording (lexis) needs to be as clear as 
ordinary use of language (kurion). There, he makes the same distinction between an understanding of the 
world which is immediate and non-representational (idion) which interestingly becomes equal with the 
normal, the most frequent use of language (kurion) 
 συγκεχυµένον from συγκεχυµένα32
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to what is more familiar in itself (Met., VII 3, 1029 b 3).  What is more familiar to us, 33
however, is jumbled up and unclear. It has to come to light in form of a particular kind of 
logos. Moreover, this process involves a detour, a taking a distance which separates or 
analyses the ordinary givenness any puts it together (synthesis) and subsumes every 
particular under a whole. 
But the things that are first evident and clear to us are more-so the ones 
that are jumbled together, but later the elements and beginnings become 
known to those who separate them out from these. (Physics, 184a 20-30) 
Things are only understandable to us when they are offered as in relation to wholes 
(katholon). As a result, the detour to understand particular things is also in considering 
them as a whole or part of a whole. 
it is necessary to proceed from what is general to what is particular, for it 
is the whole that is better known by perceiving, and what is general is a 
kind of whole since it embraces many things as though they were parts. 
Something of this same kind happens also with names in relation to their 
meanings, for a name too signifies some whole indistinctly, such as a 
circle, but the definition takes it apart into particulars. (Physics, 184a 
20-184b) 
Aristotle calls the final clarity which gives the accurate, just character of things to the 
investigator the “definition (horismos).” Definitions give clarity to the names in the same 
way.  Definitions are the kind of speech that are connected to the being of things in their 34
particular determination (to ti ēn einai).  
 Also look at the Physics where Aristotle expresses the same process in knowing or understanding events: 33
“The natural road is from what is more familiar and clearer to us to what is clearer and better known by 
nature; for it is not the same things that are well known to us and well known simply. For this reason it is 
necessary to lead ourselves forward in this way: from what is less clear by nature but clearer to us to what 
is clearer and better known by nature” (Physics, 184a 20-23).
 Children, gifted poets and also madmen in different ways have a privileged access to the world in its 34
unarticulated whole. While Heidegger assumes that this means that they have it naively and obscurely, one 
may regard this obscurity, this forgetting of the distinctions, as the first step in questioning the already 
articulated logo-centeric world of Aristotle. That is to say that although he believes that the definitions 
bring the moments of the articulation of the world to light, this articulation seems to be already established 
by “the prevalent” usage of the terms (kurion.) It is controlled by the common sense.
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…the [orismos] ὁρισµός is determined as οὐσίας τις γνωρισµός [ousias tis 
gnorithmos].  Γνωρισµός [gnorithmos] means: “making known with . . . ,” 
“making familiar with . . . ,” presenting a matter. [Horismos] (Ὁρισµός) is 
making one familiar with a being in its being (BC. 14).  
As we mentioned above, Heidegger replaces the definition with a particular kind of 
speaking which ‘addresses’ the genuine being-there of things in their limits.  
On the basis of this natural way of being in the everyday, arises the 
characteristic possibility of a peculiar speaking that addresses being-there 
in its genuine presence, in the character of its [limit] (peras) . It addresses 35
it in such a way that being-there is addressed in its limitedness (BC., 28)  36
This genuine recognition of otherness happens either through imitation (mimesis), as one 
can read in the Poetics, or definition (horismos). “The [logos] λόγος as [horismos] 
ὁρισµός ‘addresses’ beings in their [ousia] οὐσία, in their being-there” (BC., 29). Logos 
as ‘address’ is a moment of an originary interruption from the flow of organic life in that 
being-in-the-world is manifesting the very structure or the how of the articulation. What 
has been prepared in the immanent motion of presencing from an underlying being 
(hypokeimenon) to what-IS-being (to ti ēn einai) manifests itself in that part of life which 
possesses logos, in Dasein. The whole presencing is looked after and guarded in the 
safety of logos. It is as if logos as this originary 'address’ is the home of being as 
presencing.  
 What 'address’ as originary logos does to the things in general familiarity and 
obscurity is that it analyzes them into their moments and combines them in their relation 
to their being (to ti ēn einai). What becomes clear in the philosophical definition of a 
particular thing is the very articulation of the parts that bring about a thing in its 
limitedness.  
 The words ‘limit’ and ‘limitedness’ are of utmost importance for Greek culture 
and Heidegger's phenomenological reading of Aristotle. For the being-there (Da-sein), 
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ousia needs to be established as being complete and having an end. One sees the same 
tendency toward a function, the for-the-sake-of-which or that which brings the being to 
its completedness in present. In chapter 17 of Book V of the Metaphysics, limit (peras) is 
characterized as “the esketon, the outermost aspect of what is there at the moment, 
outside of which, at first, nothing more of the matter encountered is to be found and 
within which the whole of the beings encountered are to be seen” (Met., 5. 17, 1022 a 
4).  In this way, the limit (peras), origin (arche), the look (eidos), and the end (telos), 37
come together in the logos ousias as definition (horithmos). According to Heidegger,  
This character of the πέρας[peras] is then determined, without 
qualification, as [eidos] εἶδος. The having-of-limits is the genuine “look of 
a being that has any kind of range” (Met., V. 17, 1022a 6).   Πέρας is, 38
however, not only [eidos] εἶδος but also τέλος [telos]. Τέλος [telos] means 39
“end” in the sense of “completedness,” not “aim” or even “purpose.” That 
is to say that completedness is a πέρας [peras] such that “movement and 
action go toward it” (Met., V. 17, 1022a 7) —[kinēsis] κίνησις and 40
[praxis] πρᾶξις, the being-occupied with something where a movement or 
action finds its end. (BC., 28) 
In the definition of the limit  the beginning and end come together and become present. 41
Having limits or to establish being-there as limit is as timeless as having an end and the 
beginning at the same time (hama). 
 τὸ ἔσχατον ἑκάστου καὶ οὗ ἔξω µηδὲν ἔστι λαβεῖν πρώτου, καὶ οὗ ἔσω πάντα πρώτου.37
 εἶδος [ . . . ]ἔχοντος µέγεθος38
 ibid.39
 ἐφ’ ὃ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις40
 Defining the limit  πέρας in the Metaphysics, Book 5. Aristotle writes: “Limit” means: (a) The furthest 41
part of each thing, and the first point outside which no part of a thing can be found, and the first point 
within which all parts are contained. (b) Any form of magnitude or of something possessing magnitude.(c) 
The end of each thing. (This end is that to which motion and action proceed, and not the end from which. 
But sometimes it is both the end from which and the end to which, i.e. the final cause.) (d) The reality or 
essence of each thing; for this is the limit of our knowledge of it, and if it is a limit of the knowledge, it is 
also a limit of the thing. Thus it is obvious that "limit" has not only as many senses as "beginning" but even 
more; because the beginning is a kind of limit, but not every limit is a beginning.(Met., 5.17. 1022a5-15)
40
 As part of the definition of limit, Aristotle very quickly goes on to explain matter 
and form. Perhaps this is because in regard to matter and form the whole idea of efficient 
and final causality comes to the picture. The final cause, or the for-the-sake-of-which, can 
be regarded also as the limit, the function and the formal cause. The efficient cause as the 
beginning, as we will see, is also determined by this limit. This is parallel to the structure 
of hylomorph in which the end as energeia already determines hylē as dynamis. This 
being-at-one’s-end (entelecheia) is, of course, explained not in terms of pure being (a la 
Parmenides) but rather as "pure energeia,” which has a character of activity as putting to 
work (en-ergon). However, it still retains the mode of stability. Aristotle often speaks of 
ta onta (entities) as synhestota and synhistamena (respectively, Physics B, 1, 192b 13 and 
193a 36). These participial forms are from the verb histemi, "I stand" or "I make to stand” 
(Sheehan, 1983. 143). In this reading, then, the world of the Greek is populated with 
entities as “the stable" (das Ständige), i.e. both independent and enduring/subsistent 
(Sheehan, 1983. 143-144).  
 This limit is associated with the last step in an originary expression of being in 
logos or philosophical description. That is to say beings are obscured by averageness and 
must come to light in a philosophical investigation (or as I will argue later, through 
philomythos, that is the kind of imitation which is informed by philosophy). 
Categorizations and predications in philosophy (or definitions in general) seem to be the 
product of the task of analyzing and putting together (synthesizing) of the world as it is in 
its immediacy. Therefore, there has to be an originary and primary motion at work in the 
very presencing of beings in their being, through which the articulation of the world as 
present comes to light. According to Heidegger the definition is Aristotle’s attempt to 
‘address’ beings in their being. That is why, there is such an affinity between a sort of 
speech (logos) with the being of things. Things turn into an image of themselves (in 
logos) to be put in relation to a whole in a philosophical definition to come to the clarity 
of truth.  
 Definition puts particulars and universals in a relationship of predication. But, we 
should be careful not to turn this to an idealization. The basic concepts and conditions of 
41
this motion are explained as follows: “Definitio is horismos. horismos is a logos, a “self-
expression” about being-there as being. … the specific character of the definition 
ultimately arises from the fact that the being itself is determined in its being as 
circumscribed by the limits. Being means being-completed” (BC. 11). That is to say to 
define is not to impose mental categories to the things in the world, but it is a discovery, 
an interruption that says nothing but the “how” of the presencing itself. Nature in itself 
expresses itself in speech. Humankind is constituted in such a way that their meditation 
would reveal the “how” of this expression at the same time. The access to this presencing 
and the meaning of the ousia of the things is a phenomenological moment of the being of 
human being as the life-possessing-logos (Zoōn logon ekhon). Life for Heidegger is 
being-with not only other human beings but also animals. It is a sense-making-being-
alongside-one-another. 
 It is worth remembering the value of this analysis for Heidegger and the critique 
of community. This fundamental ontological analysis helps us see the nature of being-
with in a new light. Animals and humans are not at hand next to one another, but are with 
one another; and (in the case of humans) they express themselves reciprocally. Self-
expressing as speaking about . . . is the basic mode of the being of life, namely, of being-
in-a-world (BC., 16).The relationship of man to its world is not that of being located 
inside the world or holding a subject-object relation with it; but rather, human beings 
“have their world.” What “life-possessing-speech” says is that, the being-in-the-world of 
the human being is determined in its ground through speaking. 
 As for the critique of that which has been revealed in the process of definition, 
one can argue that this motion is altogether controlled and tamed instead of revealing the 
genuine character of otherness as it claims. The movement involved in the definition is a 
circular one, beginning with a particular (thing or action), which presents an apparent 
distance from the universal, and ending with bringing the particular under the universal 
again. In the next section, I will argue how considering limit as definition in logos ends 
up making the whole movement aporetic.  
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 Meanwhile, this is exactly where Heidegger and others begin their critique of 
logos as the  limit by introducing a different understanding of the limit and the whole. 
Heidegger introduces the end of life or death as the limit which targets the very actuality 
(energeia) of the end in Aristotle. Derrida, on the other hand, considers the inaccessibility 
of the other as the limit. That is to say that to ‘address’ the other as the other is always 
plagued by the paradox of logos as public and private at the same time. My intention to 
‘address’ the other would have to use the public, common-sensical and familiar language 
which belongs neither to me nor the other. Now, it is by considering this limit as limit 
rather than anything accessible, familiar, or clear, that the possibility of the emergence of 
the other can be thought about. 
 In considering community as ‘following,’ as I mentioned in the previous chapter, 
we are confronted with this latter form of limit. The being of a follower is constituted 
always already by her attitude towards her limited access to the other which I called the 
‘being-in-trouble’ of man. That is, one always falls short and is at a loss in understanding 
the other completely or appropriating that which is given to her by the tradition or others 
in language. Conversely, Aristotle seems to think that ‘following’ ought to be controlled 
by the clarity of the definition. To tease out this tension, we need to attend to the paradox 
that unsettles logos. 
1.2.2.2. The Paradox of Logos 
 It is at this point that the second kind of logos, or the other sense of logos which is 
closely tied to and is equi-primordial (co-originary) with the ‘address’ is brought to light 
by Heidegger. Logos is the very exhibition of the “about which” of speaking. In this 
sense, speaking is not simply “uttering a sound,” but rather, “the genuine function of 
[logos] λόγος is the apophainethtai the bringing of a matter to sight” (BC., 15). Speaking 
about things (logos ousias) as the fundamental character of the being of human beings is 
a delimiting of the meaning of things (horismos). In the very process of “bringing a 
matter to light,” in the very admission that speech is “about” something else, that it is an 
indicating, a pointing beyond, we are already pointing to a caveat, a scission that 
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generates bifurcating series from within the structure of the being of the thing (BC., 17). 
In this sense, definition (logos ousias) is always at risk from within by the 
multifariousness of sense generation force in its structure, which is expressed as 
presentness-as or as appearing-as.  
 Here is where Aristotle is conservative and cautious. He prefers to remain in the 
boundaries of the actual world (the world of being-at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia)). 
As we can see in the case of semantic innovation and metaphor in the Rhetoric and the 
Poetics, Aristotle is quite aware of the danger of multiplicity in appearances at this very 
level and ultimately contends that appearances need to be controlled by the prevalent 
usage of speech (kurion) (Poetics, 1458a; Davis, 124). In this sense, the apparent 
discovery is the discovery of the structure of the world as present and historical.  
 Heidegger reformulates the tension in speech (logos), contending that such a 
disclosing function at the same time (hama) has a tendency to “speak about something 
with others” (BC., 14). This other function is related to the look (eidos) of a thing in the 
social sphere. Speech indicates something as common (koina) which works through the 
function of memory and the temporality of the past. We “grow into such a common 
intelligibility” (BC.,16). From this, we can conclude that for Heidegger, at least at this 
stage of reading Aristotle, the revealing function of speech (logos as address) is 
supplemented or limited by its social and historical function.  
The expressed "lies fixed," is a [keimenon] κείµενον. The [keimena 
onomata] κείµενα ὀνόµατα, precisely as [keimena] κείµενα, "fixed," are 
available to others; they are [koina] κοινά (BC., 16). 
When the value of linguistic items, especially names, are fixed, according to Heidegger, 
they turn into the “currency”  that is controlled by grammar. Their freshness in revealing 42
the "givenness to me" of "my" experience and "my" desires would be reduced to a value 
function in a system with “a character of averageness” and “without an explicit 
relationship to the matters spoken about” (BC., 16). Therefore, as he admits, that which is 
spoken no longer belongs to an “individual.”  
 As if like money that is administered by law to remain proportionate and just.42
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 Heidegger adopts a peculiarly Nietzschean language with reference to truth, the 
same language that is used and expanded by Derrida. He readily acknowledges that 
speech which was supposed to function in disclosing (alethuein) turns into a common 
language which is "worn out, used and used up” (BC., 16). He elaborates: “Everything 
expressed harbors the possibility of being used up, of being shoved into the common 
intelligibility” (BC. 16). That means that the ‘address’ to the being of the other as it is, is 
inevitably reduced to the public language. Words become like currency, the capital that 
people spend without expressing genuine difference. 
 Heidegger and Derrida’s enemy is prevailing authority and sovereignty of the 
ordinary language (kurion) which grounds the logical and scientific language as well. 
Because of their availability in usage, they gain a false form of clarity which does not 
speak about any original experience anymore. We will come back to this point later when 
discussing the function of money and law.  So, although there is a virtue to speaking 43
clearly as if the same as others, the genuine ‘following’ of the other is necessarily vague 
and in an awkward language.  
 Heidegger uses the term “interpretedness" to refer to this common intelligibility 
which comes from history. In the Concept of Time as well as BT, he calls the fixed logos 
 In a different context, Derrida underlines this usage of language through underlining different usages of 43
the word usure in french. On the one hand, usure refers to the same wear and tear of the freshness of the 
creative moment of a word when it turns into a concept. It is necessary for a truth to cover its origin if it is 
to have an eternal claim. Like the coin (nomisma) which has to undergo such a wear and tear, wipe off the 
figure on its face in order to have an eternal value. Up to this point, he is in accord with Heidegger and 
Nietzsche.  
 On the other hand, however, he cautions to underline the second meaning of usure as in usury. The 
surplus value in the process of exchange itself. This possibility appears to be ignored by Heidegger. 
Heidegger simply goes past the level of surface and the force and the movement of language itself. 
Although he seems to be talking about the disclosing function of language, apparently this disclosing 
function is supposed to be without any waste, surplus or unanticipated darkness or surprise. Language 
seems to become transparent and to simply reveal the meaningful life of humans. Heidegger seems to 
believe that at least at some basic everyday level language becomes transparent to reveal what lies beyond 
it (CT., 22). Language is basically is a “speaking about something.”… in the case of humans, they express 
themselves reciprocally. Self-expressing as speaking about…is the basic mode of the being of life, namely, 
of being-in-a-world. Where there is no speaking, where speaking stops, where the living being no longer 
speaks, we speak of “death.” (BC. 16) 
 Therefore, like Aristotle, the only mode of community that Heidegger explicitly elaborates on (at 
least up to Being and Time) is this economic average being-togetherness. For Derrida, on the other hand, 
there is a surplus in this exchange that he points out through the profit earned in usury. It is money itself 
that is producing the surplus value. This is a production at the surface. Death and the impossibility is 
already part of life and part of experience for Derrida. And it is precisely in experiencing such an 
impossibility that life may come to pass in its richness and unpredictability.
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which grounds the discovery, “idle-talk” (CT., 28). As idle-talk is the way in which 
interpretedness is preserved, it retains the latter’s basic structure. Interpretedness means 
to address something as something in a state of concerned engagement (besorgenden 
Umgangs) (CT., 28). In this sense, concerned engagement will end up addressing nothing 
more than the idle-talk.  
 A long as this activity involves some kind of interpretation and ‘address,’ Dasein 
can have some active or passive role in it. That is what constitutes the ethics of 
‘following.’ Heidegger is clearly putting Dasein at an intersection where he can choose to 
cover things within their common intelligibility (through, what he calls, “parroting” (CT., 
28)) or alternatively to address  things in an originary way (Urspünglichen 44
Ansprechens). Definition, for Heidegger, should be doing this task. Should Dasein choose 
to uncover and make clear (to use Heidegger’s term from BT to “be-in-truth”), this would 
happen through learning and giving definitions. As I mentioned above, Heidegger 
emphasizes this character of logos as the ‘address.’  45
 This movement is crucial in regard to the consideration of a particular, the 
abnormal and the outlaw as well as the innovative and creative ‘following’ of the other. 
That is because, after all, “that which is given in advance is only given in the averageness 
of being-there” (CT., 28). Heidegger is in agreement with Aristotle in insisting on the 
necessity of such movement from “more familiar to less familiar.” He simply paraphrases 
Aristotle, “I must proceed precisely from what is ungenuinely there to what is genuinely 
passed over in acquaintance” (CT., 28). However, as I argue below, Heidegger and some 
other readers of Aristotle also demonstrate that confronting the threat of the abnormal and 
monstrous, Aristotle gives in to the pre-established structure of the world in genus and 
species and reduces the contingent motion (kinesis) in the nature (physis) to a perpetual 
hylomorphic activity of being-at-work-staying-itself, generally and for the most part. 
 It is noticeable that for Derrida, ‘address,’ is what we aim at but it is impossible. That is, we are bound 44
somehow or another by the common intelligibility. For Heidegger, originary address becomes possible 
when Dasein faces her own finitude. 
 “Horismos is a type of speaking, of addressing the world such that beings are addressed with regard to 45
their completedness and in this completedness as present” (BC. 26). 
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Idle-talk extends over to seemingly genuine questions and investigations, thus keeping 
Dasein from engaging in original interpretation and examination (Auseinandersetzung) 
(CT., 29). 
 Thus, while Heidegger agrees with the necessary disclosing function of truth (a-
letheia), he finally accuses Aristotle of reducing the result of the discovery to the 
respected opinion (endoxa) and the dialectic within the boundaries of the reasoned 
discourse (logos). In fact, Heidegger is even suspicious of the givenness of the world in 
the definition, and scientific investigation as a whole, too.  
Talk of this kind is distinguished by the lack of any original appropriation 
of what it is about and through the so-called verbal thinking (Wortdenken) 
which has surrendered to the power of certain verbal phrases 
(Wortbegriffe), it may also pervade and govern the treatment of problems 
within scientific disciplines (Wissenschaft). (CT., 22-23) 
Besides, it does this by endoxa or the dominant view,  what Heidegger calls the 46
“intractable domination of ‘the one’(CT., 22). 
[used up logos] obscures the true appearance of the world and the events 
in it by instituting a dominant view (herrschende Ansicht). …Usually and 
for the most part the ontic mode of being-in (discovery) is in concealment 
(CT., 28).  47
Thus, in the ordinary concerned engagement (besorgenden Umgangs) with the world it is 
‘the one’ (das Man) that talks. Everyone participates in the world that is co-revealed to 
being-in-the-world-with-one-another. That is to say, the public is jointly concerned with 
the surrounding world (miteinander besorgten Umwelt) without authentically 
appropriating it as one’s own (uneigentlich) (CT., 20).  
 We will see that what hold a city at its best is what the elite think of as just and through the laws that they 46
establish. 
 That is why, Aristotle insists, in the Metaphysics 4. Chapter 2, that being can be talked about either in 47
terms of truth, in categories (κατηγορία), or in terms of the hylomorphic movement from potency (dynamis) 
to being-at-work (energeia) or else it is false or by chance (κατά τύχη).
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 This suggests that although the genuine philosophical investigation for Aristotle 
may involve moments of unclarity or wonder, those moments are at the service of a 
clarity. The clarity points to the meaning of being as ousia and in all the categories which 
are more or less available already in the world. “Aristotle did not get beyond the 
thematization of the being of entities as ousia, whether in the particular regions of entities 
or in the highest instance-the divine” (Sheehan, 1983. 141).  
 Thus, as differential and active as ousia is, it is still in-the-world. As far as the 
question of an originary ‘following’ and innovation is concerned, the clarity is a clarity 
in-the-world. In fact, such a motion is completely circular. Discovery is not the discovery 
of something utterly new but the re-discovery of that which has been given in history.   
 As much as Aristotle tries to put his philosophy forward as the genuine mode of 
inquiry (historía as genuine inquiry) or 'following’ authentically, his philosophy does not 
discover a radically new otherness but rather shines a light on the way things have 
already been revealed (historía like the knowledge or narration of the past).  
 Still, this should not be read only as a criticism. Philosophy’s task for Aristotle is 
expected to be the discovery of what is unclear in nature or uncritically accepted as 
public opinion. Nonetheless, my critique, following Derrida and Heidegger, highlights 
the necessary marginalization that afflicts his attempt to make a science of nature and 
change by reducing the presencing to actual and present beings.  
1.3. Ousia and the Limit  
1.3.1. Ousia and the Critique of the Limit 
 Heidegger is in accord with Aristotle’s explication of the way beings come to pass 
in their determinate forms, in their being-at-their-ends/limits. For him, that is the 
condition of the possibility of coming-to-present altogether. In his interpretation of ousia 
from Book V of the Metaphysics, Heidegger demonstrates that Aristotle’s emphasis on 
the determinacy and limitedness of the being of things as well as the way they express 
themselves in logos is to be underscored as the way being comes to pass in “the 
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there” (Da-sein) for human beings. He stipulates that human beings as life-possessing-
speech (Zōon logon echon) and the “there” of disclosing have access to the separateness 
of things in an originary logos (idion). 
Heidegger maintains that the Greeks, especially Aristotle, read entities as 
phainomena, appearances that show up in a correlative noein or legein, 
which manifests their meaningful presentness-as or is-ness (ousia, 
Seiendheit, beingness). (Sheehan, 1983. 137) 
On the other hand, he holds that for Aristotle like the rest of the Greek, ousia ends up 
being associated with thinghood, the available and actual beings in use. He reviews the 
coming-to-be of this term in Aristotle and concludes that ousia has yet retained its 
ordinary meaning as “estate, property, possessions and goods”  (BC., 17-18). 48
 Heidegger believes that for the Greeks the most general mode of being (ousia) is 
the being-there as use, being in its availability as what he calls ‘ready-to-
hand’ (zuhanden) as well as ‘present-at-hand’ (vorhanden). This is how things appear to 
humans initially and for the most part. At this primary level the question “what is being?” 
concerns the question of “the Being of beings” (τί τὸ ὄν). It is replaced by the being of 
beings: τίς ἡ οὐσία (Met., 7.1.1028b 2, BC., 18), that is, their presencing in the everyday 
dealing with beings, “in appearing, an entity appears as something meaningful- [in a 
practical field or else in apophantic sense].” (Sheehan, 1983. 137) 
 Ousia does not mean univocity for Aristotle. It does not mean absolute being or 
the One either. The very distinction he establishes between the divine and what is in 
 He underlines that there are two basic ways such technical terms are established.  Either “a determinate 48
concrete context, seen anew for the first time” for which a completely new term must be coined together 
with the matter. In this situation, an expression “that was not at hand” is coined and then gains currency as 
soon as it is used in ordinary speech. The example for such a term would be the word entelecheia coined by 
Aristotle himself to capture the being of natural phenomena as the completion of a process. There is, yet, 
another way as well. A word that is fixed for an ordinary use gains new, technical significant while still 
retaining its own meaning. In this case, the technical aspect of meaning is added or “co-intended with the 
ordinary meaning” (BC. 18). He mentions that thinghood (ousia) is one of those terms of the second group, 
meaning it is available in natural language and customary use and has given additional signification or 
terminological clarity. In other words, it has a meaning "initially and for the most part.” (Ibid.) for the 
“people.” Heidegger contends that even in the terminological sense of the word, thinghood (ousia) does not 
completely lose its customary meaning. This customary meaning, according to Heidegger, is “property, 
possession, possessions and goods, estate. It is noteworthy that definite beings—matters such as 
possessions and household goods—are addressed by the Greeks as genuine things” (BC. 18).
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motion shows that he has a very different reading of the world from the Eleatics. Still, he 
does not consider an originary motion in this perspective but rather deals with the 
products of motion in their actual presence. This results in an investigation of different 
meanings of being (diversity and multiplicity) in the way being is related to a core 
concept (thinghood of the thing). This is famously described by Aristotle as follows: 
There are many senses in which a thing may be said to “be,” but they are 
related to one central point, one definite nature [pros hen kai mian tina 
phusin], and are not homonymous. Everything which is healthy is related 
to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the 
sense that it is a symptom of health [etc.]. ... So, too, there are many senses 
in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point [mian 
arkhên]; some things are said to be because they are “substances” [ousiai], 
others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a 
process toward substance [etc.]. ... As, then, there is one science which 
deals with all healthy things, the same applies in other cases also. ... It is 
clear then that it is the work of one science also to study all things that are, 
qua being. But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is 
primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they 
get their names. (Met., 3. 1003a 33-b18) 
The multiplicity as a whole seems to be the character of the sublunary world which 
involves necessary motion and change. According to Aubenque, “change instills a 
“scission” in the sublunary beings so that they are ecstatic, standing outside themselves, 
never all at once what they are” (Protevi, 33-34). Because of this scission, between the 
thinghood and the accidents, the ontology of sublunary beings is dispersed among 
categories. They are capable of accepting different predicates, different answers to the 
categorial question of “quality” (how?), quantity (how much?), place (where?), and so on 
(ibid., 34). In fact, this scission, for which Derrida uses the terms the originary trace, 
symptom, originary cut, even ‘the fall,’ and Heidegger uses the expression, “Ontological 
difference,” is the condition of the possibility of multiplicity, difference and generation.  
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 Aubenque believes that such a categorization of sublunary beings as becoming-
other in motion and change puts them in a paradoxical if not contrary situation of always 
being-other than themselves. This is what, I think, he means by the “scission” as well. In 
order for a being to be something in this world, it has to be of such and such an attribute, 
which means that it is partly “not” or at least “other than” the unity of ousia, a "focal 
meaning,” or “pros hen.” 
 Thus, in logos or as species (eidos), they would only artificially come together as 
an entity that stays the same while in fact they are judged as things holding certain 
attributes. For Aristotle, sublunary beings, the beings that are in motion and change, 
through their very contingent character “escape from a thought which only speaks by 
combining that which is divided” (Aubenque, 487). This means that thought cannot 
capture the scission fully and yet it is the scission that gives beings. The “it” which 
“gives” in Heidegger’s “es gibt” which is his formula for “there is” or existence seems to 
be this mysterious and uncapturable scission by which things are what they are in species. 
Thought only arbitrarily and abstractly captures being as hypokeimenon, predicate, etc. 
 To overcome the inability to capture the scission, sophists would deny the 
existence of a pros hen altogether (hence, univocity of being). In effect, for them, only 
accidents (sumbebekos) really exist and consequently scission simply disappears. On the 
other hand, there are Eleatics who also deny the scission by contending that: “there is 
only one substance and no accidents” (hence, equivocity of being) (Aubenque, 486). The 
discovery that being is core-dependent, and not just a mere homonym means that a 
science of being is possible, even though the absence of a univocal sense of the predicate 
being entails that there cannot be a Form or Idea of being (the case is comparable with 
that of the Good or Justice; cf. NE., 1096a 23-29). 
 That is where the philosophy of Aristotle is ultimately headed, toward some sort 
of “regulated economy of being,” focused around the unity a focal meaning (pros hen) or 
the analogy of being between all the modes being can be said. These strategies in dealing 
with the meaning of being can be observed for almost any major concept. He first 
acknowledges that being is used in multiple ways and then he establishes a core-
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dependent homonymy between them. This strategy, as we argue in the following chapter, 
is tied to the explication of motion as well. Things are what they are in spite of a non-
substantial change. Different accidents respond to questions: how much? Where? How? 
When?, etc., nonetheless, they retain their wholeness.  
 In Heidegger’s interpretation, then, while attending to change and generation in 
nature, Aristotle prioritizes the generation of “the same”, “for the most part” or what is 
already available and familiar. Nature (physis) for him is mostly actual (energeia) and at 
its end or completion (entelecheia), and change for him is towards a pre-determined end 
(teleology). The material in potency (dynamis) is already headed towards becoming 
complete and appropriated  in the being-at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia). All change 49
and growth is therefore anticipatable, organic, and hylomorphic, since such movement is 
always towards a present, actual and familiar “heading”. That is to say it is teleological 
and its limits are already determined. The “heading” or the target is always already 
determined and in-the-world. Aristotle has, in effect, marginalized the creation of the 
abnormal, the unaccountable, and the monstrous. This does not mean that he does not 
allow the creation of the abnormal. Nature is reigned by what is actual, prevalent, and 
more frequent, as if there is a virtue attached to large quantities or the many. Although 
this is not a denial of the existence of alterity, it is an arbitrary ruling of the familiar and 
the common.   50
 In all cases of generation and motion, the authority of the limit in logos, eidos, 
entelecheia, and so on, keeps the unity of presencing intact. The being of unity and 
sameness is kept at the same time as the articulation of change and motion. That is what 
 The partial italicization is meant to emphasize the unduly preference for the proper and the actual 49
creeping into Aristotelian discourse.
 Being-at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia) and the organic presencing reigns the world of Aristotle. He 50
uses the most political words, related to ruling and sovereignty for being and presencing. In the Categories, 
chapter 5 opening line, he says “ousia is the most lordly sense (kyriotata)…”. The translators sometimes 
render this word as “the strictest or truest” but the primary meaning of it which Aristotle uses for the people 
in the Politics (Pol. 1306b20) is “having power or authority over”. The words entelecheia, and hyparchē for 
the determination of the limits of being “at the end” or “in the beginning” in every individual determination 
have political connotations and actual political meaning as well. They share the root archē which means 
holding, possessing and having authority over. This is significant given that the ground of the science of 
metaphysics is entelecheia and hyparche which refer to beings in their the look and availability.
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Derrida underlines as hama, which means together at the same time. Derrida writes of 
this word:  
The entire force of Aristotle’s text depends on a single word which is 
scarcely visible because it is so evident; as obvious, it is also discreet and 
hidden, but it operates all the more effectively for escaping thematic 
attention. The tiny hama is that which sets the discourse in motion in 
terms of its articulation; from this point on, it will constitute the inner core 
of metaphysics; it will be the small key which both locks and unlocks the 
history of metaphysics—the skeletal frame on which the entire conceptual 
apparatus of Aristotelian discourse is supported and in terms of which it is 
articulated. In a certain sense, it expresses the dyad as the minimum. (MP., 
56) 
The hama guarantees that while we are dealing with motion and change, the end and the 
result of change remains in view,  and the structure of unity and wholeness remains 51
intact. The target or the ‘heading’ in the motion is in-the-world, familiar, and already 
appropriated and controlled by the eternal, accountable laws of nature. Consequently, the 
world that Aristotle depicts is colorful and multiple but still controlled under certain 
unities. Unfamiliar colors and languages are not allowed. 
 What comes to the fore in eidos and logos remains in, to use John Protevi’s 
terminology, horizontal and vertical unity (Protevi, 39). Horizontal unity refers to the 
unity of an actual being during its acquisition of different categories. This motion does 
not produce a new species or genus. It is intra-genera. That is, intra-genera motion is 
possible within the categories in reference to a focal point (pros hen), or through the 
analogy of being.  Also, vertical unity guarantees that the inter-genera change is possible 52
too, insofar as the transformation from one being to another remains within the 
independent and separate boundaries of the genera. This means that there would not be 
One can argue that having in view (in French voir) is a mode of having (in French a-voir) after all. It is a 51
mode of delayed presence. 
As for analogy,  look at Appendix 1 for further discussion. 52
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any surplus or unanticipated genus or species created during the process of change 
between species and that the transformations are accountable. 
1.3.2. Ousia and the Critique of the Present 
 We began the chapter by contending that the authentic mode of ‘following’ can 
only come about by admission to the incomplete, relational, and historical structure of the 
being of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Heidegger calls the relational being of Dasein, 
“Care [Sorge]” which is essentially related to temporality.  
It is as impossible to omit Dasein’s being-in as it is to omit its while-ness 
[Jeweiligkeit]. As Care [Sorgen], this entity, which in each case is oneself 
remains forever on its way to something. Dasein’s being is intent on [Aus-
sein auf] that which it has not yet become but is able to become. (CT., 38) 
Considering the being of Dasein as “ability to become” opens Dasein to possibilities 
beyond what is actual or the exhausted possibilities in-the-world. It is to consider Dasein 
as potency (dynamis) as opposed to actuality (energeia).   
 Ousia as presencing as opposed to present beings, or the static structure of Dasein 
and its others gives Heidegger an initial critical tool against modern idealist connections 
like self and identity. Notwithstanding, Heidegger argues that the promise of ousia has 
been systematically compromised in favor of a regulated economy of being as the same 
rather than the expression of difference as such.  
Οὐσία [ousia,] means “being-there,” and it does not have an indifferent 
sense of being, as, ultimately, there is no such thing. Οὐσία is the 
abbreviation for παρουσία [parousia], “being-present.” Usually the 
opposite is πουσία [pousía], “absence,” not simply nothing but something 
there, although there as a lack. (BC., 24-25) 
Entities in all of their determinations, in all senses, are defined for Aristotle in terms of 
presence. Even the "absence" is defined in terms of a lack, which ultimately points to a 
presence. Aristotle's philosophy becomes increasingly concerned with different modes of 
such presence as “constancy,” and more importantly with an idea of becoming-present 
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“in the sense of coming forth into the unhidden, placing itself into the open” (GA 9: 
272/208),  and to show how in fact they can be schematically read as the same. Brogan 53
Translates Heidegger as follows: 
In Aristotle’s time, ousia is used both in this sense (of property) and in the 
meaning of the fundamental term of philosophy. Something is present. It 
stands in itself and thus manifests itself. It is. For the Greeks, “being” 
basically meant this being present (Anwesenheit). But Greek philosophy 
never returned to this ground of being and to what it conceals. It remained 
on the surface  of the presencing itself (des Anwesenden selbst) and 54
sought to observe them in their available determinations. (Brogan, 48) 
I find it significant that Heidegger emphasizes the surface as opposed to the ground. The 
implication seems to be that there can be a kind of presence on the surface which is not 
grounded in ousia or genuine presencing of beings. Apart from the word “surface,” what 
this citation highlights is that being (ousia) actually had a sense of property, and capital, 
as though we have  being in its individual occurrence. Heidegger observes that, for 55
Aristotle, the particular being of things is associated with their look (eidos), which is 
brought about from the neighboring of beings and concepts “on the surface”. In other 
words, Heidegger criticizes Aristotle for systematically betraying his own discovery by 
controlling the movement (kinēsis) of revelation with the present manifestation of things 
in the public realm or the opinion of the many (endoxa). 
 The manifestation on the surface for Heidegger comes from what is already 
available in the ordinary public discourse which does not address or define beings in their 
Cited from, White, Carol. J. (2005) “Heidegger and the Greeks,” in A Companion to Heidegger (eds H. L. 53
Dreyfus and M. A. Wrathall), Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK. Chapter 8. p. 137
Italics and underline is mine.54
 Avoir in French, which is associated with voir, to see, to look which denotes the basic familiarity with 55
things in their looks.
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being. They do not correlate to an immanent motion, to the clarity of the logos.  He 56
believes that this being-with is inauthentic and does not capture the genuine character of 
Dasein and its others (CT., 21). The consequence of the Greeks’ neglect of what remains 
absent, in the background, and not appearing, is the preference for beings as if they are of 
certain particular properties, traits (Züge), being present-as this or that, which they 
possess in their being-at-work (energeia). 
 Time, in this sense as “the number of change,” would stay homogeneous. That is, 
the rate and quality of time does not change. Aristotle thereby makes sure that the future, 
for the most part, resembles the past. Things are as much present now as in future and in 
past. Perpetual necessary laws of presencing guarantee presence of beings in future and 
past. In this sense even absence is not pure.   
 But, Heidegger acutely observes that the Pandora’s box that Aristotle opens 
between being and the multitude of expressions (“being can be said in many ways.” (Met 
VII)) cannot really be closed by such a metaphysical system and reveals its internal 
paradoxes, insofar as we attend to its conceptuality. Conceptuality does not refer to any 
mental or categorical system, but the way concepts are correlated with one another 
making the experience of the world as a whole (BC., 15).  
 In order to reap the benefit of this conceptuality, the understanding of the ‘limit’ 
and ‘limitedness’ needs to be re-evaluated and modified. The question of being for 
Heidegger is a question which concerns presencing and not present beings. That is why 
he sets out to open the question of the difference as such. By questioning the status of the 
limit, as death as the non-being, he re-orients the question of being back to the difference 
itself (CT., 40-45). That is where, Heidegger thinks, we should begin the questioning: 
“We must stand within the difference that let beings be” (Brogan, 49). The disclosing 
function produces a necessary gap between the being of the things in their immediacy in 
 In Concept of Time Heidegger talks about presencing (anwesenheit) in terms of familiarity and public 56
discourse. Knowing things and others initially and for the most part is available to Dasein in public 
discourse. That is the kind of discourse that make us able to find our bearings in the word and be-with 
others (CT., 20-23).
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everyday experience and their manifestation in order to be able to bridge the gap with a 
definition (logos ousias). 
 That is where, I believe, Heidegger goes beyond Aristotelian and Greek 
philosophy to think about the originary possibility of being instead of what is proper, 
commonsensical, and actual. He challenges the notion of identity by focusing on being 
human as an interruption or as a standing in the difference. Before things are present and 
actual, fixed and used up in a commonsensical or ordinary propriety and identity, they 
can be read or interpreted-as this or that. The reading or as-structure comes before the 
identity of the subjects and the objects and constitutes them both. “….this as-structure 
bespeaks the arrival of meaning among entities, the irruption that occurs only with the 
arrival of man” (Sheehan, 1983. 138). Gathering in reading, or sense-making is co-
originary with human beings through the as-structure. 
 Da-sein, Heidegger’s term for human being, is his strategic choice of a term for 
highlighting the standing in the difference. Da-sein is a gathering in reading. It is not a 
self who has a text before him to read or to interpret, but rather, Da-sein is already 
57
constituted by the gathering that happens in this reading (Silverman & Ihde, 1).  This 57
reading is co-constituted by the originary logos that ‘addresses’ beings in their being.  At 58
the same time, as long as Da-sein is co-constituted by the as-structure, it is the possibility 
of being otherwise than it actually is. It is open to the possibility of non-being and 
difference as such. 
 Heidegger and following him Derrida take the possibility of the difference as such 
(the scission, the gap and the ‘it’ that gives) seriously and express interest in the way 
every presencing is a withdrawal of being at the same time.   59
Wherever the thinking of the Greeks gives heed to the presencing of what 
is present, the traits (Züge) of presence which we mentioned find 
 The comparison is noteworthy with a very short passage called “Was heisst Lesen?” Which is translated 57
by Sallis as “What is called Reading?.” Some simply translate this as “What is Reading” but one should 
note that this word, heisst as a verb has two meanings: as an intransitive verb it means “to be called; to be 
named, like in Wie heißt du? (What is your name?) Ich heiße ....  (“I am called ….); as a transitive verb it 
means “to call (someone something), to direct, call to do something” as in “Sie hieß ihn nach Schule 
anrufen”, meaning roughly, “what is reading?” Heidegger writes,  
What is [calls forth] reading? That which is sustaining and directive in reading is gatheredness (die 
Sammlung meaning to collect, to gather and to congregate). To what is gathered? To what is 
written, to what is said in writing. Authentic reading is a gatheredness to that which, unbeknown to 
us, has already claimed our essence, regardless of whether we comply with it or withhold from it. 
Without authentic reading we are also not be able to see what has us in sight nor to gaze upon any 
appearance or semblance.  (Heidegger, M, 1954. Tr. By John Sallis) 
There is a lot to unpack in this short passage. One point is what John Sallis reads as an alternative in 
translating heisst in a transitive sense meaning that we are directed or called to read even before we decide 
consciously to do so. This is confirmed by Heidegger right after, when he writes as if something is already 
‘directive’ in the text. Something in the “writing” that “unbeknown to us has already claimed our essence.” 
It is an ‘essential’ call. We are not asked to reflect on a text as subjects confronting the text but rather our 
very essence ‘claimed’ by the ‘gatheredness’ is constituted in the act of reading and writing. There is a 
gatheredness in writing, as if there is a kind of writing as the place of community and 'following’ before we 
decide deliberately to write or compose any law or social contract. Dasein is the place of the emergence of 
writing which calls forth for an authentic reading. To be for different for Dasein, to have a signature and 
writing for Dasein is already a take a reading on what has come in the gatheredness. In this sense, 
everything down to every perception of the appearances of things turn to a reading which is equi-primordial 
with writing. 
 “We are trying to attain a basic orientation toward being-characters by examining the extent to which all 58
of these apparently different characters of being are linked as characters of the there” (BC. 24). In this 
sense, talking about community is to study the modes of gathering in “the there.” The question is whether 
there can be an originary presencing in “the there,” or what comes to fore in “the there” is always pre-
determined by the necessary organic presencing of nature or the necessary expression of the world in the 
categories. 
 For Derrida, this very movement defines the law of supplementarity. The fact that we always arrive 59
either too early or too later at the place of the presencing of beings. Being never shows itself completely 
and we can never be at the presence of being as such. 
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expression: unconcealment, the rising from unconcealedness, the coming 
and going away, the duration, the gathering, the radiance, the rest, the 
hidden suddenness of possible absenting. These are the traits of presencing 
in whose terms the Greeks thought of what is present. But they never gave 
thought to the traits themselves, for presencing did not become 
problematical or questionable to them as the presencing of what is present. 
Why not? Because the only thing for which they asked and perhaps had to 
ask, responded and replied, that is, answered to their questioning in these 
traits of presencing which we mentioned. (Cited by Brogan, 48; PA., 25) 
Heidegger effectively emphasizes this withdrawal of being (Entziehung, Entzug) in the 
very process of presencing which was ignored or left out systematically by the Greek and 
their later interpreters. That which is considered the proper, the completion or the end or 
the limit in the present by the Greeks, for Heidegger, is but a trace left of a more 
originary withdrawal, the retreat of Being which can give rise to the multiplicity of 
beings and a new for of temporality directed towards future.   
 Following Heidegger, Derrida radicalizes this emphasis on the difference as such 
so that every trait, property or appropriation of the meaning of being as well as the 
individuation as a being, is to be understood as an originary re-trait, or retreat of Being 
(Psyche, 52). Hence, retrait is a ‘translation (without translating)’ of the expression, 
withdrawal of Being, (Gasché, 156). Derrida replaces the gathering altogether with the 
difference, the rift of being (Fuge des Seins) that ultimately challenges property, 
authority, and sovereignty.   
 Altogether, I follow the same trend in questioning the tyranny of the actual and 
present in philosophy in favor of the potential and difference as such. I will follow 




 In this section, I explored some of the ways Aristotle attends to diversity in beings 
and the way different categories come to surface (logos and eidos) immanently. This 
suggests also that the categories of being are tightly connected with the categories in 
speech. Aristotle believes that logos has an immanent genesis related to the way things 
come to surface (presencing) in their particular look (eidos) rather than being an arbitrary 
imposition of mental categories to beings. In fact, Heidegger argues that truth as aletheia 
means exactly that. That is, the definition (horismos as logos ousias) of a thing is true, if 
and only if it corresponds exactly to the way things come-to-be or become present in 
logos.  
 At the same time, I demonstrated that the generation of diversity is restricted in a 
two-fold manner. Multiplicity in nature is controlled by completely different and 
independent genera and species in reality on the one hand, and by different, independent 
categories of language on the other. That is precisely why innovation in logos is a good 
indication to study whether the generation of the singular or innovative is allowed or not 
in Aristotle’s system. The way he treats innovation in language, in other words, indicates 
how his system deals with alterity, the abnormal, immigrants, and aliens. 
 The reference to immigrants is not only metaphoric but relates to Aristotle's 
conservativeness in regard to foreign words and metaphors: “For people feel the same 
way about wording as they do about foreigners and fellow citizens” (Rhetoric, 3. 2. 
1404b 10). Too many metaphors and foreign words makes the language unfamiliar and 
barbaric for Aristotle. Logos, for Aristotle, is not simply a medium of communication but 
it is the very place where the presencing comes to light and safeguarded. 
 In all cases, however, we are also taking into consideration that in order to be able 
to explain diversity and change in nature, he has to open a gap between an underlying 
level of being (hypokeimenon) and an appearing of some sort in particulars, the gap of 
difference which he tries to watch over and bridge with philosophy through some 
different schemata.  
 While the science of metaphysics for Aristotle works within the temporality of the 
present, the actual consideration of the singularity, otherness or the difference as such 
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calls for a new kind of temporality. Heidegger and Derrida are after the time of the time 
of the soul (energeia), of the coming-to-be of the original difference which does not 
count the lapses in between changes of the present categories or species but the one that 
gives different expressions in the first place. For that, they need to define new limits that 
are not pre-established as present and actual categories and yet provide some form of 
whole.  
 I did not elaborate on Heidegger or Derrida’s solutions here but only suggested 
that they replace the actual or present end of the categories with precarious limits like 
death of oneself or the other to provide the possibility for genuine presencing in the 
future. In this way, Dasein as human kind of understanding is more associated with 
potency (dynamis) than being-at-work (energeia). In the following chapters, we look at 
the promises and shortcomings of the Aristotelian limit and the way ‘following’ of the 
other justly, ‘addressing’ the other as different being that it is involves a new limit that 
gives a new temporality as well.  
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2. Chapter 2: Motion and Change: The Nature’s Heading 
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2.1. Introduction: Aristotle on Motion 
 We mentioned that, according to Aristotle, man as the life-possessing-logos is the 
locus of the expression of life. Life-possessing-logos is the place where the genuine 
character of beings can be revealed. We also mentioned that Heidegger exploits this direct 
access of man to its others (to the world and other people) in order to critique the notions 
like subject, self and object as separate from the world. Besides, Aristotle potentially 
provides the possibility of a pluralistic world by assuming the multiple senses of being. 
By focusing on presencing (ousia) rather than present beings, at least initially, Aristotle 
allows the emergence of a world that is hospitable to multiplicity and alterity. Life is 
pregnant with possibility, which can come to the fore in logos.  
On the other hand, logos is also associated with the end (telos), limit (peras) and 
the look (eidos) of beings. Heidegger mentions that for the Greek, including Aristotle, 
presencing (ousia) retained its ordinary usage, which denotes beings in their availability 
and use. In other words, that which emerges in logos for the Greek remains the available, 
present, and actual beings rather than a necessarily immanent character of being. 
Multiplicity is allowed within the boundaries of the familiar genera and species. Different 
meanings of beings should ultimately be accessible through the core meaning of being 
(pros hen) or by analogy.  
The next challenge is to explain how things stay within the boundaries of being 
while they are growing or changing to other things. The question is whether Aristotle’s 
metaphysics allows the generation of an absolutely new and free being. In the language 
used in this work, the question is whether his system welcomes an originary generation of 
otherness or an authentic ‘following.’ 
Again, Heidegger takes his lead from Aristotle by a) Aristotle’s consideration of 
motion as a process separate from agents and beings, in fact, as a stage of being where 
things are not-yet-at-their-end and still actual (i.e. as energeia ateles) and b) Aristotle’s 
recognition of the undetermined material (hylē), a stage where beings are not yet actual 
and present. Both of these characters of the science of motion would potentially permit a 
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generating that is not headed towards already actual or present beings. Life-possessing-
logos could accommodate the ‘following’ of the liberated other or oneself as the other. In 
other words, human beings could understand the presencing of the other without being 
responsible for, or accused of  limiting the existence of the other or one’s original 60
expression through representation or categorization of some kind.  
Aristotle explains the immanent motion (kinesis) which generates beings from a 
potential material (hylē) to their actual looks (eidos) which is the informed matter 
(hylomorph) so as to account for the generation of the singular beings. However, in an 
attempt to develop the science of motion, he systematically prioritizes one form of 
generation, that is natural organic generation, which creates some form of accountable 
ideality in repetition. In effect, he also marginalizes the accidental and inorganic 
formations while admitting that they rarely happen. 
In developing the science of natural motion, one encounters the same conundrum 
as before. On the one hand, establishing a science to understand the generated beings 
calls for the laws, which are able to anticipate future events and beings, on the other 
hand, such an anticipation inevitably places a universal limit on the genuine character of 
future events as well as the presence of an unanticipated other. All that is in future in this 
way turns into the repetition of the same or similar present and actual beings.  
In this chapter, I will first examine the phenomenological reading of Aristotle’s 
laws of generation. I explore the way Aristotle manages to study motion as such and the 
price he has to pay for making the science of motion possible. The former is a celebration 
of potency (dynamis) and the originality of ‘following’ while the latter is the strategic 
systematization, which gives a static identity to the follower. I will argue that Aristotle’s 
recognition of the immanent motion in nature plants the seed of yet another mode of 
generation or the deviation from the organic and normal mode of ‘following’. In other 
words, using Derrida’s terminology, Aristotle first recognizes and subsequently 
marginalizes the creation of the abnormal. Thereby, it is Aristotle himself who provides 
 This refers also to the mental categorization. It is worth remembering what kategoria in Greek originally 60
means. In Greek kategoria means "accusation, prediction, and category." It is a verbal noun from 
kategorein "to speak against; to accuse, assert, predicate. 
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the ontological ground for the ‘nomadic’ distribution of beings. An example of such a 
‘following’ can be seen in the work of art, which according to Heidegger, manifests the 
creative power of difference as such.  
Considering being a self or community as ‘following’ some universal laws that 
ordinarily establish one’s horizon of understanding of being jeopardizes the authenticity 
of one’s being. Then, I suggest that, should we have originary ‘following,’ that is an 
authentic possibility of considering oneself and the other as such, we need to have a 
motion whose end is not already pre-determined or written. 
2.1.1. Motion in Aristotle, Two Rival Views 
 The merit of Aristotle’s formulation of motion, as I mentioned above, is his 
attempt to bring the motion itself (energeia ateles) to light. In fact, some scholars like 
Brogan in his seminal work, Aristotle and Heidegger, The Twofoldness of Being, 
precisely argue to this effect. He claims that what is established as the necessary 
presencing (ousia) in nature is nothing but this life-giving force of motion (kinēsis). Thus, 
ousia in Aristotle is already potency (dynamis) rather than being-at-work (energeia).  
 He emphasizes that by becoming an actual natural being, the being has not lost its 
potency (dynamis). That is, potency (dynamis) is not a certain potentiality that vanishes 
when it has become actual. Quite the contrary, he emphasizes that dynamis needs to be 
understood like hylē as perpetually at work in the presencing of natural beings and 
holding them in their being (Brogan, 85). 
 Another group of scholars including Derrida attribute this discovery to Heidegger 
and his critique of Aristotle’s thought. I believe that it is the bifurcating tendencies within 
Aristotle’s thought, as I briefly mentioned above, that give rise to such opposing 
interpretation of his work. That is to say, to explain all modes of ‘following’ that 
Aristotle’s work gives rise to, one needs to consider the forces and laws that he prefers 
and the ones that he marginalizes.  
I argue that Aristotle himself prioritizes the present status of nature, nature as 
being-at-work, and motion as the necessary and eternal principle that “for the most part” 
65
generates the same or similar. Following Derrida, I will argue that it is precisely in this 
“symptomatic mis-recognition or mis-treatment” (DDP. 6) that Aristotle sanctions a 
hidden, differential and unfamiliar movement; I call ‘nomadic movement.’ The scale of 
this systematic marginalization becomes manifest in the recurrent re-appearance of the 
abnormal in different contexts in his text and his treatment or mis-treatment of them, 
whether in the Generation of Animals and Ethics or the intervention of strange and alien 
words in the Poetics and the Rhetoric. In all of these cases, we notice him allowing the 
multiplicity, which he subsequently tames or limits by the anticipation of the similar 
father figure, the integrity of the system, or clarity of ordinary and dominant language 
(kurion). 
By conjuring up the forces of motion from the depth of the material mixture 
where being is still in gestation, Aristotle opens the door to the creation of unfamiliar, 
unworldly bodies and forms. Below, I argue that Aristotle usually attributes these bestial 
formations to accidents, unfamiliar mixture in underlying matter, or an unintentional but 
necessary and tragic flaw, a missing the mark (hamartia). Part of the necessary motion in 
nature is the contingent and unanticipated events which lead the motion to miss the target. 
The created catastrophe in this way, like the ones in the Greek tragedies, does not look 
like a normal turn of events or any familiar form. It is essentially a deviation and 
deformity from the hylomorphic structure of nature and still it is a genuine expression of 
the immanent movement in nature. Beyond the normal, ordinary formations of nature, 
accidents and hamartiai unveil the neutral creative power of difference as such. 
Moreover, the existence of these monstrous or bestial formations underlines the arbitrary 
preference of Aristotle for the organic generation in nature. 
In fact, investigating the most originary form of presencing, Heidegger finds an 
alternative to the necessary and natural presencing. He suggests that one can be in touch 
with such an expression of difference in the work of art. Apart from the ordinary logos 
and the organic laws of nature that reflect the inherent motion in life, the authentic 
revelation of nature (the automatic force of creation) comes to pass only in the work of 
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art. The gifted poet suspends the already determined telos and logos and reaches this 
inorganic animal motion.  
2.2. The Economy of Motion 
 We mentioned that motion once again highlights the disclosing character of logos 
and its relationship with nature. The question is whether Aristotle manages to account for 
the generation in nature while keeping the singular character of the other intact. I will 
argue that he acknowledges the genetic power of motion within the material mixture 
within the material mixture while strategically and economically bringing it under the 
economy of a scientific account. 
2.2.1. Motion as Energeia Atēles 
 In reference to motion (kinēsis), we come across another formulation of 
presencing (ousia) as potency (dynamis) versus being-at-work (energeia). Aristotle takes 
control of motion, which is essentially the state of being incomplete (aperon), by 
formulating it as an interdependent relationship with material potential (hylē) on the one 
hand and an actual form (morphē) on the other. As I have already pointed out, the form 
corresponds to the final, complete shape or look (eidos) of the thing in speech (logos). 
Heidegger confirms the latter, maintaining that, “the clue by which eidos- and thereby 
also morphē- are graspable is logos.”  Or again, “Morphē must be understood from 61
eidos, and eidos must be understood from logos.”  That is to say that hylomorphism is 62
plagued with the same paradox of logos.  
 In his study of change, Aristotle reasons against Eleatics who deny change. He 
believes that by their insistence on “a single principle,” they closed the possibility of 
studying nature in general. Change for the Eleatics would make being plunge into non-
being while for Aristotle it happens “within the horizon of being” (Met., 4.2.1003b 10). 
 WEG 345f=250 (Cited in Sheehan, 150)61
 WEG 345=249 (Cited in Sheehan, 150)62
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That is the promising aspect of his physics which welcomes a kind of being which is still 
not-yet (dynamis) but actual (energeia ateles). 
 He manages not to eliminate the unity of being, ousia, altogether. In other words, 
insofar as we say “non-being is non-being” and as long as we are attributing some kind of 
“is-ness” to it, it has to be at least minimally on the surface of things. In yet another 
formulation, it is argued that change occurs in such a way that it would not dismantle the 
vertical (inter-generic) or horizontal (intra-generic) unity (Protevi, 2001. 6-8) of the 
essence.  In the former case, the underlying material principle, hypokeimenon, retains 63
the unity of essence during the alteration, which occurs within the categories of existing 
entities (motion). For the latter, i.e., vertical unity, the hylomorph would guarantee the 
unity and particularity of the entities while alteration occurs across the borders of 
substances of existing entities (generation and destruction). The relationship between 
entities with vertical unity would be established through analogy. For Aristotle then, there 
is no lapse of non-being throughout the change even in destruction but rather we would 
see a change in appearance from one existing entity to another. Thus, we can conclude 
that beings are constantly present as if they do not destroy.   64
 Aristotle defines motion as the being-at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia) of a 
potency as potency (or as such) (Physics, 201a 10-11, 27-29, b 4-5). The ingenuity of this 
definition is that it keeps the paradoxical situation of motion intact while managing also 
to keep it within the structure of logos. For a being to be represented or manifested in 
logos, it has to come to its completion and stability, to its being-at-work-staying-itself 
 Before Aristotle, change from A to B was thought to be first, from A to non-being and then from non-63
being to B. And since non-being cannot be thought of, it is considered impossible. This is the logic of 
ontological contradiction while Aristotle proposes a logic of phenomenological contraries for motion. John 
Protevi finds the clue as to such a strategy in Aristotle’s use of negative particles. That is Aristotle uses 
negative particle “mē” in “to mē on” exclusively Physics 1 to refer to the becoming-not that is involved in 
change, yet, whenever he wants to refer to absolute non-being he uses “ouk on.”  Therefore, that which is 
not X  (to mē on) equals to that which is non-X” while “ouk on”  equals that which simply absolutely is 
not” (Protevi, 1994. 46). Walter Brogan cites and translates Heidegger from Vorträge und Aufsätze about 
the signification of these terms as well, concluding that in thinking about motion in this way, Aristotle is 
thinking being and non-being at the same time, while keeping them distinct. (Brogan 75)
 That is, incidentally, where Heidegger introduces death as a precarious form of completion and end, the 64
one that contains an element of absence and potency. Death as opposed to constancy of familiar life injects 
the character of potency to motion precisely because it is an event which is not-in-the-world.
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(entelecheia). And since “man has no access to entities except in terms of their being (i.e., 
their meaningful presence in logos),” this means that human beings only grasp beings in 
so far as they are in energeia, while ergon of energeia and telos of entelecheia express 
the element of stability and endurance in them (Sheehan, 131). For Aristotle, movement 
and change are still a mode of being and in fact the fundamental mode of being in the 
sublunar sphere. According to the definition, then, motion can reach logos (because it is 
entelecheia) but that which it brings to logos is the potency (not-yet appearing) as such.  
However, saying that entities are in motion essentially amounts to saying that they 
are endless (ateles) while the definition of the entity has to be about beings in completion 
(en telei). Such is the paradoxical character of becoming and motion. Sheehan explains 
this as follows: 
A moving entity as moving is present in logos somehow standing in its 
telos but as not yet having come fully into its telos. To understand a 
growing thing as what it fundamentally and properly is, namely as 
growing, we must understand it as appearing (en eidōi), but appearing in 
such a way that the entity brings with it into eidos a nonappearing 
(Sheehan, 150). 
 Thus, there is a sense in which the genuine character of things in motion emerges 
as the suspension of appearance or the anticipation of appearance. What appears in 
motion maintains a mysterious appearance of an absence. Heidegger calls this 
paradoxical notion a “pres-ab-sence” (Sheehan, 150). At least in this rendering, Aristotle 
manages to talk about motion in its appearing in logos, that is as energeia atēles. It can be 
argued that the ambiguity and the potential paradox that Aristotle produces through the 
notion of energeia atēles gets him closer to pre-socratics like Heraclitus more than 
Parmenides. 
 For Heidegger, still, the prime example of this motion in Aristotle is nature 
(physis). Thus, a part of what an entity manifests in motion is an absence, a non-
appearing. For example, as opposed to a grown tree, whose soul is flourishing in its ergon 
(function) as nutrition, the seed appears as not-yet grown tree which is still energeia as it 
69
is fulfilling its function in being an incomplete apple tree or a virtual apple tree, a not-
yet-apple tree.  
 Aristotle describes this virtuality as potency (dynamis). Therefore, potency 
(dynamis) is not a capacity, inactive and simply potential, but rather an activity of 
manifesting the appearance and the nonappearance at the same time. Richardson calls this 
the “ambivalent nature of physis” (Richardson, 310) in Aristotle.  In this sense, motion 65
includes an interplay of “Anwesung (coming-to-presence) that is negatived 
(Abwesung)” (Richardson, 310).  When something comes-to-presence in morphē, 66
receiving its eidos, it brings with itself that which it has negated, or taken out of presence. 
For example, when an apple receives the form of an apple, it announces the necessary 
dis-appearance of the blossoms of the tree let alone the seeds (Richardson, 313).   
 Now, the withdrawing of the seed of an apple tree or the blossoms into itself is its 
dynamis. It is important to note, however, that for Aristotle (and perhaps not for 
Heidegger and Derrida) dynamis is still headed towards entelecheia. It is that detour away 
from absolute stable presence. Dynamis for Aristotle seems to be always not-yet fully 
complete but can be and is the source of repetition. This repetition is the basis for its 
ideality which makes the science and laws of nature possible.   67
 As we read in chapter 2 of BC, Heidegger sees a fundamental relationship between 
the Greek terms ergon, peras, and telos, by which being-at-work (energeia) is prioritized 
over potency (dynamis) as being incomplete and in motion. That is to say, although 
 Richardson among others sees the reflections of some pre-Socratic and particularly Heraclitean 65
conception of physis here, where for Heraclitus “physis is Being itself.” Physis is ambivalent in that as 
being it manifests itself and at the same time is “inclined to conceal itself.” 
 Sheehan has found other expressions in Heidegger explaining this non-appearance accompanying 66
appearance: An-sich-halten (to restrain oneself), In-sich-Ziruck-gehen  which means to “withdraw into 
oneself”(Richardson 310).
 It is also significant that physis is only the being of the entities which have their principle of motion and 67
rest in them. “The plant keeps its principles (archai) within itself.” That is why, in contrast with the artifacts 
which have their principle and source outside themselves for example in their maker's mind and whose 
ends are genuine energeia as complete (teleia) and outside the process of creation, natural entities can never 
bring their not-yet-ness completely into telos. Sheehan uses a very key term to explain this process of 
“allowing the possibility to remain possibility” (Sheehan 151). We may say that the natural entity as 
opposed to the artifact (technē), keeps on repeating its possibility (re-petere: to reach out for again and 
again) (Sheehan 151-52).
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motion in Aristotle happens between contraries and everything can actually turn out 
otherwise than expected, the measure is still the appropriation of the end.  
A natural being maintains itself and is maintained “in” its sameness. 
Therefore, it must in a way not be itself. Inasmuch as it directs itself 
towards itself, it is not itself but in relation to (kata) itself (Brogan, 77).  
 This relationality and directionality, which constitutes the being of a natural being, 
is towards a natural being’s limit (peras). A natural being is striving toward being itself. 
Aristotle, in turn, admits that in reference to potency he had to invent a new term to make 
motion understandable. This term, which is interchangeably used with energeia, is 
fabricated or, as Aristotle writes, “designed” for the treatment of dynamis or motion par-
excellence. The term is entelecheia which combines several key notions in Aristotelian 
philosophy, (en-tel-echeia).  It is almost the same as ousia in its non-terminological, 68
political connotations as “possessing, having, and ruling.” Motion in the sense of potency 
is always toward or with an eye on the completed state. In a complete formulation 
Sheehan expresses the unity of such terms as ergon, telos, and peras as follows.   
An entity, standing or lying present (hypokeimenon, etc.) in its self-
limitation (peras) and showing itself for what it is (eidos), “has itself” (cf. 
echein) “in its fulfillment” (en telei): en-tel-echeia (Sheehan, 144-145). 
It is only in that complete standing in presence that an entity is performing its proper 
function or work (ergon), hence energeia as well. Therefore, motion in this sense seems 
to be still a delayed presence. To use Derrida’s terminology, it is headed towards the 
proper, the same, and the capital. Brogan even emphasizes that the direction is towards 
“being the same unity with themselves” (Brogan, 76). That is to say that the beings in 
motion keep their sameness with themselves, they are always already towards that 
anticipated sameness given by their form. So, as much as he tries to establish a difference 
 As we mentioned following Heidegger, “telos” in entelecheia does not mean primarily "aim" or 68
"purpose" neither "cessation" but rather "completion, fulfillment, and accomplishment. Also “echein” in 
“entelecheia,” meaning “has itself,” has the same root as hexis, as habit, in turn meaning “possession,” 
“holding” or “having.”
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in the motion from this to that, in fact, a being is headed towards nothing different but 
toward being-identical- to-itself.  
Aristotle accomplishes the thinking of kinēsis in its belonging together with 
peras. Physis is a way of ousia. Change can be kata to auto, in respect to the 
same. The kata here somehow holds together and yet separates. It does so 
through the hama, as Heidegger points out in the section 19 of Basic 
Problem of Phenomenology. Through this word, Aristotle is able to 
articulate the structure of the being of change. Natural beings are beings 
whose necessity, unity, and simplicity allow for change and coming to be in 
time (Brogan, 76). 
 This is the kind of thinking of change that makes time as the neutral “number of 
change” possible. Time is simply counting this becoming-other while being the same. In 
other words, what Aristotle regards as “other and other” of time do not produce different 
numerical unities or entities but rather count the same (hama) being (Physics, 218a 10). 
The “other and other” of time never destroys the “same and the same” of time (Lawlor, 
21). Directionality does not produce the unanticipated and so time turns circular, 
producing the same over and over. 
 The Metaphysics IX, section 5 explains the force of life or the automatic kinēsis in 
physis which leads natural beings necessarily towards their limits. “Natural beings 
emerge out of themselves and direct themselves toward their being while maintaining 
themselves in the necessity of their limits. Their coming to be is not by chance or force, 
but a necessary coming to be that is continuously governed by their being” (Brogan, 
69-70). 
 Therefore, Aristotle first welcomes the not-yet-named or non-appearing and then 
very quickly controls it in favor of repetition for the establishment of the science of 
nature. It is as if he wakes up the dormant forces of the material mixture in nature and 
then strives to put them to sleep back again. One can argue that through the temporary 
suspension of the telos and logos for a moment the other, the difference as such gets a 
chance to reveal itself as not-yet fully appropriated.  
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 However, since what appears in this way might very well be against the familiar, 
organic world, in the hierarchy of natural generation, Aristotle regard them as less perfect 
or totally monstrous. This will have its corresponding effect when the motion reaches the 
surface in language.  
 That is when power of silence is unleashed to give voice to the genuine character 
of the world or to ‘address’ the otherness as such. When comes to pass in this way, the 
logos is not anticipated and may come into conflict with the established, sedimented 
logos of the past or the public discourse. As a deviation from the public discourse it is in 
form of a metaphor or altogether a foreign language.  69
While regarding the automatic motion in nature as originary, Aristotle still 
maintains his preference for what is actual, in view, knowable and accountable by 
prioritizing a heading, a capital “towards” which beings are headed just to maintain their 
constant being. 
2.2.2. Motion and the Material Mixture (hylē) 
 Attention to the motion in itself (energeia ateles) and the material (hylē), that mode 
of being which is not-yet appropriated, little by little begin to release the power of yet 
another kind of motion that can express the unfamiliar and the original difference as such. 
I argue that Aristotle is aware of this a-teleological, ‘nomadic’ motion; but he 
strategically controls it in favor of the necessary and eternal one which imitates the 
circular locomotion of the heavens.  
 In this regard, one can remember the opening remarks of Socrates in the dialogue “the Apology”. He 69
mentions that what he is going to say in his defense will be truth and nothing but the truth. Yet he also 
characterizes his speech and his logos in two ways: one is that his language will appear “not ornamented”. 
It is not a decorated version of the language of the present. He says, “I shall use the words and arguments 
which occur to me at the moment.” This mode of expression seems to be of a different form of temporality. 
The expression is coming “at the moment.” Now even a more startling character of this speech is that it is 
idiomatic and perhaps idiotic. The language of the truth is not only ugly but also like a foreign language. 
Socrates expects people of the jury understand him and yet he says: “I would have you regard me as if I 
were really a stranger whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue and after the fashion of his 
country.” The language of revelation, the authentic language of the truth and originary ‘following’ is a 
foreign language compared with the ordinary language. It is idiomatic and private (idiom) as if idiotic and 
stupid.  
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 At the beginning of Book A of the Physics, Aristotle gives two rival interpretations 
of physis: the material (hylē)  and the form (morphē) (Physics, 193a 28-31).  According 70 71
to Brogan, Aristotle presents the subject as two ways of ‘addressing’ physis (Brogan, 82). 
It is worth remembering that physis does not refer to any natural being per-se but implies 
the automatic self-generating power of generation. Therefore, Aristotle is situating the 
generating force of difference within both material mixture and form. Then, there is this 
corporeal material force in depth underlying the expression of the singularity, which 
comes to the surface in an unanticipated way, thereby threatening the integrity of the 
system. The images, simulacra, and semblances are examples of such makings.  
 That is why Aristotle very quickly takes control of this unfamiliar source of nature. 
According to Brogan hylē for Aristotle is the underlying substance of change, and that 
which is in a “fundamental relation with that to which it belongs and for the sake of 
which it counts as matter” (Brogan, 83). Thus, as Brogan confirms, “inasmuch as it is 
addressed from the point of view of morphē, hylē co-constitutes the being of natural 
beings. When the hylē gathers itself (kinēsis) in its proper place and stands forth as the 
being it is (eidos as morphē), then hylē is the ousia of natural beings” (Met., 1042a 32; 
Brogan, 84). This is the meaning of hylomorphism.  
 Hylomorphism in this manner does not mean that there is some dark matter before 
the formation of something in logos, which could potentially be used otherwise. Material 
(hylē) is part of the definition of a thing as long as it is already formed. “Only inasmuch 
as the matter is directed toward and delimited by morphē (as eidos) is a being embodied 
in its ousia, and one with itself. Thus, it is morphē that defines what a being is and 
determines the appropriate matter that is essential to this being” (Brogan, 87).  For 
Aristotle, it is only retrospectively and by reversal that the material exists as potency. The 
Hylē in Greek originally means forest and woodland, and not merely the trees or wood. It never means 70
some originally unformed and indeterminate stuff that then is formed in some way.
 Heidegger translated the passage in the Physics which is cited by Brogan with his own equivalent terms 71
for German words as follows: “It is of decisive importance, first, that we allow space for beings as a whole; 
second, that we release ourselves into the nothing, which is to say, that we liberate ourselves from those 
idols everyone has and to which one is wont to go cringing; and finally, that we let the sweep of our 
suspense take its full course, so that it swings back into the basic question of metaphysics which the 
nothing compels: Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?” (Brogan 82)
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most original movement for Aristotle is the one, which leaves nothing unaccounted for or 
unformed. Natural motion has to meet its anticipated end. “The essential characteristic of 
natural movement is that it originates out of and toward itself while remaining in 
itself” (Brogan, 86). Consequently, through kinēsis, a natural being simply embodies, 
incorporates itself. Aristotle makes a similar statement about the generation of the same 
in the Physics, “man generates man” (Physics, 193b8), meaning the controlling eidos is 
within the very generation itself, and hence the process of generation entails the self-
provision of that which is “appropriated for…” The “from which,” say, (Smith Sr.) and 
the “to which” (Smith Jr.) have the same eidos (“Man”) (Sheehan, 1983. 153). 
 Aristotle still depends on hylē for individuation when he writes: “If form is the 
definition of a being in general, hylē determines its thisness (todē ti)” (Met., 1045b 18). 
Nonetheless, the process of generation of a natural entity as being-underway from Senior 
(father) to Junior (the son) (genesis as physēos hodos eis physein- see Physics 193b 12) 
never has to go outside of itself but rather consists of instantiation of the eidos (Smith 
Sr.), and the second instantiation of the same eidos (Smith Jr.) (Sheehan, 1983. 153).  
 This is confirmed by Heidegger’s translation of individual being in Aristotle, 
which is aligned with how a thing appears in its “look” in public rather than the genuine 
occurrence of difference. The individual being (hekaston) in its private presencing is 
translated by Heidegger as das Geeinzelte. Brogan explains that this choice of the term in 
German is not very common and emphasizes the prefix Ge- which indicates a gathering 
or community (Brogan, 84). Altogether, it seems that Heidegger would like to underline 
that what is considered individual is essentially connected to the what is common 
(koinon) and public, indicating that hylē needs to be understood as headed towards being 
in common with other individual beings (Brogan, 84). Hylomorph is headed towards 
appropriation, a kind of having and being proper in eidos and logos which is public as 
well as private.  
 Now, if it is the combination and mixture in the material that in reality give rise to 
beings why is that Aristotle prioritizes form as what determines the being of a thing. This 
is in line with what we mentioned in the last chapter. It seems that before the material 
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change immanently expresses the character of individual beings, their end is already 
determined by what they look like for the most part. It is the surface, the being, the ousia 
as being available, that has already determined the result of the generation before the 
individual is given the time or chance to reveal itself. The reason seems to be the priority 
of natural generation for Aristotle.  
2.2.3. The Necessary Nature of the Organic Making 
 The paradigmatic example of motion and change within categories for Aristotle is 
the necessary movement in nature.  
Natural beings emerge out of themselves and direct themselves toward 
their being while maintaining themselves in the necessity of their limits. 
Their coming to be is not by chance or force, but a necessary coming to be 
that is continuously governed by their being. The heneka—that “for the 
sake of which” they are becoming (as archē and telos) (Physics 200 a8) 
governs the movement that is necessary “in order to” (without which a 
being could not be—ou aneu ouk endechetai) (Met., 1015 a20; Physics, 
200 a6) (Brogan, 69-70).  
Aristotle makes a distinction between natural genesis, which is automatic and necessary, 
and an artificial making (technē), which imposes some deviation on natural presencing. 
The necessary nature of this movement and the already anticipated end and telos makes 
the movement already in-the-world and inhospitable to innovative creations. That is, 
there has to be a prior tacit awareness of the unities that are necessary in the horizon of 
the motion and generation. “It is only from a prior awareness of this unity that we can 
even relate to beings and recognize the nature of their being” (Brogan, 88). In effect, 
natural beings are not made up of formless, indeterminate material. Every material is 
already in a necessary relationship with the order of the organic nature which violently 
puts it to use. Being in accordance with nature for Aristotle is equal to being necessary 
and eternal (aidion).  
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 The originary character of natural beings is due to this necessary and eternal 
nature. That which is in the way of eternal (aidion) has the character of being necessary, 
whereas that which happens to come along with such a being, but does not constitute its 
beingness, is incidental (sumbebēkos). Natural beings, according to Aristotle, are both 
everlasting and necessary (Brogan, 67).  
 Aristotle emphasizes this fact in all sort of ways. “Each being itself and its logos 
are one and the same and not merely in incidental way” (Met., 1031 b19–20). For beings 
to be necessary and everlasting, they have to be a whole or united. “That which is as a 
whole and that which belongs to this kind of unity as “that without which the whole 
would not be possible” is the necessary (Met., 1015 a20). There is, then, evidently a 
virtue or an advantage attached to that which is necessary, united, and everlasting as 
opposed to what is incidental and singular. Aristotle himself insists that only beings that 
emerge out of themselves and go forth into their being without being caused by 
manipulation (bia) or chance (tychē) are necessary beings and thereby ever-presencing as 
they are (Physics, 199 b15–19). Technē is said to violently interrupt this first kind of 
motion, changing the natural course of beings to what an agent has in mind.  
 In this reading of nature, it is suggested that ‘following’ naturally as the same is 
the most stable and the best way and any imposition of a form from outside must be 
examined with the already established destination in logos. Instituting an arbitrary 
gathering or category from beyond is considered violent. In other words, an event that 
does not follow the necessary structure of the world, as we know it, is not natural and is 
violent. Thus, the philosopher’s expectation for the events to follow the same way as 
before has made them ontologically more original as well.  
2.2.4. The Violent Nature of the Organic Making 
 Movement by nature is possible because necessity rules over the world of nature. 
The material mixture has to follow the laws to become available and visible. Without 
necessity, the free movement from out of itself toward its telos that is the essence of a 
natural being would be impossible.  
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 There are two kinds of violence imbedded and admitted by Aristotle in the 
implementation of the necessary natural laws. Firstly, there is a violence in the way in 
which the natural laws incorporate an ‘other’ as a “such” into a “this.” This process is, in 
fact, the fundamental insight that allows Aristotle to develop the categorial understanding 
of beings (Brogan, 71). Aristotle poses this as an immanent and free appropriation of 
matter to produce multiplicity in natural world within the boundaries of genera and 
species. Still natural and organic, the second form of violence is when the eternal 
presencing of nature is cut short by another process from beyond the immanent material 
mixture of a being (Physics, 199b33).  
 The incredible fact is that Aristotle himself finds another form of necessity within 
the process of natural presencing (Physics, 199 b33). There are two kinds of necessity 
involved in nature. He implies that there could be the imposition of form from outside 
where the path towards telos is cut short.  
There is a movement in nature that makes a things what it is. A grass is a 
grass because its form incorporates its material necessarily in form of a 
grass. However, a cow might eat the grass according to its nature and the 
nature of the grass and this is a second sort of movement in nature, a 
motion that impedes another motion or is in community with it. (Brogan, 
71) 
The second form of necessity cuts the path of the coming to be of the grass short in order 
to turn it into milk, a nourishment for a cow (Brogan, 71). Both of these movements are 
organic and necessary but the second one is also violent for they are imposed from 
beyond the unity of the entity. 
 There are always two paradoxical forms of necessity: one that is the necessary 
and homogeneous life-giving force, “that without which, as the accompanying cause 
(sunaition), life would be impossible” (Met., 1015 a20–21). This is the necessity by 
which things come to be rather than not-be. However, the second kind of natural 
necessity is the one that is “compulsory” (Met., 1015a 27). In both forms of natural and 
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organic necessity, there is an inevitable violence imposed by the natural laws which 
Aristotle is aware of.  
 Brogan explains both kinds of natural necessity as the inherent violence in nature. 
“By enforcing its limits, necessity appropriates what is not governed by necessity and 
what is therefore non-being and limitless change. Change according to necessity is 
change that is directed toward and “for the sake of” the aidion.  It holds itself within the 72
ever-presencing of ousia and is this sameness with itself” (Brogan, 69).   73
Hence, natural beings in motion are in fact identical to themselves from the very 
beginning and the time is still like the number that is being “the same and the same” as 
opposed to “the other and the other.”  
 Here is where reading physis as kinēsis begins to reveal its internal paradoxes. 
The more one emphasizes the necessity of natural movement and the repetition thereof, 
the more political and forceful it gets. I would like to underline particularly the words that 
in Brogan’s language has a forceful and political connotation. It is as if we are asking 
about the sovereignty or the one in charge of the inherent automatic motion in nature. 
That is where we encounter the violent and arbitrary foundation of authority in this 
metaphysical system.  
Thus natural beings, which are under way toward and becoming what they 
are, are already governed by their being. Being-toward cannot be properly 
understood by analogy to an abstract line. A natural being in its movement 
toward itself is always already itself and its movement is a returning or 
turning back upon itself. (Brogan, 86; my emphasis). 
It is noteworthy that we are still concerned with the motion that is free and automatic and 
yet Brogan’s language is rife with political terminology. The significance of these terms 
is that they attribute a sense of cultural and political appropriacy to a certain kind of 
According to Brogan, aidion refers to aei deios, that which remains in shining of presence and therefore 72
is seen (theoria) in unconcealment. 
By referring to the aidion, he in fact refers this necessity to the immediate access to the being of things 73
through noein before any external imposition of form is performed on the beings. It is as if in the presence 
of the divine, or the timeless things are already present in their necessity. 
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generation rather than another. There is a virtue attached to staying the same or 
‘following’ the necessary laws, which ironically makes them not purely natural anymore. 
In explaining the automatic nature of natural movement in Aristotle, Brogan’s language 
brings together “the eternal, the necessary and the violent” altogether in one paragraph:  
Change according to necessity is change that is directed toward and “for 
the sake of” the aidion [eternal]. It holds itself within the ever-presencing 
of ousia and is this sameness with itself. Necessity is this violent holding 
itself together of a movement that is governed by the need to be. Life is 
violence. It appropriates to itself what is necessary in order to be 
(Aristotle gives the example of nourishment and breathing). Aristotle says 
necessity does violence in this way to what lies in the path and gets in the 
way of the thrust (hormē) or the deliberately chosen direction 
(prohairesis) (1015 a28) (Brogan 70-71).  74
 While establishing the sovereignty of necessary laws of nature, Aristotle perhaps 
unintentionally sanctions and lay the grounds for the existence of that which is not purely 
organic. Philosophers are tasked with watching over this hidden motion at the heart of 
nature against the incidental semblances, which might occur (tychē) or exploited by the 
sophists.  
That is perhaps why, with the admission to the marginal improper makings and 
gatherings in nature, the ones that are not organic, we already noted above, Brogan’s 
language has turned political and forceful as well. Altogether, the point is that, 
phenomenologically speaking there is no reason one should use the language of violence 
or non-violence to explain the generation of beings in the world. If as phenomenologists, 
we are to describe the experience of reality as it is, there should not be any presupposition 
of the ‘heading’ of change. In the case of change in Aristotle however, organic making is 
evidently prior and more proper in virtue of being more frequent.  
 Thus, for Aristotle, the principal example of ousia in the sublunar realm is physis 
which as I have argued he understands as being-at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia). 
my emphasis74
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Natural generation for Aristotle eternally reveals the best and the most stable beings. 
Motion in this realm is definable in speech (logos) only as far as nature’s acts are 
anticipatable “generally and for the most part.” In fact, as Joe Sachs puts it in his 
commentary to the Physics: 
Aristotle speaks of the patterns of nature as present not always but "for the 
most part." His way of understanding the causes of things does not do 
violence either to the stability or to the variability of the world, but affirms 
the unfailing newness-within-sameness that we observe in the return of the 
seasons and the generations of living things (Sachs, 25). 
Unlike Brogan, Sachs believes that there is no violence in considering the multiplicity in 
the world and prioritizing what happens “for the most part.” This is because of the very 
double character of Aristotle’s philosophy, that he intentionally and knowingly 
marginalizes other forms of making (accidental or man-made) as improper. Yet, it is 
precisely this decision which gives the improper motion an ontological sanction to 
present the unfamiliar or the abnormal.  
 On the same hierarchical distinction in nature, Brogan actually quotes Aristotle 
about one strange improper motion. In the beginning of Chapter III of Book II of the 
Physics Aristotle writes: “Since physis is the originating and governing over being-
moved and thus over the upsurgence [ousia] which bursts into the open, our methodos 
must not allow kinēsis essentially to remain in concealment. For whenever kinēsis 
remains unfamiliar, physis also remains in unfamiliarity” (Physics 200 b12–15; WBP, 
341). What he seems to be doing is to bring kinēsis under the light of logos and 
familiarity before it begins to create unfamiliar and unaccountable (alogon) entities. That 
is how he indicates some “unfamiliar” kinēsis for which we might have an “unfamiliar” 
physis. 
 It is worth noting that Aristotle does not deny the existence of an improper 
kinēsis, that is a kinēsis which is not in accordance with natural presencing. He merely 
underlines that in order to be able to scientifically account for motion we have to bring it 
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to unconcealment. And if all motions need to come to unconcealment, they have to 
remain familiar and organic.  
 Now, there is no objection to the automaticity of change which remains immanent 
to nature, however the problem is the familiarity that is assumed which connects the 
limits of motion with the established logos and already present and familiar forms. By 
assuming that we can move from what is more familiar to us to what is familiar in itself, 
he is basically prioritizing the commonsensical normality, thereby taking the absence and 
hiddenness away from the process of natural making. 
 Aristotle is well aware of the fact that beings may be impeded from reaching their 
telos even though the movement toward their end is an automatic one and governed by 
necessity. He calls the kind of necessity that characterizes natural beings hypothetical, i.e. 
“if nothing interferes” (Physics, 199 b35). He is wary of the occurrence of accidents that 
might interfere with the process and lead it toward unanticipated results. The natural 
necessity is always haunted by the inorganic motion, accidental events, or (in the case of 
the sophists) the political intentions which might carry them away to produce alternative 
realities or monstrous results.  
The leading example of such accidental anomalies is hamartia, the accidental 
flaw which makes the organic order of things get carried away towards an improper or 
unanticipated end. I follow Joe Sachs and Michael Davis in rendering this word in 
accordance with its original root as “missing the mark.” Of course, hamartia originally 
refers to the flaw of the tragic hero, the one that leads him to a disastrous fate, a fate that 
he could not anticipate but was already necessary and written for him. As I will argue in 
the following chapter, hamartia is a recurrent theme in Aristotle, pointing to the cases of 
an unaccountable or unanticipated disaster that brings about wonder and catharsis. 
Hamartia in this sense is symptomatic of an unfamiliar movement at work in nature 
which is not organic per-se and misses the target or telos, as well as logos and eidos. It is 
unfamiliar, as if altogether not in-the-world. The important point is that these kinds of 
makings are considered inappropriate and catastrophic as if imposed on peaceful and 
normal natural order of things. 
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2.3. Alterity and the Beast, an Example 
 What gets increasingly clear as we proceed with the generation of animals is that 
the dominant trend is that of hylomorphism of some sort, while at the same time 
acknowledging the threat of the fringe and of the abnormal which ought to be tamed as 
far as possible. The important point, however, is that Aristotle acknowledges that the 
movement of generation starts completely naturally and the abnormal is unavoidable to a 
large extent due to possible unknown natural deviations (hamartia). But when it occurs 
the movement would breach the vertical unity and instead of hylo-morphe produces cata-
strophe.  These final unexpected, unforeseen ends and deformed matters, Aristotle calls 75
monsters. I owe this discovery to John Protevi’s critical reading of Aristotle although he 
does not refer to the significance of hamartia. This section is the elaboration and 
contextualization of his account from his book titled, Time and Exteriority: Aristotle, 
Heidegger, Derrida.  
 The immediate source of motion in most of animals is the male principle, the 
father, who sets the seeds in motion through injecting semen into female body. While 
doing this, in fact, the natural organism is participating in the immanent movement of 
nature. Ordinarily, this should not cause any problem and through participating in it 
living organisms “have a share in what always is and is divine” (De Anima, 2.4.415a 30). 
 This is only when they are doing their main function properly, “since the most 
natural thing for a living thing to do …… is to make another like itself, for an animal to 
make an animal and a plant to make a plant” (De Anima, 2.4.415a 30-b). 
 The most ideal model for this form of life-giving is when the superior male 
principle through the seed of the father victoriously overcomes the motion inherent in the 
maternal material on which it works, thereby producing the appearance of the same form 
in a father-resembling male child. Aristotle writes: “If the semenal residue in the 
catastrophe (n.)1530s, "reversal of what is expected" (especially a fatal turning point in a drama, the 75
winding up of the plot), from Latin catastropha, from Greek katastrophe "an overturning; a sudden end," 
from katastrephein "to overturn, turn down, trample on; to come to an end," from kata "down" + strephein 
"turn" (on line etymology)
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menstrual fluid is well-concocted, the movement derived from the male will make the 
form of the embryo after its own pattern” (GA. 4.3.767b 15 -17). The detour of woman 
needs to be gone through, only to return to the same paternal form.  
Then Nature, aiming at the best end, uses it up in this place for the sake of 
generation, that another creature may come into being of the same kind as 
the former was going to be, for the menstrual blood is already potentially 
such as the body from which it is discharged (PA, 738b 1-5). 
 It is in this way that, according to Protevi, during the whole patriarchal history of 
philosophy the generation of the body is controlled under the hylomorphic production of 
the same. In other words, the maternal material is mastered so that the detour of the 
mother’s matter will not break, but only provide the circumference of the circle of the 
species.  
 Aristotle observes the reproduction of animals and tries to explain both 
normalities, gender distinctions and abnormalities alike. He acknowledges that semen 
does not have a simple, pure potency with clear seeds. It is, in fact, “common mixture 
(panspermia) of many elements”(GA. 4.3.769b 29). He then confirms that the anomaly 
and gender distinction as well as monstrosity is as a result of this original mixture of 
elements in the seed, that is, seeds are prone to be bifurcated, digressed from their 
original path if they come across some mishap (hamartia). Moreover, he clearly states 
that “what is called ‘panspermia’ exists in potency, not being-at-work; it cannot exist in 
being-at-work, but it can do so as potency” (GA. 4.3.769b 2-4). 
 Monstrosity occurs and beasts are created as a result of the process being carried 
away (hence kata-strophe) from the appointed eidos. To contrast with the eternal, 
necessary, and organic presencing in nature, I would call this alternative path, the path of 
the inorganic/nomadic making. The deviation  begins with nature taking the path of “the 76
female type” rather than producing the same looking son. Aristotle both gives in to the 
creation of the female and at the same time tries to show that it is somehow accountable.  
 literally from dēv, and dīv in Indo-European languages meaning beast or monster also the same root as -76
deo- and theo- meaning divine.  
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Anyone who does not take after his parents is really in a way a 
monstrosity, since in these cases Nature [physis] has in a way strayed from 
the generic type. The first beginning of this deviation is when a female is 
formed instead of a male, though (a) this indeed is a necessity required by 
Nature, since the race of creatures which are separated into male and 
female has got to be kept in being; and (b) since it is possible for the male 
sometimes not to gain the mastery either on account of youth or age or 
some other such cause, female offspring must of necessity be produced by 
animals (GA. 4.3. 767b10-15). 
But, of course Aristotle concedes that the monstrosity happens: 
As for monstrosities, they are not necessary so far as the purposive or final 
cause is concerned, yet per accidens they are necessary, since we must 
take it that their origin at any rate is located here (GA. 4.3. 767b10-15). 
 By its very nature the unknown and risky material of woman is monstrous and 
would literally create a flaw of some kind if it leaves any residue, surplus and trace.  The 77
surplus, then, is necessarily not controlled by the form and would remain animal, outcast, 
outlaw, unnatural and abnormal. Aristotle readily equates monstrosity with inorganic 
nature, that is the nature that “strayed away from the generic type.” Also, he claims that 
the sudden turn away (kata-strophe) from the generic and natural form begins with 
female.  
Anyone who does not take after his parents is really in a way a 
monstrosity, since in these cases Nature has in a way strayed from the 
generic type. The first beginning of this deviation is when a female is 
formed instead of a male (Ibid.). 
 Aristotle finds it necessary to account for the threat, perhaps to help avoid it. He 
mentions that the seed or semen is the soul in potency which needs to be concocted 
properly or in an appropriate form. The propriety becomes very significant when we take 
 If the movements imparted by the semen are resolved and the material contributed by the mother is not 77
controlled by them, at last there remains the most general substratum, that is to say the animal.
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our criteria from the common sense and common language which is a public realm. 
Monstrosity, abnormality and improper, Aristotle attribute to the violation of unity and 
hylomorphism. 
For, following what has been said, it remains to give the reason for such 
monsters. If the movements imparted by the semen are resolved and the 
material contributed by the mother is not controlled by them, at last there 
remains the most general substratum, that is to say the animal. (GA. 4.3. 
767b 10-20)  78
 The animal substratum then needs to be controlled and tamed in the boundaries of 
the familiar look (eidos) and familiar speech (logos). This is a peculiar admission that 
persuades Heidegger to develop the idea that Dasein exists in potency and not energeia.  
 Developing on Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics, in contrast to the way of 
the father, the logo-centric way, Derrida has explicated the way of the mother, based on 
the notion of “metaphoricity.” He argues that in the absence of a pre-determined telos, 
and eidos, Aristotle admits, the surplus produced as a result of the workings of motion 
(considered as such), or the animal matter would not stop creating beings, but rather it is 
pregnant with all kinds of formless (aperon), monstrous creatures. This clearly shows that 
what appears nonsensical or unaccountable (alogon) to Aristotle, the outlaw, the 
abnormal and metaphorical is in fact the condition of the possibility of sense, justice, and 
law.  
2.4. Hylē and the Force of Life 
 As we just mentioned, even in the hylomorphic and automatic movement of 
nature, there is a necessary violence. On the contrary, I would simply call the Gestalt or 
the appropriation that is inherent in nature, “the tyranny of the organic.” In fact, I think 
the preference for physis over technē in the making of beings  only makes sense if we 79
Then people say that the child has the head of a ram or a bull, and so on with other animals, as that a calf 78
has the head of a child or a sheep that of an ox. (Peck, A. L. Generation of Animals. Loeb Classical Library; 
366. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942., 4.3. 767b 10-20)
 and other (perhaps inappropriate) kinds of makings 79
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already assume that there is more to be revealed in nature than natural laws can ever 
unveil. In other words, there can be unknown motions at work in nature which necessary 
natural laws cannot incorporate.  
 Again, Aristotle is vigilant to recognize that a being can still be viewed as not 
what-it-is or at least as not-yet-what-it-is. Hylē can show itself as a privative (sterēsis) 
way of being (Met., 1033a 8-12). Brogan explains this is a curious language which is very 
revealing. He says that in such cases the “matter” is here presented as not yet dwelling in 
its eidos, and therefore as not presencing as such” (Brogan, 85).  
 Hylē can bring to light the mode of being of not-being-at-home (which Heidegger 
would call “unheimlisch”) or being-unfamiliar. It is a state of being “privative,” not-yet-
proper, improper, or inorganic. Brogan follows Aristotle in this case by accusing such 
appearances as “falling away from the truth” or being a “semblance” (Brogan, 85). Yet, it 
is in the very admission to the possibility of such an individuality that the ontological 
path is opened to an alternative path of distribution, the path of simulacra or “semblance.” 
He writes: “The individual appears as not yet in its being. When we address the 
individual natural being as matter, we point to a moment or phase of this being that is 
only properly grasped in terms of the structure of being as a whole” (Brogan, 85). This 
very distinction between the proper and improper path of motion is an admission to some 
alternative path of following and gathering. Non-being, as we have already discussed, is 
not simply nothing but rather that which is, but has no independent being of its own, and 
is only inasmuch as it appears along with what appears in itself as itself.  80
 Aristotle refers to this kind of appearance as incidental (sumbebēkos). The 
philosopher is the one who is able to see the proper and needs to keep an eye on what 
truly shows itself as itself. To do so, he or she must separate (krinein) the being from non-
being, that which only appears to be. At this point, there seems to simply be no measure 
other than what has already appeared as present in eidos or logos to determine what is 
natural and what is incidental. The only measure is repeatability as the same or being 
 See also Schumacher, Eric. Aristotle on the Nature of Analogy. Lexington Books, 2018.80
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eternal as if copying the eternal circular locomotion of heavens in the presence of an 
eternal god.  81
 Heidegger uses Aristotle’s attention to the process of natural presencing “from 
more familiar to us to more familiar in itself” (Physics 184 a16ff) to turn our attention to 
where the authentic possibilities are in gestation. In addition, he radicalizes the move by 
going beyond natural beings in life and in-the-world, calling them “idols” and present 
ideas people cling to all the time.  
It is of decisive importance, first, that we allow space for beings as a 
whole; second, that we release ourselves into the nothing, which is to say, 
that we liberate ourselves from those idols everyone has and to which one 
is wont to go cringing; and finally, that we let the sweep of our suspense 
take its full course, so that it swings back into the basic question of 
metaphysics which the nothing compels: Why are there beings at all, and 
why not rather nothing? (BW., 112) 
This is where the idea of death or nothingness seems to have replaced the end, limit as 
entelecheia in-the-world. I read Heidegger’s suggestion to “let the sweep of our suspense 
take its full course” as the being-in-trouble of ‘following.’ ‘Following’ can take its full 
effect if one realizes that one does not know where the end or destination is. Of course, 
there are those who ‘follow’ the “idols,” the already appropriated and incorporated 
material. Those remain in the economy (literally oiko-nomos the order of the household) 
of presencing of what is already present, but Heidegger is pointing to the possibility of 
embracing the possibility of impossibility (nothingness) and the unfamiliar (unheimlich, 
literally not-homely).  
 Therefore, clinging to what has come to presence instead of the process by which 
generation occurs turn the generated into idols. That is where Heidegger seems to suggest 
that the revealing force of motion and generation does not necessarily have to be natural. 
The significant stage is the end (telos), which has to remain in potency and should not 
This referred to precisely in Book Lambda. In other words, the generation and motion in nature 81
unlimitedly imitates the circular locomotion of heavens at the presence of eternal god. 
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turn into some mental category or natural beings alike. Here, Brogan is not a hundred 
percent clear whether it is physis or technē that has a more revealing power. Yet, he is 
vigilant to point out that there might be more to technē than he previously mentioned as 
inferior to the natural presencing. His consent comes, perhaps, as a result of going back to 
the origin of presencing and focusing on the difference between being and beings, 
highlighting that motion is the archē of presencing but not any present being. He almost 
admits that there might be in a sort of technē the same or even more originary power of 
presencing than natural expression of beings per-se. He does this by referring to 
Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art” (Brogan, 70). Heidegger writes:  
True, there lies hidden in nature a rift-design, a measure and a boundary 
and, tied to it, a capacity for bringing forth— that is, art. But it is equally 
certain that this art hidden in nature becomes manifest only through the 
work [meaning the work of art]”(BW., 195; Brogan, 70). 
 What Heidegger believes will come to the fore in the work of art is not the beings 
as they are in their ordinary look, neither some mental image in the intention of the artist, 
but the very rift, or difference itself. Heidegger also holds that the rift, or the gap itself, 
constitutes that which attracts human attention. The trait (Zug) of a being as withdrawal, 
as that which retreats from appropriation and manifests the rift as such for the first time 
comes to pass in the work of art and not in the ousia of natural beings plainly and simply. 
That is how, I believe, Brogan admits that Heidegger has in fact gone beyond the actual 
presencing in nature and challenges the distinction between necessary and artistic 
(technē) altogether. 
2.5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I argued why Heidegger attends to Aristotle’s explication of nature 
to study the being of human beings. He finds Aristotle an ally against idealism and 
psychologism in explaining the presencing of things in nature for human Dasein. He 
thinks, also, that the way he raises the question of the ground of being as presencing 
(ousia), has strategically been in one way or another reduced to the study of a being (like 
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God), beings or some form of intellectualism. Therefore, he thinks the question needs to 
be revived from the dawn of western metaphysics again. 
 Now, what is important for him in Aristotle which he thinks is the necessary 
ingredient in the study of the authenticity and freedom which I render as originary 
‘following’ is at least two-fold. One is his appreciation of particularity and multiplicity 
and second is the motion and generation in nature. Aristotle attempts to account for both 
at the same time. In spite of the solutions he provides, the very problem he raises 
unsettles the identity and authority of a subject or one single organizing principle. He 
famously gestures against the authority of the overarching dominance of Platonic Forms 
over particulars or the static nature of being in Eleatic philosophy.    
 In providing a response or an account to the problem he raises, however, Aristotle 
ends up prioritizing the structure of present and actual (energeia) over the possible and 
potential (dynamis). Multiplicity is allowed as far as it is bound to the schema of 
categories and produces different genera and species already available. And motion of the 
undetermined material (hylē) is only proper if it is headed for the appropriation in the 
form (morphē). Again, he does not deny the existence of improper making, but 
establishes such an arbitrary hierarchy that makes his account of nature and physics 
already political. He clearly prefers the present and actual constitution and generation of 
things in nature. Hylomorphism and teleology still guarantee the generation of the same 
or “for the most part” in spite of differences and multiplicities.  
 I discussed that in his explication of Aristotle’s account of natural making and the 
necessary appropriation of the material (hylē), Brogan’s language has already become 
political and expresses the essential violence and hierarchy involved in the process. The 
very distinction between proper and improper making is a sign of such an arbitrary 
distinction between proper and improper making. Later in reference to the most authentic 
making in the work of art for Heidegger, Brogan wonders about the problematic state of 
such distinctions. I explained the hierarchical system of values in nature that results from 
this metaphysics of presence as if nature is already political for Aristotle. 
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 In the following chapters, I will elaborate on how the principles and laws of the 
gathering of people in Aristotle is just an extension of the same politics of nature 
elaborated in this chapter. Gathering of bodies in a community for Aristotle seems to 
follow the same tensions that are at work in the generation in nature as well. The tension 
gives rise to different modes of being-with as following in both individual and social 
level. 
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3. Chapter 3: Ethics of ‘Following’: the Nature of Laws in Aristotle 
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3.1. Introduction: The Overview of the Chapter 
 In this chapter we begin addressing the problem of community and following in 
the human domain according to my phenomenological reading of Aristotle. The 
discussions in this chapter are divided into three major parts that trace the natural origin 
of laws in Aristotle and the conflicts that arise along the way. Here is how chapter is 
divided: 
1. Logos as the law of community: The merit of a Heideggerian reading of Aristotle is 
that it distances itself from the laws as simply a political/social imposition of abstract 
categories and demonstrates their essential connection to the well-being of every 
‘follower.’ Community, being-with, and ‘following’ one another are not a break from 
the natural definition of man as life-possessing-logos and life-in-the-polis. The nature 
of logos brings about the being-togetherness for Aristotle. Other moments of logos are 
‘speaking-about’ and ‘speaking-with’ which means that logos is co-constituted with 
other concepts and in communicating with others. For Aristotle, the ontology of laws is 
part and parcel of the ontology of logos and altogether beset by the same difficulties.  
 According to Heidegger, Aristotle connects the ontology of laws with the ontology of 
language by delving into the very genesis of expression of desires. Aristotle believes that 
the presencing (ousia) of community among humans, like other animals, is as a result of a 
form of indicating, directing and being directed in everyday life through voice towards 
the pleasant and away from the painful. Before classical distinctions between nature and 
culture, to explain the genesis of logos and the principles of its coming to be, Heidegger 
follows the track of this voice (phonē) in animals in search of the place where it becomes 
particularly human. This is still not necessarily a moral community or a political 
community for Aristotle.  
This stage is very crucial especially because of the way Aristotle talks about it in 
the Rhetoric. In an attempt to show how we have immediate access to the world and 
others (being-in-truth), he goes to an inorganic level of animal forces, the place where 
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logos is still in gestation. I argue following Heidegger and Derrida that here is where he 
unleashes the power of the unfamiliar and the ‘other’ which is not confined to the familiar 
and clear logos.  
2. Being-just, Being-towards-the Good: Reading Aristotle in this way, Heidegger helps 
one see how the laws that are supposed to help individuals choose the golden mean of 
virtues, the most just, the most proportionate, and noble are not abstract or 
psychological; rather, like the rest of Aristotelian basic concepts, they are ontological 
and teleological.  
 Heidegger mentions that Aristotle regards the life of contemplation as the end and 
the most complete happiness for humans. Therefore, any deliberation of action needs to 
be in accordance with the end of man as contemplation. According to Heidegger, 
Aristotle brings the whole basic conceptuality that I discussed in the previous two 
chapters, namely teleology, hylomorphism, and the unity of logos, eidos and peras back 
to the picture. Deliberation (boulē, bouleusis) is supposed to bring the presencing of 
beings to the clarity of the limit, end, or logos. It is not simply a psychological act but 
that which makes the realization of an action or an event in its right place and time 
necessary. 
 Heidegger believes that Aristotle manages to prove the priority of the life of 
contemplation immanently through the notion of pleasure. Aristotle demonstrates this by 
setting up a hierarchy of pleasures and showing that we are naturally drawn to find 
contemplation of things as they are in their entelecheia as the most pleasurable 
comportment. Being true to one’s nature and function means to follow the ethical laws to 
preserve and guard the necessary and actual presencing of beings in themselves 
(entelecheia). The virtuous action, in this sense, is to hold one’s desires in such a balance 
so as to not fall for the appearance of things and ‘address’ them in their true being.  
 This gives the moral virtues, particularly justice, an ontological sense. Heidegger 
finds in this movement from the appearance of the pleasant to what is truly pleasant the 
merit of Aristotelian philosophy. For him, this is essentially the same movement from the 
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ambiguity and unclear ‘fallenness’ of man in “the one” (das Man) to the clarity of 
revealing the truth of beings in their ‘definition.’  
This is also where Derrida diverges from Aristotle’s notions of justice, end, and 
happiness. In the same vein as Heidegger, Derrida contends that in fact what Aristotle 
prioritizes as the most appropriate and proper end of man is akin to the affirmation of 
what is most familiar, actual (energeia/entelecheia), and stable. 
 That is where the critical part of the chapter begins. The paradox of the end and 
the limit will be examined in two moments, one in this chapter and one in the next. In this 
chapter, I highlight the passages where Aristotle comes across the aporias within his 
system. One is the case of the judgment of the right action or the golden mean. According 
to Aristotle’s formulation, one expects that were we to deliberate and exercise virtues, our 
actions should hit the target. Instead, having perhaps the tragic figure in mind, Aristotle 
himself grapples with the case that in spite of upholding the virtue and deliberating, one 
still misses the mark (hamartia). It seems that what ultimately determines the results of 
one's actions is beyond deliberation, implying an unforeseen force as the source of 
bringing about events.  
 I will conclude from the discussion that although Aristotle accurately pinpoints 
the immanent process by which people’s desires alongside deliberation bring about 
actions and makings, he ultimately prefers the deliberative operation by which the most 
appropriate making comes to pass. For Aristotle the immanent process of making actions 
and decisions is not the most original or authentic mode of following. The most authentic 
action is, instead, the one in accordance with deliberation and logos which is ‘headed’ 
toward the most noble, appropriate, and a pre-determined end. Notwithstanding, Aristotle 
admits that the most effective, creative, and beautiful action, as in poetics, is not the one 
that simply ‘follows’ or ‘does not follow’ the rational principle, the one which is 
logocentric and similar to the past, but rather it is the kind of action that is aligned with 
this unfamiliar and hidden natural force of desire. Actions and events resulted from this 
force produce catastrophic ends of action as in the case of tragedy and the tragic figure. 
Should we want to embrace the true ‘following,’ we would have to choose the path of 
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nomadic following which celebrates unanticipated ends, or pure possibility (dynamis as 
energeia ateles). 
      
3.2. Logos as the Laws of community  
 Heidegger believes that an important facet of life-possessing-logos is being-with-
others. Thus, characteristic of his critique of the Cartesian self as the thinking subject, he 
stipulates the being of being human before one is a subject or a self. Before one is a 
thinking subject, separate and independent from other selves, one is by nature wired to 
“be-as-speaking-with-one-another through communicating” (BC., 33). Consequently, 
what Heidegger finds helpful and worth reviving in Aristotle is the relationship he 
establishes between the two definitions of man as life-in-the-polis (zoōn politikon) and 
life-possessing-speech (zoōn logon ekhon). It is not only speaking (logos) that informs 
the life of man but speaking-with-others.  
In the being of human beings themselves [zoōn logon ekhon], lies the 
basic possibility of being-in-the-[city state (polis)]πόλις. (BC., 33; Politics, 
1253 a 9) 
It is crucial to notice that this mode of being-with, for Aristotle, is not linguistic in the 
sense of any natural language or at the level of concepts or reason yet. At the very basic 
level, Heidegger argues that essential to the being-togetherness of all animals is the 
immanent desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. They use different kinds of voice 
(phonē) to lead each other towards the pleasant or away from the painful. He translates 
Aristotle from the Politics (1. 2, 1253 a 9) in the following way: 
In the mode of speaking about . . . human beings uniquely have their being-
there among that which lives. Vocal announcing (φωνή, [phonē]) is an 
indicating ([semion] σηµεῖον) of [ḗdē] ἡδύ and of [luperon] λυπηρόν, of 
what is pleasing and of what is distressing, of what supports and upsets 
being-there, and therefore it, (φωνή, [phonē]), is at hand as a mode of 
living alongside other living things (human beings possess this announcing 
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as well, but it is not the ἴδιον, the ‘peculiarity,’ that constitutes the being of 
human beings) (BC., 33). 
Heidegger explains the transition from animal gathering to human gathering in terms of a 
transition that occurs in voice (phonē). Necessarily and naturally, we are-with-others in 
directing one another towards what appears pleasant or away from what appears harmful. 
Like animals, human beings, at a very basic level, announce what is pleasant or seems 
pleasant or painful to each other. This is the most basic mode of community before 
humans are even subjects independent of the world and nature. At this level, we are 
dealing with purely immanent forces of desire. Although this state looks very much like 
the state of nature for modern philosophers, especially Rousseau, the fact that logos is the 
link to the state of being-with-others complicates the nature-culture distinction.   
 Thus at a very ordinary level, logos is in this affective communication in terms of 
expressing pain and pleasure, in warning or in recommending a given state of affairs or 
events (Politics, 1. 1253a 16).  
And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or 
any gregarious animal is clear: For nature, as we declare, does nothing 
without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. (Politics, 
1293a 9-12)  
Heidegger naturally connects being-in-the-polis to being-in-possession-of-language. “In 
being-in-the-πόλις [polis], Aristotle sees the genuine life of human beings. To show this, 
he refers to the fact that the being of human being is having-speech (logon ekhein)” (BC., 
34). What appears in Heidegger’s Concept of Time as ordinary or everyday community 
“being-with-one-another” can be claimed to have derived from this original insight of 
Aristotle. It is significant, however, that Heidegger time and again emphasizes that this 
community is the most basic but not the most authentic being-with one another (CT., 34). 
As I mentioned in the last chapter this logos is governed by the power of the idle-talk 
(CT., 22). Therefore, for Heidegger, this level of being-with-one-another still does not 
explain the quality of this hyphenated being through logos, the character of the logos, 
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neither the most authentic logos. The analysis simply indicates the co-originary character 
of life for human beings with others.  
 On the other hand, for Aristotle, it is the end, the completion, and the limit that 
explain the most originary presencing (ousia) of beings in nature. Life-possessing-speech 
can only meet its full potential, end, completion, and limit in the polis, which constitutes 
the second function of man as being-in-the-city. As the definition shows, the function, the 
for-the-sake-of-which (ergon) of human beings is to activate and exercise speech (logos). 
Considering that speech has several moments including speaking-about and speaking-
with, it brings to light the hyphenated being of man more than any other phenomenon. 
Hence, logos is the activating (en-ergon hence energeia) of the being of human beings in 
a polis. In this sense, logos also constitutes the being of the laws of the community. Logos 
is the principle in accordance with which a flourishing gathering of human beings comes 
to pass. Aristotle would like to take a step further and argue that being-human already 
reveals the possibility of what is genuinely good and genuinely pleasant. The distinction 
between the original or authentic as opposed to that which is clear and ordinary does not 
become problematic for Aristotle to the extent that he seems to prioritize clarity over 
originality. Human logos is essentially headed towards what is genuinely pleasurable.   
 As opposed to modern distinctions between the state of nature and the social 
contract (in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau to name a few), Aristotle complicates the 
distinction between nature and culture. More precisely, the distinction between nature and 
culture, nomos and logos, becomes aporetic due to the aporetic nature of logos which we 
elaborated on before. One may go as far as to contend that the definition of human 
Dasein is only complete when logos unfolds its paradoxical singular-plural character. 
3.3. Organic Nature of laws in Aristotle 
 Now the question is: how are the laws, the logos between one another explained 
by Aristotle? Or what is the nature of this communal logos? In order to show how logos 
becomes aporetic, Heidegger focuses on where the immanent and natural motion of 
desire gives rise to the human mode of following. Heidegger tracks the voice of life, 
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looking for where it becomes different in humans. So, at the animal level, the sounds 
(phonē) of animals indicate pain (luperon) and pleasure (ḗdē) to other animals. Here is 
the rest of the quote from above, extracted from book I of Aristotle’s Politics and 
translated by Heidegger. It is a long quote, but is worth analyzing. 
The being-possibility of animals has of itself reached this mode of being, 
having perception of what constitutes well-being and being upset, being 
oriented toward this and indicating this to one another. However, speaking 
is, as such, more than this, having in itself the function of making manifest 
(δηλοῦν)  (not simply referring, but being such that what it refers to is 82
made to speak), making manifest the beneficial and the harmful, and 
thereby the proper and improper, too.  That is, what distinguishes the 83
being of human beings from that of other living things is their unique 
aptitude for perceiving what is good and evil, what is proper and improper, 
and so on. The being-with-one-another of such beings (i.e., beings that are 
in the world in such a way that they speak with it) makes for household and 
the [city-state (polis)] πόλις (BC., 33; Politics, 1253a 9).  84
Being moral the way that Aristotle proposes in this passage (as a distinction between 
human and animals) begins with an animal stage where humans and animals are both 
with one another and use voice to express pain and pleasure. Human beings, however, do 
not only use voice to indicate sources of pain and pleasure. Human beings are also, by 
nature, the revealers of truth (having in them the function of making manifest). This 
means that they make things manifest in their definitions, or in how things are in relation 
 Plat. Crat. 423a82
 Thus the function of making manifest (delon) is accompanied by a communal aspect of indication of 83
designation of the harmful and the beneficial, and more importantly the proper and improper.  
 The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals 84
as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and 
to indicate those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the 
harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from 
the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral 
qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state (Pol., 1.1253a).
99
to their function, telos, or limit. The quote explains how human expression takes the 
initial indicating at the level of animal that is indicating pain and pleasure to a second 
level of indicating what is “beneficial and harmful” as well (BC., 34).  “The beneficial” 85
and the “harmful,” apart from the immediate or natural satisfaction of desire, include 
some kind of end in view. In other words, while pain and pleasure can be immediate and 
related to body, beneficial and harmful are completely mediated, interpretive and related 
to a unity of some kind.  
 Heidegger interprets Aristotle as saying that man’s voice is different because it is 
connected to a whole, to some end, and unity. Sounds, for example, are not first received 
individually as pure parts which then would be put together and interpreted as this or that. 
We always already experience a voice as, for example, the sound of a bird or a piece of 
music. So, on the one hand, logos addresses “the there” (Da) as beneficial or harmful in 
an instant immediately; yet, on the other hand, it is only meaningful because of the proper 
end. The harmful and the beneficial are, therefore, at least partly determined by other 
human beings. That is to say logos is as much political as personal.   
 Heidegger emphasizes that being-with-one-another has less to do with “being-
situated-alongside-one-another” and more with “being-as-speaking-with-one-another 
through communicating, refuting, and confronting” (BC., 33). It turns out that the 
political being of man is such that in making sense of his world, man takes things as 
already significant. It is not the case that things are objectively there for man and only 
later become harmful or beneficial. Rather, things always already appear-as “the mode of 
the beneficial and the harmful, of that which uplifts or upsets being-there (BC., 34).”  
 This already puts judgement and deliberation in an ambiguous and problematic 
situation. The measure is ambiguous for that which licenses what is beneficial or harmful. 
It seems that things are to be received always already evaluated by the community as 
beneficial or harmful. On the other hand, there is this immanent power of presencing, 
through pleasure itself. It is not all that clear why something is desirable to me. What 
 συµφέρον, βλαβερὸν85
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seems to make the whole of an object also makes its meaning ambiguous. When 
something looks pleasant to me, the question is whether it is because of my natural 
inclination to it or because I understand things in accordance with the way things are 
evaluated in public.  
 This is why Heidegger emphasizes on the role of pleasure in Aristotle’s ethics. 
Emphasis on pleasure is an emphasis on what is most immanent to every individual’s 
being. Pleasure and pain, according to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, constitute basic 
possibilities “in which the world is encountered in its initial being-there. [They] are, as 
such, the modes in which living things are with one another, in which the community 
(koinonia) is constituted” (ibid.). In this way, animal feelings of pain and pleasure are 
communicated and negotiated with others to establish an appropriate, communal sense. 
Such is the ambiguous, singular-plural character of how a sense of appropriateness is 
formed. 
 As if hiding the ambiguous (to some extent cultural and public) nature of this very 
basic being-togetherness, Aristotle insists on the purely natural origin of the city. It is 
very suggestive, then, that in the end, community as the completion of man in a city-state 
is compared to the growth or maturity of any natural thing, like “a horse”: 
Hence every city-state exists by nature, inasmuch as the first partnerships 
so exist; for the city-state is the end of the other partnerships, and nature is 
an end, since that which each thing is when its growth is completed we 
speak of as being the nature of each thing, for instance of a man, a horse, a 
household. Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is its chief 
good; and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good. From these things 
therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is 
by nature a political animal (Politics, 1.1 1253a 1-5). 
Gradually however, it is Aristotle’s own emphasis and insistence on the natural 
constitution of the city that causes an ambiguity. He is well aware of the immanent 
motion of desire and how it produces unities automatically. And yet, he insists that by 
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nature a pleasant action which is in accordance with man’s function has to be in 
accordance with deliberation in logos. 
 At the same time, another feature of logos that naturally brings about a 
community, as we mentioned, is that logos puts humans essentially in a communicating 
situation. The very same natural force makes humans live with one another and at the 
same time establish a limit of appropriateness to their end. For Aristotle, being in 
accordance with nature (physis) means that the good (agothon) is only met in a 
community. The motion of animal desire, which for animals and the animal world is a 
neutral force of producing difference and multiplicity without a telos is threatening for a 
communal and clear system of sense-making. The force of desires might create 
differences that would not correspond to a pre-determined whole. The motion of desire 
might very well be carried away by sophists who are trained in rhetoric to manipulate the 
communal logos.  
 Aristotle’s speculative philosophy aims at watching over this motion to make sure 
it leads to the being-at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia) of every entity. So, neutral 
desire, which was the condition of the possibility of every motion whatsoever, “ought” 
not to produce a form other than what is already anticipated as proper and clear logos. 
That is why the project of politics, a flourishing being-with-others, for Aristotle, is at the 
same time a moral and normative project of directing to the best end.  
 Ironically, as Hannah Arendt shows, the political lives of the Greeks were 
completely separate from their ordering of the household (oiko-nomos). For her, political 
life (bios politikos) is supposed to provide new possibilities of action (vita activa) and 
production (Arendt, 22), makings and doings in a completely separate order (Arendt, 24). 
But, as I tried to show, even in the realm of politics the end simply reaffirms the order of 
the actual including the house as well as the city. For example, no man goes out in 
Aristotle’s projection of the city, fighting for the rights of women. Aristotle’s politics and 
ethics altogether account for the present or the actual order of things and in that respect 
legitimize the order of the house as well. Every individual’s action is determined by the 
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ultimate good of the city which is the reaffirmation of what is truly just, truly pleasant 
and good in itself in accordance with logos.  
 Now, to justify and legitimize the movement towards the end of man in logos, or 
the life in accordance with contemplation and at the same time keeps its relation with the 
immanent movement of desire, Aristotle makes a distinction between what is truly 
pleasant and what appears as pleasant. That is, for him, the force of the “ought,” to do the 
right thing also needs to be immanent. He argues and insists that to do the right thing is 
more pleasurable and true to the being of human as life-possessing-logos and it is not 
simply a communal appropriateness.  
3.4. Ethics of ‘Following,’ Being-towards-the-Good (agathon) 
3.4.1. Immanent Forces in the Ordinary Speech 
 After asserting that the animal, natural voices make humans act and follow one 
another, Aristotle explains how actions in fact occur. How does one choose or not choose 
to follow one directive and not the other? Although all evaluations of action happen 
through a contextualization in terms of a whole, we still do not have the ultimate 
happiness or measure of judgment in view. At the immediate level, actions are still run by 
maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. In understating the ontology of moral laws in 
Aristotle, the key is in the notion of pleasure and its different kinds. Aristotle summarizes 
the voluntary actions that are affected by man’s desire for some good as follows:  
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All that men do voluntarily will be either that which is or seems good, or 
that which is or seems pleasant (Rhetoric, 1369b23-25).   86
Pleasure (hedonē) is a “determinate mode of being-in-the-world,” of “one’s well-
being””(BC., 35).  Since, evidently, that which produces the disposition we have just 
mentioned is the pleasant (hēdú), we need to illustrate all of the forces that make events 
appear pleasant or worth pursuing.  
 The directives come more than anywhere else in the Rhetoric of Aristotle. The 
Rhetoric is where an action is talked about in terms of how people are directed to do this 
or that, or the forces in speech that guide it. We can see all of the manifestations and 
products of such presencing in rhetorical speech. In rhetoric, the speaker uses all he has at 
their disposal, all modes of expression, conceptual or affective, to lead the audience 
toward where he or she deems appropriate. Rhetoric is the art of manipulating all of the 
communal existential forces of humans to lead people toward a final heading intended by 
an orator—and perhaps “the other of the heading,” that is not a prior anticipated intention 
or telos at all. It is the place to study the genesis of different kinds of doings, makings, 
and directing in community. 
 Heidegger seems to want to suggest that Aristotle is aware of all these rather 
unaccountable, inorganic, or altogether bestial forces. The Rhetoric, like most of 
Aristotle’s speculative philosophy, is an attempt to watch over these forces, to treat and 
mold them, so as to make them accord with the most appropriate human function. To 
 There might be a criticism against cases like courage where what one chooses does not even look 86
pleasant. The questions in this regard is, why one does a courageous action when according to Davis, 
“courage is frequently rather unpleasant and can easily make one dead” (Davis xviii). If one truly seeks 
pleasure, one needs to find a more lasting and legitimate end for the courageous action. “Lasting and 
satisfying pleasure never comes to those who seek pleasure, but only to the philo-kalos, the ones who look 
past pleasure to the beautiful” (Sachs, xxiii; NE. 1099a 15-17, 13). In fact, in cases like courage, actions 
like killing the opponent do not look beautiful in the first place. The point is that the internal force of the 
pleasant which was supposed to take the body and desire towards the most beautiful, so that we could 
anticipate the good action and judge it accordingly, seems to pushing against the immediate decision to do 
the courageous act. One has to represent the action in a whole story or with having the good of the city in 
mind to begin to see it as worthy. Michael Davis takes a step further, claiming that actions basically begin 
to make sense when they are represented in speech (logos), “when they are talked about (Davis. xvii.).” 
That is perhaps why Aristotle considers honor as the second best choice after kalon as the ultimate end and 
principle of doing good actions. Or that the virtue of magnanimity (megalopsychia), which means greatness 
of soul, is considered the "the crowning virtue.” The character that is shared by all of these concepts is that 
they go beyond the immediate action to the image or representation of action as a whole, or in the eyes of 
the others.
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quote Paul Ricoeur, in The Rule of Metaphor, “Aristotle’s Rhetoric constitutes the most 
brilliant … attempt to institutionalize rhetoric from the point of view of 
philosophy” (RM., 16/11). That is what comes next in the Rhetoric. In effect, he looks at 
all the forces which give rise to actions and events in order to make sure that deliberation 
guarantees the final good making, the happiness of the doer, and the beautiful end.   
3.4.2. Different Forces of Doing (praxis) and ‘Following’ the Animal 
 Unlike other animals, not all human makings and doings are natural. Additionally, 
not all human makings are made according to logos. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle observes 
that in everyday life the actions of human beings can be caused by “chance (dia tyche), 
nature (dia physis), compulsion (dia bion), habit (di’ ethos), reason/calculation (dia 
logismos),  anger (dia thumos), and desire (di’ epithymían).” What I called the originary 87
‘following,’ for Aristotle amounts to leading the life of moving past semblances of 
pleasure to achieve true pleasure. He explains these forces in turn as follows: 
Things which are the result of chance are all those of which the cause is 
indefinite, those which happen without any end in view, and that neither 
always, nor generally, nor regularly. (Rhetoric, 1.10. 1369 b)  
Chance (tychē) is unlimited (aperon), infinite, multiple, and evil (NE., 1106b 26-30). It is 
not anticipatable and controllable by logos. This is rendered as “without having an end in 
view.” Accidents are rare and, as is the case with “what is contrary to nature,” they do not 
need to be investigated.  
 Nature is open to investigation because of its repetition and its happening 
“always, or generally, in the same way” (Rhetoric, 1.10. 1369 b). This repetition and 
generality make the incompleteness of nature look like the ‘rest’. In this respect, nature 
looks very much like habit (Rhetoric, 1.10. 1369 b). The ease and pleasure that come with 
 λογισµός, οῦ, ὁ, λογίζοµα (I) a counting, reckoning, calculation, computation, Tan account, bill, Dem.  87
(II) without reference to number, calculation, consideration, reasoning, Thuc.,  
an argument, conclusion, Xen. (III) reasoning power, reason, id=Xen. (Liddell and Scott's Greek-English 
Lexicon)
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habit are associated with this similarity with nature, which has to be mastered and 
revealed.  
 Aristotle attributes things that are contrary to nature to either some unknown 
mixture in nature or chance, but admits that they are rare and need not be investigated 
(ibid.). Things of this sort might also be contrary to nature not arbitrarily or by accident, 
but by some violence of bodily or otherwise intentional force, what Aristotle calls by 
compulsion (βία, which literally means bodily strength, force, power, might). These “are 
done by the agents themselves in opposition to their desire or calculation” (ibid.).  
 The actions done by calculation need to have their end in view. They are the 
closest to just actions because of their mathematical character. They are in accordance 
with calculative reasoning in spite of the fact that they might not involve actual 
mathematical calculation. 
 Out of all forces mentioned here, only one is in accordance with reason 
(logismos), and yet Aristotle argues that if the forces are in balance the result will be in 
line with the being of things as they are in accordance with deliberation. Since desire and 
anger bring about catastrophes, they need to be held at bay so that beings can be truly 
present as what they are. Therefore, the balance in desire and anger make beings truly 
present as what they are (energeia).  
 All along, however, Aristotle seems to be wary of the fact that, unlike everything 
else in nature, many of the doings and makings of humans are the result of their 
imposition of categories on nature (technē) and fabrications (simulacra) that might not 
resemble the truth (RM., 11). He is well aware of the "dangerous power of eloquence" 
which may well be used with no regard for truth. He is deeply concerned about the 
ethical judgments and justice of the orator, for a good reason (RM., 11). That is why he 
deems it necessary to write a philosophy of rhetoric.  
 The modes of presencing in rhetorical speech are not necessarily in 
correspondence (adequatio) with any real or familiar reality or natural presencing, but 
they are nonetheless persuasive and effective. The manipulative power of rhetoric occurs 
on the surface of things, making it difficult to determine what reality it refers to, if any. 
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For Aristotle, They are therefore semblances of truth, not the truth itself. So as to control 
what comes to the surface, Aristotle begins to make concessions and determine necessary 
ends and goals and sets up a hierarchy.   
 It is in this context that a choice needs to be made. A deliberate choice 
(prohairesis) is a “a matter of desiring to do what deliberation has shown to be conducive 
to our goal” (NE. 1111b26-30; NE., 1112a30-1113aI2; cited in Sorabji, 107). It is worth 
noting that against many commentators who psychologize this definition of choice, as I 
argue below, deliberation can be interpreted as a directing of the forces of desire towards 
an ontological settling down in logos. Commentators like Sorabji still believe that this 
operation is intellectual and psychological. This reading as I discuss below will come 
across some difficulties with regard to Aristotle’s notion of the end of man as political life 
or contemplation. Thus, while I agree with the calculative nature of the deliberate choice, 
I do think that this choice is that which constitute the being of the individual before she is 
regarded as a self or identity. At this point we need to ask what the character of the end is 
and how it affects every action and decision made.      
3.4.3. ‘Following’ to the End 
 What is the ultimate measure and end which should be immanent and in line with 
pleasure as well as logos? In other words, how are we to understand the highest form of 
pleasure as being-in-logos? My contention in this section, following Heidegger, is that all 
modes of end suggested by Aristotle in different contexts as the most pleasurable are at 
the same time in line with entelecheia, how things already are in the present and actual. 
In all moments of decision-making, to deliberate is to look at the completion, the just, the 
most beautiful as the measure. These are all in accordance with what appears in logos and 
are still troubled with the same aporia and ambiguity. He famously writes in 
Nicomachean Ethics Book X (7-8) about the character of virtue being “the work of what 
is best in us, namely “intellect” (1177a 17-20). For Aristotle, David Roochnik argues, 
such a work is described as “contemplative” or “theoretical,” which is the most 
continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely activity available to human beings. 
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Furthermore it “alone seems to be liked because of itself” (1177b1), for it supplies no 
benefit other than itself. Finally, theoretical activity actualizes what is most divine in us 
and allows us to approximate the gods, whose “activity is superior in blessedness” and is 
itself “theoretical” (Roochnik, 2011. 480).  
 Now, for long it has been argued that this account seems problematic for it flies in 
the face of Aristotle’s earlier descriptions of ethical and political virtues. For Martha 
Nussbaum for example, this passage stands in clear contrast to Aristotle’s earlier claims 
about the self-sufficiency of the excellences of character (Nussbaum, 1986. 373). She 
denounces the intellectual activity as more Platonic than Aristotelian: “These chapters do 
not fit into the argument of the Nicomachean Ethics; indeed, they represent a line of 
ethical thought that Aristotle vigorously attacks” (Nussbaum, 1986. 373). Nussbaum even 
considers them as out of place to the extent that they might “have [been] composed 
separately… [or might have been] inserted …by someone else (ibid.)  
 In contrast, firstly there are counter arguments which prove the essential 
homogeneity of practical life with theoretical at least in terms of the former being partial 
and with the view towards the latter. Secondly, there are stronger claims that shed light on 
the ontological character of pleasure associated with theoretical life. Such interpretations 
which support the Heideggerian phenomenological reading will to a large extent solve 
this apparent discontinuity. This gives more evidence to justify Heidegger’s 
understanding of the theoretical end of man as being in accordance with entelecheia.  
Thus, in order to explain the nature of theoretical life and its relationship with the 
practical, there are scholars who stipulate a hierarchy among virtues. Instead of a major 
split between virtues, they suggest practical virtues being in unity with the whole in 
contemplative life. They argue that the divine nature of contemplation underscores the 
very partial nature of practical and political life and its essential limitedness. As Eric 
Salem contends, the claims in Book X chapters 7-8, underline that the ethical life is “on 
the way to the theoretical” (Salem, 2010. 156) and that the ethical life is “at best a partial 
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realization of the highest life” (ibid., 158). This observation implies a homogeneity 
between theoretical and practical life as well.  88
 A more nuanced and arguably more ontological explanation of the relationship is 
presented by other scholars. Roochnik, for example, agrees to some extent with the 
apparent separation of the contemplative act versus practical one. He contends that at 
first glance, in fact, the leisurely activity of thinking done for itself and with no practical 
purpose or motive in view does not seem very ethical neither practical. At first, He counts 
the reasons why this life of contemplation is the happiest according to Aristotle (NE. 
10.7):  
(1) We can theorize more continuously than we can do anything else. (2) 
Theorizing is most pleasant. (3) It is most self-sufficient; that is, it has the 
least need of external goods or human assistants. (4) Theorizing is the only 
activity loved for its own sake, for it produces no gain other than itself. 
These characteristics are encapsulated by (5): it is most leisurely. 
Leisurely activity is performed in the absence of external constraint and 
without an eye to the clock. As such, it is as close to "free time" as human 
beings ever come. (Roochnick, 2008. 731) 
Gradually however, Roochnick tries to complicate the kind of activity that we call 
contemplation. On the one hand, Aristotle’s mentioning that contemplation needs to 
emulate the divine (which is famously described in Metaphysics 12.9 as “thought 
thinking itself”) clearly makes happiness being a-political, “stranger to the commonplace 
or political, or …somehow beyond the human” (Roochnik, 2008. 732). On the other 
hand, the existence and the expression of that (speech or action) which is unworldly can 
threaten the stability of the political. The emergence of the unworldly action or speech by 
itself makes that action or speech the most political activity. Contemplation in the sense is 
not simply a having like knowledge (episteme) which one learns and belongs to him. 
According to Roochnick, contemplation consists of an activity of discovering albeit 
 This, as I will argue further, shows that although according to Arendt the political life of the Greeks 88
belongs to a separate sphere beyond the economy of the household, and separate from contemplative, 
altogether political life is not fundamentally run by separate principles.
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discovering the truth which has always been present in ambiguity or we already have it in 
memory (Roochnik, 2009. 7).  Contemplation, the most divine activity, in this sense 89
according to Roochnik, is as much about pure leisurely thinking as about deriving the 
golden mean of virtues, the practical activity.  
 Roochnik does not elaborate on the ontological and political ramifications of this 
unity. However, his analysis sheds a good light on the ontological character of theoretical 
life and Aristotle’s view about pleasure associated with contemplation. In other words, it 
seems that the controversy among scholars about the relationship between theoretical and 
political life arises as a result of the anthropomorphic or psychological readings of the 
rest of the books of NE (i.e., the ones before book X), or the nature of decision and 
deliberation.  
 Should we follow Heidegger’s ontological account, the controversy disappears. 
Heidegger continues his ontological explication of human end by reiterating  Aristotle’s 
contention in book X. He interprets intellection, the ultimate happiness, as “a certain form 
of life associated with meaning-making (BC., 32). In other words, before man become a 
self, the fact that one’s being as well as his life-in-the-city are characterized by logos 
turns all activities of the life-possessing-logos (leisurely or the one’s having a practical 
end in view) into the ones of an interpretive nature.  
 The complete character of contemplation becomes clear when we look at the kind 
of ontological pleasure that we are supposed to enjoy in it. After determining the 
happiness and the main activity of man as contemplation, the question is how to lead the 
life-possessing-logos to exercise her function and to choose (prohaereisthai) what is 
genuinely pleasant rather than what seems pleasant. Unlike other natural beings we are 
not automatically drawn to reveal our function in a complete and just (dikaios) way. The 
perpetual activity of learning and exercising rational principles is to see through these 
 Roochnik writes about the usage of this term in De Anima, underlining that theoria there is contrasted 89
with knowledge in that knowledge (episteme) is a “having” but not actively using, whereas theoria means 
being “actively engaged in the working with” (De Anima, 412a26) the knowledge one has. Theoria in this 
sense has an active becoming and temporality to it, its focus is the momentary application of knowledge or 
science. Aristotle uses the phrase “right now” (ede theorein De Anima, 417a 25) to emphasize the active 
character of this operation.
110
pretenses of the truth and let the things appear in their being-at-work-staying-itself 
(entelecheia). 
 While Many scholars interpret the choice which involves deliberation and 
practical wisdom as a cognitive process of decision making (Sorabji, 111-112), 
Heidegger argues that the choice is primarily an ontological one. The judgment to do the 
right thing at the right moment is not an imposition of a mental or psychological category 
to a state of affairs. Contemplation means letting things show themselves as they are in a 
just and accurate way.  
 This is not to deny that the choice (prohairesis) involves deliberation but rather 
that in keeping with the natural presencing of beings, deliberation of the just action, the 
golden mean, the most noble or beautiful is not simply a psychological or cognitive 
activity. Heidegger interprets deliberation in this way in accordance with the life of 
contemplation which is in letting beings be themselves in their categories, in their ends 
(entelecheia). Deliberation in this sense is in line with logos, limit and the definition of 
things. 
 This is how deliberation makes judgment. Judgment is a gathering in logos that 
addresses the being of things in the right (juste) way. Justice can be interpreted 
ontologically in this way as the judgment which is in accordance with the being of a 
thing. Through deliberation the proper categories are assigned to things.   90
 The most perfect kind of justice means to ‘address’ beings as they are, to judge 
them right (to use Derrida’s terms, juste and justesse). Justice is to ‘address’ beings in 
their genuine categories (Derrida, DDP. 47-48).  Justice and judgment in this first sense 91
need to be distinguished from a mental or psychological process. This is also true about 
happiness and the beautiful, which are famously not about a temporary psychological 
 Categories, derived from katēgoríā, in Greek means charge or accusation, implying that being is already 90
to be responsible and in charge of something. 
 Categories as we showed in the last chapter refers to the presencing of beings as they are and not an 91
imposition of mental categories on beings. Derrida reminds us that categories etymologically bears the 
sense of having responsibility or being accused of something.
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state but a disposition or a mode of being. In this sense, being happy and being just are 
different expressions of the same notion.  
 Heidegger argues that Aristotle insists that this striving of human beings towards 
their end is still immanent and natural. He demonstrates that as humans, we are naturally 
inclined to find ultimate pleasure in contemplation of beings as they are in being towards 
their being-at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia).  That is because Aristotle defines 92
pleasure as a kind of movement towards a “settling in” a position or state (katástasis 
athróa). “Let it be assumed by us that pleasure is a certain movement of the soul, a 
sudden and perceptible settling down into its natural state, and pain the opposite. Such is 
the nature of pleasure” (Rhetoric, 1.11.1370 a). The important thing is that the words 
Aristotle uses produce a paradoxical situation. Pleasure is discussed here as a motion 
(kinēsis) of the living principle. Yet, we know that not all motion and change are 
pleasurable. Motion is only pleasant if it restores the original presenting of the same state. 
He continues: "Necessarily, therefore, it must be generally pleasant to enter into a normal 
state” (Rhetoric, 1.11. 1369 b33). It is worth remembering also that, in his Poetics, 
Aristotle mentions that the ultimate pleasure produced by a work of art, like that of 
painting, comes as a result of the restoration of "recognition" after an initial de-
familiarization or hiding. “Understanding and reasoning out what each thing is results 
when [one] contemplate them, for instance that “that's who this is” (Poetics, 4. 1448b 
8-10). For Aristotle, “pleasure” in poetry is the pleasure of recognition. “We delight in 
contemplating the most accurately made images of the very things that are painful for us 
to see, such as the forms of the most contemptible insects and of dead bodies” (Poetics, 4. 
 One can argue that this his latter state constitutes also the meaning of the most perfect kind of justice as 92
well. 
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1448b 10-12).  Although for the full effect of the work the detour of lexis is necessary 93
and metaphors, foreign words, and lengthened words are necessary for the movement of 
the soul to happen, altogether pleasure comes as a result of the return to what is available 
in the normal state.  
 The words used for the normal state, the most pleasurable and dominant state are all 
of the same root. Heidegger underlines that in the expression used for this normal state, 
εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, the word hyparchei can be translated as “the genuinely 
available possibility of the being-there” (BC. 34), like the pleasure of learning. He wants 
to emphasize that the normal state, the proper state, or the appropriate state is desired 
because it is the most pleasurable. Hyparche has the same root as hexis and habit. It 
indicates the subsistent and stable nature of things in their natural state. It is worth 
remembering from the previous chapter that hyparche shares the political connotation of 
a leading or a sovereign mode like that of entelecheia with the same root, -eche, to have, 
possess, or hold as well as to reign and to govern. It implies that the most genuine state of 
being of a thing has the most appropriate, the most pleasurable, the most natural and the 
most stable character. 
 From such an ontological viewpoint, the well-known controversy we opened this 
section with disappears. The problem was the incompatibility of Aristotle’s account of 
happiness from book X (7-8), i.e., happiness as contemplation and leisure with the rest of 
the book which stipulates a politically active life as the happy life. The most pleasurable 
life as the life in accordance with entelecheia of every being and individual is also the life 
that treats any individual being in the city in a just way that is its right place and merit. 
By contemplating about the just and accurate characterization of images in logos while 
 He adds, "if one happens to have not seen him before, the image will not produce pleasure as an 93
imitation, but only on account of its workmanship or coloring or some other such reason. (Poetics, 4. 1448b 
18-20). By this Aristotle is conceding that there might be some affective pleasure out of some non-
conceptual factors of a depiction or art. That is a creative intervention at the level of the means of delivery 
of art: " on account of its workmanship or coloring or some other such reason." In terms of tragedy he tries 
to deal with this in wording (lexis) for example. Yet, he is trying to minimize this as one can see in the 
quote above.  Furthermore, he contends that we need to have known the object beforehand and imitation is 
merely a return to the thing as we know it in a new light perhaps. This is a limited semantic innovation 
since even the surprise is like that of an eclipse which does not interfere with the hylomorphic, teleological 
process of motion in Aristotle.
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having no practical and political aim in view, one in fact is questioning the limits and the 
just character of the life-in-the-city. That is why Socrates, for example, who never fights 
for an office or political status, is still considered a political threat for the institutions of 
the city. Socrates leads a private life, the life of contemplation and his activity is simply 
to contemplate the meaning of words but this very activity unsettles the ordinary meaning 
of words to the extent that in the Apology he begins his speech by apologizing from 
everyone for his speaking a language that sounds “foreign” to the men of Athens. By 
contemplating the normal, ordinary and politically established terms like justice, 
courage , etc., the man who is contemplating is the most political man. As if having 
Socrates in the back of his mind, Roochnik describes the being of the contemplative man 
as philosophers saying: 
 Philosophers bear some similarity to criminals, for they too are marginalized. 
Preferring leisure to being-busy, and therefore opting out of the realms of 
politics and war, out of the competition for money, power and fame, they 
become strangers. But their alienation is simultaneously a completion. For 
they think, they theorize. In doing so philosophers function as a paradigm of 
how to use leisure well. (Roochnik, 2008, 734) 
More than mere leisurely activity however, being similar to “criminals,” “the outlaws” as 
was Socrates with respect to the God’s and the laws of the Athens, makes Socrates also 
the “heart” of the city as well. The contemplative activity interrupts the familiarity and 
universality of laws and questions the ordinary logos and laws as to their ground. 
Aristotle never goes as far as Socrates in praising that which is un-worldly or foreign and 
ultimately remain conservative but contemplation as this very investigation for clarity 
seems to be a political activity nonetheless.  
 Aristotle continues with another example of pleasure: habit itself. Difficult things 
like learning/education become pleasurable and easy when we turn them into a habit.  
…the same with habits. For that which has become habitual becomes as it 
were natural; in fact, habit is something like nature, for the distance 
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between “often” and “always” is not great, and nature belongs to the idea 
of “always,” habit to that of “often.” (Rhetoric, 1.10. 1370a) 
In the case of habit, then, it is a settling in (katástasis) of something that is necessary but 
not completely natural, turning it into something that is almost natural (Rhetoric, 1370a). 
Drives in life-possessing-logos that may turn beings into other things in an accidental, 
contingent, and in an unpredictable way must be educated and under control through 
habit. This is associated with the same dichotomy of “beings as the truly are” and “beings 
as they appear”.We can see that the ultimate end of mankind as happiness in 
contemplation seems to be but the restoration of the being of things as they “are," as 
opposed to how they "appear" as a result of desire and anger:  
Desire is the cause of things being done that are apparently pleasant. The 
things which are familiar and to which we have become accustomed are 
among pleasant things; for men do with pleasure many things which are not 
naturally pleasant, when they have become accustomed to them. (Rhetoric, 
1.10.1369 b) 
Therefore, in order to restore a quasi-necessary motion towards pleasurable rest, actions 
(praxis) of the individuals need to acquire habits (hexis). As most commentators of the 
Nicomachean Ethics argue, habits are in accordance with energeia, that is, the actively 
putting to work of one’s function (energeia as en-ergon). We can see that habit is the 
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restoration of the natural presencing of one’s function in nature. This is confirmed by the 94
distinction between a feeling/disposition and hexis (Met. 5.1022b).  95
This does not mean that habits are natural, which Aristotle explicitly denies. But, he also 
mentions that habit are not “contrary to nature” either. Once a habit is acquired it makes 
the hardest learning processes easy and pleasurable. Therefore, the pleasure is the 
pleasure of reaching one’s appropriate end and the settling in it.  
 Hexis, having the similar root, ekho, with hyparche and entelecheia, active as it is, 
is the state of returning to the same (settling in) in spite of all of the drives which draw 
the soul back and forth, acting like a spring or in Sachs example, “a Newton’s wheel,” 
which restores its equilibrium after any move away from it (NE., xii). Further, this state is 
a state of choosing an action knowingly and for its own sake, which makes it completely 
 In contrasting hexis with disposition (diathesis), Joe Sachs refers to Aristotle’s formulation of 94
“disposition” in his two other works: The Categories (8b) and On The Soul (417b 15-17), reminding us 
that, in fact, disposition refers to “passive states” such as cold, heat and sickness. Dispositions are 
temporary and they are removable. They are psychological or physical in nature, but not ontological. He 
distinguishes between the surface level impressions that are significant but not drastic as opposed to deeper 
level effects that can drastically change the direction of motion and give rise to a different entity (Sachs, 
NE., xii). He makes a distinction here that might prove to be important: he refers to dispositions as shallow, 
while he sees hexis as deep and active. Later we read in Aristotle’s Poetics that the effect of Comedy is at 
the surface level and the effect of tragedy is at a deep level. 
We see a similar pattern for moral virtues and acquiring habits. According to Sachs, in Book VII of 
the Physics, Aristotle remarks: “children are not changed as a result of acquiring a habit. They are not even 
trained. Learning is the process of one’s overcoming distractions.”  
The motion involved in learning is to overcome the forces that might distract one from leading the 
path of nature (Sachs, NE., p. xii).  In other words, knowledge is “an active knowing that is always already 
at work in us.” This is confirmed in the Categories (8b 27-35) when he writes: 
Let habits and dispositions constitute one kind of quality. The former are unlike the latter in being 
more lasting and stable. Comprised among what we call ‘habits’ are virtues and all kinds of knowledge. For 
knowledge is considered as lasting and hard to displace from the mind, though a man may, in fact, have 
acquired it in only a moderate measure, unless some great change should come over him, thanks to disease 
or the like. And the same will hold good of the virtues—for instance, of temperance, justice. For these are 
allowed on all hands to be hard to dislodge or displace.  
Sachs concludes that to acquire a hexis is to become aware, or to reveal the having or holding of a 
certain state or virtue. In learning, there is no alteration or change involved, but rather a turn from potency 
in being or having a state to the being-at-work in that state. That is why Aristotle identifies moral virtue as 
a hexis in Book II, Chapter 4 of the Ethics. So, if hexis is a kind of settling in one’s being, what constitutes 
a good, moral action is related to the flourishing of this being and not a particular thing in the state of 
affairs. Sachs mentions that the central assumption of the book is this relation of virtue of an action to the 
doer and not the deed. By comporting oneself in a certain way, or by “holding oneself in a certain 
way,” (pōs echōn,) one can be moral. Hence why no action is universally good or bad. We have, for every 
person, an optimal action that is in accordance with her optimal state of balance. Aristotle calls this state 
that one holds as “a stable equilibrium of the soul” (Sachs, NE., xiii). Sachs mentions that this phrase 
translates the Greek: bebaiōs kai ametakinētōs: implying “in a condition from which one can’t be moved all 
the way over into a different condition.”
 On hexis in NE and Eudemian Ethics look at Appendix 2.95
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different from a blind adherence or copying of some rules or a blind habit. This constant 
comportment constitutes what Aristotle calls character (ēthos). The movement towards 
the end of man, to the appropriate body-politics is from ethos (with epsilon) to ēthos 
according to Sachs: from being a certain way in potency (not actively and knowingly) to 
being-at-work having the same thing knowingly (ibid.). This seems very much the same 
movement from unclarity to clarity from the previous chapter. 
 In the realm of human action, there would already be a shift from the animal body 
to a habitual body that grows out of education in childhood. Habitual actions, according 
to Aristotle, are done with ease and pleasure—with almost no effort, and not contrary to 
nature: “the virtues arise in us neither by nature nor against nature. Rather we are by 
nature able to acquire them, and we are completed through habit” (NE., 1103a 25-6).  
 Meanwhile, man’s corporeal nature puts his being in a precarious situation of 
longing and desire. Irrational longing or desire, illustrated in anger and bodily desire, 
turns things away from what they are and therefore need to be tamed by the stability of 
logos. Both anger and bodily desire are associated with the motion of the body, always 
longing for being-other than a thing is. They seem to be closer to the expression of the 
pure difference. Therefore, it seems that the ultimate “ought” in this reading of Aristotle 
is “to be what one truly is consistently.” 
 Thus, happiness as a stable end is always already anticipated. It is not 
some state in the future, or a revelation that would rip the texture of the world, 
but it is the fulfillment of a definition. This, as Sachs points out, is confirmed in 
Physics VII, where Aristotle compares the end of man with the completion of a 
house: 
Then just as neither do we call the completion of a house an alteration…., it 
is the same way also with virtues and vices, and with the things that have 
them or take them on, for the one kind are perfections and the other losses, 
and so are not alterations (Physics, VII. 246b). 
The consequence of this is that the immanent and natural laws that bring about the city 
give everything in the world its proper or appropriate place. That is the first meaning of 
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justice as the most perfect virtue. Justice for humans is to uphold the necessary laws 
given as a result of the transition from phonē to logos. Logos gives everything in the 
human world its definition, its proper or appropriate (prepon) place. Justice, for Aristotle, 
is to keep beings in their presencing—what they are expressing, what they are at their end 
(entelecheia). 
 Heidegger appreciates this ontological character of happiness as to let beings show 
themselves as what they are. But again, what they are for Heidegger is not coming from 
the appropriateness of the actual world or the common ordinary language. To contrast 
this, we can look at how Heidegger himself established this movement in BT.  
 In BT, Heidegger in fact talks about the deliberation and decision, as that which is 
at work revealing the truth. While criticizing the limit as actual and present, he still 
confirms that the deciding is not psychological and deliberation is in line with revealing 
the being of a thing as it is. In reference to the poem of Parmenides, Heidegger writes: 
The fact that the goddess of truth who leads Parmenides places him before 
two paths, that of discovering and that of concealment, signifies nothing 
other than the fact that Da-sein is always already both in the truth and the 
untruth. The path of discovering is gained only in krinein logo, in 
distinguishing between them understandingly and in deciding for the one 
rather than the other. (BT., 223; my emphasis) 
 To “distinguish between two paths understandingly” (krinein logo) and “to 
decide” are perhaps the elaborate rendering of what Aristotle calls deliberative choice 
(prohairesis). As I mentioned before, as long as Dasein is the place of the presencing of 
beings in logos it is “in truth”; but primarily Dasein finds herself in the unclear and the 
semblances of truth and that is why she is in “the untruth.” It seems then that Heidegger 
is in fact highlighting the same decision making between revealing the truth and covering 
it. Nevertheless, for him, what is familiar and actual does not afford any authentic 
possibility.  
 For Aristotle, on the other hand, the decision making and deliberation remains 
within the logos and has to remain present, actual and at its end. The more he tries to 
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establish immanent and natural end of man the more he instills appropriateness of the 
actual in the most intimate and inorganic levels of the generation of man. This is evident 
in the hierarchical system of society and the status of women and slaves in his Politics. 
This rational over-reach is exacerbated by the focus on the language of appropriateness 
and the insistence on the communal aspect of the proper, most beautiful or just action. All 
along he uses true pleasure as his evidence to prove that.  
3.4.4. Being Headed towards the Noble (kalon) 
 From the beginning to the end of NE, pleasure remains the strongest candidate for 
the happiness—that is, the most self-sufficient and complete alternative for happiness. In 
every case, however, improper pleasure is only apparently good, the closest to us that 
must be questioned, put away in favor of a more lasting and permanent pleasure and for 
the good in itself that is in accordance with how things truly are, at their limit, eidos and 
logos.  
 We are thrown back to the original aporia of logos again. Aristotle admits, “The 
good is talked about exactly as variously as being” (NE. 1.4.1096a 23). Thereby, the 
original conflict at the heart of logos and expression is basically transferred to the realm 
of the ends of the action. If one wants to know what actions mean morally, or to judge an 
action, one is inevitably divided between the singular situation, and the communal one; 
the singular sense for me, and the language of “the other.”  
 The most pleasant or the most just or beautiful (kalon) as it appears to the particular 
individual, as it is as such, and as it is considered in society might not be the same. That 
is how the beautiful or noble starts to become ambiguous and aporetic. It starts to be used 
in close association with what is socially appropriate.  
 The way this happens is that kalon is considered the same as prepon, (the 
appropriate). As Davis Risebeck  observes in a gloss on the Topics, not only is 96
appropriate the same as the most beautiful, but it is also suggested that what is kalon is 
 Riesbeck, David. "Aristotle and the Scope of Justice." Journal of Ancient Philosophy [Online], 10.1 96
(2016): 59-91. Web. 8 Apr. 2018
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even based on what is appropriate (Topics. 1.5 102a 5-6). In the Nicomachean Ethics as 
well, these two have been associated closely with one another and with the mean between 
extremes in action and feeling (NE., 4.2 1122a34-b7, 1123a6-9, 4.6 1126b36-27a5, 10.8 
1178a10-13). The virtuous agent feels and acts as he should, when he should, toward the 
people he should, as much and as long as he should, for the reasons he should, and so on; 
appropriate action is the one that hits the mean (NE., 2.6 1106b21-28). As Risebeck 
confirms, the idea of appropriateness is deeply political since it has the beauty and 
flourishing of the others in view.  
 Risebeck also suggests that it is in this sense that the just action is related to kalon. 
This association is particularly strong in the Rhetoric, which gives prominence to actions 
such as “those choice-worthy things that someone does, not for his own sake,” “deeds for 
the sake of others,” and “good actions that concern others and not oneself” (Rhetoric, 1.9 
1366b36, 1367a3, 1367a4-5). As we will explore in the next chapter, however, the 
problem persists in the realm of justice, as Aristotle connects the good of the individual to 
that of general good, and finally the good of the other.  
 Also, to make sense of the kalon, and to give unity to all of the virtues, Aristotle 
associates the kalon, the most proportionate, with “the golden mean.” To determine the 
Golden Mean is not a matter for mathematics, but is not alien to mathematics either. It 
needs the most perfect virtue, which is justice in a general sense. The general or complete 
sense of justice, then, according to Aristotle, is that disposition, which makes one able to 
see the most proportionate, the most beautiful as the golden mean in regard to any 
particular virtue and any particular circumstance. So, justice in this sense is not simply a 
social virtue but is the fundamental orientation of life-possessing-logos to deliberate the 
sense of individual actions by putting them in relation to wholes and evaluating them as 
virtue or vice. Is this sense, the just, the beautiful and the golden mean come together and 
are associated with the most appropriate.  
 By establishing this hierarchy, we enter the critical aspect and the aporetic nature 
of Aristotle’s treatment of justice. By opening the door to all animal, inorganic, and 
immanent forces of desire, and (teleologically) taming them in favor of appropriateness, 
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he has systematically mis-treated all gatherings that occur unexpectedly. The important 
point is that he admits the existence of such unnatural or demonic gatherings and tries to 
eradicate them altogether. Paradoxically, however, he provides the ontological grounds 
for them as inorganic, animal or bestial. 
  
3.5. Conclusion: Hamartia and Following the Nomadic  
 Doings, makings, and gatherings, for Aristotle, always follow a hierarchy of the 
best (agathon), the most flourishing and happy (eudaimonia), the most beautiful or noble 
(kalon), and the less virtuous, the barbaric, the monstrous, or the completely evil. 
Essential to all motion and generation, as we mentioned with regard to the generation of 
animals, is, on the one hand, the immanent force of bodily desires for pleasure and 
avoidance of pain, and, on the other hand, the transcendent, rational limit that is imposed 
on creation by a form (morphe, eidos) associated with logos.  For the gathering of sense 97
to be accounted for, the movement of desire, which is generating species, has to come to 
an end, meet its limits, and receive names and articulations: 
For what is bad belongs to what is unlimited (aperon)  as the 98
Pythagoreans conjectured and what is good (agathon)  belongs to what is 99
limited whereas success is possible in one way only (which is why it is 
easy to fail and difficult to succeed—easy to miss the target and difficult 
to hit it). (NE., 2. 1106 b 29-30)  
 The unanticipated—the one that has no proper name yet—is, therefore, the 
monstrous, the unlimited, and the catastrophic. For the beings to be in perpetual state of 
pleasure and rest, in the most organic sense of the term, their desires have to be in a 
 One can argue that this trend has been continued even more drastically throughout middle-ages by 97
replacing the logos with the logos in religion and absolute eternal forms or ideas in the mind of God. 
Through a providential, divine creation every creation has been categorized as already anticipated and 
necessary by God. 
 ἄπειρος boundless, infinite,98
 ἀγαθός, good99
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balanced state so that they do not turn to something else. The entities at-their-end also 
must express their essence (ousia) perpetually. In other words, they always have to be 
towards their being-at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia). Being-[perpetually]-at-one’s-end 
is to be at the precarious position of the limit, or border (peras). This is the perpetual state 
of expression of an entity’s being what it is and, at the same time, what makes it distinct 
and separate from others. That is what makes this metaphysical notion so political. What 
a thing is, the expression of the genuine identity of a being is already making it differ 
from others. It is to determine its borders and limits. We are already talking about “the 
Ends of Man,” “Crossing the borders,” the immigrants, the aliens, and the monsters.   100
 The significance of Aristotle’s text is that whether in the generation of animals or 
the ethical contexts, he recognizes the possibility of “missing the targets,” namely, bad 
(kakos) and ugly (aischros) makings and doings. Notwithstanding, he insists on 
marginalizing or stigmatizing them as vices, barbaric language or unaccountable, bestial 
formations. In the case of human makings (poiesis) and doing (praxis), one of the terms 
he uses for the ontological deviations—mistakes in the universal laws, as well as 
involuntary mistakes caused by the internal constitution of human beings—is, “missing 
the mark (hamartia).”  
 However, missing the mark, failing to recognize, or to use Derrida’s term, the 
“mis-recognition” or “mis-treatment” of bestial formations is “symptomatic” (Derrida, 
DDP, 39).  That is to say, Aristotle knowingly, and systematically tries to circumvent 
such deformities or to turn all of them to accountable  bad formations which can or 101
 In order to deal with the abnormal, singular particulars, immigrants and aliens, Aristotle himself 100
examines different kinds of borders, limits or completions. He has different schemata to deal with the 
generation of the other while advocating the use of reason to determine the end in each case or, as Ricoeur 
would say, to keep the generation of the new under “the watchful eyes” of reason. For things in nature, the 
ones which have the principle of motion and rest in themselves, he contends that, they seek their necessary 
end “for the most part.” Nonetheless, as we mentioned in chapter 2, some unknown mixture in the seed of 
the father in the process of gestation, or overactivity of the receptive material in mother’s womb, may 
interfere with the process of coming-to-be of an animal, in which case, the end would not express the same 
thing as its form or the form of the father and leads into the creation of monsters. That is when the 
immanent power of desire in nature means (i.e. want to say or express (to use Derrida’s term vouloire dire)) 
more than the anticipated end.
 Through the sort of accounts that are psychological, biological, physiological and the like. 101
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“ought to” be avoided. He, himself, “misses the mark” by which he indicates or points at 
the creation of the abnormal, the bestial, and the monstrous. We learned from Aristotle 
that being comes to the fore in logos, but in uttering the results of such “missing the 
marks,” he is the one, who releases all sorts of beasts in logos.  
 Here is where in the Nicomachean Ethics, he points to the possibility of that. In 
targeting the best and most balanced and moderate course of action, Aristotle contends 
that the end or the target is the golden mean. The Golden Mean as the most noble (kalon), 
the most balanced, proportionate, and beautiful is always mine and particular, which 
means that it is not Platonic. Nonetheless, it is anticipated and rational. It is controlled by 
logos. As I mentioned above, he makes sure that through calculation and deliberation, 
necessarily, the most just, beautiful and right results must come to pass. I also mentioned 
the ontological character of deliberation that controls the presencing of things towards the 
accomplishment of the hylomorph.  
 This is particularly critical when one is supposed to be judged, or someone 
commits an unjust action. When some criminal or wrong doer is judged, the question of 
what went wrong, who to blame, what or who is responsible for the deviation,  and 102
what the just measure is for the good versus bad action has to do with accurately 
identifying the agent or the source of action. Here is a bit more context to the citation 
above. He writes: 
Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions in which excess and 
deficiency go astray while the mean is praised and gets them right [hit the 
mean, aim at the right, kalon, balance of desires, justice] and none of these 
belong to virtue. It is also possible to go wrong in many ways (for what is 
bad belong to what is unlimited (aperon) as the Pythagoreans conjectured 
and what is good belongs to what is limited) but there is only one way to 
get something right. (which is why the one is easy and the other is difficult, 
 The root of this word in Indo-Iranian languages “-dēv-” is associated with beast, bestial etc. 102
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it is easy to miss the mark (hamartia) and difficult to hit it. (NE., 1106b 
26-30) 
The Golden Mean of virtues is a modification of desires, a having (habit, hexis, echei) or 
singular targeting of desires (for the beneficial (pleasure) and the harmful (pain)) which 
makes the seed, the potency, or the body of an entity to be directed towards a proper 
(prepon), appropriate holding-at-one’s-end (entelecheia). Therefore, the subsequent 
choices “ought” to be controlled by the power of logos. Here comes the symptomatic 
mis-treatment. In the case that a desire “goes astray” and the agent “misses the mark” in 
targeting the mean that he “ought” to pursue, he will produce deformity. Monsters, here, 
are vices that are created often much more than proper makings because we are dealing 
with human choice and desire. 
 Aristotle investigates different kinds of these mistakes to account for as many of 
them as he can. Some of these actions and mistakes, according to Aristotle, take place as 
a result of a permanent disposition. Unjust acts can refer to an unjust disposition or a vice 
in a person. That is when the principle of movement that causes the action is within the 
person and under the control of his deliberation. Still, Aristotle introduces other forms of 
making and doing that have a strange affinity with this one.  
 In NE., 1135b18, Aristotle explicates a number of reasons why someone might be 
responsible for an “injury over his fellow.” He mentions that when the injury inflicted, 
happens contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a mishap (hamartēma);  when it 103
happens not contrary to reasonable expectation, but without malice, it is a mistake 
(atýchima).  In the case of a mistake, the source of responsibility lies within the agent 104
(and so it is accountable), whereas in the case of a mishap, the initiative lies outside him 
 ἁµαρτάνω: the same root as hamartia: “missing the mark” 103
1. generally, fail of one's purpose, go wrong, 
2. fail of having, be deprived of, mostly 
3. rarely, fail to do, neglect, 
4. do wrong, err, sin
 accident or misadventure, and offense due to mistake and not reasonably to be expected104
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(NE. 5.1135b 17-19). In a footnote, the translator draws attention to the possible 
relationship between the involuntary mistake and the tragic mishap or “missing the mark” 
(hamartia). He comments that there is too much similarity, here, to ignore. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, in regard to the disruption of an unjust act that does not speak to the 
character of the agent of it, Aristotle writes: 
Thus it will be possible for a deed to be unjust without yet being an 
“unjust act”  if the element of voluntariness is absent. By a voluntary act, 105
as has been said earlier,  I mean an act which lies in the agent’s power to 106
perform, performed by the agent in full knowledge and without ignorance 
either of the person acted on, the instrument used, or the result intended by 
his action. He must know, for example, whom he is striving with, what 
instrument, and what result he intends to achieve…. 
Later he continues:  
A man may possibly strike his father, realizing that he is striking a man or 
a bystander, but without knowing that it is his father whom he is striking. 
(NE. 5, 1135a28) (this example likely refers to Oedipus, (Poetics 13, 
1453a7-17 hamartēma)   
This is a new category of events introduced here. The normal category is when the result 
is in accordance with the deliberation. Those choices and decisions determine the being 
of somebody. They are, jus (in Latin), and juste (in French meaning right), or just to his 
being. Some actions and mistakes can be referred back to the bad judgment or 
miscalculation under the influence of desires. Both of these results are anticipated and 
accounted by Aristotle’s metaphysics.  
 This means that, as Whalley confirms too, an “act” has a particular implication for Aristotle. It means 105
that it has to be teleological, aiming at a good if not at a final good. 
 In book three and explication of the voluntary and involuntary.106
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 But Aristotle is vigilant to mention particular cases like Oedipus, where in spite of 
all of the calculations by the individual, he does actions that does not speak to his 
character and would not result in a hylomorph but a catastrophe. In that case, the 
principle that is creating the event, Aristotle admits, must have been from outside of him 
or incidentally. The source of the making and the mistake is outside his being and he is 
not to blame (NE., 1135b18).  107
Therefore, the error in the part of a character like Oedipus, points to an agent, a doer, or a 
maker of state of affairs, which is beyond the expectation of a rational, virtuous doer and 
maker, as well as the audience of the tragedy.  
 There are then three ways in which a man may injure his fellow. An injury done in ignorance is an error, 107
the person affected or the act or the instrument or the result being other than the agent supposed; for 
example, he did not think to hit, or not with this missile, or not this person, or not with this result, but it 
happened that either the result was other than he expected for instance he did not mean to inflict a wound 
but only a prick, or the person, or the missile. When then the injury happens contrary to reasonable 
expectation, it is (1) a misadventure. When, though not contrary to reasonable expectation, it is done 
without evil intent, it is (2) a culpable error; for an error is culpable when the cause of one's ignorance lies 
in oneself, but only a misadventure when the cause lies outside oneself. (NE., 1135b18) 
2 The three sorts of injury are ἀτύχηµα, ἁµάρτηµα, and ἀδίκηµα. The second term is introduced first, in its 
wider sense of a mistake which leads to an offense against someone else （the word connotes both 
things）. It is then subdivided into two; ἀτύχηµα, accident or misadventure, and offense due to mistake and 
not reasonably to be expected, and ἁµάρτηµα in the narrow sense, a similar offense that ought to have been 
foreseen. The third term, ἀδίκηµα, a wrong, is subdivided into wrongs done in a passion, which do not 
prove wickedness, and wrongs done deliberately, which do. (NE., 1142a) 
[7] Again, in deliberation there is a double possibility of error: you may go wrong either in your general 
principle or in your particular fact: for instance, either in asserting that all heavy water is unwholesome, or 
that the particular water in question is heavy. [8] ἔτι ἡ ἁµαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ 
τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον: 
Again, a man can be said to have deliberated well either generally, or in reference to a particular end. 
Deliberative Excellence in general is therefore that which leads to correct results with reference to the end 
in general, while correctness of deliberation with a view to some particular end is Deliberative Excellence 
of some special kind. 
If therefore to have deliberated well is a characteristic of prudent men, Deliberative Excellence must be 
correctness of deliberation with regard to what is expedient as a means to the end, a true conception of 
which10 constitutes Prudence. Understanding, or Good Understanding. (NE., 1142b) 
With regard to problems, and the various solutions of them, how many kinds there are, and the nature of 
each kind, all will be clear if we look at them like this. Since the poet represents life, as a painter does or 
any other maker of likenesses, he must always represent one of three things—either things as they were or 
are; or things as they are said and seem to be; or things as they should be. These are expressed in diction 
with or without rare words and metaphors, there being many modifications of diction, all of which we 
allow the poet to use. Moreover, the standard of what is correct is not the same in the art of poetry as it is in 
the art of social conduct or any other art. In the actual art of poetry there are two kinds of errors, essential 
and accidental. If a man meant to represent something and failed through incapacity, that is an essential 
error. But if his error is due to his original conception being wrong and his portraying, for example, a horse 
advancing both its right legs, that is then a technical error in some special branch of knowledge, [20] in 
medicine, say, or whatever it may be; or else some sort of impossibility has been portrayed, but that is not 
an essential error. These considerations must, then, be kept in view in meeting the charges contained in 
these objections.
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 Aristotle rejects the possibility of the attribution of this making (the catastrophic 
making) in the horizon for Oedipus to the divine writer. He says such an ending and 
discovery (the divine intervention) is too easy and does not bring about catharsis (Poetics, 
1455a 15-20). In effect, he leaves no other option for the audience than thinking of a 
bestial force at work in the nature or the order of things that threatens everyone—and 
there is no secure escape from the contingency of its creation. Hereby, Aristotle admits 
that the disastrous effect or bad formation might occur in the process of individuation 
unbeknownst to the doer and against his best calculations. This is still a motion of desire, 
but not from within the control of the deliberation of the individual.  
 There is this passage in the Politics, where he is suggesting the characteristics of a 
tyrant and it has a curious affinity with this situation. Here, too, he is referring to the 
bestial power of generation of events. These events are not in control of the deliberation 
and are created as a result of a mistake or stupidity, what Derrida calls bêtise, from the 
same root bête, beast, and bestial (B&S., 147).   
…each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to 
the whole state as other parts are to their whole, while a man who is 
incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he 
has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower 
animal or a god.  (Politics. 1.1253a 25-27) 
This passage is too enigmatic for me to interpret in passing. But, what it does indicate is 
that Aristotle is evidently very wary of those “parts” that somehow or other will not be 
subsumed under a “whole”. They seem to be not simply anomalies that can be simply 
dismissed or straightened. They are in the same order as gods, Aristotle claims. These 
lower beasts seem to be in the same order as the sovereigns. They are also self-sufficing 
as if like self-generating power of physis or logos, except that they are of a different order 
of expression and paradoxically become active when deliberation is suspended. It seems 
that the thought of bêtise becomes active particularly when the deliberative thinking stops 
working (B&S. 148). As we mentioned in the last chapter, this is akin to the language of 
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difference and the gift of being. It is in the naiveté of silence or hearing that physis begins 
to express this original language of difference. 
 Once admitting to the existence of a mis-treatment, and the automatic power of 
generation of events beyond calculation, one expects Aristotle would turn into an 
immanent philosopher of becoming. Well, he goes deep into the multiplicity of desire 
through imagination in tragedy, but only in order to educate, warn, and threaten the 
audience against such unaccountable makings. That is to say that philomythos and 
philosophy, for him, have the same goal of bringing a kind of rationality to the picture. 
The gifted poet is the one who realizes this threat, and by invoking and appealing to the 
audiences’ power of imagination, tries to threaten them about the consequence of their 
actions and the vulnerability of their situation.  
 Another place where the contingencies of action are revealed (and Aristotle deals 
with them head on) is in the formation of a political community. That is, in the 
implementation of general justice and laws to a polis. This will be continued in the next 
chapter. 
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4. Chapter 4:   Following the Just, Following the Nomadic: Deconstruction of 
Laws in Aristotle 
And of the man in you would I now speak.  
For it is he and not your god-self nor the pigmy 
in the mist, that knows crime and the punishment 
of crime.  
Oftentimes have I heard you speak of one who 
commits a wrong as though he were not one of 
you, but a stranger unto you and an intruder upon 
your world.  
But I say that even as the holy and the righteous 
rise beyond the highest which is in each one of 
you,  
So the wicked and the weak cannot fall lower 
than the lowest which is in you also.  
(Kahlil Gibran, 40) 
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4.1. Introduction: Two Modes of Natural Community in Aristotle 
 The two communities which I believe can be read from Aristotle’s text come 
about as a result of his attempt to establish a just society in accordance with the natural 
development of human beings towards their end. One formulation of community, what I 
call “exchange community,” arises in accordance with Aristotle’s general systematic 
conceptuality by establishing the end of man in the city. Before attending to the second 
mode of community about this very natural process, there are two complications within 
Aristotelian scholarship which need to be addressed. Right away, there is an apparent 
conflict between the end of man as contemplation (Book 10) and the end of man as life-
in-the-polis or political life. In this regard, I follow David Roochnik’s suggestion that 
there is no fundamental conflict between the two. I believe my writing in this chapter also 
confirms his suggestion that leading a truly contemplative life is essentially the same as 
leading the same as leading a political. This brings us to the actual process of the genesis 
of community and laws and the complications thereof.  
 The laws or nomos of this economic community are not an interruption of the 
state of nature (logos and nomos essay). For Aristotle, unlike modern formulations of 
community in contrast to so called “state of nature,” one’s true freedom is not 
compromised in community with others. It is actually quite the contrary. As we discussed 
before, being in community for Aristotle implies being already in accordance with logos, 
hence speaking-with others. That is to say that human beings find their true expression 
and freedom in accordance with their nature, (possessing-logos) primarily by ‘following’ 
the logos of the public and consequently the laws of the city.  
 On the way to establishing this primary mode of community, Aristotle hints at the 
possibility of missing the target and failing to justly ‘address’ the individual character of 
every citizen. I argue that such an admission opens the structure of Aristotelian 
community and its laws to an alternative mode of ‘following’ which is not sanctioned 
primarily by Aristotle’s own system.  
 This alternative path or mode of ‘following’ and community which I call 
“nomadic following,” is akin to the destruction (in Heidegger’s terminology) of the 
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tradition or deconstruction (in Derrida’s terminology) of the laws. More generally, 
Aristotle’s self-reflection and self-criticism make him the first follower of this new mode 
of ‘following,’ albeit by taking only some initial steps in that direction. Therefore, we 
begin with the immanent and natural genesis of the laws of community in Aristotle and 
conclude with the suggestion as to what the most original mode of ‘following’ in general 
is.  
4.2. Derrida on Justice, Responsibility, and the Laws 
 Before embarking on the study of Aristotle on law and justice, in this section I 
explain my critical point of view. My justification for using deconstruction of tradition as 
my lens is that to read Aristotle as part of the tradition is to ‘address’ his text justly. As I 
will try to show in this chapter, the only way to justly ‘address’ the other is through 
deconstruction. Especially, with regard to tradition, deconstruction (which I take it as a 
translation of destrucktion in Heidegger) is the most authentic mode of ‘following.’ 
Therefore, I will enact deconstruction to address Aristotle, Heidegger and Derrida’s 
thought while trying to analyze how they treat otherness.  
4.2.1. The Point of Departure: Dasein, Being-with, and Interpretation 
It is safe to assume that Derrida’s point of departure in examining the self, 
community, and politics is Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity and psychologism. I 
mentioned before how Heidegger explains the hermeneutic state of the being of human 
beings as Dasein, the place of the interpretation of being. In most of his first books and 
lecture courses, Heidegger begins with the assumption that before being a self or having 
an identity, the primary and preliminary mode of being of human beings is a “concernful 
engagement” (Besorgen Umgang). This means that for the most part, things matter to 
Dasein in a pragmatic and practical sense and not theoretically. Being-at-home and being-
in-familiarity with one’s environment (Umwelt) is the most basic form of being-in-the-
world-with-one-another (CT., 22), in fact, more original than notions like empathy or 
inter-subjectivity.  
131
Heidegger asserts that the relationship between Dasein and its others is primarily 
guaranteed by the essential community in making sense of the world. “One (das Man)” 
Heidegger’s word for the being of the public, “shares (teilt) and has a cared-about 
world” (CT., 23). I also mentioned before that Heidegger does not hide the Greek origin 
of this formulation (humans as life-possessing-logos and life-in-the-polis) and contends 
that as being-in-possession of language, this essential community has an interpretive 
character. He calls this most ordinary state of being-with-one-another in the world or 
being-at-home-in-the-world “communication or communion” (Teilnahme) (CT., 23). 
What we share is not just mine or yours, but it is an essential state we find ourselves in 
together. We depend on it to be able to find our bearings in the world.  
Familiarity includes trusting the world and submitting to it without 
suspicion and arrange, cultivate, harness, and keep [the surrounding 
world]at our disposal. (CT., 24) 
He further develops the linguistic character of this familiar sense-making in terms of the 
idle-talk (Gerede). Dasein grows up into and primarily develops this elaborate 
hyphenated existence through the most ordinary way we make sense of the world around 
us. We learn what is good for what, where, when, and how and interpret things and 
people under this light. Our being, incomplete and relational is our most useful property, 
estate, and fund which we can depend on and spend every day with ease. Heidegger 
emphasizes the fact that this basic sense-making power is not authentic yet it is our main 
and primary asset before abstract and theoretical constructs like cognition and 
representation.   108
 It is important to remember that Dasein’s hyphenated and incomplete existence as opposed to being-at-108
one’s-end and complete or having an essence should not be understood negatively as a lack. That is the 
route of psychoanalysis or even Marxism which highlight the unconscious psychic or economic forces 
behind and before the constitution of the self and consciousness. For Heidegger, being under-determined 
turns Dasein’s existence into a positive, life affirming discovering power and an interpretive force 
(moglichkeit). On the other hand, Heidegger still distinguishes between an average primary discoveredness 
as opposed to an originary discovery (cf. CT., 28).  
 Although structurally speaking, Aristotle’s definition of truth as aletheia paves the way for 
Heidegger towards such a distinction, Aristotle himself has reservations with regard to the emergence of the 
unanticipated as truth.
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In everyday life we talk without originally appropriating what the talk is 
about what we say about something-the said (das Gesagte)- is said on the 
basis of hearsay (the newspaper), parroted (nachgeredet), picked up from 
our reading; and it is ‘said without thinking’ (daher geredet) in this 
rootless fashion. When we are together with others and go about our 
business (besorgenden Umgangs), our talk (die Umgangssprache) is 
characterized by uprooted inauthenticity (entwurzelen Uneigentlichkeit). 
(CT., 22) 
Therefore, Heidegger maintains that the clearest understanding of the other in this most 
basic mode of community is, in fact, borrowed both from the past and the average 
understanding. What is crucial here is the fact that he still associates the experience of the 
other in terms of language and interpretation. Dasein, as a relational being which 
Heidegger calls Care (Sorge), dwells in an interpretation (Auslegung) of the world. 
Nonetheless, interpretation is mostly guarded by idle-talk.  
It is idle-talk –through which the most common being-together-with-one-
another is lived and directed- that facilitates the intractable domination of 
‘one’ (das Man). (CT., 22)  
In other words, Heidegger believes that what constitutes being-at-home or being-
in-clarity in the world does not genuinely belong to every Dasein. The meanings and 
definitions of things are not appropriated by each individual singularly, rather it is a 
common interpretedness that they discover and learn while growing up.  
Dasein finds its most authentic interpretation in defiance of this basic relationality 
and dominance of the “one,” the public. Death provides this non-relational character for 
Dasein. As such, the death of everyone exclusively belongs to that particular person 
alone. In this way, death strips away relationality and provides the possibility of being-
alone for the first time. “Death is that possibility which is the absolute impossibility of 
Dasein” (BT., 255). This means that while death is one’s own exclusively, one cannot 
experience it as such. Cutting the hands of the “one” from what is on the horizon for 
Dasein can potentially open this horizon for a genuine discovery. This is what Heidegger 
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calls Dasein’s “ownmost potentiality-for-being” (BT., 256). This authentic expression and 
‘address’ for Heidegger is given to Dasein only when he shuts off the voice of the public 
and listens to the original not-yet-determined giving of Being (There is as es gibt). Being-
towards-death of Dasein has little to do with its actual demise or the linear temporality 
towards an end in time. It nonetheless strips away Dasein’s responsibility towards others.  
Thus, it is at this very point that the interpretation of otherness is essentially tied 
to the problem of language, interpretation and ‘address.’ When one assumes that the 
being-togetherness is constituted by different modes of language, the understanding of 
the other essentially becomes a matter of interpretation. Whatever method or strategy one 
maintains for interpretation in general is also applicable to the interpretation of another 
person or the historical ‘other.’ 
One can argue that Derrida’s point of departure in the critique of justice and the 
treatment of others in law is founded upon these basic assumptions about Dasein’s 
hermeneutic situation and its interpretive and textual being. Derrida also agrees with the 
inauthentic character of ordinary speech and the idle-talk. In order to be in responsible 
‘following’ of the other “rather than seeking conformity, one may have to set oneself 
apart from what is publicly or commonly accepted.” (GD., 26) One’s true and authentic 
being emerges as a result of a heretical stance against what is inherited from the tradition 
or the public.  
This is the very meaning of ethics and responsibility for Derrida. One’s actions 
are only one’s own and appropriated when one takes responsibility for them. One’s 
signature on an event or action which makes that action genuinely one’s own comes 
about only when it is not in conformity with the system of sense-making or the laws. It 
has to be irresponsible with regard to the inherited. In other words, responsibility is tied 
here to heresy in all the senses of the term: “departure from a doctrine, difference within 
and difference from the officially and publicly stated doctrine and the institutional 
community that is governed by it” (GD., 26).  
With regard to the interpretive character of being-in-the-world, the most genuine 
‘following’ or community is the most original interpretation of otherness and the most 
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just response to the other which ‘addresses’ her as such. On the other hand, however, this 
most authentic ‘address’ is necessarily heretical in relation to the interpreted discourse 
and unjust in relation to the instituted laws. Such is the paradoxical and impossible 
character of laws in relation to justice. Authentic being-in-following is the perpetual 
experience of this trouble and aporia. That which is the most authentic expression of 
Dasein or the most responsible and ethical mode of ‘following’ is necessarily and 
paradoxically the most heretical, amoral, and unlawful.  
It is noteworthy that aporia, as the term suggests, is a blind alley; hence, a non-
experience. That is, the very statement “experience of an aporia” is paradoxical. That is 
because the experience seeks a passage to the other or to its object which, in this case, is 
blocked and hampered. That is why, for Derrida, every genuine reading or understanding 
of the other is finally a translation, and every translation is a transformation which falls 
short of expressing the character of the other. 
Notwithstanding, this impossibility, as the one with Heidegger’s notion of death, 
is not a paralyzing or a negative indifference. Quite the contrary, it is the only passage 
towards the other and oneself alike. Here, the problem intersects with the political, 
ethical, and legal each of which has a claim in guaranteeing the just and accurate 
treatment of the other.  
Laws claim to ‘address’ the rights and merits of others and consequently my own. 
Especially in theories like that of Aristotle, for whom the city is a place where the 
function of man is realized, the laws that determine the role of individuals in the city 
enjoy a particular ontological character. It is primarily the job of a judge or a statesman to 
recognize the proper character of individuals and their merits. Laws in such a system do 
not merely delimit individuals’ social or economic rights; instead, they sketch the most 
beautiful, flourishing, and balanced being-togetherness of people in logos. Laws are not a 
contract between already molded and complete selves but rather they outline and 
formalize the most virtuous way of being-togetherness which subsequently delimit 
oneself as well. They finally determine how one ‘ought’ to experience the other and 
oneself or how one is to ‘follow’ the other.  
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The problem becomes more evident and significant with regard to religious 
traditions and laws in two ways. First, laws in religious traditions and cultures define the 
self as already connected to the absolute other, God. Secondly, receiving the laws is 
always tied with the interpretation of texts and tradition. Altogether, the laws that project 
the “who” of human beings and their others are tightly tied with one’s interpretation of 
language and ‘address.’  
4.2.2. Deconstruction of Laws and Justice 
4.2.2.1. Deconstruction as Justice 
 As I tried to show in this work, destruction or deconstruction of tradition in 
Heidegger and Derrida is not trying to destroy the tradition. On the contrary, they aim at 
‘addressing’ the true character of a philosophical tradition in order to disclose what has 
left unmentioned in them. In this sense, it is deconstruction itself which is the mode of 
‘following’ that lives up to the singularity of a philosophical text, not by parroting “the 
said” or the “interpreted,” but by translating and transforming the text’s forces.  
Deconstruction is about criticizing the foundation of laws for better judgments 
and more just interpretation of others. Derrida’s problem with moral laws is their pretense 
to establish universal justice, which excludes diversity and brings about unity among all. 
Derrida thinks that the dependence on the sovereignty of such laws threatens personal 
responsibility, free judgment and decision-making.  
The privilege granted to unity, to organic ensembles, to community as a 
homogenized whole – this is a danger for responsibility, for decision, for 
ethics, for politics. That is why, I insisted on what prevents unity from 
closing upon itself, from being closed up. It is not only a matter of 
description, of saying that this is the way it is. It is a matter of accounting 
for the possibility of responsibility, of a decision, of ethical commitments. 
(Derrida & Caputo, 13) 
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 Derrida sets out to defend the essentially ethical character of deconstruction in his 
lecture “Force of Law.”  As I elaborate on below, in this essay in a Socratic style, he 109
defends the integrity and consistency of deconstruction with regard to the question of 
justice (McCormick, 399). He tries to show that all of his philosophy from the very 
beginning deals with the question of laws and justice either directly or indirectly. Derrida 
insists that the word “law” is not merely limited to legal context but rather it can point to 
a meaning that is “moral, juridical, political, natural, etc.” The problem is the universal 
claims of any such laws, which makes them deconstructible. This is precisely what I tried 
to accomplish in previous chapters with regard to natural and ethical laws in Aristotle. 
By destabilizing, complicating, or bringing out the paradoxes of values 
like those of the proper and of property in all their registers, of the 
subject, and so of the responsible subject, of the subject of law (droit) and 
the subject of morality, of the juridical or moral person, of intentionality, 
etc., ... such a deconstructive line of questioning is through and through a 
problematization of law and justice. A problematization of the 
foundations of law, morality and politics. (McCormick, 400) 
Deconstruction in this sense does not consist in any particular system of thought or 
methodology, but an ethical intervention or ‘following’ in the historically inherited 
discourses of all kinds. Deconstruction suspends the said and unsaid intentions of the 
texts and the audience and let life as potency reveal itself from within the texts and 
tradition. “Deconstruction, as Derrida defends it here, pursues the unceasing interrogation 
of the authority of all opinion, conventional or political, even those of 
philosophers” (ibid.). 
 For Derrida then, the most authentic mode of ‘following’, the one that does not 
have a presumed telos and is nomadic is realized in deconstruction itself. Especially in 
regard to the political community, deconstruction as ‘nomadic following’ explains the 
 Derrida, Jacques. "Force De Loi: Le Fondement Mystique De L'Autorite," Cardozo Law Review vol. 11, 109
no. Issues 5-6 (July/Aug. 1990): p. 920-1046. In this chapter I cite this essay as (FL)
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hermeneutic situation of Dasein with respect to otherness. Therefore, it is in fact neither 
controversial nor surprising to hear Derrida claim that “deconstruction is justice.”  
‘Deconstruction is justice,’ since it calls for an untiring (in principle 
infinite, because never "finished") analysis of the philosophical heritage 
and its juridico-political systems, an analysis that is inseparable from an 
equally infinite responsibility (Weber, 2005. 42). 
Deconstruction is justice not in a legal sense, but in terms of responsibility. In studying 
the history of philosophy or in reading any particular system of thought, deconstruction 
does not claim to reveal the intentions of the author or the underlying meaning of the text. 
Instead, it remains on the margin of philosophical texts revealing what has been left 
unmentioned or systematically marginalized by the text.  
 Deconstruction considers the other as singular and the encounter as an event 
which is not repeatable and cannot be subsumed under any law. Justice in this sense is 
constant deferral of law or of universal decision. It is the admission that in any and all 
enforcement of laws, one falls short of doing justice to the other and ultimately falls back 
in some theoretical, institutional, or political system. Therefore, it seems that the only real 
solution to keep the force of justice active is to experience justice as an impasse or 
impossibility. Deconstruction reveals the complicity and the contradiction involved in 
any pretense of justice as law or any expression that claims to be an ‘address.’  
 With this new decision and path comes a new mode of motion that is not without 
‘followers.’ Deconstructive ‘following’ is a perpetual calculation and dealing with all 
sorts of law as present. Derrida says: 
I want to insist right away on reserving the possibility of a justice, indeed 
of a law that not only exceeds or contradicts ‘law’ (droit) but also, perhaps, 
has no relation to law, or maintains such a strange relation to it that it may 
just as well command the ‘droit’ that excludes it (FL., 927). 
While the being of the ordinary Dasein is, according to Heidegger, characterized as 
being-in-familiarity or being-at-home, ‘following’ in Derrida’s sense describes Dasein’s 
perpetual attempt to find one’s bearings after finding oneself “in-trouble” or in an aporia. 
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For Derrida, ‘following’ the other is a heedful conduct and an a-teleological nomadic 
‘following.’ It is a perpetual territorialization through deterritorialization. It is not simply 
dialectical as for or against any system of thought, but rather a movement or intervention 
within them. Derrida calls this movement in his early works deferral or différance. In 
defending the integrity of deconstruction, he repeats the same term in “Force of Law” 
again: 
For me, it is always a question of differential force, of difference as 
difference of force, of force as différance (différance is a force différée-
différante), of the relation between force and form, force and signification, 
performative force, illocutionary or perlocutionary force, of persuasive and 
rhetorical force, of affirmation by signature, but also and especially of all 
the paradoxical situations in which the greatest force and the greatest 
weakness strangely enough exchange places (FL., 929). 
Therefore, it is only by weakening the structure of law and emphasizing the generative 
force of the surplus that the laws of all kind become open to the other of the law or to the 
uncalculated. Derrida does not simply add a new concept to philosophy. He intervenes at 
the level of phonemes and diacritical marks within an existing word, a law, or a concept, 
and delays its present meaning. Again, it is worth noting how in this very concept of 
différance deconstruction as justice is enacted. Derrida has not heedlessly added a new 
concept to the philosophical tradition as if like an authority. He signs, however, by puting 
off the present meaning of a concept (in this case différence in French) by an intervention 
at the level of graphemes, i.e. turning “e” to “a.” For him, then, ‘following’ justly is the 
same as différance and the very process enacted in the term. 
 Derrida’s way of treating discourse, his enacting of deconstruction itself is an 
enactment of what he means by justice. His writing and style is performative in the sense 
that it shows how one might be able to find his bearing in a text without necessarily 
having a pre-established telos or any pre-established law. The terminology of 
deconstruction as well as the new nomadic categories gradually come to pass in this 
engagement with the text or tradition at hand, and the same time as Derrida is 
139
demonstrating the internal conflicts in the texts that he engages with. The measure and 
the new writing under his signature are created in the very act of reading and ‘following’ 
the text and subsequently uncovering the constellation of concepts that comes to the fore. 
Deconstruction as this intervention in reading the tradition and interpreting otherness 
does not claim to understand the other or even to be able to have a dialogue with the 
other; instead, it takes full responsibility for the violence that one is bound to commit 
whenever one embarks on such a task.   
 After Derrida’s intervention, one is bound to pause before the concept and let it 
make sense as if it were a new language. He injects temporality—what he calls 
metaphoricity—within the body of the concepts, cultures, and commonsensical issues 
that are already benumbed and stupefied, and turns them into singular problems and fresh 
questions. There is no pretense of presence, completion, or identity, and there are 
especially no general laws or community. Deconstruction is not a method or theory but an 
intervention which ‘follows’ the emergence of concepts while they are coming to be. 
 Laws in general and particularly in terms of political context define inside and 
outside, normal and abnormal. Their application always involves some kind of positive 
force of elimination and delimitation. Deconstruction exposes the marginalization 
committed by these general laws as well as their aporias. “…the exposing of the aporias 
and the margins of the traditional is an act of resistance and an openness toward the 
future. The future is a possibility of transcending violence, a possibility already aspired 
after in the tradition itself” (McCormick, 399). In the lecture, I just cited, Derrida sets out 
to prove his point in a performative way. In a Socratic way, as in the Apology or the 
Republic, he acts out the essential relationship between justice and language with his 
audience while giving a speech about this topic. He puts his audience in a position to 
witness in person the necessity of deconstruction, the violence inherent in the laws, and 
the aporias involved with complete compatibility of laws and justice. Far from 
encouraging resignation or a turning away from politics, these aporias actually render 
more urgent the demand of justice. Here, I will review this performance before applying 
the same critique to Aristotle’s laws.   
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4.2.2.2. Deconstruction and the Aporia of the ‘Address’  
 At an American university conference titled “Deconstruction and the Possibility 
of Justice,” Derrida spoke to an audience of law students. Derrida scrutinizes and objects 
to the very title of the conference he is invited to. He mentions that by way of 
coordinative conjunction “and” in the title, the organizers of the conference have initially 
set these two concepts apart as if they were incompatible. Thereby, they question whether 
deconstruction can in fact be co-extensive with justice. Derrida goes on to explain how 
the application of laws is beset by some aporias as well as the fact that laws essentially 
involve some kind of force and violence. Derrida points out that for him to come and give 
that speech for example he has to abide by the laws and regulations around holding a 
conference one of which is to speak the language which is not his. He sets out to show 
that as a result of such aporias, the experience of justice becomes "an experience of the 
impossible" (ibid.), that is, of the incalculable and the unpredictable.  
 One of the aporias which he performs with his audience is the aporia of the 
‘address.’ The conflict is between the uniqueness of the address and the name and 
necessity of the generality of the law.  
An address is always singular, idiomatic, and justice, as law (droit), seems 
always to suppose the generality of a rule, a norm or a universal 
imperative. How are we to reconcile the act of justice that must always 
concern singularity, individuals, irreplaceable groups and lives, the other 
or myself as other, in a unique situation, with rule, norm, value or the 
imperative of justice which necessarily have a general form, even if this 
generality prescribes a singular application in each case? (FL, 946) 
Derrida cunningly compares the case of the impossibility of justice to that of the ‘address’ 
in his own case. He admits to the impossibility of ‘addressing’ the audience justly and yet 
his desire to do so (vouloir dire). It is worth remembering that throughout this work we 
have been dealing with this immanent and natural desire to give full expression to one’s 
experience or to the presencing of nature and the failure to do so completely. Derrida 
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writes about this trouble in addressing the other as follows: “A sort of polemos already 
concerns the appropriation of language: if, at least, I want to make myself understood, it 
is necessary that I speak your language, I must” (AR, 232). Justice in this sense calls for a 
response and responsibility, the call that one feels compelled to (must) answer.             
 As we explained with Heidegger, as well, the problem is with logos and its 
relation to an ‘address.’ Justice, according to Derrida, is to ‘address’ the other as they 
truly are or a thing as it truly is—to manifest a thing in a proportionate manner regarding 
its being. Justice as ‘address’ is to define, to delimit a thing, or in an English expression 
“to judge someone or something on their own merits.” The ‘address,’ therefore, is 
necessarily tailored for the singular. Anything more or less in an ‘address’ is unjust. To 
send a parcel or a piece of mail to a particular person, you need an exact direction or 
address otherwise, your parcel will never meet the destination and will “miss the mark.”  
 However, the speaker’s intention to address people fairly, according to Derrida, 
always already becomes impossible by the nature of ‘address’ itself. The complication is 
not one but many. For one, my intention to address an issue in language (vouloir dire) 
must involve the language of the audience, or the addressee, to be able to be an address in 
the first place. Derrida writes: “I must speak in a language that is not my own because 
that will be more just, in another sense of the word juste as opposed to justice as [law] 
droit” (FL, 923). I have to use the language of the other to express my intention. This is 
to say that in order for one to be understood, one has to enter the public realm. This is the 
first stage of reducing the singularity of “me” and the other to what is not mine and does 
not belong to any singular other. This is what Derrida considers as violence upon oneself 
and the addressee alike. I use the language of the other thereby not only reduce my 
intention and myself, but I also deprive the world of its full expression by limiting it to 
speaking. I “must speak” is always violent per se. 
The challenge that Derrida's thought addresses to us is to realize the need 
to ‘learn’ -from the other, from the nameless, from the phantom -how to 
address ourselves to her; how to learn her name with the keen awareness 
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that looking for that name and learning it bears in itself the risk of ‘losing,’ 
forgetting, betraying it in its singularity. (Weber, 2005. 41) 
Therefore, in order to be fair to the audience and address them authentically, I have to 
translate, to commit an injustice, or to use violence with the problem I am ‘addressing’ as 
well as to my intention, which has been contaminated with my language and background. 
Thus,  Derrida argues that the condition of the possibility of justice in ‘addressing’ one’s 
otherness fairly is the condition of its impossibility. My arrow would necessarily “miss 
the mark” without any moral fault of anyone in particular. It is simply tragic, and in 
keeping with the language of the previous chapters, catastrophic (kata-strophic) as 
opposed to hylomorphic.  
 It is significant that the question of justice and law finds its way not only to the 
question of language, but also to that of translation. Derrida says, “It is more just to talk 
the language of the other” (FL, 921). This statement already contains a mediation 
between the two parties: addresser and the addressee. This invokes the question of 
translation as a “desire to say” (vouloire dire), that will remain as an “always imperfect 
compromise between two idioms” (FL, 925). In all such cases, we are dealing with the 
problem of supplementation and mediation, which is both necessarily violent and unjust 
due to the nature of language.  110
4.2.2.3. Aporias of Laws and the Priority of Responsibility  
The problems involved with the laws in general are threefold depending on 
different stages of their emergence and the decision or distinctions based on them. These 
 Derrida makes another intervention at the level of language that needs to be looked at carefully. “The 110
word "enforceability" reminds us that there is no such thing as law (droit) that doesn't imply in itself, a 
priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility of being “enforced," applied by force.” We 
assume that the parties involved in justice as law are enacting a contract between themselves. The verb 
collocation for law in French, “"appliquer la loi," (applying the law) according to Derrida, exacerbates this 
misunderstanding. The English collocation "enforcing the law" is closer to the phenomenon which 
underlines the fact that law has been present before us and one is simply under the obligation to abide by it 
in order to be able to address or be addressed. It is in this sense that he also refers to Kafka’s “Before the 
law.” We are always already before the law which is our only way of access to the other. (ibid., p. 925)
143
stages may vary from a pre-political, natural state to a state where we already have 
political laws applicable to each case by judges. 
 In the former stage, as we saw with Aristotle’s account of nature, it seems that 
Hobbes and Aristotle are on the same page. They both seem to believe in an essential 
violence in a pre-political stage. Aristotle as we mentioned before is not particularly fond 
of a limitless and chaotic nature and sets out to find its limits and ends. Against religious 
and particularly Abrahamic violence as in the command to sacrifice of Isaac, “Derrida 
identifies this [pre-political] kind of violence as Greek, as enlightenment, and later, as 
‘mythic’” (FL., 63; McCormick, 405). Derrida contends that such a tendency has not been 
diminished at all throughout the centuries.  
A constant trope in the study of law throughout the many socioeconomic 
and political changes of the past several centuries is the opposition of law 
and violence, law, on one hand, and ‘the way of beasts,’ as some authors 
put it, on the other. (McCormick, 418) 
Ontologically speaking then, the laws of society in this first sense are no different from 
the laws that separate man from nature. I have already mentioned that for Aristotle, for 
example, the pre-organic stage is associated with this silent, bestial, and un-informed 
matter. In a similar way, at the level of society, laws determine the merit and the character 
of individuals give them a place and address in the city whereby they are known. Laws 
save anonymous beings and give them a name and voice. That is to say that there is a 
kind of violence associated with the pre-political stage, which needs to be overcome by 
laws and the legal system. Moreover, I have also explained the essentially logocentric 
nature of this emergence, presencing, and naming.  
Whatever their differences, the most Greek testament of the Bible, like the 
Greek philosophic tradition, privileges ‘the word’ or ‘reason’ in a way that 
is potentially idolatrous from the stand- point of Judaism. If such 
‘logocentrism’ is not fully idolatrous, it certainly has homogenizing, 
imperializing or coercive tendencies. (McCormick, 406) 
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I have already elaborated in chapters 2 and 3 about the ontological necessity of these laws 
and their essential violence in producing a sharp distinction between normal and 
abnormal, proper and improper, etc. Derrida mentions more difficulties of practically the 
same nature with regard to the political systems. McCormick nicely summarizes these as 
mentioned by Derrida: 
(1) judges apply previously established rules, on one hand, yet create law 
freshly in the moment of decision. As a result, they conserve yet destroy 
the law; they function in one way as machines but in another as founders. 
Legitimacy is threatened because, on one hand, each case is different and 
should be treated as such, and, on the other, consistency is required to 
prevent arbitrariness. (2) Derrida emphasizes the undecidable, that which 
cannot be sublated under a rule or even, for that matter, a prudential 
decision. It "haunts" not only hard cases but, as if a ghost, even routine 
cases. Finally, (3) there is the imperative of urgency, the fact that a 
decision must be rendered now and cannot be put off. Derrida observes 
that there is a "madness" to this aspect of the decision (FL 23-28). 
(McCormick, 403) 
 As a result, judges conserve yet destroy the law; they function in one way as 
machines but in another as founders. That is to say, the dominant and sovereign character 
of laws, the fact that they have to act impersonally and automatically, make them 
conspicuously blind to singular character of individuals. “Automatic application of 
existing legal doctrines, especially combined with the exclusory aspects of operating 
within a legal idiom cannot embody just decisions” (Mathews, 33). Therefore, the 
problem, as Mathews observes too, “lies in this conflict between imposed universality 
and unique circumstance. The law fails to achieve justice if it applies reductive generality 
without considering the singularity of each case and the requirements these different 
realities produce” (Mathews, 34). Derrida’s distinction between law (droit) and justice, 
justice being the undescontructible force and the laws being inevitable and yet 
economical, is meant to deal with this precarious situation. “If I were to apply a just rule 
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without a spirit of justice and without in some way inventing the rule, the example for 
each case, I might be protected by law (droit), my action corresponding to objective law, 
but I would not be just”  (FL, 940). While law is backed by institutional force, justice 111
calls for a critical force of resistance which results in less violence as it does not 
effectively make or destroy anything. This force of resistance is not equal with inaction, 
indifference, or pacifism. It is an invitation to question the laws as to their foundation and 
interpretation of reality. Patience and indecision puts the current forces of action on a 
creative path than other than what is already made towards the promise of justice “to 
come.” 
 For Derrida, then, it is only in the experience of the impossibility of the 
law (that which can be accounted for) that a call for or a promise of justice, “if 
such a thing exists,” is constituted. Only recognizing one’s aporetic situation as a 
‘follower,’ one’s being-in-trouble, constitutes the just attitude towards any law 
with universal and necessary claims. That is when the necessary, violent order of 
laws is suspended in favor of patience, and a heedful comportment towards the 
other is held, regardless of justice as law. This is evident in the reaction of the 
tragedy’s audience to the incomprehensibility of the fate of the tragic figure. Their 
calculation is interrupted, and they experience the impossibility with “pity and 
fear.” They only “wonder” and fear for their vulnerable and delicate situation. 
Justice belongs to the realm of the gift beyond calculation, whereas the law 
belongs to the economy of presence and strategic political decisions.  
 Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that law exists. But justice is 
incalculable. Justice requires one to calculate and reckon with the incalculable. The 
aporetic experience of justice is this experience, which is as improbable as it is necessary. 
According to Derrida, these aporetic moments of decisions are the ones in which the 
decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule (Ibid.). 
 Elsewhere he reiterates almost the same complexity: If the act simply consists on applying a rule, of 111
enacting a program or effecting a calculation, we might say that it conforms to law and perhaps by 
metaphor, that is just, but we would be wrong to say that the decision was just.
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  Justice at this moment calls for a supplement beyond justice, beyond adequation, 
and beyond calculation. It calls for a surplus of excess that paradoxically restores justice. 
Being moral in passing judgments will inevitably be beyond the confines of the lawful 
and will amount to being disproportionate: 
Transformations, indeed juridico-political revolutions take place—cannot 
be motivated, cannot find its movement and its impulse (an impulse which 
itself cannot be suspended) except in the demand for an increase in or 
supplement to justice, and so in the experience of an inadequation or an 
incalculable disproportion (FL., 957). 
Paradoxically, then, to be just, one is necessarily disproportionate and unjust, and that is 
why justice can only be experienced in its impossibility. Derrida compares his ethics and 
politics of responsibility with that of Levinas's celebration of otherness as justice and 
equity. He quotes Levinas calling for “the equitable honoring of faces (droiture de 
l'accueil fait au visage)”(ibid.).  
 The merit of Aristotle’s discussion of laws and justice is that in the dawn 
of western philosophy, Aristotle lays the ontological foundation for both of these 
modes of attending to the otherness. Aristotle explains the force of justice behind 
both inevitable laws and the ever-transcending promise of fairness or equity. But, 
in the interest of establishing the city, he sets forth on the course of philosophy 
and prefers the former stable system by which he misses the mark.  
4.3. Aristotle’s Natural Politics: The Statement of the Problem 
 As we argued in previous chapter, for Aristotle, being in possession of logos 
naturally allows humans to direct and be directed by others in a community. As Trott 
confirms, the community in logos is Aristotle’s roadmap for humans to achieve their end 
(Trott, 105-109). Aristotle believes that it is only in the city that man can manifest his true 
function and excellence of character. According to Heidegger, this claim aligns with the 
basic Aristotelian principle that being something requires fulfilling one’s definition, 
which for humanity involves possessing logos (zoon logon ekhon) as well as living in the 
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polis (zoon politikon). Therefore, for Aristotle, laws of the city have an essential 
connection with the being and the character of individuals.  Laws function like logos in 112
determining the authentic character of man, his world, and his others. In this sense, 
Aristotle’s community and laws are already normative and moral. The general principles 
that constitute the perfect form of justice (dikaiosunē) are to reveal the right or juste 
(using Derrida’s word) manifestations of beings as such in society. Therefore, it is only in 
a just city and through its laws that the originary character of individuals can come to 
fruition.  
 Grounding the laws based on logos besets them with the difficulties of logos as 
well. Being aware of the aporetic character of logos, which makes it vulnerable to 
innovative and sophistic misuse,  Aristotle himself does his best to provide some kind 113
of basis for modification and change in ‘following’ the laws in order to ‘address’ the 
individual character of citizens. Aristotle contends that laws establish “partial justice.” 
For Aristotle, this “partial justice” has the same genus as the more complete form of 
justice, which he calls “fairness.” He considers the same force involved in both choosing 
the most proportionate, beautiful, or just action privately with regard to all virtues 
(complete justice) and choosing the lawful action in society (partial justice).  That’s 114
why, whenever the laws as partial justice fall short of making a judgement in a particular 
situation, the more general justice comes to the rescue.  
 The principles that produce just actions are to ‘address’ beings or individuals in their being in a juste 112
manner. This is what I call, following Derrida, the ontological meaning of justice as the right-giving or 
juste-givenness. Aristotle calls this use of justice, fairness or equity (epieikeia).
 As we explained before, logos is the place of the manifestation of the being of things. It involves the 113
motion from inorganic matter towards expression and clarity. In this way, if anywhere in the process the 
motion goes astray in sophists’ case for example, the correspondence between the thing and its expression 
becomes distorted. That is the expression in the logos does not reveal but conceal the true nature of reality. 
So the sophistic misuse is grounded in the essential motion in the character of original, private (idion) 
logos.
 He in effect inserts an originary temporality into the eternal and universal laws which will eventually 114
create more original gatherings and comportment towards otherness, not anticipated by him or his laws. 
Thus, in fact the force of justice which ultimately cannot be bound to the laws of the city or even the 
phronetic decision making of the judges in accordance with the spirit of the same laws. 
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 He thereby ensures that being in accordance with logos does not mean that the 
laws of the city are fixed like universal rational “categorical imperatives.” As Trott 
contends, laws that are in accordance with logos are always subject to criticism and 
reformation (Trott, 106). This, is because the laws are the result of deliberation, which is 
at the same time both a natural capacity and inclination of every man. In this way, for 
Trott, Aristotle’s city is very much organic, natural, and subject to perpetual modification 
of the end. He contends that this is the very meaning of human happiness as the life of 
contemplation.  
As I discussed in previous chapter about the nature of contemplation, Trott’s 
reading is also confirmed to some degree by David Roochnick understanding of 
happiness. Roochnick gestures against Martha Nussbaum’s contention about the rift 
between two definitions of happiness in NE from books I and X, one stipulating 
happiness as the life of contemplation and the other as political moral life. Accordingly, 
for both Roochnick and Trott, the political nature of man makes his contemplative 
activity essentially political. The concept of human nature as possessing-logos and at the 
same time life-in-the-polis “makes nature and its end a question for politics instead of 
being a prescription that might be used to exclude persons from political life” (Trott, 
106-7). Both Trott and Roochnick are in line with Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in 
emphasizing the ontological character of ethics and politics. The definition of man, his 
original ontological make up in logos make his natural deliberative activity a political 
one.  
It is important to note that although both Trott and Roochnik agree on the political 
nature of contemplation, Roochnik seems to be pointing to a qualitatively different mode 
of thinking more in line with Socrates that Aristotle himself.  For Roochnik, the best 
activity of man as contemplation is also a “leisurely, divine, and un-wordly activity” to 
the extent that the ones who engage in it resemble the criminals and outlaws (Roochnick, 
2008. 731). He insists on the active nature of contemplation as opposed to mere 
knowledge (episteme) but implies that it is not of the same nature and quality as 
calculative deliberation or political life since Aristotle famously rejects the political life 
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of honor and power as the happiest life. As an example of such a private life I mentioned 
the political activity of Socrates.  
As I mentioned in the last chapter, the critical activity of contemplation looks 
increasingly like the dialectical activity of Socrates in the city. Socrates deliberately 
chooses the private life over public because a philosopher cares for the truth rather the 
opinion of the many, the latter being a necessary ingredient for the life of a statesman. 
But, the very act of questioning the real meaning of words and virtues by Socrates is 
already perceived by the authorities of the city as a threatening political activity. That is 
to say that the life of contemplation, the life of happiness in private and in leisure, not 
caring for money, favors, or popularity, is also the most political life. If what holds a city 
together is logos, and one is happy when one is engaged in deliberation in logos, then to 
deliberate and question the ends or the definitions of concepts is to envision different 
ends for the political system and to question the authority. This is the real political 
activity associated with contemplation and not the establishment of a city or being a 
statesman, which is associated with a life of honor. Nor is contemplation merely a private 
and mystical activity. Again I believe that in the public realm and in the city, Aristotle 
only hints at this way of thinking. In cases where the universal laws fail, he pragmatically 
and strategically chooses the same kind (genus) of deliberation to restore the stable 
character of the city. In other words, he prefers the stability of the city over the 
multiplicity and innovation. 
On the contrary, Trott reduces the activity of contemplation to more of the same 
calculation. Consequently, for Trott, the free and critical activity of contemplation works 
within the boundaries of laws albeit trying to improve them.  
Consistent with the naturalness of being human, Aristotle conceives of 
freedom that accompanies reason as the capacity a person has to achieve 
the telos. According to nature, human beings strive toward their 
completion; living in logos, human beings determine what constitutes 
completion for them. Logos is the end and fulfillment of being human and 
also the source that projects humans to their end. According to this way of 
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being in logos, a person is shown to be free, but that freedom does not 
compromise a person’s naturalness. (Trott, 107)  
Freedom in this sense is to reveal one’s true nature as deliberation and to be in 
accordance with logos. Trott takes a step further and claims that being in accordance with 
nature does not necessarily determine the telos, nor does it limit the constitution of 
Aristotle’s politics as an unchangeable end. He holds that Aristotle’s laws and politics, 
based on logos and deliberation, provides freedom for individuals to achieve their unique 
happiness. Hence, he denies that the logocentric city faces an aporia with regard to 
innovation or alterity. He writes: 
The way a human being accomplishes the life that amounts to happiness 
will be unique to each person, but achieved in each case by logos 
according to virtue. The end- happiness determined through logos –
remains the same for human beings, but what amounts to that end- what 
rational activity will mean and look like – will depend on the deliberations 
in which we engage to consider how to achieve happiness (NE., 
1095a19-21). The human being is stable in the internal projection towards 
an end, but variable regarding which life so constitutes that end and how 
to achieve that end. (Trott, 107) 
Although Trott does not properly mention his source,  his claim is strikingly similar to 115
that of Heidegger. What Trott’s discussion lacks, however, is the deconstructive critic that 
informs Heidegger’s take on tradition. Logos, which provides the basis for the 
deliberation of the end of the city and man, for Trott, is still universal, homogeneous, 
 He refers to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle only in a very short footnote in passing.115
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present, albeit as a means to determine “unique ends.”  He does not scrutinize the 116
character of logos in terms of temporality. For him, logos acts without a surplus in 
determining the unique character of people’s ends. If the being of man or Dasein is 
constituted by logos, logos cannot simply be considered a means to define one’s end. It is 
not the case that the being of human is first constituted and one subsequently uses logos 
as a tool to determine his particular end. Dasein as the place of interpretation of the world 
is constituted by logos which is already historical and temporal. 
Trott does not attend to the double character of logos as if logos is completely 
natural and does not own any arbitrary or conventional character, due to its public and 
historical usage. In fact, it is this initial historical character that constitutes the being-at-
home of human beings in society in the first place. In contrast, as I mentioned before 
according to Heidegger, public historical logos for Aristotle has to be clear and in 
frequent use (kurion) or it becomes idiomatic, enigmatic, and barbaric. Homogeneous 
logos is not mine and not free but dominated by the idle-talk of the “one” (das Man). The 
freedom which Heidegger is after, a ‘freedom’ which is the authentic expression of one’s 
being, is inevitably marginalized by this deliberative and natural (even phronetic) 
progress of the laws.  
In what comes below, I argue that Aristotle himself is aware of the trouble 
involved with the contingency, innovation, and alterity in both metaphysical and 
particularly political level of analysis. It becomes evident that the end of the city and the 
establishment of clear logos or universal laws limit the genuine expression of individuals 
in a city. One needs to follow Aristotle’s footsteps to find out why his noble attempt to 
establish a just city, which aims at ‘addressing’ the citizen’s individual characteristics, 
 With reference to Socrates, it is worth remembering that for him as he mentions in the Apology, logos of 116
the philosopher is fundamentally foreign (like a foreign language) to the public language of “the men of 
Athens.” This fundamental heterogeneity between the language which is directed and committed to the 
truth and justice is reduced to the contemplation of different ends for Trott.  
Perhaps, it is this very heterogeneity with the public logos that approximates the language of 
Socrates to those of the prophets and sorcerers on the one hand (as in Euthyphro, where Euthyphro claims 
both Socrates and himself are considered to be men of divinity by the many), and ironically enough to the 
innovators And sophists on the other. What constitutes Socrates’ difference from sophists seems to be his 
integrity and admission to the problematic situation and his indecision with regard to passing hasty 
judgments and decisions.  
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necessarily misses the mark. It is as if unbeknownst to his conscious intention, the force 
of justice, the one that aims at the singularity of the other or a genuine ‘following’ of the 
other, makes the universal laws ‘miss the mark’ and become necessarily violent to the 
other. All at the same time, the force of justice and the surplus it creates founds the 
ontological ground for an alternative path to an alternative mode of gathering.   
4.4. Immanent Constitution of Laws in Aristotle 
 In the realm of ethics, the challenge that Aristotle takes up is the implementation 
of laws of nature, namely the ones that determine the being of humans, in social and 
economic interactions. In Book V of the Ethics, Aristotle is still struggling with two aims 
at the same time. On the one hand, man’s definition carries him over to the city, and he 
needs to show that the good of the city, which is eventually carried out by the laws and 
public logos, is equally constitutive of man as the contemplation of logos in private. On 
the other hand, the good of the city as a whole might very well undermine the true 
expression of one’s individual character. Economic and political needs of the city, as we 
will examine here, add new factors to consider making the impersonal and authoritative 
laws necessary. The dominance of the laws and public discourse can shut off and conceal 
the unique voice of individuals. Thus, Aristotle strives to prove that the being of man is 
such that, from the very beginning, the same rational and calculative operation is 
involved both in determining the golden mean of virtues in private as well as the 
judgments and jurisdictions in public and political domain.  
 He has, of course, already prepared the scene by defining man as essentially in 
relation to others. Defined by logos, with every decision, man is already living in and 
modifying public discourse. Thus, in determining the golden mean of virtues, for 
example, one activates the same deliberative and phronetic intellectual virtue that informs 
the decision-making of the judges in public.   
 Aristotle does concede that on the way from the singular expression (idion) to the 
public expression (kurion), the nature of logos seems to have changed or at least become 
ambiguous. Singular expression of individuals, their free and responsible expression, 
153
does not seem to match perfectly with the universal good of the city. Furthermore, 
entering into society means one needs to develop virtues in addition to those needed in 
private. Even private virtues need to change essentially in order to fit the socio-economic 
context.  
 Having all these considerations in view, at the beginning of book V of Ethics, 
Aristotle conducts a rather semantic analysis of the way people use the words “justice, 
just, and unjust” for actions and virtues (NE., 5.1.1129a). He finds out that people use 
“justice and injustice” ambiguously. That is to say, justice can potentially help Aristotle 
establish the connection between the authentic expression of individuals and their 
responsibility in public. Being informed about justice seems to involve the human ability 
to knowingly choose the best and the most noble (kalon) action in every individual 
context. Moreover, justice seems to be the glue which holds the community together in 
the most excellent fashion. Instead of determining certain specific acts as inherently just 
and unjust in society independent of individual contexts, Aristotle once again examines 
the forces that drive actions in general. Aristotle portrays justice as a driving force that 
makes bodies move or act in a certain way. Justice is “that characteristic” which makes 
them [i.e. people] performers of just actions” (NE., 5.1.1129a 7-9).  
 Yet, the ambiguity in the usage of justice which Aristotle wants to equate with a 
polysemy or analogy turns out to be indicative of a much more serious ontological 
“stumbling block” that he has struggled with throughout Metaphysics under 
‘individuation.’ This division or conflict is evident in the two different kinds of justice he 
defines. The first is defined immanently in relation to how an individual perceives the 
good and the beautiful for himself, the other, and the city. The second is defined as the 
social or communal force that makes sense of the action and characters in public and that 
makes actions subject to the judgment of public reason. The former he calls “the fair” and 
the latter “the lawful.” 
Altogether, his attempt, at least at the beginning of Book V, is to hold on to the 
conflict between these two forms of justice, hoping that what turns out to be the Good of 
oneself and the other in any individual context would retain an anticipatable relation to 
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the general Good of the city as determined by the laws. “The unjust [person] is both a 
lawbreaker and unfair and takes more than his share. So that obviously a law-abiding and 
a fair man will be just. Consequently, ‘just’ is what is lawful and fair” (NE., 5.1.1129a 
30-35). According to this provisional definition, justice is defined as the political or social 
virtue that holds society together in balance, as well as the political virtue that guarantees 
the well-being and flourishing of an individual. It has a normative value implicated in 
law. Justice in conformity with Aristotle’s teleological, hylomorphic system guarantees 
his desired logocentric body-politics in a social domain. But first, let us consider what 
makes all virtues part of justice in general.  
The most general force of “ought” or moral force towards the golden mean is the 
same as the one involved in choosing the golden mean of virtues and just action towards 
others in public. Virtues hold an essential relationship to the beautiful, noble (kalon), and 
the proportionate. Virtues are defined, as Joe Sachs writes in his commentary, as “the 
most beautiful (kalon).” The force of justice in the most general sense is also the force of 
the “ought” behind all virtues aiming at the most beautiful making or doing.  Aristotle 117
mentions that “it orders one to do the deeds” (NE. 5.1.1129 b20). In this sense it acts like 
the form of all virtues. All virtues aim at the golden mean, which is both the most 
beautiful and the most proportionate. To define beauty as proportionate implies that parts 
are regarded in relation to a whole. If it is a part of a whole, an action is most beautiful 
when it plays its proper role in the organic structure of the whole city. In other words, 
justice in the most general sense is the same as other virtues “conceived from different 
point of view” (Stewart, 401). In this sense, justice should rather be called “the virtue of 
 This is confirmed and complicated by Michael Davis who considers the same operation at work in the 117
Poetry and Poetics. In that book also Aristotle is aiming at explaining the most beautiful making. In both 
cases, it seems his most beautiful is the one that is in accordance with logos. Yet, as I argue in this chapter 
the striking admission that the best making and poetry arises as a result of the creative rational activity of a 
poet or an affective activity of an insane person complicates the picture drastically. Aristotle thereby 
concedes that in fact what brings about the most beautiful making is not always the most calculative and 
the clearest but the unknown (hence bestial), private (idion, idiotikon) force of generation which is alogon 
and unaccountable. 
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"righteousness" or of "moral Justice” a virtue displayed towards others, a social virtue 
(Chroust & Osborn, 129-130).   118
Virtue is the state conceived simply as a state; Justice is a state conceived 
as putting its possessor in a certain relation to society (Stewart, 401). 
As a social-political virtue, justice goes beyond all other virtues in that it governs the 
employment of all virtues towards other citizens. It is not simply to be able to implement 
measures “at home,” but towards others. It is the excellence of being-together. 
Justice (dikaiosunê) is, most properly, an active condition of the soul by 
which one chooses neither more nor less than one’s fair share of those 
goods that one can have (by depriving others of them); this is the justice 
that is a part of virtue, but the word is also used for the whole of virtue, 
regarded as a relation toward other people (NE., 1129b 26-27). In the latter 
sense, justice is a willing acceptance of the laws of the community as 
governing one’s life (NE., 1129b 12-19). In the former sense, justice is 
subdivided into its various manifestations: in the distribution of honor and 
of a community’s common supply of possessions in proportion to what 
people deserve (NE., 1130b 30-33, 1131a 25-29); in the equitable 
judgment of penalties for those who wrong others in any way and thus 
gain undeserved advantage (NE., 1132a 6-14); and in the equitable 
reciprocal exchange of commodities and services (NE., 1132b 31-34). All 
forms of justice in its particular sense are opposed to greed (pleonexia), 
the desire to have more of some good thing than one deserves (NE., 1129b 
1-10). 
Justice involves a quantitative judgment, even when the things judged are not strictly 
measurable. This quasi-mathematical aspect of justice means that the judgments that 
govern choices of just from unjust constitute the form of all virtues. If the final cause of 
all virtues is the Good or the Beautiful, then justice is the formal cause of virtues. 
 Anton-Hermann Chroust & David L. Osborn, “Aristotle's Conception of Justice,” Notre Dame L. Rev. 118
129 (1942)
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Most of book V of the NE is about Aristotle’s attempt to establish partial justice 
(the laws of the city) and prove that it is homogenous with the perfect form of justice 
(NE. 5.10.1137b 8). They are both run by a force of mathematical and rational 
calculation, which from Book III of the NE we learn is called deliberation. He explains 
how the force of justice makes possible the laws that guarantee the happiness of the 
whole while also determining the characteristic difference of individuals.  Entering the 119
actual realm of community and action with others, more uncontrollable contingencies 
arise, making impersonal and universal laws inevitable.  
4.5. The Force of Justice and Laws of the Exchange Community 
Aristotle has a very basic story to tell about the origin of society. He contends that 
everything started with human desires and needs. He remarks that the original community 
is perhaps created out of necessity among “people who are different and unequal”. He 
writes: “For a community is not formed by two physicians, but a physician and a farmer, 
and in general by people who are different and unequal” (NE. 5.5.1133a 16-17). For 
example, I am house builder, but I need shoes that I do not know how to make. The 
shoemaker, in contrast, needs a house. Community is therefore formed out of exchange. It 
is in this context that partial justice is introduced. Therefore, the essential difference and 
inequality among people and their arts is a necessary condition for the emergence of a 
community.  
 Moreover, this reciprocity (exchanging goods) has to be done excellently and 
fairly. In accordance with partial justice, Aristotle believes that the job of a judge is to 
"restore equality" according to the individual’s merit. The excellence of exchange is 
justice as the most beautiful (kalon) and balanced proportionality because “if there is no 
proportionality, the exchange is not equal and fair” (NE. 5.5.1133a 12). Thus, he equates 
 Also, perhaps this is the most important political lesson one can learn from Aristotle, that the most 119
immediate and private or personal form of happiness comes to pass only in understanding the fact that 
one’s happiness is most essentially tied to the happiness of others in a city. Politicians and the nobles 
accomplish this through establishing the law.
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the good and beauty of an exchange with that of every individual. It is only in a fair 
exchange that the merit of every individual in society is met.  
In order to establish a just exchange, “everything that enters into an exchange 
must somehow be comparable” (NE. 5.5.1133a 19-20). This is why the initial inequality 
and difference must be equalized. This is the task of “money” (NE. 5.5.1133a 18). Money 
makes the singular character of individuals as show-makers, builders, doctors, and 
soldiers… equalizable and translatable in exchange. Therefore, although at first blush we 
may think that the difference in the characters are at work in the community, in exchange, 
it is not the real difference which provides community but the nominal value of money. 
This nominal value in exchange has nothing to do with the proper character of individuals 
for it is arbitrary. For example, as a technical character, one may be a unique calligrapher 
but in exchange and in the eye of the laws, he is worth a sum of money comparable to a 
shoe-maker or a builder. This is because there is an arbitrary leap from the proper trait of 
an individual which is immanent to his being and the value assigned to him by the laws 
determined by the society and implemented through money. 
The word for money (nomisma comes from the same root as nomos, which means 
“law” or “convention.” Money is the measure and the value that is concretely used by the 
law to establish equality among the various members of a given community.  It is used in 
rectificatory or distributive ways to restore balance. Although money owes its existence 
to that of difference and exchange, through its usage, it equalizes differences. Justice in 
this sense serves to equalize through money because, as Aristotle asserts, without the 
function of a middle-term, there would be “no exchange and no community” (NE. 
5.5.1133a 24). This is how an individual’s characteristics become “equalizable,” 
“comparable,” or translatable in proportional terms to one another. More and more, law 
and its generality take the place of individual decision making. The establishment of 
money as the common medium of exchange paves the way for the automatic application 
of laws that are less dependent on individual responsibility and more on the stability of a 
system. Dependence on money and the impersonality of laws becomes more concealing 
than revealing. 
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 Gradually, with entering the public realm, the incentive for a more concrete, yet 
more abstract and repeatable measure for calculation and judgement increases. We are 
still naturally drawn toward creating law that becomes more abstract and gradually 
replaces justice to serve the city, like a machine with a character of repeatability at the 
service of more stability and efficiency for all. “Proportionate equality of benefits to 
burdens and contributions stabilizes the city by giving all parties reason to co-operate and 
benefit one another” (Politics,, 5.8 1307b26-8a13).This is how laws increasingly look 
like a solution. They constitute an impersonal system which modifies itself immanently. 
Anyone who works according to the law or is “appointed by” the law is in harmonic 
relation to the whole and can govern accordingly. Political science, which informs and 
establishes the laws educates everyone, including the magistrate, to govern according to 
the established code. Modifications can also happen but occur under the same calculative 
system. 
Aristotle wants to ensure that when the opportunity arises, one knowingly makes 
the morally appropriate decision in society. The laws provide the political infrastructure 
to educate and mold the bodies as the means of justice.  Little by little, the good of the 120
city determined by the laws and adherence to them, enjoys preference over the 
characteristic differences of individuals.  
Every community is established for the sake of some good, since everyone 
does everything for the sake of what they think to be good (Politics, 1.1 
1252a2-3). Justice is whatever promotes and preserves that common good 
(Politics, 3.12 1282b17, NE., 5.1 1129b25-27).   
In order to guarantee the latter, the common good, Aristotle very quickly connects this to 
the program of the city and political science, the “most governing and most master 
art,” (NE. 1094a 30) which puts all other forms of knowledge in their most proper place. 
Political science  
 It should be noted that law is not a made out of the vision of a charismatic leader or anything like 120
modern conception of law. At this stage at least he is following the course of nature in establishing the 
being of entities as they are, this time in a city and communally and in relation to actions.
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…lays down the law about what one ought to do and from what one ought 
to refrain, the end of this capacity should include the ends of the other 
pursuits, so that this end would be the human good. (NE., 1094b 4-6) 
Political science establishes laws that work automatically like natural laws and determine 
what is just for every possible situation in accordance with logos. The political laws work 
to achieve the best and most hylomorphic results, the ones that commonly occur and are 
anticipated by the laws. He writes: 
Will it not better enable us to attain what is fitting, like archers having a 
target to aim at? If this be so, we ought to make an attempt to determine at 
all events in outline what exactly this Supreme Good is, and of which of 
the theoretical or practical sciences it is the object. Now, it would be 
agreed that it must be the object of the most authoritative of the sciences—
some science which is pre-eminently a master-craft. But such is manifestly 
the science of Politics. (NE., 1. 1094a 23-28, my emphasis) 
Aristotle considers political science, which can put all arts including rhetoric in its place, 
(NE., 1. 1094b4) as the best and most ruling science to help every individual hit the 
target, or avoid “missing the mark.” Here, he is using the analogy of the archer, which 
confirms my observation in relating this to hamartia and “missing the mark.” This is yet 
another indication that hitting the teleological and hylomorphic target and not missing the 
mark is the most just and noble and systematically preferred. This hylomorphic, 
appropriate target is the end of the city.  
For even if the good is the same for one person and for a city, that of the 
city appears to be greater, at least, and more complete both to achieve and 
to preserve; for even if it is achieved for only one person [10] that is 
something to be satisfied with, but for a people or for cities it is 
something more beautiful and more divine. So our pursuit aims at this, 
and is in a certain way political. (NE., 1094b 8-11) 
Here is the regulated economy of means and ends to provide happiness for the city. 
Aristotle acknowledges that the good choices (proairesis) of individuals are important 
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and can end beautifully, but he attributes divinity to the good of the city. Therefore, the 
good of the city is the final aim of politics. It is worth noting that while the aim of politics 
and legislation is “the good man,” (NE., 1. 1100a 1) which Aristotle equates with the 
good of the city, the caveat between the programmatic good of the city and the individual 
remains open.  
Under the guise of justifications lies what Derrida calls the “mystical foundation 
of authority.” Aristotle admits that the happiness of the state, which is a form of energeia, 
is divine—like the unmoved mover or the perfect circulation of cosmos—and yet from 
the Physics we know that that is unknowable and unreachable for sublunary beings. Such 
is the impossible motion already inherent in logos that constitutes the “mystical 
foundation” (Derrida, 1990. 947) of law under the guise of reason or speech.  121
The divinity that Aristotle attributes to the good of the city is associated with how 
things are from the divine or eternal perspective. Now, the danger is that a philosopher or 
a statesman would think that he has access to this divine creative power of making, that 
he can anticipate the creation or has access to its principles (archē). He considers this 
threat when he writes: 
…it is preferable for the law to rule rather than any one of the citizens, and 
according to this same principle, even if it be better for certain men to 
govern, they must be appointed as guardians of the laws and in 
subordination to them; for there must be some government, but it is clearly 
not just, men say, for one person to be governor when all the citizens are 
alike. It may be objected that any case which the law appears to be unable 
to define, a human being also would be unable to decide. But the law first 
specially educates the magistrates for the purpose and then commissions 
them to decide and administer the matters that it leaves over ‘according to 
the best of their judgment, and furthermore it allows them to introduce for 
 Here a silence is walled up in the violent structure of the founding act. The “mystical” is an abyss in the 121
heart of what is supposedly well founded: vanished cruelties at the moment of constituting a state, forgotten 
terror when new law comes into force, events which remain historically “uninterpretable or indecipherable 
(ininterpretables ou indéchiffrables).” (Derrida, 1990. 943)
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themselves any amendment that experience leads them to think better than 
the established code. (Politics, 1287a 19-23) 
The law is the principle that replaces the government of a monarch. Aristotle argues that 
because all humans have the same essential definition, which determines their function 
and flourishing, it makes no sense that one person should govern the rest. Therefore, it is 
preferable that everyone should obey the law, and the magistrate would merely watch its 
execution.  
Obviously, Aristotle is avoiding the emergence of tyranny and sophistry alike. 
However, this choice amounts to a conservative decision to choose stability over 
innovation and particularity. Like the anomalies, accidents, or abnormalities in nature, he 
goes as far as rejecting all that is not in accordance with logocentric laws as bestial.  
He therefore that recommends that the law shall govern seems to 
recommend that God and reason alone shall govern, but he that would 
have man govern adds a wild animal also; for appetite is like a wild 
animal, and also passion warps the rule even of the best men. Therefore 
the law is wisdom without desire. (Politics, 1287a 19-25)  
Aristotle does not deny the creative power of animal desire, but systematically prefers the 
stability of public reason, even equating it with the laws of the divine. The very equation 
of individual with bestial reminds us of his earlier claims about the indeterminacy of the 
material and the desire, which needs to be controlled and brought under the reign of 
logos. Systematically and gradually, the clear, the normal, and the lawful are preferred 
and are approximated with that which is divine. It is this emphasis on the sovereignty of 
the laws of wisdom which makes him compare the individual with the beast.  
 As I mentioned chapter 3, however, Aristotle is always pre-occupied with the 
tragic character and the bestial force involved in determining the catastrophic end of man. 
It seems as though there is an affinity between the innovator, the philosopher, the one 
who has a privileged and private access to truth (idiotikon) on the one hand with the 
tyrant and the sophist who pretends to have access to the universal truth on the other 
hand. Aristotle is obviously aware of this affinity and aims to deal with it. He prefers the 
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stability of the rational community, thereby violently discards the irrational innovator or 
the singular character as bestial or abnormal.   
4.6. Aristotle on Justice and the Deconstruction of Laws  
 In this section, I look at how Aristotle strives to tackle the problem of 
individuation and innovation especially in the realm of action and how he admits to its 
aporetic nature. What is the universal definition that can guarantee and anticipate the 
emergence of the individual in all instances? We explicated in previous chapters of this 
work that Aristotle has a general response to this question. He formulated the question in 
terms of the presencing (ousia) and tried to deal with the contingencies involved through 
several schemata (hylomorphism, and teleology) and a regime of concepts, including 
potency vs. actuality, material vs. form, etc. 
4.6.1. Individuation: an Ontological Stumbling Block 
 For the realm of action with its inherent contingencies, the stakes are so high that 
the concern for a measure of individuation in the application of the universal laws is 
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raised in the middle of Metaphysics Book VII, chapter 3, where Aristotle is examining 
what the underlying meaning of being, which endures motion, is.  122
At first, Aristotle considers the material (hylē) instead of the definition or form (morphē) 
as a serious candidate for the underlying meaning of being with regard to what is 
individual (the principle of individuation) (Met. 7.3.1029a10-30). Although he ultimately 
rejects the material as “evidently unknowable by itself” (Met., 7.3.1029b28), he refers to 
the problem as a “stumbling block” (aporotátei)  (Met. 7.3.1029b 1). That is, the 123
relationship between material (indeterminate and unknowable, yet individual) and form 
(knowable but universal) is problematic even in the realm of nature and eternal natural 
laws. His strategic solution to make the science of metaphysics possible, as I elaborated 
on in previous chapters, was to make the material knowable and accountable in 
hylomorph. It is only through reversal from the already shaped and formed individuals 
that we can fathom the material stage. Nonetheless, Aristotle does not deny the immanent 
 Much like the discussion about ousia in Book V, here in Book VII Aristotle distinguishes between at 122
least 4 meanings the thinghood (ousia) of a thing. First, Being-at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia). Which 
he contends is “the keeping on being of a thing what it was to be”. Second, the “universal”. Third, “the 
general class” and forth, what underlies these. With the four meanings mentioned above, he contends that 
the hypokeimenon or what underlies as primary form of thinghood, has to be the one, “the others are 
attributed to and itself not attributed to anything else.” (Met. 7.3.1029a 22) However, he is ambiguous about 
hypokeimenon. He mentions that in some sense “material is said to be the first underlying thing.” His 
justification is of course that what remains of things after their demise is their body or material- which 
makes it look like the hypokeimenon or the underlying thing, he also says that “Now thinghood (ousia) 
seems to belong most evidently to bodies….” which survives the death of the form. Then he tries to extract 
the form from body. Aristotle looks at the bodies, looking for where the particular identity or sense of a 
thing becomes separate or independent from it. It is curious how he points out the difference between the 
middle or inside of the body with their “limits”, “such as a surface and a line and a point and the 
unit.” (Met. 7.3.1028b 20). That is, he distinguishes the surface and the borderlines as more independent 
than “a body or a solid.” (ibid.) He even compares the limits with the “everlasting forms” in Plato, which 
are simply an expression of ideality or how things could make sense. On the other hand, he contends that it 
is the form which is the underlying thing. Yet, another is the third, which is the combination of these. (Met. 
7.3.1029a 1-5) Although, the third candidate looks more promising as it implies the scheme of the 
hylomorph, he quickly modifies his claim saying that what is more primary than material should in fact be 
more primary that “what is made of both.” (Met. 7.3.1029a 8) At this dialectical stage, he seems to be 
completely divided between what constitutes the thinghood as universally true, as an ideality which is 
repeatable, can be attributed to but not attributed to something else and what makes that ideality particular 
to the “this-ness (to de ti.)” While offering no response at this stage, we know from some commentators 
that finally the schemes hylomorph supplemented with other schemes like potency vs. being-at-work are 
the efficient economic ways he would address the “stumbling block” (Met. 7.3.1029b 1) of individuation 
confronting universality.
 ἀπορωτάτη is of the same root as ἄπορος meaning without passage, having no way in or out.123
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movement in matter that originally gives rise to beings. With the contingency of results 
and the paradox of logos, the problem is exacerbated in the realm of action.  
 The same stumbling block in the Metaphysics seems to afflict the application of 
the universal good for the good of every individual in society. It is noteworthy that he 
anticipates the problem in the Metaphysics which has no practical concerns in view. He 
writes “…where actions are concerned, one’s job is to make what is completely good 
[telos perhaps] be good for each person out of the things that are good for each 
one” (Met. 7.3.1029b 6-8). Aristotle  is extending the question of foundation for 
individuation in metaphysics to the realm of laws and its application to the good of an 
individual.  He understands that the job of whoever is expected to pass judgement is to 
somehow subsume the individual under general laws and to ‘address’ or to do justice to 
the being of the individual. However, he acknowledges that the law has come to be “out 
of the things that are good for each one”. That is, that which originally “gives” the laws is 
the singular expression of the individual (idion).  
 It is worth remembering, from the previous chapter, that ousia as the most 
fundamental meaning of being is already a combination of present and absent. Ousia is 
not simply any well-founded present being but the presencing of that which is not-yet. 
But, as soon as we enter the realm of action, ethics and especially politics, in order to 
guarantee the execution of his supposed laws, Aristotle strategically supposes a divine 
end for the city and establishes the universal laws of justice. The silent familiarity with 
truth remains the mystical foundation for the strategic decision-making in Aristotle. 
However, as has already been shown, the same laws which are supposedly founded upon 
individual experiences gradually hide their private foundation. The laws, which are 
supposed to be “just” to each member of the exchange, somehow become blind to the 
particularity and necessarily negate their own foundation. 
 Later it can be seen that every time we approach the individual experience, the 
ambiguity comes back. On the one hand, the original experience of every private citizen 
(idiotikon) is and has been the foundation of logos and the law, and on the other hand, 
this experience somehow must follow the law and the common language in order be seen 
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or recognized in the first place. The individual experience is confined and marginalized 
under the tyranny of the laws just like the language of the poet that has to abide by the 
prevalent language of the public.  124
 Once again, it is in this sense that justice as law becomes the ethico-political 
fulfillment of Aristotle’s hylomorphic and teleological metaphysical system. The 
normative implication is that the law-abiding citizen has a more flourishing being than 
the outlaw. It is noteworthy that this is not simply a moral claim but an ontological one. It 
is justice that guarantees the fulfillment of human function in society. It is also justice that 
makes humans act in a way that maintains their being-at-work-staying-itself 
(entelecheia). In this sense, it is the universal law of justice that ensures hitting the target 
or telos. Through the formulation of law, Aristotle ensures that a law-abiding citizen can 
flourish by being in a state of harmony with his telos. Thus, he stipulates that a law that is 
most universal is relevant for any particular follower as well. Still, I will point out below 
the place where the “stumbling block” of individuation in the Metaphysics seems to have 
reappeared in regard to the laws of actions.  
4.6.2. The Paradoxical Character of Laws and Money 
 One may argue that philosophy for Aristotle begins with wonder and not the clarity. To which I will 124
respond as follows: Wonder is, according to Aristotle, the beginning of philosophizing, and authentic 
thinking: 
It is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophize; wondering 
in the first place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual progression raising 
questions about the greater matters too, e.g. about the changes of the moon and of the 
sun, about the stars and about the origin of the universe. Now he who wonders and is 
perplexed feels that he is ignorant (thus the myth-lover (philomythos) is in a sense a 
philosopher, since myths are composed of wonders). (Met. 1. 982b 15-20 my emphasis) 
This quote points to the affinity between philosophy and myth-making on the one hand and the kind of 
wonder that Aristotle has in mind on the other. The wonder, in the tragedy, and in the study of nature in 
general is not of the strange occurrence in the language itself, nor is it of the divine intervention but of the 
very repetition of the same in the making of the nature. It looks more like the wonder of a biologist, who 
studies nature and is amazed by the generation of the seasons every year or an astronomer who studies the 
wonders of the repetition of movements of the heavenly bodies. Such a scientist of nature is amazed by the 
accidental interruptions of difference like an eclipse, but would not go as far as attributing it to a divine 
intervention. His wonder motivates him to give an account for the accountable discoveries and accountable 
interruptions and not unaccountable (alogon) makings. The proper philosopher and myth-lover for Aristotle 
is the one who explains the events and wonders when he can and suffers the misgivings of the bad makings 
in pity and fear with others. 
166
 To show that laws and their implementation and normalization through money act 
very much like logos, I shall begin again with the genesis of community and the necessity 
of money in Aristotle. This will further reveal the paradoxical character of justice as laws. 
 I mentioned already that Aristotle takes “exchange communities” as a 
paradigmatic context for reciprocal justice (NE 5.5 1132b31-33b28). From here, Aristotle 
talks about community as reciprocity and exchange and partial justice as the mechanism 
that holds the balance and equality in an exchange.  
 As was remarked with Heidegger, this is very much comparable to how logos 
functions for Aristotle. Language (or speech) is the medium of communication. Without 
it, no particular person’s desire, needs, or demands would come to light or be expressed. 
The public expression, nevertheless, has to be controlled by the measure of clarity for it 
to communicate anything at all. Moreover, language like money, “exists by current 
convention and not by nature” (NE. 5.5.1133a 30). Aristotle even assumes that in the case 
money, “it is in our power to change and invalidate it” (NE. 5.5.1133a 35). 
 As Heidegger remarks, on the one hand, logos, “a self-expression about being-
there (ousia) as being” (BC. 11), is supposed to bring the nature of individual beings and 
speakers to light. On the other hand, logos acts like money as the currency that an 
individual or a society might invalidate partially or completely. In other words, being-
essential and being-conventional are “inseparable structural aspects of the [logos] 
λόγος” (BC., 16).  
 Just like currency, logos, when it is fixed, turns into a keimenon. Now, keimenon 
in a different context refers to a “text,” or as Heidegger reads it, as “what lies fixed.”  125
The character of the fixed, written, or textual names (onomata) is that they are communal 
and partly arbitrary. Heidegger considers the fixed terms as common or communal 
(κοινά) (BC. 16).  
 Therefore, in Heidegger’s reading, logos has these two separate aspects at the 
same time. It brings to light the speaker and the matter at hand while also detaches itself 
 Heidegger cites Metaphysics on this issue: “Met. Ζ 15, 1040 a 11: τὰ δὲ κείµενα κοινὰ πᾶσιν.” Keimeno 125
means to lie; to have been set/put 
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from the speaker, so as to be able to enter the social realm. Thus, “language is something 
that belongs to everyone” (BC., 16). This is the Aristotelian version of the language we 
live in as the common intelligibility of the world around us. We are thrown and born in 
such an intelligibility. In other words, language in this sense is the expression of human 
beings’ being-in-the-world as communal and not personal, singular and perhaps 
innovative. It is not one’s singular mode of ‘following.’  126
This is how Aristotle claims that the means of communication and mediation (whether it 
is speech or money) needs to be neutral, bleached out, and used up in usage, acting 
simply as a catalyst in exchange. In order to establish justice as laws, Aristotle considers 
money as neutral in exchange without any surplus or intrinsic value, exactly as a medium, 
or in Derrida’s language, “bleached out” in usage (usure) (Derrida & Bass, 2009. 216).  127
 According to Aristotle, money has an ideality that provides the possibility of 
repetition in the future (NE. 5.5.1133b 11). He warns that the value of money, like the 
objects it stands for, might fluctuate over time (diachronically), but ‘synchronically’ 
speaking, it has the constancy needed to establish a system of reciprocity. Without any 
reservations, Aristotle acknowledges that money “acts like a measure: it makes goods 
commensurable and equalizes them” (NE. 5.5.1133b 17-18). He even goes as far as to 
admit that as a neutral unit and measure of exchange, money “must be established by 
 Heidegger uses the same Nietzschean language that Derrida later adopts in “White Mythology” in 126
reference to the metaphysical language of philosophy. In fact, as Derrida demonstrates, this is the 
characteristic of all such metaphysical systems that try to consider all of their members “at the same time.” 
And such a system that ignores the essential temporality between its members is at risk of producing some 
transcendental signifier or mystical foundation by which it establishes itself and its authority. 
 Derrida refers back to Saussure, illustrating the fundamental similarity of the communal aspect of 
language and money. For Derrida’s reading of Saussure on the relationship between language and economy 
look at Of Grammatology. Also for a further discussion of Saussure’s perspective look at Appendix 3.
 But, as Derrida points out, by becoming separate from its original function comes money’s second 127
usage along with the second meaning of the word “usure,” as in usury. Derrida explains the additional 
product of a certain capital, the process of exchange which, far from losing the stake, would make that 
original wealth bear fruit, would increase the return from it in the form of income, of higher interest, of a 
kind of linguistic surplus value. This second meaning of usure, indicates the resistance against complete 
neutralization of money, or language. In the language, this is the case which words would not simply bring 
worldly things to light or simply be reduced to their general meaning but they express nothing but 
themselves. This produces another level of sense-making that gives rise to a new turn in metaphors and 
would start its own intervention in the exchange or totally abolish the exchange and open it to another 
realm or domain, that of the gift of justice. The mode of sense-making in this realm would be the gift of 
sense beyond exchange, what Derrida calls the donation of sense (donation la sens). This would be also the 
beginning of a new form of community being law or reciprocity altogether. 
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arbitrary usage- hence the name ‘currency’” (NE. 5.5.1133b 21-22, nomisma from the 
same root as nomos; my emphasis).  
 Thus, here are the principles that give rise to community as exchange summarized 
by Aristotle: there is no community among equals. That is, no community if there is no 
difference among the parties involved. “It is need which holds parties together as if they 
were one single unit….There is no community without exchange, [and] there is no 
exchange without equality and no equality without commensurability” (NE. 5.5.1133b 
5-20). 
 For the Aristotelian community, it is through reciprocity, exchange, and 
equalization without surplus that the just community can properly perform its function. 
The original different, the condition of the possibility of community, is also conceived as 
a threat of injustice. Eco-nomy is not only about the ordering of a household (oiko-nomos, 
literally the ordering or the household but also, all political activity is run by exchange 
and economy. Even charity, which can be an instance of getting out of the economy of 
exchange, is instituted in the city as a form of a proper exchange.  He writes:  128
It is by their mutual contribution that men are held together. That is the 
reason why [the state] erects sanctuary of the Graces (charis the root of our 
word, charity) in prominent places in order to promote reciprocal exchange. 
For that is the proper (prepon) province of gratitude: we should return our 
services to one who has done  us a favor, and at another time take the 
initiative in doing him a favor. (NE. 5.5.1133a 1-5) 
Charity is part of the exchange (returning a favor) as if bound to the anticipatable system 
of quid pro quo of the economy. No activity, political, ethical, and even poetical (related 
to imagination and rhetoric) is allowed to be beyond the boundaries of exchange if it is 
supposed to be accountable and just in Aristotelian sense.   
 Although Arendt considers the political life (vita activa) as an essentially different activity, in this 128
analysis one can see that even among the Greeks only a fringe minority like Socrates engaged in such an-
economic activity. The rest including Aristotle raised the fortresses of the city so high that the house and the 
city look more the same structure in different size run by the same metaphysical principles.
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  Up to this point in Book 5 of the Ethics, Aristotle has established at least one 
version or form of community as reciprocity, an economic community between different 
arts and different members. Such a community is based on partial justice or justice as law, 
which is expected to put different arts in a harmony that brings about the flourishing of 
the city as a whole.  
 Concretely, however, in everyday dealings of people, it is the institution of law that 
accomplishes justice. It is the law and its means (money) that gives the value and place of 
individual makings and doings in the city-state. Ontologically speaking, law acts like a 
linguistic system that gives and evaluates actions. Thanks to the universality of law, we 
have a measure to make sense of actions as part of a whole. 
 The outlaws are the ones who not only ignore or threaten the balance implicated in 
law, but also the balance of the whole value and meaning-making system of community. 
This is why doing an unlawful act does not merely violate a particular individual’s fair 
share or territory, but threatens the whole system of sense-making in the community. 
4.6.3. The Aporia of Law and the Force of Justice in Aristotle 
 In this section, I argue that the condition for the possibility of justice in Aristotle’s 
definition of justice as laws are also the conditions of its impossibility. Justice can be 
experienced only in the experience of the impossibility of justice as law (in Derrida’s 
language “justice as droit”). This experience occurs for Aristotle in a particular case when 
he deals with the outlaw as a singular case and not simply as a general category. 
 Aristotle claims that universal law came about as a result of one individual’s need 
to take part in exchange. Yet, as I argued, the moment the neutral law is established, it 
ironically loses the capacity it is made for: to care for and include future particular cases.   
 He anticipates the problem at the beginning of Book V, where he makes a 
distinction between justice as law and justice as fairness. There is a curious relationship 
between the unfair and the unlawful, which he tries to deal with “in terms of part and 
whole.” He writes, “Unfair and unlawful are not identical but distinct and related to one 
another as “a part is related to a whole” (NE. 5.2.1130b 11). 
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 As Aristotle puts it, “Everything unfair is unlawful but not everything unlawful is 
unfair” (NE. 5.2.1130b 11). Hence, fairness is more complete and more encompassing 
than justice as law. However, fairness is homogeneous with justice as law. He remarks (at 
the beginning of book V) that fairness is part of justice along with lawfulness. After this 
primary proposal, the rest of book V is an attempt to reconcile these two modes of justice 
by meticulously examining different kinds of justice and law. After examining all forms 
of justice, Aristotle returns to the original definition and division above. He expresses his 
unease with the situation, describing this as an impasse (aporia) regarding fairness 
(epieikeia).  
 Joe Sachs gives a footnote to his translation confirming that by the distinction 
between fairness and justice as laws, Aristotle means to deal with the exceptional cases in 
law. Nonetheless, it seems that the gradual development of the argument has let the 
exceptional cases take the stage and lead to a new beginning. Moreover, Aristotle is 
trying hard to subsume the exceptional cases under the universal while admitting to the 
impasse. “The impasse concerning what is fair follows roughly these reasons, but they 
are all correct in a certain way and not at all mutually contradictory” (NE. 5.10 1137b 7). 
 Aristotle even insists that the nature of fairness is of the same kind (genos) as 
justice, although “the fair thing, …is better than a certain kind of just thing” (NE. 
5.10.1137b 8). While he confirms that it is an impasse to justice “according to law,” he 
nonetheless contends that “as an impasse …it is a making-straight of what is legally 
just” (NE. 5.10. 1137b 11). His language suggests that he is trying to meticulously avoid 
a “missing the mark” that he seems to have anticipated on the horizon. He seems to have 
seen a problem or a catastrophe on the horizon that he wants to avoid very calculatedly. 
His language is the language of force. He insists that there is “one force” that drives 
human beings or citizens to do both lawful acts and fair acts. From the very beginning, 
we were after the same force that makes people do just actions and, here, Aristotle claims 
that the force we are looking for might be “the force of the impasse itself.” In both the 
Metaphysics and here in the Nicomachean Ethics, he explains “the stumbling block” or 
the impasse as follows: 
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The reason is that all law is universal, but there are some things about 
which it is not possible to speak (legein) correctly when speaking about 
them universally. Now, in situations where it is necessary to speak in 
universal terms but impossible to do so correctly, the law takes the 
majority of cases, fully realizing in what respect it misses the mark 
(hamartia). The law itself is nonetheless correct. For the mistake lies 
neither in the law nor the law giver, but in the nature of the case. (NE. 5.10 
1137b 12-18)   129
From this quote, it is evident that the problem is tied to the nature of speaking, or 
‘addressing’ the abnormal other, a new problem, an individual case, or any unanticipated 
particular. “The law and the lawgiver” are correct, Aristotle confirms. The aporia that 
makes it impossible is “in the nature of the case.” Of course, this does not invalidate the 
law with regard to normal cases, but the issue for Aristotle is that a new claimant of truth, 
an absolutely new case, an alien or foreigner, and the untranslatable ‘other’ call for justice 
as well. Such cases question the foundation of the laws.  
 What is wrong with “the nature of this [new] case” (physei tou pragmatos) other 
than it is not anticipated by the universal law or the frequent language? Its fault is that it 
is not normal, it could not be anticipated and the general did not apply to it. It was 
undetermined, unknowable, unaccountable (alogon), unlimited (aperon). But, it is being 
considered abnormal and monstrous only when the law is enforced. Justice as law 
violently marginalized the individual as abnormal and aporetic in nature. It is noteworthy 
that what is natural as such can be neither normal or benign nor abnormal or monstrous. 
It is only the laws that begin to make such distinctions. One needs to pay attention to the 
fact that by being considered out of the law, the abnormal does not turn into an animal. 
The animal has its place in the hierarchy of natural genera for Aristotle, however, lower 
than human. But this impasse is related to a mistake, a fall, or a wrong doing which one 
 my italics and emphasis.129
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commits without malice or intention neither out of vice. It is associated with the claim of 
a finite system that aims at schematizing infinite cases.  
 The economical structure of law, as Aristotle admits, necessarily comes to a halt. 
He writes, “there are cases which it is not possible to cover in a general statement” (NE., 
5.10. 1137b 17). The local currency cannot not measure the novel issue anymore. We are 
not in the order of the house (oiko-nomos) but the realm of the gift and innovation.  130
While justice as law works in the economy of the present, the momentary suspension of it 
opens the economic structure of time. The eternal natural laws used to give the eternal 
natural world an anticipatable future, a future like present. By the break-down in the 
system of universal laws, for the first time, possibilities are not anticipated and are in a 
limitless motion (energeia ateles). In short, the consideration of the other as an absolute 
other irreducible to general laws gives Aristotle’s system an a-teleological force and a 
new form of time that brings about the becoming of justice. For a moment, the structure 
of presence collapses and “difference,” with its full force, begins to create the possibility 
of "a call” for justice. 
 The problem of universal laws is not confined to Aristotle, but rather afflicts any 
law that establishes a synchronic system between its members. Considering either a 
present and actual, divine or necessary order of things would inevitably lead to the 
impossibility of addressing innovative singular cases justly. In regard to receiving a 
tradition, the follower is not seen singularly by the general laws of the past or the public 
discourse and one lacks a measure to treat others justly. If attentive and conscientious, the 
follower would realize that he is ‘in-trouble,’ that he falls short of being just, and yet he is 
bound to make decisions and pass judgments all the time. 
 I shall look more closely at the tragic and catastrophic fate in Aristotle’s desire to 
establish justice to try and see why and how the universal law misses the mark and what 
the consequences of that is. Going back to the earlier quote from Aristotle, he mentioned 
that there is something wrong or abnormal with the outlaw that makes it an aporia for the 
 The reference is to Derrida’s 1992 book Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money and the contrast between the gift and 130
economy. For Derrida on the Gift, look at Appendix 4.
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universal law, and therefore makes it miss the mark. As is evident in the quote above, 
Aristotle is talking about a mishap, (hamartia). “Now, in situations where it is necessary 
to speak in universal terms but impossible to do so correctly, the law takes the majority of 
cases, fully realizing in what respect it misses the mark (hamartia).” Hamartia is the 
word that is used several times in different forms and derivations in the Poetics referring 
to the fatal flaw of a tragic character.   
 Hamartia, as I mentioned before, is an essential flaw or a natural symptom that 
carries the events away from their anticipated end results. I suggested that with respect to 
natural laws and natural motion, hamartia is responsible for violating hylomorphic 
anticipated end. Concerning actions and decision, hamartia carries the rational 
calculation of a character in a tragedy away from its calculated, anticipated end in 
happiness. The result of this flaw is the cata-strophic end of not following the course of 
nature or the universal laws of justice. Consequently, Aristotle implies that the same way 
that unknown or unaccounted mixture in matter brings about deformities in the course of 
reproduction, some unknown abnormality in the nature of the particularity brings about 
the failure of the universal laws.  
 However, in referring to a particular other, or the personal or private context of 
experience  the activity involved in decision making that is not in accordance with the 
laws is regarded as more just than justice itself. As I noted before, by approaching the 
individual Aristotle’s language becomes enigmatic. Here, he mentions that to go beyond 
the law is more just than justice itself. He even surpasses this by contending that the 
outlaw is what founds the law itself: 
That is why the fair is both just and also better (beliton) than just in one 
sense. It is not better than just in general but better than the mistake due to 
the generality [of the law]. (NE. 5.10.1137b 8) 
He, of course, expects that at the moment of the creation of a new law or the expansion of 
a previous law, the new law would be subsumed under the general. He hopes that the 
same kind of calculation will give new laws. He does his best to restore the structure of 
present. Thus: 
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In situations which law speaks universally, but the case at issue happens to 
fall outside the universal formula, it is correct to rectify the shortcoming, 
in other words the omission and mistake of the lawgiver due to the 
generality of his statement. Such a rectification corresponds to what the 
lawgiver himself would have said if he were present, and he would have 
enacted if he had known [of this particular case]. (NE. 5.10.1137b 19-25) 
With the words that he uses, it is evident that he is making an extra effort to make the 
universal present again after its legitimacy is dramatically breached. Because after all, 
some sort of “logical or universal criteria are required for the legislative practice to be a 
rational enterprise. For this is the only way to make equality and justice 
possible” (Contreras, 2013. 23). In reality, it was the very operation of the rational 
calculation that caused the mishap in the first place. It is like asking Oedipus to calculate 
more to avoid his catastrophic fate while the calculation of the same kind brought him to 
that point in the first place. 
 In the Rhetoric (1.13.1374a-1374b24), Aristotle discusses almost the same 
situation about the laws which miss the mark due to the infinity (aperon) of cases. His 
language is fraught with the same ambiguity as he introduces the notion of equity as the 
supplement to the laws. As many commentators noted, he advises that when coming 
across novelties or singularities of this kind, the judges should take the whole into 
consideration and re-establish the law anew rationally and deliberatively (Contreras, 
2013. 24; Leyden, 1985. 96-7). Aristotle suggests 
to look, not to the law but to the legislator; not to the letter of the law but 
to the intention of the legislator; not to the action itself, but to the moral 
purpose; not to the part, but to the whole; not to what a man is now, but to 
what he has been, always or generally. (Rhetoric, 1.13.1374b 17-18) 
Aristotle mentioned before that “the problem is not in the laws but in the nature of the 
matter at hand.” Here in this quote, he is trying to re-establish and re-affirm the integrity 
of the law by supplementing it. He looks for the presence of a solid measure in “the 
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intention of the legislator” or a “moral purpose” only to finally contend that what the man 
is at the moment should be judged in reference to what he has always been.  
Although for a judge who wants to make a strategic judgement what Aristotle 
suggests is absolutely necessary. What I am objecting to is the metaphysical and 
ontological consequence of the generalization of such a strategy. To say that one should 
consider “not what a person is now” can be a very charitable strategy, but it is also an 
admission to the impossibility of knowing the individual in its singular and indefinite 
character in the context at hand.  
For where a thing is indefinite, [perhaps accidental or by chance] the rule 
by which it is measured is also indefinite. (NE. 5.10 1137b 20-33)  131
It is in this very indecision and admission to the indefinite nature of the material mold of 
the particular that Aristotle acknowledges an a-teleological moment or a paradoxically 
indefinite measure. Aristotle implies that “the indefinite” (aoriston, meaning limitless) is 
the condition of the possibility of any definite solution. After all, the laws are to ‘address’ 
the presencing (ousia) of such private experiences (hetōn praktōn hylē). The indefinite 
matter of action (praktōn hylē), like the original potential material in the Physics, re-
appears again as potency, this time with an ambiguous end as if without telos.  
 He contends that the solution is to create a measure for the indefinite mold by 
adapting the law at the same time (Contreras, 2013. 22).  Aristotle tries to re-establish 132
the correctness, if not logically at least strategically, but as I mentioned in the previous 
chapter, he is preoccupied with the exceptional cases of the tragic figures.  
 Now, Contreras among others asserts that Aristotle is still asking for more laws. In 
other words, the corrections for Contreras do not have to lay the foundation of indecision 
or paralysis. I do agree with him on that. However, what I do not agree with is that 
Aristotle’s laws, even when they are developing phronetically, will include the other. This 
was the case with Trott’s formulation of progress in Aristotle’s city as well. As I 
 περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόµον, ὥστε ψηφίσµατος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ ὁ κανών ἐστιν131
 Contreras’s citation in this page has a typo. Or he has “missed the mark” and referred to a text that is 132
actually in Nicomachean Ethic while he claims it to be in the Rhetoric. 
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mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the universal measure to apply to individual 
cases and pass judgements for Trott was a homogeneous logos which is used 
deliberatively and phronetically, but what I tried to show here is the gradual modification 
of the very nature of measure or logos. I highlighted the movement in the text, where 
Aristotle is gradually getting carried away by his own admission to the aporia. One can 
see that the nature of the laws, which are supposed to be just, needs to transform from 
purely logocentric ones. Evidently, Aristotle does not intentionally and theoretically 
follow that route, but his language points in that direction and lays its foundation. For 
example, he offers a new measure whose character and categories are given by the 
indefinite. This is evident especially in the paradigm that he provides right after 
mentioning “the indefinite measure” to clarify what he means: “As for example the 
leaden rule used in Lesbian construction work. Just as this rule is not rigid but shifts with 
the contour of the stone, so a decree is adapted to a given situation” (NE. 5.10 1137b 
20-33). The reference is to the Lesbian molding that had an undulating curve. The leaden 
rule, as explained by Steward in the footnotes was a “flexible piece of lead that was 
accommodated to the irregular surface of a stone already laid in position, and then 
applied to other stones with the view of selecting one of them with irregularities which 
would fit most closely into those of the stone already laid” (Steward, 531). 
 Here is the paradoxical moment where justice is in pondering alongside the 
outlaw. How are we to understand this space of suspense, of interruption? As Derrida 
confirms, the interruption of decision is not an amoral or unethical moment. Quite the 
contrary, it is a moment of the creation of justice but in paradoxical or rather 
contradictory terms. "More just than justice" in Aristotle's terms lacks proper criteria of 
calculation. I suggest, following Derrida, that such a mis-recognition produces a 
mistreatment, which is symptomatic of a surplus or an outlaw, which is more just than 
justice itself. “It is now plain what the equitable is, and that it is just, and that it is 
superior to one sort of justice” (NE. 5.10. 1138a). What he thinks is now “plain” does not 
seem to be without difficulty and constitutes the nature of a different kind of ‘following’ 
and a different kind of law. Aristotle is conceding, in effect, that it is not always through 
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calculation of phronēsis but through miscalculation that a state of affairs is created 
involuntarily. This miscalculation is what he calls hamartia or “missing the mark.”  
Upon the collapse of the universal law and justice as law (droit), equity emerges in 
honoring the singular as singular. This final determined decree is the foundation of a new 
law. The law or the decree exists as undecided or indefinite given by the aporia itself. 
However, the moment a law or judgment is passed, it takes the form of injustice rather 
than justice. As Aristotle writes: “A man is fair/equitable who chooses and performs acts 
of this sort, who is no stickler for just in bad sense, but is satisfied with less than his 
share, even though when he has the law on his side” (NE. 5.10. 1137b35-1138a2). 
Aristotle is readily admitting that to do justice is to not abide strictly (i.e. justly) to 
the law and to be satisfied with injustice, namely “less than one’s share” even if the 
decree says otherwise. This is where Aristotle concedes to this alternative mode of being-
with and hints at the fact that it might be even superior (kritton) than the written word of 
justice (nomikondikaion). He seems to have realized the systematic misrecognition by the 
written word of the laws he created. Notwithstanding, his own miscalculation and 
hamartia has already set out a motion that is no longer teleological. This is how the force 
of justice has overcome this paralyzing melancholia before the impossibility of the laws. I 
believe that the implication of what Aristotle concedes to is that in fact any decision (to 
act or not to act) should be taken while acknowledging the impossibility and the promise 
of justice.  
 Scholars like Contreras are accurate in believing that Aristotle thinks that equity is 
rational (if not logical at least axiological, that is “the congruence of the value with the 
purpose of the [original] legislator) and a restoration of justice as fairness” (Contreras, 
2013. 23). But, my contention is that the force of justice has already carried away 
Aristotle in admitting to a level of creation beyond deliberation. There emerges another 
kind of justice which cannot be supplemented by the same measures. In addressing 
otherness as such, as Aristotle admits, one is dealing a new case that is unanticipated and 
thus outside the juridico-political paradigm already established. The new judgement 
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emerges as a supplement, which will necessarily not correspond to the definition of the 
just as we know it. This judgement is basically without a measure. The person who is 
making the decision is at this point is at the brink of the generation of an absolutely new 
making, the generation that is akin to the work of poets rather than judges who act like 
machines.  
 Unlike the Contreras’ suggestion about the operation of practical wisdom (phroēsis) 
and more calculation of the same kind at the time of the creation of the new laws, other 
examples in Aristotle’s treatment of innovation confirm my reading. Another such 
moment happens when in the Poetics Aristotle explains how a gifted poet creates a new 
tragedy or poem. Aristotle adopt a similar strategy there to provide the possibility of 
innovation in moderation.  
4.7. The Gifted Poet and the Insane: 
As we mentioned before ordinary logos is supposed to capture the present 
structure of being-with-others-in-the-world. To deal with new experiences, Aristotle 
offers a modification in expression or a decorated expression of some kind, what he calls 
lexis. In this sense the poetic language is to fit the coming-to-be of events and things in 
the world. 
Aristotle confirms this task when he maintains that as part of wording, metaphor 
is needed to expand or enliven the world “before our eyes.” Alongside foreign words, 
neologism, and lengthened words, metaphor is the most powerful means to bring the 
material potential or dark undetermined material or thought (dianoia) to light and life 
(Poetics, 1455a22). Aristotle later acknowledges that the process of bringing to light 
cannot simply be done by ordinary language. 
By merely combining the ordinary names of things this [to bring new 
experiences of people to light] cannot be done, but it is made possible by 
combining metaphors. For instance, "I saw a man weld bronze upon a man 
with fire," and so on. A medley of rare words is jargon. We need then a sort 
of mixture of the two. For the one kind will save the wording from being 
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prosaic and commonplace, the rare word, for example, and the metaphor 
and the "ornament," whereas the ordinary words give clarity. (Poetics, 
1458a) 
But, as we read in this quote, not only should there be a moderation and balance between 
ordinary words (kurion) and the new expressions but also not all metaphors are 
appropriate. He delves into the structure of metaphor to find the most proper one. He 
defines metaphor as a process or a carrying (epiphora). The root and the structure of the 
word metaphor as meta-pherein literally means to “carry over.”   
Metaphor is a carrying over of a word belonging to something else, from 
genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or by 
analogy. And I speak of analogy whenever a second thing has to a first a 
relation similar to that which a fourth has to a third; for one will state the 
fourth in place of the second or the second in place of the fourth, and 
sometimes people add the things to which the replaced word is related. Old 
age to life is like evening is to day; accordingly one will call evening of 
life, or the sunset of life. (Poetics, 1457b 8-10) 
By breaking down the concepts to their constituting categories and re-combining the parts 
again, Aristotle manages to express new experiences by the same old terms. As Aristotle 
holds in the definition of metaphor, the transference (epiphora) is controlled either within 
the boundaries of categories or through analogy like a hidden syllogism. In other words, 
according to Lawlor, “metaphor uses sedimented predicates to describe new experiences 
or experiences of new things” (Lawlor, 1992. 31). 
 On the other hand, in order to produce proper metaphors, this movement (epiphora) 
of metaphor as meta-pherein has to be completed to form a complete analogy. That is, 
metaphorical language has to communicate in order for a tragedy to meet its end. Thus, 
the role of wording (lexis) is to empower the plot to actually accomplish its task and to 
bring the audience toward the end, which is “the contradiction,” according to Aristotle: 
In order to organize the stories and work them out with their wording, one 
ought, as much as possible, to put them before the eyes. Only thus by 
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getting the picture as clear as if he were present at the actual event, will he 
find what is fitting and detect contradictions. (Poetics, 1455a 21-25; my 
emphasis) 
In this sense, the most beautiful wording captures the strangest, the most unheard of 
experiences and yet the tragedy as a whole would accomplish its end. Metaphor needs to 
act as a part in a whole. In the Poetics, he literally brings examples from poets where, in 
the absence of a present concept in the language, they creates a new, unheard of term. 
But, he quickly says that this creation has to be in moderation so that the language would 
not become enigmatic, nonsensical, or altogether “barbaric" (Poetics, 1458a 25).  
 Therefore, even in the treatment of the absolutely new, Aristotle creates a hierarchy 
of the propriety. Of course, there is no doubt difference between good and bad makings 
but the point is that he prioritizes the ordinary language over foreign words, alien words, 
and metaphors. This strategy which defines a proper metaphor is not hospitable to 
immigrants, strangers, and individual cases alike. Also, this is not only about words. “For 
people feel the same way about wording as they do about foreigners and fellow 
citizens” (Rhetoric, 3. 2. 1404b 10). He is literally advocating for a stable community and 
the kind of innovation which does not threaten the integrity of the system.   
 Therefore, in order for the metaphor to work properly, that is to actually bring the 
making of the logos to light, the cycle of recognition, which consists of a detour of 
syllogistic reasoning, must be complete. Recognition is a key element both as a discovery 
in the plot and as means to provide clarity in language. For, as Aristotle holds, the 
pleasure and the delight of poetry as imitation (mimesis) is in the recognition which 
presupposes a prior familiarity (Poetics, 1448b15-20). If the end of man or the happiest 
life of man is in accordance with contemplation (theoria), recognition is to bring about 
contemplation for the audience through the detour of metaphor.  
 According to Aristotle, making a proper and successful metaphor is the job of a 
gifted poet like Homer, who is able to metaphorize well, “to metaphorize well is to 
contemplate what is like (homoion) (Poetics, 1459a 6-8). The gifted poet has the power to 
see through the future and find similarities between events and objects to make novel 
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connections. He must have a sharp eye to seek out similarities between the way events 
are talked about and bring together concepts and make new combinations out of the old 
ones. In this sense, a metaphor for Aristotle does not illustrate something absolutely new, 
but rather sheds light on the way concepts and predicates are made to refer to events and 
referents. Metaphors shed light on the coming-to-be of the concepts. As Aristotle 
contends, metaphors are to put the coming to be of events and things “before our eyes.” 
In this way, the reader or the audience is able to focus on the process of the coming-to-be 
of the world as it already is in actuality.  
 The creative activity of a gifted poet is what he calls philomythos, which is a kind 
of poetry that is more philosophical (related to unities and wholes) than the accounts of 
history, which is merely about the episodic events in the past) (Poetics, 1451b1-6). But, 
even in the Poetics, Aristotle mentions an alternative to rational making: 
Hence the poetic art belongs to either a naturally gifted person or an insane 
(manikos) one, since those of the former sort are easily adaptable and the 
latter are out of their senses. (Poetics, 1455a 30-35) 
This is a very striking passage in the Poetics, where after writing extensively about the 
rational constitution of the most noble making (poieisis,) Aristotle readily admits that the 
whole operation might as well be the work of stupidity and insanity (what Derrida calls 
“bêtise”). “Missing the mark,” miscalculation, private language (idiotikon, which is of the 
same root as idiocy, idiot) are all pointing to the same level of thinking, which is not in 
accordance with deliberate calculation, and logos and yet brings about a kind of making 
albeit not hylomorphic making.  133
While hitting the mark creates the necessary anticipated form, “missing the mark” creates 
an unanticipated gathering or a coming-together that is deformed and even monstrous.  
In the Ethics, as I tried to show in the last two chapters, Aristotle seems to be 
aware of actual makings whose source and principle are not in the familiar laws of nature 
or the deliberation of an agent. Still, he advocates for more prudence and more 
 Look at Appendix 5 for Derrida on Betise in the history of philosophy. 133
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calculation for an anticipated outcome. This is the task of book VI of the Ethics, where he 
sets out to scrutinize into the intellectual virtues of man to figure out a deliberative 
function that can be used as a measure for more calculation. Nonetheless, the point I was 
trying to make was the alternative mode of ‘following’ that Aristotle’s system of justice 
as laws unintentionally gives rise to. In fact, the suggestion in Book VIII that “between 
friends there is no need for justice (NE., 8.1.1155a26-31) ensures that he has taken steps 
towards alternative measures to ‘address’ the otherness beyond the calculative thinking 




 In this chapter, I examined how the deconstructive critique of the laws can explain 
their genesis and failure as well as different modes of community within and on the 
margins of Aristotle’s text. The merit of the Aristotelian formulation of community and 
the ontology of laws is the internal dialectic that is in progress within his analysis. He 
puts on trial his own suggestions and formulations out of which he lays the ground for the 
development of thought process and even alternative modes of thinking altogether.   
 What I argued about Aristotle’s version of justice and community is an answer to 
the question of the ontological foundation of law at the dawn of western philosophy. I 
tried to show that his text is bifurcated between two kinds of being-with whose 
excellence is justice. I called them “community as exchange” and “nomadic following.” 
Both of these comportments towards otherness are intrinsic to the essential development 
of human beings’ nature towards its flourishing in being-with-others-in-polis. In keeping 
with the natural growth of man, both of these communities at their ends are associated 
with logos and interpretation.  
 There are two moments in which Aristotle points to the genesis of community along 
with its laws and principles. One is when he tries to establish a just city in accordance 
with man’s function and definition as life-in-the-polis. Here we witness the immanent 
constitution of a city whose function is to bring the originary character of citizens to the 
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fore. However, two forces carry the original aim away towards impersonal and universal 
laws. One is the function of money in community as exchange, and the other is the 
question of sovereignty of laws over man. Gradually, Aristotle replaces the good of every 
individual with the good of the city and as a result, the laws turn a blind eye to the 
singularity of individuals.  
 In such a circumstance, the second moment of the genesis of community and laws 
comes to pass. When, as a result of the previous measures, justice as universal law 
becomes impossible. Aristotle tries rectify the laws with more of the same genus. He 
assumes that at the moment of the creation of law, phronēsis would go beyond both 
nature and convention—and in one stroke found both of them. But phronēsis, as he 
admits later in book VI, can be abused by the sophists as a tool and not a measure. 
Consequently, phronēsis cannot stand outside the system. It has to be contained within 
the boundaries of reason and universals. It is part and parcel of the whole Aristotelian 
system of intellectual virtues and his cosmology, which as we explained in previous 
chapters, is bound up within the structure of the actual and the present.  
 Nonetheless, my argument in this chapter was that admitting to the impossibility 
that afflicts his metaphysical system, Aristotle hints at a path beyond his own solutions; 
the path of “nomadic following” and the heedful conduct. The laws of “nomadic 
following” are not based on calculation of the same kind but are given by the indefinite 
material at hand. They are realized only if one takes the potency of the indefinite matter 
or singular case at hand seriously. Following this path allows the laws to move beyond 
calculation in the silence of logos and provides an ability to hear the voice of the ‘other.’ 
This does not mean that the laws do not establish some form of justice. Instead, it means 
that the general laws are blind to the most originary case which founds them in the first 
place.  
 Applying the Derridean deconstruction of law to Aristotle’s formulation, one can 
explain how and why the process of the immanent constitution of a just community in 
exchange, admittedly becomes aporetic. In a general critique of laws, Derrida enacted 
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this aporetic situation in a lecture himself, comparing the implementation of laws to the 
laws of language and other cultural and institutional conventions. 
 For my part, I argued that the nature of laws of exchange in Aristotle and their 
implementation through money are comparable with presencing of beings in logos and its 
double character. Thus, laws are plagued with the same aporia as logos with regard to the 
problem of alterity, innovation, and the singular expression of individuals. That is to say, 
just like the natural laws and presencing in logos that for the most part generate the same 
and the familiar and do not necessarily ‘address’ the abnormal or the unfamiliar, Aristotle 
admits that the universal laws of justice do not meet some special circumstances (NE. 
5.10.1137b 19-25). It is noteworthy that he is not admitting to a failure in the laws but an 
essential unaccountable otherness in the nature of the singular context (NE. 5.101137b 
18). We need a new measure to apply to that which is indefinite. This measure needs to 
be given by the indefinite or the singular other, which is not reducible to the same (NE. 
5.10 1137b 20-33). He calls this second more complete form of justice 
“fairness” (epieikeia). 
 With respect to this admission, my contention in this chapter was twofold. Firstly, 
Aristotle is well aware of the problem of laws and systematically prefers the stability and 
generality of laws over unaccountable innovations or the radical alterity of the other, and 
secondly, this very mistreatment of singularity ontologically grounds a mode of 
community and ‘following’ that he calculatedly and deliberately tries to avoid.   
His admission to the aporia of laws, the failure of partial justice in ‘addressing’ 
the singular other transforms the nature of fairness (epieikeia) into a completely different 
mode of being-with-others. Fairness turns into, trans-forms, or undergo a metamorphosis 
into something other than a mere supplement or rectification of justice in the way that 
Aristotle initially puts forth (NE. 5.10.1137b 19-25). The rectification of the law, which is 
necessarily unjust, is paradoxically the most responsible comportment towards the other. 
“Following creatively,” without a predetermined system or calculation in headful 
comportment towards the other is in fact the most responsible mode of being-with. 
However, as I mentioned following Derrida, such a ‘following’ is always “heretical” in 
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all senses of the term. Any decision or judgment in that territory is considered outlaw yet 
carries the signature of the one who makes them. That is why decisions at this realm are 
still more free and responsible than a blind following of the law.   
 One of the best examples of this aporetic situation and its resolution in an unlawful 
yet responsible decision can be seen in the well-known novel Les Misérables. My 
reference is to the judgment and the critical decision of Bishop Myriel. Valjean a recently 
discharged convict seeks refuge in his church. Myriel accommodates him and shows 
hospitality to him. In spite of all that, Valjean steals silverware from him. But the police 
capture him again and bring him to the Bishop and ask him about the issue. Myriel saves 
Valjean from jail by claiming that he had donated the silverware to him and there was 
even more for Valjean to have.  
 The significant point here is that according to the laws of justice, Myriel should 
have turned Valjean in. This is what the fanatic police inspector Javert would do even to 
himself had he ever even thought of violating the laws. On the one hand, we have the 
claim of the law to recognize the agent as who he is, in this case the criminal that Valjean 
is. On the other hand, it seems that it is Myriel who really heeds the otherness and the 
singularity of Valjean’s situation. Even though he recognizes Valjean as a criminal, 
Myriel decides to set him free, a decision which is in itself unjust according to the laws. 
Nonetheless, as the story proceeds, it seems that his action leads to a major 
transformation in Valjean’s life. Valjean becomes Mayor Madeleine, the founder or 
executor of the laws. Unlike what Aristotle suggests for such moments as deliberating the 
character of the individual at the moment or as he has been all his life, Myriel celebrates 
the other individual as a possibility of what he can be. The fact that right after his 
decision Valjean commits another crime reminds the reader of the threat and wager in 
embracing the possibility.  
 This kind of comportment towards the other, according to Derrida, is necessarily 
unjust in a calculative sense and is more similar to heedful conduct with respect to the 
alterity of the other. In this chapter, I referred to the point in Book V of NE where 
Aristotle seems to be drawn towards this direction. In such a moment, it seems, he gives 
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up his calculative deliberation and completely gives in to the alterity (NE. 
5.10.1137b35-1138a2).  
 I aimed at demonstrating that Aristotle opens this path, which I called the path of 
‘nomadic following’ by admitting to the aporia. This is a route that does not have an end 
in view and celebrates motion and change in the subject, the object, and measures alike. 
However, this will undermine his initial metaphysical project based on the beingness 
(ousia) as the present (parousia). Things are present at their limit or are headed towards 
their pre-determined limit in-the-world. 
 By exercising heedful conduct, the conduct that  is receptive to alterity and 
welcomes an essential modification, opens Aristotle’s metaphysical system to a new kind 
of temporality that lays the foundation of a different kind of calculation. Justice as laws, 
just like the laws of nature, presupposes the presence of beings in the future and the past. 
The events and individuals have to be anticipatable as if they are similar or the same. 
Time as “the number of change,” for Aristotle, stays homogeneous. Aristotle thereby 
makes sure that the future, for the most part, resembles the past. Things are as much 
present now as in the future and in the past (BC., 24-25). Had he embraced the 
consequences of the suspension of the laws, he must have prepared himself for a new 
kind of temporality beyond the economic temporality of the present or the temporality of 
the ‘givenness.’ This primordial temporality gives beings as if for the first time and in an 
unanticipated manner.  
 Laws in this way cannot be based on the actual and present availability of beings. 
The principle of motion in presencing as being-at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia) will 
have to be replaced with the ones that accommodate pure potency (dynamis). Aristotle 
plants the seed of this generative force, this potency, which later bifurcates into two very 
different understandings of ‘following’ the laws in Islamic philosophy and theology.  
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5. Chapter 5 : Conclusion: Being a Muslim, Being a ‘Follower-in-Trouble’ 
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5.1. Conclusion (1)  
 Post-Heideggerian phenomenology is characterized by the critique of identity as 
identical or present to itself and the community as a kind of making (poiesis) or ideality. 
Derrida, in particular, emphasizes the potential danger and violence of any political 
community which is gathered around such ideal makings, or institutions as state, nation, 
Europe, the West, and so on. Such a construct serves as an organizing principle that gives 
completed definitions and identity to its members. The horizon of these definitions is 
always already determined, leaving little room for the authentic possibility of the 
individuals to flourish.  
 By attending to the treatment of alterity and innovation in these systems, one can 
truly liberate the force of this critique. For Derrida, any such heading or capital is formed 
at the expense of eliminating those that are not identical or similar to this arbitrary 
making. Even in Aristotle, whose political system promises moral flourishing, the system 
altogether is not very hospitable to strangers or innovators. According to him, as I argued 
in this work, this goes back to the laws that determine every synchronic system. As 
Aristotle admits, due to the generality and universality of the laws, they are not tailored to 
address the singular character of every member of the system (NE. 5.10.1137b 19-25). 
Thus, they are essentially enforced. That is, the laws are established by producing a 
normal, repeatable state of affairs, and as a result, they do injustice to the singularity of 
individuals. Besides, the laws repeat and legitimize what is typical, which consequently 
marginalize what is considered abnormal or creative. Accordingly, Derrida drastically 
problematizes the bold line between the outlaw as a criminal and the outlaw as an 
innovator.  
 To avoid falling prey to such synchronic systems and constructs, I took the 
perspective of the individual in dealing with the problem of community and identity. I 
approached being-togetherness in terms of ‘following’ the other. ‘Following’ the other 
can take a temporal angle in which case it amounts to talking about ‘following’ a 
tradition. It is worth remembering that the question of ‘following’ is not about a subject 
who decides according to specific measures to choose between one reading of tradition or 
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one community rather than another. Formulating the problem in terms of ‘following’ 
means to ask about the moment where ‘following’ gives rise to the ‘follower’ and the 
‘followed’ at the same time. It is the ‘givenness’ of a particular event, the encounter with 
a singular other, which creates the ‘followers’ and the ‘followed’ at the same time.  
 For example, an anthropologist can look at the followers of a religious tradition 
and imagine them as identities following some essential principles and laws of conduct or 
performing the same rituals. They might act the same way and say similar things, like 
Muslims who attend Friday prayers at the same time toward a certain direction (qibla)  134
and almost exactly in a predictable way. But, I am interested in the original moment of 
distinction that gives rise to their being as ‘followers’ and what they ‘follow.’  
Aristotle’s view, Heidegger argues, can put the whole discussion on an immanent 
existential plane because, for him, the human being is not defined as an independent self 
or subject who, only then, decides to comport oneself to others. For him, to be-with-
others is not “to be” an individual subject who abides by the laws of reason, social 
contract, etc., but rather, it is already to be-in-community with others (BC., 45). Also, in 
BT, he seems to be adopting the same basic Aristotelian insight when he talks about 
Mitdasein, He supplements the term Dasein with Mitdasein, arguing that they are co-
originary: “certain structures of Dasein …are equi-primordial with Being-in-the-world: 
Being-with and Dasein-with [Mitsein und Mitdasein] (BT., 115/149).” That is to say that 
humans always already find themselves in a hyphenated existence in relation to others.  
For Aristotle, human beings as life-possessing-logos and life-in-the-polis are 
always already in being-in-the-world-with-others. Humankind is first and foremost “life,” 
a mixture of the world and others, and the rest (i.e., self, subject, object, etc.) are 
secondary abstractions. According to Heidegger, life in this sense is not bios or the world 
of nature in a biological sense (BC., 14). Our being as humans is already constituted by 
our meaning-making relationship with life. Life in this sense, matters to human beings 
and is on the way to express itself in logos. This does not mean that a human being is an 
The Qibla meaning “direction”, or “facing” is the direction that should be faced when a Muslim prays 134
during Ṣalāṫ (prayer). It is fixed as the direction of the Kaʿaba in the city of Mecca. Most mosques contain 
a wall niche that indicates the Qibla, which is known as a miḥrâb.
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independent subject that constitutes or represents the world in knowledge, but that the 
human being is the place where life shows its unfolding in logos. 
With a collapse of subject-object distinction in this formulation of human 
existence, the whole question turns into how life in its animal formation unfolds in itself 
automatically to become manifest in a communal logos. Dasein, for Heidegger, names the 
place where the presencing (ousia) (not present beings) comes to pass and meets its limit 
or completion in logos. Therefore, the question of community is deeply connected with 
the unfolding of the nature, the laws, and principles under which the nature meets its end 
as well as the nature of the end.  
 In keeping with the phenomenological reading of Aristotle, in this work, I tried to 
demonstrate that for him, the same basic concepts that determine the coming-to-be and 
generation of beings in nature are at work in accounting for how people are with one 
another in time. In this way, I argued that Aristotle’s meditations about the coming-to-be 
in nature produces the necessary ingredients of the critique of any gathering of a people 
as a construct, an arbitrary institution, or a making. However, we demonstrated with 
Heidegger that the moment Aristotle tries to turn his meditations into a science, or a 
metaphysical system, he ‘misses the mark’ and produces another ideality. 
 Aristotle produces a system of present entities not merely by focusing on beings 
but by giving them a familiar end (telos). That is how the metaphysics of presence is 
created by prioritizing the familiarity with the look (eidos) of the things, i.e., the telos of 
presencing, and thereby closing the possibility of the emergence of the difference as such. 
I argued that in such a synchronic system, the interpretation of tradition as ‘following’ the 
others of the past engenders the repetition of their way of life. ‘Following’ turns out to be 
like a son ‘following’ and resembling his father. 
 Aristotle in effect marginalizes some modes of ‘following,’ calling them 
monstrous, bestial, or abnormal. Conversely, the genuine or authentic ‘following’ is to 
defy the laws of the present and the actual as well as to question the very legitimacy of 
them. The transcendental study of the law makes it possible to see similar patterns of its 
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occurrence in establishing every metaphysical system and to show the arbitrary ground of 
sovereignty or the “mystical foundation of authority” (Derrida, 1990. 920).  
 In each chapter of this work, I tried to show the same problem with the 
Aristotelian formulation of universal laws. I investigated different forms of law, first in 
nature (the universal formulas that explain multiplicity plus the ones governing motion 
and generation), then in moral action (the educational rules of conduct toward the golden 
mean of virtues) and finally in the social sphere (the just laws of the community). In all 
these cases, I argued, Aristotle refers to the universal formula as that which establishes a 
hierarchy of the noblest making, the most appropriate and the most stable as opposed to 
less appropriate or altogether bestial formations, human vices, unjust acts, or the outlaws. 
However, the very attention of Aristotle to the indefinite matter (hylē), as that which has 
no name yet, or the immanent force of desire releases other forms of makings and doings 
that bring about the creation of the outlaw as well as the innovative. Thus, each chapter of 
the present work consists of two main parts: the formation of the ideal system and the 
dissemination of marginal forces that give rise to alternative gatherings. 
 In each chapter of this work, I tried to show the same problem with the 
Aristotelian formulation of universal laws. I investigated different forms of law, first in 
nature (the universal formulas that explain multiplicity plus the ones governing motion 
and generation), then in moral action (the educational rules of conduct toward the golden 
mean of virtues) and finally in the social sphere (the just laws of the community). In all 
these cases, I argued, Aristotle refers to the universal formula as that which establishes a 
hierarchy of the noblest making, the most appropriate and the most stable as opposed to 
less appropriate or altogether bestial formations, human vices, unjust acts, or the outlaws. 
However, the very attention of Aristotle to the indefinite matter (hylē), as that which has 
no name yet, or the immanent force of desire releases other forms of makings and doings 
that bring about the creation of the outlaw as well as the innovative. Thus each chapter of 
the present work consists of two main parts: the formation of the ideal system and the 
dissemination of marginal forces that give rise to alternative gatherings.  
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In each chapter, this form of making or doing is discussed under the concept of 
'missing the mark’ (hamartia), which implies an unintentional but essential flaw like that 
of the tragic character. As opposed to the normal and familiar makings and doings 
hamartia produces unfamiliar and bestial modes of making. Derrida talks about the 
concept of bêtise in French, which is very much similar to hamartia in Greek although he 
does not establish the relationship. Hamartia for example in the case of the character of 
tragedy is not an intentional wrongdoing or fault of character (as in vices) but a mistake, 
miscalculation, stupidity (bêtise), or some flaw. However, this seemingly epistemological 
flaw is not an error because as opposed to the Cartesian error or mistake, there is not 
scientific method that can avoid it. In chapter four and in analysis of different kinds of 
mistakes according to Aristotle, I pointed out that the source of thin mistake is not within 
the intention or deliberation of the agent nor does he attribute it to a divine force. In 
effect, it points to an alignment in thought with the creative forces that are not 
anticipatable, and are a-teleological or nomadic.  
Having the literal meaning of kategoria as accusation or blame in mind, hamartia 
like bêtise in French is responsible for such accidental, stupid, catastrophic, or monstrous 
makings and doings as those of the events and the fate of the tragic figure.  As such an 135
alignment in thought, which is obviously not intentional, non-calculative, and nomadic, 
hamartia does not act in accordance with Kantian categories of mind or even Aristotelian 
categories of speech. It is point to a trans-categorial category much the same way that 
medieval thinkers way before Kant describe. Derrida writes about bêtise as follows: 
This category is precisely a category whose signification is never assured 
….bêtise is not one category among others. Or it is a transcategorial 
category. One will never be able to isolate a univocal meaning of a 
concept of bêtise in its irreducible link to the French idiom. Now, if it is a 
category, then bêtise, as an accusation and as an attribution, an attribute, a 
 Derrida writes: the word “bêtise” belongs to the language of indictment; it’s a category of accusation, a 135
way of categorizing the other. It is most often manipulated as an accusation, a denigration, an 
incrimination, blame that tries to discredit not only a mistake in intelligence or knowledge but also a 
misdeed, an offense, an ethical misdeed, or quasi- juridical accusation. (Derrida, DDP. 48)
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predicate, a predication, if this category doesn’t belong to the regime of 
the normal series of categories, if it is an exceptional category, a 
transcategorial category, then it corresponds to the first literal definition of 
the transcendental in the Middle Ages. Long before Kant, “transcendental” 
meant quid transcendi omni genus. It’s a category that transcends all the 
categories and doesn’t belong to the series or table of categories. (Derrida, 
DDP. 48-9) 
In this work, I argued, Aristotle himself paves the way for his medieval reader to find out 
about all the forces of generation and motion and as a result different modes of 
community. Therefore, each chapter consists of first, outlining Aristotle’s attempt to 
explain the immanent expression of beings in nature or the constitution of actions and 
makings in the natural growth of man towards fulfilling its definitions. Secondly, I tried 
to show how with respect to all of his necessary laws, Aristotle inevitably and gradually 
is drawn and compelled to point to the possibility of the alternative mode of movement, 
generation or gatherings.   
In this light, in Chapters 1 and 2, I delved into Aristotle’s Physics, into what I 
called the politics of nature, looking for the principles of the emergence of any gathering 
in nature and how for Aristotle beings are judged, differentiated, and evaluated. I asked 
what the laws are under which such a natural presencing occurs. I argued, following 
Heidegger, Brogan, and Sheehan, that there is a sense in which Aristotle is perhaps the 
first philosopher that attempts to successfully account for the laws of motion and 
generation in nature, that is the principles according to which individual beings come 
after one another. I argued the most original and the best example of presencing (ousia) 
for Aristotle is the natural presencing (physis) that is the repetitious and automatic 
coming-to-be of things immanently. 
 The coming-after in nature follows such necessary and eternal laws of 
presencing. This stands against the human making in the arts (technē) which is not done 
automatically and therefore is not in accordance with the being of things in nature. In 
such cases, the artists or artisans impose arbitrary forms or categories on natural material. 
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They violently carry the natural beings away from their natural presencing and impose 
the form in their minds on natural material (Sheehan, 151-52; Brogan, 88). 
On the other hand, Heidegger observes that while trying to capture the original 
presencing of things (instead of present beings), Aristotle sets up different schemata to 
make this motion accountable like a science. They include hylomorphism and teleology 
which are two of the most important schemata to account for automatic natural change. 
These schemata explain the being of things in nature and evaluate them as flourishing or 
deteriorating. For example, hylo-morphism explains how a seed of an apple tree as a 
material (virtual material (hylē) is in potency (dynamis) always already towards its being-
at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia) or enactment of its function or form (morphē) as an 
apple tree. Being an apple tree is the enactment of what is already in potency in the 
material; it is en-ergeia literally en-ergon (putting into work/function). The form also 
constitutes its perfection, completion, and end which it begins the growth always already 
towards it. That is motion does not happen without having some completion in view 
(teleology).   
 In nature, being-at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia) reigns. The pre-Socratic 
origins of nature in the matter, chaos or strife, or unlimited motion (energeia ateles) 
“ought to” follow the necessary and eternal laws of nature, meet their end and be 
appropriated by the form (eidos). This immanent motion is characterized by 
hylomorphism. Hylomorphism does not mean the combination of form and matter but that 
there is no unformed or uninformed matter. The matter in motion can only be known 
when it is appropriated at its limit (peras which is associated with logos and eidos) or 
with respect to its being-towards the proper limit. 
 In order to produce the science of nature whose principle (archē) is motion 
(kinēsis) Aristotle provides another ideality, which is repeatable. There is a sense in which 
the motion (kinēsis) and generation in nature “for the most part” generates the same, in 
spite of the differences and accidents (tychai). There is a limit to the change and motion 
that is determined by the way things are in their familiarity and availability. The heading 
or telos is already anticipatable, otherwise it would be accidental and unaccountable 
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(alogon). Natural generation “ought to” follow the necessary and eternal laws of nature 
(physis) rather than being an imposition of mental categories or being unaccountable and 
monstrous.  
The proposed limit and end exacerbates this situation. Heidegger remarks that 
ousia keeps its everyday use of the term as well when it enters Aristotelian terminology. 
It still means estate, possession, almost akin to the notion of currency or capital. The 
familiarity of the look (eidos) of the things in everyday use constitutes the end (telos). 
Thus, Aristotle prioritizes the end which is in our possession.  
  Altogether, Heidegger pinpoints two findings or emphases in Aristotle that are 
unprecedented and crucial: first, his focus on end (telos) and limit (peras) and second, his 
attempt to account for motion. Still, he criticizes Aristotle’s priority for the present and 
actual beings. He shows how the problem is exacerbated when Aristotle, in fact, 
associates the end with speech (logos). Speech (logos) is the place where the primordial 
character of beings is ‘addressed.' Using the term ‘address’ and pointing to the human 
character of logos make the revelation of the truth of beings problematic and ambiguous. 
For, in one sense, speech (logos as ‘address’) is the final destination of the process of the 
coming-to-be of beings in clarity and yet clear speech is already determined as that which 
is current and communicable in public. That is to say that clarity of the ‘address’ in the 
second sense is, at least to some extent, conventional rather than natural. In other words, 
if the primordial character of beings is addressed in logos, and the most appropriate logos 
is determined by communicability (public language), how the truth of beings comes to 
the fore is pre-determined by those limits set by the public language itself. To be 
understood and come to clarity, beings have to choose from a pool of “used up,” 
sedimented terms. As a result, the original function of logos in letting things show 
themselves as they are is compromised. The presumed place of clarity where the 
primordial character of beings or the characteristic difference of beings was supposed to 
be revealed (alethuein) is already pre-laden with the actual usage of language.  
 Aristotle acknowledges the underlying motion at work in the presenting of beings, 
but in order to be the individual determinations that they are, in their looks, in their 
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availability and their use, beings need to meet their end in logos. All that is indeterminate 
and formless has to meet its end in the actual presence and availability of things. This 
giving priority to the actual presence, availability or the familiarity with things in nature 
produces a hierarchy of the most proper and appropriate presencing as opposed to the 
least proper and monstrous. The priority for what is available, the same and actual make 
the structure of nature already political and hierarchical. Human beings as part of life are 
no exception to this politics of nature. The seed of the father “ought to” produce an end 
that is predetermined virtually, as a similar looking son. The proper limit seems to 
determine the archē or the law of motion as well.  
 Heidegger’s solution is to radicalize Aristotle’s consideration of motion and 
potency and to take the withdrawal embedded in presencing seriously. In a critical 
reading of Brogan, I demonstrated that both kinds of makings either through the 
imposition of the end by natural laws or the imposition of arbitrary mental categories are 
just as violent. To ‘address’ a being in its presencing is to stand in the difference and let 
the thing appear as an unforeseen possibility. Because of its crucial role in my analysis in 
this chapter, I repeat this quote here again: 
It is of decisive importance, first, that we allow space for beings as a 
whole; second, that we release ourselves into the nothing, which is to say, 
that we liberate ourselves from those idols everyone has and to which one 
is wont  to go cringing ; and finally, that we let the sweep of our 136 137
suspense take its full course, so that it swings back into the basic question 
of metaphysics which the nothing compels: Why are there beings at all, 
and why not rather nothing? (BW., 112) 
By questioning the heading, the end, the appropriation at the end in Dasein as (energeia/
entelecheia) and replacing it with potency (dynamis), the necessary and eternal nature of 
the laws of presencing becomes unsettled. Heidegger manages to turn every presencing in 
 make or be or become accustomed136
 To cringe: [krinj] to bend one's head and body in fear or in a servile manner.137
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reality into a gathering in reading. The temporality of such a comportment is constituted 
by what-is-not-yet, as opposed to what-is-already. 
 In chapters 3 and 4, I followed the same trend, this time regarding the laws of 
action in general (perfect justice) and in the constitution of the just society. I 
demonstrated that the generality of the laws of action in both realms is rooted in 
consideration of a proper end, which is in accordance with human definition and function 
as life-possessing-logos and life-in-the-polis. This most proper end comes about through 
different schemata for Aristotle and is associated with such terms as happiness 
(eudaimonia), the good of life, justice, contemplation, the noble (kalon), and the mean. 
In Chapter 3, I showed how Aristotle establishes that the ends are immanent to the natural 
presencing of life-possessing-logos. He is diligent to point out that in the realm of action, 
things are much more contingent and the best actions are not created naturally.  
Desire is the cause of things being done that are apparently pleasant. The 
things which are familiar and to which we have become accustomed are 
among pleasant things; for men do with pleasure many things which are 
not naturally pleasant, when they have become accustomed to them. 
(Rhetoric, 1.10.1369 b) 
Still, Aristotle’s task is to show that if one uses deliberation and calculation, she can align 
her desire and anger with the natural and automatic making to hit the target. This is the 
job of habit. In order to restore a quasi-necessary  motion towards the pleasurable rest, 138
the individuals need to acquire habits (hexis). Their actions have to become almost 
natural to produce the best end. The hylomorph, the best result in the realm of action, is 
the golden mean of virtues. The flourishing life-possessing-logos is the one who brings 
desire under the control of deliberation to let the proper and accurate character of beings 
as they really are come to light.  
 The golden mean of virtues is a modification of desires, a having (habit, hexis, 
echei) or singular targeting of desires which directs the seed, the potency, or the body of 
 It is quasi-necessary because of the contingent character of human action. Habit is not necessary like 138
nature but it is quasi-necessary like something that is not against nature either. To act according to habit 
becomes like nature, second nature. 
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an entity toward a proper (prepon), appropriate holding-at-one’s-end (entelecheia). 
Nevertheless, the appropriate or the end is still determined by logos with its paradoxical 
singular-plural character. Human choices “ought” to be controlled by the power of logos. 
With the intervention of logos, the complications we mentioned above enter the realm of 
action as well. What Aristotle claims to be genuine pleasure as opposed to apparent 
pleasure may, in fact, be an appropriate pleasure in the sense that it is determined by 
public opinion (doxa). 
The character of the hylomorph and reign of the actual (entelecheia) becomes 
clearer when Aristotle attends to the judgment of the abnormal doings and mistakes. The 
way Aristotle justifies mistakes and errors shows his preference for the hylomorph and 
yet his concern about te creation of the catastrophe. As I mentioned above, in the 
characterization or categorization (from kategoria: “to blame” or “to charge”) of beings 
as abnormal and actions as mistakes lies the foundation of another kind motion and 
creative power. The question is who is to blame for a catastrophe. It is worth 
remembering that such bad ends against all expectation happen rarely in the realm of 
natural making. But, as Aristotle admits, it is easy to ‘miss the mark’ in the realm of 
action which is more contingent.  
For the good and bad actions as long as the result is in accordance with the 
deliberation we can anticipate the end and we can claim that the metaphysical principles 
of logos are at work. In other words, we can still anticipate and judge the being of an 
individual through judging the result of his actions although the action might not 
naturally follow his being, due to the intrusion of desire of anger. In other words, actions 
and mistakes can be referred back to a bad judgment or miscalculation under the 
influence of desires. Both of these results are anticipated and accounted by Aristotle’s 
metaphysics.  
However, Aristotle is diligent to mention particular cases like Oedipus, where in 
spite of all of the calculations by the individual, he does actions that do not speak to his 
character and would not result in a hylomorph but a catastrophe. In that case, the 
principle that is creating the event, Aristotle still admits, must have been from outside of 
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him or incidentally. The source of the making and the mistake is outside his being and he 
is not to blame (NE., 1135b18).  Thus, the error in the part of a character like Oedipus, 139
points to an agent, a doer, or a maker of state of affairs, which is beyond the expectation 
of a rational, virtuous doer and maker, as well as the audience of the tragedy.   
Aristotle rejects the possibility of the attribution of this making in the horizon (the 
catastrophic fate of the character) for Oedipus to the divine writer. He is careful to point 
out that should the tragedy have a real effect on the audience and bring about catharsis 
and wonder for them, the fate of Oedipus cannot miraculously (by divine intervention) 
turn into good fortune. He regards such an ending and discovery (the divine intervention) 
too easy and ineffective (Poetics, 1455a 15-20). In effect, the blame, the responsibility 
 Aristotle writes: “There are then three ways in which a man may injure his fellow. An injury done in 139
ignorance is an error, the person affected or the act or the instrument or the result being other than the agent 
supposed; for example, he did not think to hit, or not with this missile, or not this person, or not with this 
result, but it happened that either the result was other than he expected (for instance he did not mean to 
inflict a wound but only a prick), or the person, or the missile. When then the injury happens contrary to 
reasonable expectation, it is（1） a misadventure. When, though not contrary to reasonable expectation, it 
is done without evil intent, it is（2) a culpable error; for an error is culpable when the cause of one's 
ignorance lies in oneself, but only a misadventure when the cause lies outside oneself.” (NE., 1135b18 5-8) 
The three sorts of injury are ἀτύχηµα, ἁµάρτηµα, and ἀδίκηµα. The second term is introduced first, 
in its wider sense of a mistake which leads to an offense against someone else（the word connotes both 
things）. It is then subdivided into two; ἀτύχηµα, accident or misadventure, and offense due to mistake and 
not reasonably to be expected, and ἁµάρτηµα in the narrow sense, a similar offense that ought to have been 
foreseen. The third term, ἀδίκηµα, a wrong, is subdivided into wrongs done in a passion, which do not 
prove wickedness, and wrongs done deliberately, which do. “Again, in deliberation there is a double 
possibility of error: you may go wrong either in your general principle or in your particular fact: for 
instance, either in asserting that all heavy water is unwholesome, or that the particular water in question is 
heavy. (NE., 1142a 7-8) (ἔτι ἡ ἁµαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον) 
 Again, a man can be said to have deliberated well either generally, or in reference to a particular 
end. Deliberative Excellence in general is therefore that which leads to correct results with reference to the 
end in general, while correctness of deliberation with a view to some particular end is Deliberative 
Excellence of some special kind. If therefore to have deliberated well is a characteristic of prudent men, 
Deliberative Excellence must be correctness of deliberation with regard to what is expedient as a means to 
the end, a true conception of which constitutes Prudence. 10. Understanding, or Good Understanding, (NE., 
1142b). With regard to problems, and the various solutions of them, how many kinds there are, and the 
nature of each kind, all will be clear if we look at them like this. Since the poet represents life, as a painter 
does or any other maker of likenesses, he must always represent one of three things—either things as they 
were or are; or things as they are said and seem to be; or things as they should be. These are expressed in 
diction with or without rare words and metaphors, there being many modifications of diction, all of which 
we allow the poet to use. Moreover, the standard of what is correct is not the same in the art of poetry as it 
is in the art of social conduct or any other art. In the actual art of poetry there are two kinds of errors, 
essential and accidental. If a man meant to represent something and failed through incapacity, that is an 
essential error. But if his error is due to his original conception being wrong and his portraying, for 
example, a horse advancing both its right legs, that is then a technical error in some special branch of 
knowledge, [20] in medicine, say, or whatever it may be; or else some sort of impossibility has been 
portrayed, but that is not an essential error. These considerations must, then, be kept in view in meeting the 
charges contained in these objections.
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falls on neither the deliberation of the agent nor the divine intervention. He leaves no 
other option for the audience than thinking of a bestial force at work in the nature or the 
order of things that threatens everyone—and there is no secure escape from the 
contingency of its creation. Thus, Aristotle admits that the disastrous effect or bad 
formation might occur in the process of the creation of an event in the future 
unbeknownst to the doer and against his best calculations. This is still a motion of desire, 
but not from within the control of the deliberation of the individual or the necessary laws 
of nature.  
With this admission of the existence of a mis-treatment and the automatic power 
of generation of events beyond calculation, one expects Aristotle would turn into an 
immanent philosopher of becoming. He goes deep into the multiplicity of desire through 
imagination in tragedy, but only in order to educate, warn and threaten the audience 
against such unaccountable makings. That is to say that Philomythos and Philosophy, for 
him, have the same goal of accounting for the appropriate events and warning against the 
unaccountable. Wonder for him, as Joe Sachs acutely observes, seems to be like the 
wonder of a scientist who sees an anomaly like an eclipse for the first time, but very 
quickly restores rationality by accounting for it. The gifted poet is the one who realizes 
the threat of the unaccountable in the future. By invoking and appealing to the audiences’ 
power of imagination. The poet tries to warn them about the consequence of their actions 
and to awaken them as to the vulnerability of their situation. 
 In Chapter 4, I mentioned another such complication, this time, in the social realm 
where the basic community as exchange is formed between different parties. There, of 
course, it is not directly logos, but laws, which mediate the communication between the 
parties. The paradox of logos, I demonstrated, is repeated for the laws as well: the laws 
are composed and passed to ‘address’ and meet the characteristic difference of 
individuals in order for a just community to take shape. Meanwhile, due to their 
generality, laws are necessarily bound to equalize the differences between them through 
money. I argued following Derrida that the universal character of the laws of justice stirs 
up the same aporetic condition in dealing with particular contexts as that of logos.  
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 Derrida treats this essential limitation by demonstrating the similarity of the 
general forms of the laws with those of language. He enacts the essential impossibly of 
justice as universal laws in terms of the impossibility of the ‘address.’ Thus, the ‘address’ 
is his term for the force of justice beyond any established law which targets the 
singularity of the other.  
Being-with as ‘following’ the other and always being-after leaves us in a 
hermeneutic situation. It leaves us in the trouble of forever being an interpreter of what is 
revealed in logoi of others. In the realm of society, the trouble is doubled by being also 
“before the laws” while the singularity of the other always falls outside the bounds of the 
established law. Despite being inevitable and necessary, the laws treat individuals not in 
their true character but strategically and temporarily as the same as others.  
 In the social realm, the temporary and strategic character of the laws becomes 
even more evident when Aristotle admits the inability of universal laws to deal with new 
particular cases. In order to restore justice the laws need to be supplemented by what is 
not recognized by them. 
Aristotle first accuses the particular case as being abnormal. He mentions that the 
problem is not in the laws or the lawgiver but the nature of the indefinite matter (NE. 5.10 
1137b 12-18). However, he suddenly changes his tone, suggesting that in the case when 
the general laws become impossible, it is the indefinite (aoriston, limitless, without 
boundaries) itself that gives the new laws (NE. 5.10.1137b 19-25). The judge needs a new 
measure given by individual material of action (hetōn praktōn hylē) itself. Finally, in the 
toolbox of culture and tradition, he finds a solution for the problem (NE. 5.10 1137b 
20-33).  
The solution arises as a result of his admitting to the impossibility of the general 
laws of the past. Aristotle seems to concede that at the moment of judgement with respect 
to the unprecedented, every ‘follower’ have to come to terms with her being-in-trouble. 
The judge has to grapple with the indefinite matter of action and be creative in 
concocting measures. He refers to a specific kind of ruler that Lesbian people use. The 
reference is to a Lesbian molding that had an undulating curve, a “flexible piece of lead 
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that was accommodated to the irregular surface of a stone already laid in position, and 
then applied to other stones with the view of selecting one of them with irregularities 
which would fit most closely into those of the stone already laid” (NE., 531). 
The actual character of this ruler is not clear but the implication is that Aristotle 
notices that the laws and measures of the past are not working and they need to be 
replaced by a new measure. Against his own claim before that the problem and 
abnormality is in the nature of the case, he is gradually coming to terms with the fact that 
the shortcoming is in the nature of the measure which needs to be modified constantly to 
and become other than what it is to fit the individual.  
Consequently, the indefinite matter calls for an indefinite measure which 
establishes the just action and decision at the particular moment of encountering the 
aporia as aporia. The individual judgment does not arise as a result of the application of 
the universal to a particular context or expanding the reach of the universal. Rather, 
acknowledging the singular as indefinite and problematic would, at one single moment, 
establish the law, the doer, and the object at the same time. 
It is in this context and by admitting to the aporetic nature of the laws that 
Aristotle implies an alternative mode of conduct, the one that goes beyond his own 
calculation and deliberation. This is a creative moment when Aristotle, haunted by the 
invisible force of the indeterminate, makes a transgressive decision. He is a firm believer 
of calculation and economy.  Nevertheless, he replaces the laws of justice with a mode 140
of heedful conduct toward the other. Aristotle says: 
A man is fair/equitable who chooses and performs acts of this sort, who is 
no stickler  for just in bad sense, but is satisfied with less than his share, 141
even though when he has the law on his side. (NE. 5.10. 1137b35-1138 a2)  
The moment of heedful indecision can open the possibility of a mode of nomadic 
‘following’ and heedful conduct toward others, with the possibility of justice to come. 
 It is worth remembering that even charity (Charíton) which can be the best place to break with the 140
economy of the quid pro quo and celebrate the singularity of the other for him has an institution in the city 
and should be accounted for in a reciprocal economy (NE. 5.5.1133a 1-5).
 a person who insists on a certain quality or type of behavior.141
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For a moment, the structure of presence collapses and difference in its full force begins to 
create the possibility of “a call” for justice. The suspension of laws can break the 
economy of the present (the quid pro quo economy of law) and bring about an originary 
temporality. While laws make actions and judgments anticipatable as if they are present 
and actual, the suspension of the laws brings about the temporality of future, or 
unanticipated event of singularity. 
 In this way, I demonstrated that Aristotle’s attempt to come up with the most just 
laws leads him to go outside the law and to the presence of the ‘other.’ There is no 
prepared formulation for ‘addressing’ the ‘other’ rather, should there be any hope for 
justice, it is in the suspension of the laws of the present and the heedful conduct toward 
the ‘other’. The task of practical wisdom (phronēsis) should be understood in this light as 
well. Most of the time and in ordinary cases, practical wisdom subsumes the particular 
under the universal. However, this is only true if the future always resembles the past or 
is the same or equal with the past.  
  After a discussion on methodology below, I am going to illustrate this aporia in 
regard to the difficulty of being “before the laws” in Islam. I will investigate how the 
same difficulty besets the general laws of religion. I will argue that to be a ‘follower’ of 
Islam, as the ‘follower' of tradition, is plagued by all these difficulties. To illustrate this, I 
delve into the experience of the pilgrimage of Hajj as one of the most complex rituals of 
Islam where Muslims are to manifest their firm adherence to the laws. Paradoxically 
however, I contend that this particular ritual also reveals the problematic of following the 
laws as well. Hajj in this sense is not just one of the rituals of the tradition that every 
‘follower' of Islam must perform to be a Muslim; rather, it is that action whose 
performance stages the aporia of being the ‘follower’ of the revealed laws. In effect, 
pilgrimage provides a possibility for Muslims to begin a nomadic, creative ‘following' of 
the tradition.  
      
5.1.1. Methodology and Limitations 
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  In the introduction, I proposed the methodology of work as phenomenology. 
Also, I investigated the modes of ‘following’ tradition in a phenomenological study of 
some of the figures in the history of philosophy. In dealing with the history of philosophy, 
I tried to be faithful to the very concerns that I am grappling with; I too am following a 
tradition. Below, I argue that this work as a whole is an enactment of phenomenology as 
‘following’ and as far as it is demanded to be an original ‘following’ albeit a miniature 
contribution, it is grappling with the same aporia and limitations.  
I would like to cite a text in two parts by Heidegger where I imagine him standing 
in a similar position. The text is from a footnote around the beginning of The Concept of 
Time, where Heidegger feels compelled to reflect upon his methodology and expresses 
his gratitude to the ones he is ‘following’ as well as the limitations of the ‘following.’ He 
writes: 
This investigation takes a phenomenological approach. Phenomenology’s 
first breakthrough came with Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900/01). 
This ‘definition’ is intended to indicate that phenomenology can be 
understood only by studying and learning from this foundational text. Yet, 
phenomenology is so far from being a ‘method’ that we must glean the 
modes of examination from the things themselves [die Sachen selbst]. The 
author [Heidegger] owes his understanding of this, less to the book than to 
vigorous personal guidance by Husserl. Through regular instruction and 
by generously allowing the author to view numerous unpublished studies, 
Husserl introduced the author to the most diverse fields of 
phenomenological research during his years of apprenticeship [Lehrjahre] 
in Freiburg. (CT., 11, footnote) 
I would like to think myself as doing phenomenology the way Heidegger explains here. 
In a single phenomenological moment of ‘following,’ he is, in fact, enacting the 
phenomenology of ‘following’ in a couple of ways. He is on the verge of introducing a 
new kind of phenomenology, that is his own existential phenomenology, and at the same 
time wants to acknowledge his being-in-following the tradition of phenomenology.  
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Just as I proposed in terms of ‘following’ the laws, in order to do justice and 
‘address’ Husserl’s text, he first acknowledges the source where the principles of 
phenomenology are coming from only to suspend them and in fact to do violence to 
them. He suspends phenomenology as a "method” and opens the laws to a new 
beginning. He mentions that “laws” or the “principles” of the study of every particular 
subject is “given” by the thing itself. That is akin to what I called ‘nomadic following.’ 
For the one who is going beyond the method of phenomenology, in the realm where the 
laws are as novel as the world given, every step is a heedful conduct, a dangerous 
wandering in the “apprenticeship of philosophy.” Apprenticeship, following at the level 
of personal experience of the other (“vigorous personal guidance”) when Husserl’s works 
and writings were not yet published, is where he seems to have found a breakthrough 
beyond Husserl’s method of phenomenology. The apprenticeship of philosophy is 
learning in the naiveté of being a student and not an intellectual adopting or arguing with 
Husserl’s texts. In effect, Heidegger acknowledges how he has gone beyond Husserl, and 
found his personal and different voice in understanding him. Understanding not as 
repeating or parroting, not even in challenging but in saying what has left unsaid from the 
naiveté of personal experience of the other. That is how he receives his own language and 
the new phenomenology begins to enlighten his nomadic path. As is obvious from his 
later texts he remains a faithful reader of the history of philosophy but keeps the same 
phenomenological attitude towards them as well. 
This leads to a major difficulty and limitation that this dissertation is grappling 
with as well. That is, when one suspends the intellectual assumptions and strives to 
remain open to the givenness of the tradition, the language of the otherness may come out 
as very awkward and unclear. In fact, the whole attempt in this work was to show how 
the clear, familiar language of the public is not hospitable enough to host the novel, the 
stranger. Nomadic following suspends not only the laws of the present but also the 
grammar and structure of the ordinary speech (logos). Heidegger explains this in a 
marvelous way as he continues with the footnote: 
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The awkwardness of the formulations in the following study is due in part 
to the nature of the investigation. It is one thing to tell stories about 
entities [Seiendes], but quite another to grasp the being [Sein] of entities. 
We often lack not only suitable words but above all suitable grammar. 
Language is primarily a matter of articulating and expressing entities [das 
Seinde] rather than shedding light on the being of such entities.  (CT., 11. 
footnote) 
Other than the implicit reference he makes here to Plato’s Sophist, the one that gives a bit 
more context to the prologue in BT,  the problem he is referring to is that of the 142
ontological difference. We mentioned this as the problem embedded in regarding being as 
presencing (ousia) and not any present being. I argued following Brogan that this was 
Heidegger’s strategy to unsettle the meaning of being as actual and present (beings) and 
let the traits (Züge) of things appear as what they are. He is also recalling the aporia of 
the ‘address:’ that every presencing in language is as much a retreat, a withdrawal of 
being (Sein) at the same time.  
To speak the language of in-between means that you are in effect speaking a 
foreign language, the one that Aristotle may simply marginalize as barbaric. Heidegger is 
admitting that his expressions and more importantly his grammar are going to be 
awkward. The reason is that grammar as the unity which gives sense to the particulars of 
language is a sedimented system of thought which does not easily tolerate any major shift 
or innovation. A foreign word or two, a metaphor or a simile, an analogy of some kind are 
tolerated within the overarching system of language but the unsettling of the whole 
system calls for a new grammar.  
My attempt in this work is fraught with the same difficulties. I am trying to 
investigate the transcendental conditions of ‘following’ the ‘other’, while engaging with 
the most classical texts of a tradition and yet trying to enact an original way of 
‘following.’ This is, as explained above, what I mean by phenomenology: to walk 
 Heidegger begins BT by alluding to Plato’s dialogue, the Sophist, with this short citation: “For 142
manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression "being". We, 
however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed” (BT, prologue)
207
through the givenness of a tradition or the ordinary being-with-others without an assumed 
logos and telos, trying to remain open to the emergence of thought. I hope that 
Heidegger’s explication illustrated my malady as well.  
In this light, there are a couple of issues that might seem as limitations to this 
work. By virtue of being an original contribution, my ‘following’ Aristotle, Heidegger, 
Derrida is a creative one. Rather than claiming what they wanted to say, I showed where 
their writing is taking them perhaps without their intention or deliberate choice. My 
approach to Aristotle was to consider where his theory is heading in ethics and where his 
mis-treatments or missing the marks (hamartia) might have carried away his theory 
toward another notion of justice or law. I enacted what I meant by ‘following’ by 
demonstrating how in attending to particulars and motion, Aristotle in fact conjures up 
the very forces that carry his text toward admitting to the aporia.  
 As a result, my intervention in tradition might seem dismissive of the literature. I 
owe very much of my understanding of Aristotle to Heidegger, Aubenque, Owens, 
Derrida, Brogan, and Sheehan among others, but my aim here is to creatively respond 
and expand their ideas to a new direction that pushes the discussion forward.  
 Phenomenology, as nomadic ‘following,’ means that I have only a constellation of 
what the future of the project might look like and I insist on letting it not fulfill itself, i.e., 
letting it remain in motion (energeia ateles). For me, that is the meaning of being open to 
the modes of examination, methods and measures given by “the things themselves [die 
Sachen selbst].” 
 One major path to follow is different modes of creativity. This work has a strong 
affiliation with the imagination and poetics. We are talking about creative ‘following.’ 
However, the limits of the scope this work do not allow me to go further. Aristotle 
himself has a way of taking care of creative ‘following’ in the Poetics and Rhetoric, a 
topic which I referred to only in passing and the full examination of which remains to be 
done in later works. In other words, while ‘nomadic following’ is just hinted at in ethics 
in perhaps an unintentional admission, Aristotle deals with creative takes on tradition 
head on as different kinds of making (epic, comedy, and tragedy) in the Poetics. Here, I 
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merely showed that even imagination and human making for him is a rational process 
aiming at the clarity of expression more than anything else. But the nature of the 
experience of the other in “pity and fear” and different modes of experience of innovation 
as in epic, tragedy, and comedy remain to be studied independently. In this sense, this 
work has just begun here on the verge of discovering different modes of innovative 
‘following’ in Aristotle.  
  This work started as a response to a call, from another part of the world and 
another part of history. While studying Aristotle and the forces of creation embedded in 
his text, all along I had the transcendental conditions of the Islamic community in mind.  
Thus, although it is impossible to do justice to the topic of different modes of ‘following’ 
Islamic laws and tradition, I would only venture to pose the question of Islamic 
community and identity as an example of the analyses done here. I am not really 
concerned with how philosophy or theology of Islam has followed Aristotle. Instead, I 
conduct a phenomenological study of how different modes of ‘following’ are played out 
in the context of ‘following’ Islamic rituals.  
      
5.2. Conclusion (2): ‘Following’ Islam, ‘Following’ Aristotle 
 The ontological problem of presencing we posed in Chapter 1 following Aristotle is 
repeated and reproduced in the medieval context and especially Islamic philosophy and 
theology. Although the scope of this work does not afford a lengthy discussion about the 
philosophers and theologians on this matter, I would like to highlight how the problem is 
transferred and what the ontological ramifications of it are to formulate the problem 
between religious laws and the revelation in terms of ‘the address.’ 
 What is significant is that, following Aristotle, for Islamic philosophers and 
theologians alike the problem of politics and laws are tightly entangled with natural 
philosophy. They, too, realize that to explain the laws of society even in reference to the 
revealed laws, they first need to explain the principles of presencing of events and modes 
of existence (possible, necessary, contingent) in the world. They realize that for human 
being defined as the life-in-the-polis at the same time as life-possessing-logos, the 
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ontology of laws is tightly connected to how they explain the temporal presencing of 
beings and their limits in speech (logos). Nature’s presencing in time and logos is the root 
of the problem of laws and community. For instance, it is in regard to the discussion 
about the nature of time and the eternal existence of the world that Ghazālī charges 
Aristotelian philosophers, especially Ibn Sīnā, with diverting from the creed and of being 
dismissive of religious laws (McCarthy, Richard Joseph & Ghazālī, 1999. 9). 
 Without getting too involved in the wide-ranging discussions back and forth 
between philosophers and theologians, I will focus on how the Aristotelian problem is 
transported and in fact crystalized at two levels of natural laws of presencing and the laws 
of human society within the Islamic philosophy).  
      
5.2.1. The Laws of Nature 
 The argument is that as an Aristotelian philosopher, Ibn Sīnā follows him in his 
strategic economy of prioritizing actual presencing of nature “for the most part” (taking 
the form of necessary and eternal natural laws). Laws of the creation of the world are 
eternally present and are coextensive with God as their creator. For Ibn Sīnā, God is not 
temporally prior to the world but ontologically so (Griffel, 2016, 200). That is to say that 
although God created the world and the world is caused by God but they are 
contemporary. It is not the case that God existed and then decided to create the world at 
some point in time. The latter, according to Ibn Sīnā, amounts to change of state in God 
which is impossible. Therefore, as Ghazālī observes in his Incoherence of Philosophers, 
there seems to be no God without the world and its laws (Ghazālī ,Tahāfut, 42). This 
would simply reproduce and highlight ever more strongly the present and necessary laws 
of nature in Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy.   
 Also, with the necessary presence of God and his perfectness and completeness, the 
actual becomes ever more real and good. The natural laws as they are, are not neutral in 
terms of values but are clearly more proper than what is accidentally or deliberately 
imposed by human making (technē). 
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 Altogether, the world of Ibn Sīnā is populated with events and existences that are 
either “possible,” “necessary,” or “impossible” (Griffel, 201). Things that are actual are 
necessary, which means that they follow necessarily from the existence of God as “the 
necessity of existence” (Wājib al-wujūd). What needs to be addressed by Ibn Sīna are the 
criteria for the possible and impossible. That is the place for a potential freedom or 
contingency. He is in agreement with Aristotle, supposing that the possibility as the 
unformed prime matter (hylē) only exists in the actual hylomorph. That is, the possibility 
is already virtually informed by the actuality from the past. It is always already towards a 
certain possibility of appropriation.  
 The substratum of possibility was found in the unformed prime matter 
(hylē) that underlies all physical creations. Since the world has always been 
possible, so one of Ibn Sīnā’s arguments goes, the substratum of this 
possibility, namely prime matter, exists from eternity in the past. (Griffel, 
201) 
The Aristotelian dimension of potency (dynamis) as being towards being-at-work-
staying-itself (entelecheia), or the limit, is crystalized in Ghazālī’s objection to Ibn Sīnā. 
As I demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2, Aristotle is well aware of the multiplicity and the 
alternative path of presencing in nature. However, he strategically restrains the accidents 
and subdues what he regards as abnormalities in nature. Ghazālī does not seem to be 
aware of Aristotle’s mis/treatment of contingency but he adds this cautionary angle to the 
discussion by criticizing the philosophers for their negligence of God’s will. For him, 
God’s will is characteristically beyond natural laws as understood by human intellect. 
 Ghazālī is wary of the fact that, according to the tradition, miracles do happen and 
any faithful description of the world needs to describe them. The laws need to be able to 
describe miracles as un-wordly, out of the world, and only dependent upon the will of 
God. For him, the philosophers’ world does not afford any real possibility for the 
intervention of the unknown (ǧayb). The limit is still the actuality and the familiar logos, 
what human logic and speech can allow as possible or reject as impossible. Ghazālī 
explains the philosophers’ confining of the possibilities as follows: 
211
Anything whose existence the mind supposes, [nothing] preventing its 
supposing it possible, we call “possible,” and if it is prevented we call it 
“impossible.” If [the mind] is unable to suppose its nonexistence, we name it 
“necessary.” For these are rational propositions that do not require an 
existent so as to be rendered a description thereof. (al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 42)  
As Griffel confirms, “Such a God exercises no choice about whether to create or not. In 
fact, Ibn Sīnā’s God never exercises true free choice (ikhtiyār)” (Griffel, 2016, 201). 
Entelecheia still reigns here. Possibilities and impossibilities are determined by the 
structure of the actual world and the logical semantic possibilities of the human mind.  
There, “possible” has been understood as a synchronic alternative; that is, 
something is possible if we can mentally conceive of it as an alternative to 
what exists in actuality or what will exist. We call something impossible if 
we cannot mentally conceive of it as an alternative (Griffel, 202-203). 
In this sense, possibility is not deferred to future but it is already present. There is no real 
temporality as the past, present, and future which correspond to real unanticipated 
change. Everything seems to be present at the same time. All possibilities are already 
available in the knowledge of God which is in the eternal activity of presencing 
perpetually. “God becomes a creation-automat who turns His knowledge, which may be 
regarded as the blueprint of creation, into the world that we live in” (Griffel, 201).  
 The will of God, the unanticipated force of creation, as Ghazālī suggests, can add 
a delay between events and let them be in potency before become actual. The essential 
goodness of the creation still holds for Ghazālī, besides he still is an advocate of causality 
and the laws of nature. However, for him they are not based on common sense reason but 
rather they are completely contingent upon the free will of God as the unknown and 
unknowable (ghayb). This amounts to a major critique of necessitarianism of Ibn Sīnā. In 
effect, Ghazālī considers this world as the contingent effect of God’s free will and His 
deliberate choice between the “alternative worlds” (Kukkonen, 2000).  
 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that Ghazālī does not deny the objectivity of the 
object, nor the subjectivity of intellect in constituting the object. Rather he is just making 
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all the process depend on a miraculous event, the dice throw or the will of God to give 
rise to human time and human world. God’s will according to Ghazālī is not contingent 
upon anyone but God, the one who can constitute sense as well as annihilate it.  
 Ghazālī asks for a delay  (intiẓār also meaning expectation, pause or waiting) in 143
philosophical as well as commonsensical judgement and decision, which constitutes the 
essence of temporality in the nomadic ‘following’ of religion. This temporality comes 
about when one exercises patience, holds laws in suspension, and waits for God’s will to 
manifest itself in the creation of that which has no name yet. God is the only real agent 
and every event is contingent upon His will (al- Ghazālī, Faith in Divine Unity and Trust 
in Divine Providence, 16).   The term for the delay (intiẓār) is the time that we are after 144
to substitute for the temporality of the present. This word, intiẓār, has many implications 
with its several meanings and in different declensions in Arabic and Persian. It means 
both looking, awaiting, and expecting. However, it can also mean monitoring and looking 
after, heeding and looking out.  
 The present temporality is associated with the look (eidos) of things in their 
immediate everyday familiarity which is also related to having and looking (in French 
voir and avoir). Conversely, the way Ghazālī contrasts intiẓār with the present 
temporality as having or being familiar gives intiẓār the temporality of future that is an 
expectation of an event to come. He is referring to it as not looking at something present 
but looking out for something which is always to come. Temporality, in this sense, is the 
time without any object corresponding to it yet, the time of a surprise. This is perhaps 
what Derrida calls the temporalizing of time itself (Derrida, Given Time, 14).  
 If not the same, the concept of intiẓār looks very much alike the temporality of difference as defined by 143
Derrida as deferral. Both of them imply indecision and non-completion as well as expectation of that which 
is not pre-determined. 
 See Burrell, David B. Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of 144
Notre Dame Press, 1993, pp. 52, 54, 80-81, 121. Burrell comments that in reaction to the Emanationist 
philosophy of Ibn Sīnā and others, al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arites take care that 'God alone will properly be 
called agent, and what we take to be causal activity will be explained as customary connections established 
by the divine will' (Ibid., 52).
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It should not be left unmentioned that by this very short exposition of Ghazālī’s 
critique of philosophers, I do not mean to neither endorse nor object to it.  It would take 145
another book to show the effect of such a critique in Ghazālī’s own system of thought and 
Ibn Rushd’s criticisms of that and so forth. Nonetheless, at this level through Ghazālī’s 
critique of Ibn Sīnā, one can see the very paradoxical forces produced by Aristotelian 
philosophy and their real implications in moral and religious decision-making. 
Consequently, Ghazālī’s critique supports my reading and understanding of the problem 
that afflicts Aristotelian metaphysics, the one that produces two opposite modes of being-
with or ‘following.’  
 The necessity of the laws of nature applied by Aristotelian philosophers in Islamic 
context as well depict a world, which is more or less familiar and rational (accountable 
through logos). At the same time, the critique of such a system, by scholars like Ghazālī, 
continues to provide the possibility of “alternative world” dependent solely upon the free 
will of God. In the next section, I delve into the political dimension of these two visions 
of the world.  
5.2.2. The Laws of ‘Following’ Islam 
 Ibn Sīnā like Aristotle has a vision of the complete and perfect good or happiness 
as contemplative life. This is best illustrated in his description of the good of man and the 
perfect manifestation of it in the character of the prophet.  
 His hierarchical explanation of human existence begins with his well-known 
flying man experience. Through this experiment, very much like Aristotle, he establishes 
that human flourishing is not contingent upon his body. What makes human form and 
function, what defines human is the rational soul. He imagines a person of complete 
(kāmilan) intellectual power devoid of her sensations. He stipulates that such a person 
still can be aware of her existence and develop to full rational capacities. He writes, “Our 
 As Khalidi points out, in The Incoherence of the Incoherence, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) offers an “implicit 145
criticism of Ghazālī 's conception of God. He hints that the view of causation put forward by Ghazālī would 
lead ultimately to an unsatisfactory conception of God, who would be seen to rule over the universe like a 
despotic tyrant (as opposed, perhaps, to a law-abiding authoritarian)” (Khalidi, 'Introduction,' xxxix).
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perception/awareness of our essence is itself our existence”  (cited by Black, 63-87). 146
However, for humans, this is just a primitive intellectual awareness, which has to be 
“overlooked” and human beings “need to be alerted to it”. Effectively, even for Ibn Sīnā a 
rational soul (nafs nāṭiqa) ultimately has to go through the process of knowing which is 
an individual odyssey in logical reasoning in order to become united with its object and 
become absolute knowing.  
The perfection proper for the rational soul is to become (taṣīra) an 
intelligible world (ʿālama ʿāqiliyyan) inscribed in it, the form of the 
Universal and the intelligible order in the Universal…until the entire 
configuration of existence is completely contained within the soul itself. 
(Avicenna & Marmura, 2005. 350)  
Therefore, the end or completion of knowledge is conceivable and desired for human 
beings. For Ibn Sīnā, it is the prophet himself who has reached this level of ascent by 
inspiration or insight (ḥads). But, for the rest of the people this has to be implemented 
and mediated by the prophet. This is where the problem of ‘following’ enters its public 
phase, revealing our essential being-togetherness which is already constituted by logos. 
 The problem of ‘following,’ the one I mentioned in the preface with reference to 
Ibn ʿArabi and his ‘following’ of the Prophet as the perfect man, is posed by Ibn Sīnā in 
an essential manner as well. In his De Anima, he first proves that humans need the 
prophecy as far as they are characterized by life-in-the-community. He applies a 
characteristically teleological argument, namely that because of God’s attributes, He 
would choose the best for His creatures (Ibn Sīnā, De Anima, 171–8, 248–50). Franz 
Griffel summarizes his first argument most succinctly as follows:   
Prophecy is necessary because humans are by nature beings that can only 
exist and survive through association with other humans. Their nature 
determines the formation of partnerships and these partnerships need 
legislation. The best legislation is ordained through prophecy to elected 
human beings. Before presenting this argument, Ibn Sīnā had already proven 
 shuʿūru-nā bi dhāti-nā hula nafsu wujūdi-nā146
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that God must necessarily act for the best of his creation. The equally proven 
possibility that prophecy exists becomes in light of this latter premise a 
necessity. (Griffel, 110) 
In this way, Ibn Sīnā translates Aristotle’s necessary natural laws to the realm of religious 
laws. For Ibn Sīnā, like Aristotle, the laws are not simply ordained by a social contract 
but are given for the good of man as understood by logos. The apparent difference is that 
in the case of a religion like Islam, one would object that the laws are given by God and 
do not have to abide by human logos. But, nowhere better than religion does the problem 
of logos as the ‘address’ becomes clearer. That is because the revealed logos necessarily 
goes beyond common sense or the ordinary logos. Revealed laws are personal (idion) as 
far as they are revealed to one person and exceed his public, commonsensical 
understanding and yet they are to be universal and ordained to everyone in the 
community. 
 The problem of the laws in this way is probably solved for one person, the prophet, 
or the saints or "the perfect man” (insān kāmil, a mystic term for a selected few in every 
era who can intuit the truth) because of the direct intuition and relation to God.  Ibn 147
Sīnā explains that the prophet receives the universal laws as theoretical knowledge in his 
intellectual faculty (quwwa ‘aqliyya naẓariyya). This intellectual capacity of the prophet 
is called intuition (quwwat al-ḥads), through which, according to Ghazālī’s reading of Ibn 
Sīnā, they immediately become aware of the middle terms of syllogisms (Ghazālī, 
Tahāfut, 272–274.2; cf. Ibn Sīnā , De anima, pp. 248–50). As one can see, although God 
is the one who is playing the active role, this depiction of immediacy of the middle-term 
is very much the same as the immediacy of the noēn for Aristotle. One can personally 
have an intuitive perception of the truth which only comes to light for the public in 
ordinary language or the universal laws. 
 This immediacy as we will see below is still challenged even for the prophets, especially in the case of 147
Abraham and the transgressive commands of God to leave his family stranded in the dessert or to sacrifice 
his son. However, what Ibn Sīnā means by the perfect man is the restoration of Aristotelian noēn.
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 Conversely, being heedful of the impossibility of visitation (liqāʾ) (or the unity with 
the absolute) for human beings other than the prophet even after death, Ghazālī, , 148
considers this ascent towards the absolute as well as the ascent toward becoming united 
with the self always problematic and in-trouble. Being a self in this sense is always 
already underway and incomplete, consisting of a certain topology. Thus, the telos or the 
actuality at the end, the identity with oneself (entelecheia) that constituted Aristotelian 
hylomorphism is interrupted by the lack of a proper end. The motion towards being a self, 
or a self-suffcient community under the laws is, thus, carried away on the path of 
perpetual becoming, education, and preparation.  
 Ghazālī calls the principle of this motion and the laws of conduct, adab and the 
educated adīb. Adab in this sense is the central notion in the Islamic thought and the very 
topos of community as perpetual process of acting, sense-making and interpretation. The 
word adab which I translate as “heedful conduct,” literally means etiquette, manners, 
respect, awe and punishment (taʾdīb) as well as literature and art. What is central and 
most significant, I believe, in this notion is that it contains a detour away from the 
hylomorphism of Aristotle or the intellectual identity and unity in Ibn Sīnā. As Treiger 
demonstrates, any identity for Ghazālī is a just a temporary station on the path of 
education which is only authentic if one acknowledges its temporary status (Treiger, 7). 
According to Treiger, Ghazālī’s “pedagogy of salvation” leads him to develop a theory of 
the levels of instruction (Ghazālī, Mīzān, 406-408; cited in Treiger, 8) 
 Very much like Aristotelians, for Ghazālī, education is achieved not simply by 
intellectual meditation or syllogistic reasoning but by praxis (that is actually going 
through and turning in the circle of economy) and in the process from a student of adab 
towards adīb (the one characterized by adab). Such a system makes all identities partial, 
and communities nomadic. Therefore, although Ghazālī is very much in accord with 
Aristotelians on their emphasis on action and developing habits, his interpretation of the 
 Pur Javādī shows that according to Ghazālī not everybody receives the visitation or witnessing (liqāʾ) of 148
Allah even after death. In other words, the Absolute is usually the expression of its forgetting or is 
experienced in its negation. Especially since, for Ghazālī, the life in heavens is also bodily, which means it 
carries the same impossibility for the bodies that do not have the capacity to ascend and annihilate in the 
Absolute and become united with God.
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laws and the rules of conduct is informed by the perpetual critique of the end and the 
impossibility of the unity with the absolute as the absolute ‘other.’ That is why, as Ghazālī 
observes, our relation to revelation is always an interpretation, where we need to deal 
with the problem of measure to determine the sense and the value of the revealed 
command.  
 While in the experience of the prophet, we as humans are all the singular 
‘addressees’ of the message, and we need to ‘address’ each other singularly as well, the 
‘address’ (in dealing with one another and the absolute ‘other’ is always revealed in a 
language which is historically and publicly determined. Through direct intuition, the 
perfect man receives the laws, which are then ordained to human community, tainted with 
public language and common sense understanding.  
 The root of the problem goes back to what I mentioned in chapter 4, following 
Derrida, the aporia of the ‘address’ with reference to otherness, whether this other is the 
absolute other whose message is mediated by the prophet or the call of any singular other 
for justice. We tend to reduce ‘the call’ or ‘the address’ to human logos and even worse to 
the public use of reason. Qur’ān gives several examples of this situation of being a 
‘follower’ as being-in-trouble.  
 Ghazālī expresses his melancholia in finding the truth of the ‘address’ that is not 
communicable as such. Every individual’s experiences, the revelations, and inspirations, 
like of the prophet are personal. On the other hand, they cannot be a law unless they are 
ordained for the community of ‘followers.’ But, the moment a call, an interpretation or a 
revelation is received in language it is already afflicted with the gap and the withdrawal 
of the ‘address’ itself.  The paradox of the revealed law is that it is that communal law 
(for everyone) that must be received and perceived singularly and responsibly or it turns 
to blind conformism. The character of being-in-‘following’ is highlighted and intensified 
by this aporetic situation. The revealed message stands in-between the ordinary 
commonsensical logos and the foreign and personal (perhaps idiotic, bestial) ‘address.’ 
Solving this problem in any universal way that is systematically or intellectually amounts 
218
to making the meaning of the ‘address’ present and actual and reducing the potency of the 
message or the call to a forged and superficial actuality.  
 In other words, this is the aporia of finding a measure for the laws when the 
measure is the laws. As I mentioned in the introduction, Ghazālī admits that only the 
grace of God saved him from the paralyzing effect of this aporia. We are melancholic in 
responding to the call of the other. It is noteworthy that the religious laws like Aristotelian 
laws are ontological which means that they are not merely rules of conduct for and 
between already established selves. Instead, these laws are the ones that determine the 
being of a self as well as others. Thus, the aporia, which makes the appropriation of laws 
always partial, pose the same impossibility with regard to receiving the message of god 
as the call of the other. Griffel reiterates the aporia as follows:  
At the root of all of the objections is the paradoxical feature of the judgment 
itself. On what criteria can one distinguish a revealed concept from a lie 
when it is the concept itself that is establishing the criteria? (Griffel, 113)  
That is to say, how are we to judge when the evidence or measure for the laws are the 
laws themselves? It seems that the laws are not given to provide easy solutions. What 
seems to be revealed in the message of Islam, as I argue below, seems to be no easy 
solution or set of established moral normative laws but problems that emphasize the 
aporetic nature of the message and the human condition itself. The moral laws are to 
problematize the universality of laws and call for responsibility.  
 The originary mode of ‘following,’ then, seems to be that of ‘following’ the 
nomadic path of independent investigation (ijtihād). The laws are not merely the 
commands to be followed blindly, although that is one way of ‘following’ them; rather, 
they are problems that remind humans of their groundlessness in this world and 
emphasize the followers’ being-in-trouble. The authentic attitude towards the laws is 
perhaps to suspend their actual and present character and to replace them with heedful 
conduct towards the ‘other.’ Nonetheless, I tried to show in this section, that the apparent 
universal character of the laws, and their ontological claim to educate Muslims towards 
the most flourishing and pleasant life created at least one form of following the laws. On 
219
the other hand, Ghazālī’s critical engagement with Aristotelianism revives the long-
standing aporias and the nomadic forces imbedded in the philosophy of Aristotle. Again, 
despite the question of the legitimacy of Ghazālī’s own system of thought, the 
significance of his critique for us here is that it can support my observation about the 
forces of generation and motion within Aristotle’s philosophy, the forces that create 
gatherings and generate life beyond what Aristotle’s metaphysics and politics can fathom.  
5.2.2.1. Community as Exchange vs. Nomadic Community in Islam 
 I cited an anecdote in the Preface, suggesting that many philosophers and 
intellectuals in the Islamic tradition, including Ibn ʿArabi and Ghazālī, pose the problem 
of religious community and laws at the ontological level as that of ‘following’ and 
interpretation and the necessary trouble involved with them. In responding to the 
problematic situation of the follower, whose existence is always partial and incomplete in 
the Preface, I referred to Ghazālī’s personal story and the way he suggests one can be in 
“servile conformism” or the “independent investigation,” towards the tradition (Ghazālī 
& McCarthy, Deliverance. 1). Applying what we learned about the metaphysical grounds 
of the generation of life and gathering in nature in the context of Aristotle, we can 
understand the actual being of these modes in a new light. Ghazālī writes: “we will 
inform you of it [path toward felicity] and raise you from the lowlands of ‘following’ the 
authority of others (taqlīd: literally imitation, emulation) and guide you to the smoothness 
of the path (Ghazālī, Mīzān, 29).  
 The former mode of ‘following’ is associated with what we explicated in previous 
chapters as the synchronic being-togetherness. It is the most primary, the most familiar 
relationship between people that levels out the original differences among them in the 
everyday economy of being-with-one-another. Following Aristotle, I called this first 
economic form of community which is  necessary for humans to function in a city in the 
first place “community as exchange.” That is to say that considering the laws of religion 
uncritically as present or even negotiable in terms of jurisprudence, or otherwise 
anticipatable, gives rise to a rationalized calculative order or economy. Such a community 
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presupposes an appropriated truth and an established measure of justice and happiness 
whose legitimacy comes from the past, common sense, or a leader. In such a community, 
the very question of the ontological status or the legitimacy of laws is not posed. 
‘Following’ the message does not become a problem as if the laws are totally justified, 
universal, and transparent.  
 It is worth remembering that for Ghazālī in this regard, there is no difference 
between philosophers, theologians, judges and the followers of a saints (Taˁlimiyyah) 
whom he regards as intellectuals being concerned with the “worldly sciences.” As useful 
as these sciences are, according to Ghazālī, they are bound to the structure of the present 
and actual what he calls the science of [worldly] actions ˁilm al-muˁāmila (literally 
meaning reciprocal interaction, exchange and business) (Ghazālī & McCarthy, 
Deliverance. 9). 
 Yet, the moment the ‘follower’ feels uneasy with his static situation is already the 
beginning of her ascent. There comes another mode of ‘following,’ what he refers in the 
quote above as the “smoothness of the path.” However, this latter path is not so smooth 
and plain. As we discussed in the Preface, it is characterized by Ghazālī as the 
“independent investigation (ijtihād),” which he describes as “seeking the 
unseekable” (ibid,. 5). With regard to what we discussed about Book V of the NE, 
“independent investigation” refers the moment where one has to go beyond the laws to 
establish them anew or to ‘address’ the singular characteristic of the other. It is 
paradoxically the moment that in going beyond the law one take up her responsibility for 
the first time.    
 In the second mode of ‘following’ still, there is no pretension of having the truth, 
or seeing the end, or owning the absolute knowledge; rather, it is depicted as the active 
comportment to the way of ‘following.’ One can argue that the level of “independent 
investigation” of truth, the way Ghazālī describes it, seems to be beyond philosophy and 
theology, and is associated with the ‘following’ and seeking itself, while admitting what 
is “unseekable.” Thus, by questioning Aristotelian teleological laws of nature and 
community as well as Islamic theology, including actual sectors of Islam of his day, he, in 
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effect, opens the door for a transcendental study well beyond any economy of faith or 
philosophy (Ghazālī & McCarthy, Deliverance. 4-5). 
 Finding the best path of ‘following’ for Ghazālī, is the subject of a particular kind 
of religious science, he calls “the science of the Hereafter.” Ghazālī writes about this 
science, in his book The Revival of Religious Sciences. What he elaborates on in this 
work are different modes of ‘following’ some of which are limited to the life, laws, and 
the logos in-the-world, those which he claims will end with one’s death and the other 
which is the celebration of life of the Afterlife. By revival one may wonder he means this 
latter mode of ‘following’ which is associated with living after life.  
 ‘Revival’ as a mode of following religion is nothing like theology nor 
philosophy.  Ghazālī’s system is not merely guarding the creed of Islam or the law as 149
empty, dead formulations in the affairs of the worldly life, which he condemns 
theologians for concerning themselves with. Rather through the science of the Hereafter, 
one can potentially ascend to different levels of being united with the presencing of life. 
He wants to establish a science that takes people to the threshold of going beyond the 
worldly life, which he considers barren, economic, and threatened all the time by one’s 
immanent death. The science of the Hereafter does not merely consist of a set of laws 
which promise a reward to the obedient ‘followers’ of them in the afterlife. That is 
according to Ghazālī the theologians’ business, which is another mode of economy. 
 Instead, his whole system is defined in terms of adab (heedful conduct and 
poetics in general) a kind of treatment of the other which is informed by the aporia of 
otherness and the ‘address.’ In this way, such a conduct is always already pregnant with 
the mystery or the secret. For him in different texts or even in one text in different 
contexts adab refers to the heedful indecision and suspension in experiencing the 
impossibility of appropriation of the other, the presentation of the absolute, or 
encountering the mystery. 
 The word, for “revival” in Arabic, iḥyā, does not only mean to give life again but 
rather and more importantly means to give or breath life as if for the first time. In this 
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sense re-vive and sur-live suggest a giving of life perpetually and anew. It is to give life 
all the time eternally for the first time. In fact, in answering the question: “what is the life 
worth living?” he answers the life that can go beyond life and after death. For some 
followers of the path, that would consist in the path of salvation and freedom from 
punishment (najāt) but for some would end in happiness, felicity (saʿādat). Therefore, for 
him ethics is not only in obeying the law which establishes one in her own status of being 
as an imitator (muqallid), but rather it consists of attending to the movement inherent in 
adab, and by breaking with the economy of the present.  
 In what follows, I intend to illustrate the nature of this experience in action. It is 
one thing to theoretically and metaphysically explain these modes of following and yet 
quite another to existentially describe the experience. Thus, in interpreting the ritual of 
Hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca), my purpose is to investigate how the possibility for every 
Muslim has been offered to go beyond the economy of the laws of the tradition and come 
to the threshold of asking about their ground. The major task and the story performed by 
the pilgrims during this ritual is the story of Abraham and the sacrifice of Ismāʿīl, the one 
that inspired Kierkegaard to talk about Abraham as the Knight of Faith. The story in Fear 
and Trembling begins with the ethical question of the law that addresses the community 
of followers and how this following becomes problematic for Abraham (Kierkegaard and 
Lowrie, 38). The difference and the significance of the story in the pilgrimage is that it is 
mandatory for every Muslim to experience the aporetic nature of the message.   
 My argument and suggestion is that, through the performance of Hajj, every 
Muslim has to encounter the aporetic nature of the laws not only in Islam but in trying to 
establish justice as laws.  I will argue that, in fact, Hajj targets the very appropriation of 
the truth and consequently the legitimacy of the measure of justice and laws. It thereby 
introduces a supplement to the laws which ultimately undermines the very essence of the 
laws and turns them into a heedful regard of the ‘other.’ 
5.2.3. Pilgrimage of Hajj: Staging the Identity in ‘Following’ Islam 
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5.2.3.1. Introduction to the Pilgrimage of Hajj 
The overall aim of this section is to explicate different modes of ‘following’ Islam 
that are staged in the pilgrimage of Hajj. This section is neutral with regard to the 
question of what Islam in general, or what the proper interpretation of Hajj should be. 
Instead, it is an existential analysis of the elements of the performance of the ritual and 
the narratives behind them, which target the ground of the laws in Islam.  
While most studies refer to the philosophical, theological or historico-political 
justifications when approaching the question of identity and community in Islam, I argue 
that the interpretation of the ritual of the pilgrimage can by itself reveal the multiplicity 
that exists in ‘following’ the tradition. Moreover, I will explore the existential experience 
of the pilgrims in performing the ritual. I argue that certain actions and symbols of Hajj 
first unsettle the economy of faith (especially the Sharī‘a laws) as that measure and 
organizing principle that people have (like money or capital) at present and, second, 
induce an evident shift in the attitude of the pilgrims towards the laws of the tradition, 
namely from blind ‘following’ towards a more critical engagement with them. Beyond 
Islam and Muslim identity, this section sheds light on the meaning of identity as possible 
modes of 'following’ a tradition. I should also add that this perspective toward Muslim 
identity through analyzing the rituals is unique to this work.  
 The identity of Muslims, their body-politics, and how they lead their lives are 
characterized by 'following’ the tradition and the laws of conduct (Sharī‘a). Either in 
defying, interpreting, innovating, or merely obeying and imitating these laws, being-
Muslim is defined in terms of ‘following’ the tradition. Should one consider the meaning 
of these laws present and justified, the centrality of these laws of conduct socially and in 
private makes Islam a system of presence or ideology. That is to say that the laws of 
religion give an apparent measure to make judgments and evaluate actions as if these 
laws are rational and calculated 
 Pilgrimage is a unique ritual since not only is it one of the most complex rules of 
conduct, but also it is that ritual which reveals the being of the laws and the aporias 
thereof. In other words, Hajj discloses the underlying structure of ‘following’ the 
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tradition. Hajj dramatizes the aporia of being a ‘follower’ and gives a chance to every 
Muslim to come to the threshold of the confrontation with their aporetic condition 
corporeally and emotionally. 
 This, as I argue below, is confirmed by Ghazālī’s theological and mystical 
interpretation of Hajj. He contends that unlike other acts of worship which are part of the 
economic structure of laws of religion, Hajj introduces a gap, an interruption which 
makes it a particular kind of act of worship. The complexity and sometimes absurdity of 
the actions included in Hajj make the pilgrim wonder how we understand (fahm) and 
follow any law of religion and why. Hajj is the ritual that questions the laws as to their 
ground and measure. That is to say, it ultimately unveils the ontological limitations 
involved in the existence of human beings as the followers of the ‘other’ both with 
respect to God as the Absolute other and another person. 
5.2.3.2. Pilgrimage and Seeking the Unseekable: Two Moments  
 The pilgrimage of Hajj stages one of the most complex actions of Islam, where all 
Muslims do more or less the same ritual as a community. In most of the daily actions, 
Muslims emulate the tradition of the prophet Muhammad. Especially in rules of worship 
and conduct, the life and the words of the Prophet are the criteria and exemplification of 
Islamic actions. As one might expect, the laws draw a sharp line between being-Muslim 
and non-Muslim. Such is the case for almost all rituals that distinguish Muslims from 
their others and characterize their community. Daily prayer (Ṣalāt), which today has to be 
performed in the direction of Kaʿbah, characterizes Muslims from other religions by 
introducing this new place of ‘attraction.’ The words “place” and “attraction” are used 
here advisedly in keeping with rest of my topological terminology. Having a new 
direction and being attracted as opposed to being located or having a place on earth are 
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all suggestive of the nomadic mode of existence.  It is noteworthy that the prayer at the 150
dawn of Islam used to be performed towards al-Aqṣā Mosque in Jerusalem. The prophet 
changed the direction towards Kaʿbah to give character to his people. Even as Ghazālī 
contends, Hajj itself is supposed to replace similar gatherings in other religions and 
communities. Hajj according to Ghazālī is the most characteristic feature of Islam 
(Ghazālī, & Umar, 140). It is not one among rituals or acts of worship but rather the one 
that illustrates the nature of humankind’s relation to God and to one another. In short, 
Hajj is a depiction of the being-in-trouble of human kind in this world and the aporetic 
nature of following in general. Paradoxically, then, the most characteristic feature Hajj 
which makes it the principle action that Muslims do and share, goes beyond Islamic 
history and tradition.  
Hajj refers to more than the story of Islam and the tradition of the prophet 
Muhammad. The pilgrims associate their actions throughout Hajj with a couple of grand 
narratives including the Abrahamic narratives (esp. the sacrifice of Ismāʿīl) and the 
eschatological narrative of the Day of Resurrection. Accordingly, the call to Hajj is as 
much a call to ‘follow’ the Islamic tradition, that is the complex laws of conduct in the 
pilgrimage, as it is to explore the call through different stories and temporalities. We can 
imagine a Muslim from wherever in the world setting out on this journey. According to 
tradition, the call to Hajj is an Abrahamic call. God asks Abraham to renovate Kaʿbah and 
call all believers to the ritual (Qur’an, 22: 27). Responding to the call, not of the prophet 
of Islam but of Abraham, one already enters the realm of imagination and history of all 
revealed religions rather than merely abiding by the laws of Islam. The obedience to the 
economy of Islamic laws in Hajj from the very beginning seems to make them 
ambiguous. The call gleans mythical, Abrahamic, and existential senses at the same time.  
 This attention has a critical implication towards the problem of the settlement of the Jewish people in 150
the land of Palestine. Being in a community like the Jewish community in this sense is necessarily 
associated with a place but the contrast that I am implying here is between ‘owning,’ ‘having’ and 
occupying a place as opposed to being directed at a place. The place in this sense should never be 
appropriated should it be capable of giving sense or direction to its people. Otherwise, it turns to a capital 
city, a center which makes the associated members of identities who are not authentically expressing any 
difference.  
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 Studying Hajj is a strategy to approach the laws of conduct in Islam and how they 
become problematic. So the most important feature of Hajj is that it invites and makes all 
the followers of the path to experience the problematic situation of their existence as well 
as the trouble of ‘following.’  
Now in order to show how Hajj brings every Muslim to the verge of wonder and 
let her experience her aporetic situation, I will distinguish two characteristic sets of 
actions and symbols. These actions are of course intermingled throughout the process 
even in one single action but to glean the specific effects of every action, I separate the 
actions in accordance with these two essential characteristics. In other words, through 
these two moments, one can see how for the pilgrims the revelation and religious laws 
first become necessary and then following them become aporetic.  
The first characteristic theme associated with a set of actions is the defiance of the 
authority of the actual and common sense laws given by calculative reasoning as well as 
the ones given by the everyday economy of faith. Throughout the ritual one can glean 
several actions and symbols that can potentially draw the pilgrims to this existential 
moment. These actions radically challenge the centrality of any present and actual 
authority or organizing principle and prepare the pilgrim to look for a new mode of 
following religion. In this way, economic ‘following’ becomes impossible and every 
pilgrim becomes a reader and interpreter on the path of nomadic following. The effect of 
this first moment then is exacerbated by the whole story of Abraham.  
Ghazālī stipulates that the negation of the laws of calculative reasoning opens the 
space for a new measure, the revelation, and the desire (shawq) for the presence of the 
Absolute, the unseekable. But, he assumes that the confrontation with the interruption of 
calculative reason will only produce a sense of passivity and humility in following the 
laws of religion and he does not at this stage problematize these laws at all. Meanwhile, I 
argue, that the second character of this whole process is about the foundation of the laws. 
Using Ghazālī’s own interpretation and the phenomenological existential analysis of the 
actions, I will argue that Ghazālī has just mentioned the first moment of encountering 
otherness. The other in this first moment is God whereas the nature of this otherness and 
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His singular ‘address’ is yet not in question. Meanwhile, as we saw with Aristotle and as 
Ghazālī confirms the interruption of universal and actual laws and the force of justice or 
(in this case) the promise of justice opens the place for a new mode of following and 
potential laws informed by the mystery. I will explore how this place prepares the new 
mode of temporality for the nomadic mode of being. 
 Given this, the second moment is more focused on the problem of the ‘address’ 
and the impossibility of justice as laws. I contend that this second moment brings the 
pilgrims to the awareness of their existential trouble in relation to laws – what I called 
being-in-trouble (Qur’ān, 90:4). The trouble refers to the groundlessness and the lack of 
measure in interpretation of the laws in relation to a singular other. 
 It is worth noting that the story of Abraham, the story of the one who is 
commanded to do the impossible, to sacrifice one’s own son, is here to be experienced by 
every Muslim at least once in their life time. It is not a unique demand from the Knight of 
Faith; but rather, it is an invitation for every Muslim to reflect upon the criteria of laws of 
religion especially when they are so excessive (Kierkegaard and Lowrie, 37). Instead of 
followers of a dogma or a system for ideology, Hajj invites Muslims to all be the knights 
of Faith.  
  I argue that at this stage what Muslims share is this trouble rather than any central 
idea, belief, or anything substantial. It is the attraction toward the unseekable, that creates 
the nomadic laws of ‘following’ and the nomadic community. What characterizes people, 
or according to Derrida, their trait, is the very attraction produced by the withdrawal or 
retreat, retrait of the Absolute. It is in sharing this tragic lack, and the subsequent 
nomadic motion that “a people” is constituted.  
5.2.3.2.1. Hajj and the Deconstruction of the Law as Present  
 Deconstruction of the laws of the tradition occurs in Hajj through the negation of 
the everyday economy of life and faith. The presence of the laws that gives temporality 
and spatiality to human actions and one’s system of sense-making needs to be brought 
into question. This presence as having, owning, appropriating (le capital), the captain and 
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head as the Messenger, as well as the place associated with Islam where Muslims are 
headed toward (la capitale) are targeted in my interpretation of the pilgrimage of Hajj. 
 Hajj deconstructs the everyday economy of religion as what Muslims have (le 
capital) or what they do in “time” as present. It reveals that what they perform day and 
night is nothing but remaining in the circle of the market economy and the exchange of 
the capital. The everyday economy of faith is by no means meaningless, as it is the 
economy with “God,” and as God has promised, in the Heaven, one would receive the 
bounty and mercy for every good deed he or she has done. However, as is evident, the 
structure of laws are anticipatable and present.  
 I argue that all the elements that can serve as a head or heading, center or capital, 
and can give rise to identity (as identical to itself), including the person of the prophet, or 
the place of the revelation, in Hajj, are given in their negation. Everything that normally 
gives sense to the rules of conduct and is normally taken for granted comes under 
scrutiny and is questioned as to its ground. 
 Although Ghazālī does not interpret Hajj in relation to the problem of Islamic 
identity per se, his mystic interpretation of the ritual confirms my observation. In the 
Revival of Religious Sciences, he points out that what makes this ritual very peculiar is 
the absurdity and transgressive nature of the actions that the pilgrims have to do (Ghazālī 
& Umar, 143). Many of the actions in the pilgrimage, he observes, do not make sense 
intellectually, or in an everyday economy of religion. This is how he explains the 
rationality and intellectual activity involved in the everyday ordinary laws of religion: 
Zakat [charity] is kindness; its meaning is understood and intellect has an 
inclination to it. Fasting is a break with bestial passion, which is the tool 
of the enemy of God, and involves concentration on worship by abstaining 
from [normal] occupations. Bowing (Rukūʿ) and prostration (Sujūd) in 
prayer [express] submission to God Most High through acts which 
represent the [outward] forms of submission; and souls have fellowship 
through [common] glorification of God Most High. (Ghazālī, & Umar, 
140) 
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Doing these actions, then, is not necessarily problematic nor Islamic. They make sense 
intellectually. They do not challenge the authority of reason nor do they make religion 
necessary or problematic. They establish a sense of familiarity and being-at-home very 
much like Aristotle’s laws of justice. Their sense and value is considered actual 
(energeia) and present. Ghazālī explains the psychological process at work for these laws 
very acutely and succinctly as follows: 
…whatever the intellect understands, to that is nature inclined; this 
inclination thus cooperates with the command and together with it incites 
to action. Thus, perfect bondage and servanthood [to the Lord] are hardly 
manifest. (ibid., 140) 
In this realm, it is the intellect or deliberation that provides the measure of judgement and 
evaluation. The terms “bondage and servanthood” are the terms that I would try to 
modify in terms of a special kind of ‘following,’ the one that leads to the realization of 
one’s being-in-trouble. The actions that are significant and different in the ritual, 
according to Ghazālī, are the ones that   
…people are not acquainted with…(la taʾnus bihā) and whose meaning no 
intellect can find out, such as casting pebbles at stones and running to and 
from repeatedly between Safā and Marwa [two small hills that pilgrims 
need to run between them as part of the ritual] for example. It is through 
such acts that perfect bondage and servanthood is manifest. (ibid.) 
He repeats the words ‘bondage’ and ‘servanthood’ (‘ubūdiya) again here as signifying the 
necessary attitudes toward the authority in religion. This is the first moment not only in 
Hajj but in ‘following' religion as seeking the unseekable in general. That is also why 
Hajj is perhaps the most important ritual that distinguishes Islamic identity or the Islamic 
mode of ‘following’ from other religions or other intellectual activities. For the very 
reason that the actions make no sense in any other temporality than that of ‘following’ 
Islam. This is also confirmed by Ghazālī, mentioning that Hajj was that which 
distinguished Islamic community from other religious communities. He takes it a step 
further, mentioning that the task of the Prophet Muḥammad was to restore the accurate 
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way of ‘following,’ to “restore the heavenly way [of life ] and to set the law of [previous] 
Apostles once again on its course” (ibid., 104)  
 In accordance with the first characteristic feature of Hajj mentioned above, it 
defies the apparent necessary laws of society or commonsensical understanding of the 
world. Due to the everyday and regular nature of the laws of conduct, over time, one may 
find natural or intellectual justifications for them. Little by little, they become clear and 
dominant like common sense. Hajj highlights the arbitrary nature of this familiarity (uns). 
That is because, as Ghazālī explains, “there is no impetus to perform them other than the 
mere command [of God] and the intention to comply with that command” (ibid., 138). 
That is, the complex and rather arbitrary nature of actions in Hajj frustrates intellectual 
and commonsensical understating of laws, thereby divertesthe pilgrim’s attention to their 
ground.  
 It is worth remembering that Ghazālī’s contention, in line with his critique of the 
philosophers (in Tahāfut al-Falāsifa), is that the real commands, the real cause of all 
actions and events and the real authority is that which is not familiar or in-the-world. I 
would follow him in proposing that Hajj is the perfect manifestation and reminder of this 
fact in action. Hajj reminds the pilgrims that the real author of the events and actions is 
not in-the-world, that God is absent (ǧā’ib). Meanwhile, God give commands and asks 
everyone to obey the orders which one has no criterion to evaluate, understand, or justify. 
“In such obedience the intellect desists from its [normal] operations and the soul and the 
[innate] disposition are detracted from their [proper] social course” (ibid., 140). 
 This first moment is very crucial. That is, the pilgrims have no way out but to 
seek refuge in the very process or the plot of actions and the ceremony itself to find a 
criteria for the truth of the laws. There is this moment of passivity and obedience 
ingrained in confronting the aporia, a moment of indecision and naiveté which can be 
very violent at the same time. That is the moment that wary of the hasty decisions due 151
to the absence of a valid intellectual touchstone or the universal laws of reason, one is 
 The words that Ghazālī uses to describe this first moment of humility and passivity are different forms 151
with the same root (mustakīnīna, istakānata, from the root S,K,N  meaning dwelling, staying, submitting, 
being at peace with) all indicating a sense of passivity and obedience as well as dwelling and resting. 
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very vulnerable to literal interpretation of the message. That is to say, one may simply 
begin to think that the laws are clear or given as an easy solution to trouble. However, as 
I explain below, the nature of the actions are much more complex than simply provoking 
a blind acceptance of authority or, as Ghazālī maintains “a command which requires 
obedience pure and simple” (ibid., 137). It turns out that the obedience is not that “plain 
and simple” after all.  
 In the second moment, entering the story of Abraham, the pilgrim is confronted 
with the problem of “address” and mediation in interpretation in general. The actions of 
the follower challenge the authority of Islam, since what God asks contradicts other 
divine rules of conduct actions are about to challenge the authority of religion as well. 
The invitation to do what is not normally part of religion and intellectually not justified 
plus the transgressive and excessive demands of the laws (e.g., to slaughter a lamb or 
leave the town and stay in a desert) creates a paradoxical situation for the pilgrims. This 
makes the laws necessary and impossible at the same time. The effect is that the laws are 
challenged as to their ground, where they are coming from, and who the authority is.  In 152
other words, Hajj reveals how, at first, ‘following' the authority of the prophet becomes 
necessary and then impossible.  
The actions and narratives in Hajj accomplish the second moment at the same 
time as the first by perpetually defying the presence of a center or authority (like that of a 
prophet), or negating the appropriation of any definite meaning of the revealed laws. The 
everyday significations and everyday understanding of the rules of conduct which act as 
the necessary ingredient to grant Islam a present and actual system and body-politics, are 
negated in a way that invokes multiplicity and non-identity. Notwithstanding, the 
narratives provide an imaginative space where having identity becomes a perpetual task 
of interpretation and seeking the unseekable. 
The trouble and the aporetic situation is intensified and exacerbated by the fact that many of the actions 152
and scenarios in Hajj somehow or other accomplish the first and the second moment at the same time. They 
challenge the authority of common sense laws as well as the presence of God, or the Prophet at the same 
time. In other words, at the same time, ‘following’ becomes necessary while it is not obvious who the 
captain is or where the pilgrims are heading. This will produce a present-absent effect which brings about 
the experience of ‘following’ together with its aporia. 
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 While Ghazālī would assume that the initial encounter with the impossibility of 
the laws of the present would bring about more of the same ‘following’ and obedience to 
the laws, I think the narratives and other signs in Hajj have a different story to tell. The 
actions that Ghazālī interprets as the celebration of the glory of God or the passive 
obedience to the commands can, in fact, be regarded as an invitation to the independent 
investigation, (ijtīhād).  
 After having to give up one’s familiar system of sense-making there remains no 
choice but for the pilgrims to become readers and ‘followers’ of the stories happening in 
the place of the rituals. The pilgrim seeks refuge in following all the narratives which 
share one main basic conceptuality, the aporia of ‘following’ as “seeking the 
unseekable.”   153
 My contention is that it can be shown that the ritual of Hajj is an invitation to 
invoke an active comportment to the way of ‘following’ Islam as opposed to mere 
passive obedience. Paradoxically, however, the active comportment takes the form of 
negation or transformation of the laws toward a heedful consideration of the singularity 
of the other. That is when after the suspension of the laws of tradition as given and past, a 
new momentary temporality is created a new mode of following in perpetual 
consideration of the other.  
 By neutralizing the everyday economy of life and faith, the pilgrims are ready to 
perform as the protagonists of several stories happening around the same time in one site, 
al-Ḥarām Mosque (literally meaning the forbidden mosque) in Mecca. Identifying with 
the characters of these historical and mythical stories, i.e. Abraham, Ismaˀīl, Hājar, or the 
dead who have risen from the graves to be judged, etc., and confronting the unexpected 
absence of God in Kaʿbah (the house of God), pilgrims are expected to undergo a radical 
change in their attitude towards the laws and find a new direction in their everyday faith. 
 The theological term for this activity of defying any absolute knowledge and remaining a seeker is “the 153
divine unity” (tawḥīd). It is worth noting that tawḥīd is a verbal noun which refers to an action more than a 
concept or a principle of belief. Regardless of the theological meaning of the divine unity, it is nonetheless, 
associated with all actions in Hajj which defy the presence of God in this world. Or as Ghazālī mentions: 
"confessing that He is above being confined by a house or encompassed by a town: “maʿa iʿtirāfi bi 
tanzihihi ʿan ʾan yaḥwihi bayti ow yaktanfihu baladi” (ibid., 139-140)
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5.2.3.2.1.1. From Time to Place: The Deconstruction of Time as the Present  
 In order to break with the economy of faith toward an originary take on the 
Message, the first thing to do is to unsettle the present temporality of everyday life which 
provides our actions with present and familiar meaning. is the negation and the 
destruction of time and meaning as present. The event which is supposed work must 
unsettle the meaning-making structure as we remember it from the past. “It [the event] 
should be anticipated as the unforeseeable, the unanticipatable the non-masterable, non-
identifiable, in short, as that of which one does not yet have a memory”  (Derrida, OH. 154
18). There are a lot of actions and symbols associated with such a break, but in this short 
interpretation, I will choose the ones that are associated with the idea of presence and 
capital, the head and the heading.  
 Deconstruction in Hajj begins with the invitation to the place, (la capitale), which 
is the source of tension in time. We need to go to a place where the laws as present 
become impossible and turn into a creative take on tradition. That is because Hajj is the 
ritual that reminds pilgrims of the impossibility of the appropriation or the understanding 
of God as present (Ghazālī & Omar, 139-140). 
  Any journey or pilgrimage can, more or less, provide the possibility of a break 
with the economy of everyday life. One may not be able to follow the same schedule as 
one holds at home and thereby feel unsettled. Hajj leaves no chance for the pilgrim to 
lead one’s life through memory. It exclusively targets the temporality of the present.  
 It is significant that in the chapter of the Revival of Religious Sciences (al-Iḥyā’ 
al-‘ulūm ad-dīn) dedicated to the secrets of the pilgrimage, Ghazālī recommends to the 
pilgrims to avoid any shopping or business matters during the pilgrimage. He emphasizes 
the rejection and defiance of any monetary or business activity during this trip, although 
he confirms that it is not forbidden by the laws of the tradition. He argues that this whole 
trip is supposed to avert the pilgrims’ attention from worldly engagements and so 
“financial matters are not recommended and strongly talked against” (Ghazālī & Omar, 
 Perhaps a more natural rendering could be “unmasterable,” “unidentifiable”.154
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127-128). For he believes that cutting those worldly engagements creates the desire 
(shawq) for the Lord of the house, as symbolized by the emptiness of the house (ibid.). 
 Many elements in the ritual suggest this emphasis on a radical change in 
temporality. In fact, if nothing more, Hajj can be described as the introduction of space to 
the temporality of Islam. The harmony between place, time, and actions is evident and is 
the most important aspect of Hajj. Pilgrims are to stay in certain places at certain times 
doing certain actions. Sometimes, even, there is no particular action. One is grounded in a 
desert (for example in Muzdalifah near Mecca, on the route between ‘Arafāt and Minā) 
for a night or a day, only to stay and wait. They are to stay in a place until a certain time, 
doing nothing obligatory, just thinking or asking for forgiveness.   155
 All actions are done in anticipation of the time of the judgment to come, the Hour 
(as-sā‘a) (Qur’ān, 22:1). The association of the last Judgment, when actions and their 
meanings finally come together with the time, the Hour, as well as the Day of the 
Religion or law (yam ad-dīn), in the Qur’ān problematizes the meaning of lawful and 
unlawful actions in the human realm. What is promised to the pilgrims is the emergence 
of the time (the Hour) as if what they experience everyday is everything but the time. The 
only time that is really meaningful and provides a genuine experience is the time, the 
Hour, to come. It is only through the anticipation (intiẓār) of this time that actions might 
make any original sense. Therefore, in human realm as we discussed in previous section 
with Ghazālī, the anticipation (intiẓār) is the only temporality that gives sense. Human 
judgments in this light are always partial and awaiting the Last Judgment to come. The 
meaning and the value of actions on this nomadic path do not come from the past and 
They are in fact performing the drama of the Day of the Resurrection, when everyone is waiting for their 155
turn to be judged by God. 
235
memory. But rather, they are promised (wa‘dah)  to make a final sense, ne evaluated 156
and judged on the Day of Resurrection and at the presence of God. For Muslims, to 
believe in the principle of Ma’ād (Resurrection on the Day of Judgment) negates the 
authority of the laws as that which is fully determined and has a complete meaning in the 
present. The question becomes even more evident when we realize that this new 
temporality is organized around a place which is the ultimate source of contradictions, 
Kaʿbah, the empty house of God like a promise that is not fulfilled and is literally hollow.  
 There is another indication as to the transition from the everyday temporality to 
the temporality that is informed by the mystery of this place.  The ritual of Hajj starts at a 
place which is called “Mīqāt.” Mīqāt is not one specific place, but a virtual, symbolic 
circle of certain kilometers round Kaʿbah where no one can enter before embarking on 
the process of the ritual called “Iḥrām,” part of which is to wear a certain garment and to 
formally decide (niyat) to start doing Hajj. Although this word is the name of a place, its 
root, “W, Q, T,” (as in “waqt”,) means time. It means, therefore, the place of time.  It 157
implies the location where time meets place. Or perhaps the place that time begins 
“temporalizing,” the place that gives time (Derrida, Given Time, 14). I understand this 
movement as a movement from temporality of the economy of Islam which one is born 
and grown up in it, towards the temporality of the place of the event to come, the 
temporality of nomadic following. 
 From the root: “w,‘,d”: which mean promise. It is another word associated with the principle of Ma’ād, 156
and intensifies its future implication. As opposed to most of the events in the Qur’ān which as God’s 
creations are happend in the past or present emphasizing God’s plan and providence for the world, the 
actions and events associated with the after life are all promises and hypotheses. They do not make sense 
with the present system of time more our language can afford their understanding and so they are spoken in 
their negation or as a promise. We read in Qur’an that: “They want you to bring upon them their 
punishment without delay. God never disregards His promise. One day for God is equal to a thousand years 
for you.[22: 47]; Or yet other verses like: “It is a promise[Al-Wa‘dah], of Allah. Allah failed not His 
promise [Al-Wa’dah], but most of mankind do not know.”[30: 6]. Therefore, it is interesting to note that 
“Ma‘ād” as one among the three principles of Islam, by its root means the time, the place of the promise, 
the return or the appointment. The verses mentioned plus the meaning of the root all point to a radical new 
temporality and a new dimension of life.  
 The Arabic language is very helpful in pointing out this compatibility and harmony between time and 157
place in the pilgrimage. That is because the morphological form of place-nouns is the same as time-nouns 
and it is only context that determines which one is which. 
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 From here, pilgrims enter the place of the revelation of laws and the new 
temporality that schedule and shape the actions according to them. But, it is important to 
have the original problem in mind here. For the new schedule, is still within a new 
economy and more complex laws of the same format. However, my observation is that 
the new configuration is centered around a place which defies hypostatization and 
appropriation of laws as present. This place, Ka‘bah, itself generates different kinds of 
temporality other than the present economy of the creed. It perpetually gives time, the 
time that never becomes present. Entering Iḥrām, whose root is the same root as the word 
for the forbidden act (ḥarām) and means respecting, being in awe, observing the laws, 
etc., the pilgrims’ schedule has to be in accord with heeding the mystery that is hidden in 
this place.  
 I use the word mystery (sirr) advisedly, for this place, that is the house of God,  158
does not give in to any absolute appropriation or understanding. As the capital of Islam, 
the house of God is the source of an aporia instead of a source of a major illumination or 
knowledge.  
      
5.2.3.2.1.2. Kaʿbah and the Capital (la Capitale) of Islam 
 The most important mark of space and symbol of Hajj is Kaʿbah itself. For 
Ghazālī, the House of God within the al-Harām Mosque and its surroundings symbolize 
the court of a king. Everything and every action around Kaʿbah somehow or another are 
interpreted as if they are glorifying the majesty of the king who is so majestic that no 
house can really accommodate him and all of the attempts to serve him fall short 
(Ghazālī & Omar, 143). He contends that the glory of the house and its emptiness makes 
it a great indication or symbol referring to the Lord of the house. The emptiness of 
Kaʿbah illustrates the groundlessness of humanity in this world, and it refers to the glory 
of what is to come in the afterlife. 
 However, looking at the house from the followers’ perspective, the house is much 
more a symbol of desperation and helplessness than hope. The pilgrims who are 
 Perhaps what is referred to in the Qur’ān is al-balad, (city)158
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compelled to follow the laws and are called from a far distance to visit the Lord, are 
confronted with an empty building. They are in fact confronted with their groundlessness, 
confronted the promise which is not kept and which nevertheless demands for more 
patience and loyalty.  
 When one is invited to somebody’s home, the host is expected to be there. Kaʿbah 
is the house of God and at the same time, the house of no-thing. It is literally empty. I 
mentioned that Hajj is the illustration of the day of the Resurrection when human beings 
would be finally judged in the presence of God and the presence of justice. In many other 
pilgrimage sites, there is an icon or the body of the person who is associated with the 
place. Kaʿbah is completely empty. It seems that people are invited to a great party where 
the host is not present. No revelation, no miracle, no discussion or argument. Nothing.  
 One may wonder whether the building itself is the intended message. Yet, unlike 
the architecture of the mosque which by its complex structure brings about a certain kind 
of revelation, this building is not an elaborate one; just four walls and a roof. It is a 
simple house re-built and prepared in the middle of a desert by Abraham, after he was 
told to do so by God.   It is built in a rather unknown place in the desert. Mecca, at the 159
time of the construction of Kaʿbah, was not the center of Abrahamic religions. Also, it is 
not located in a crowded city or amid the largest and oldest centers of civilization. The 
building is very humble in construction, in the middle of a desert with no windows.  
 Perhaps that is because it is itself the Call of God, a radically new cry in the 
absolute silence of a desert. Buildings in a city are in perpetual dialogue with each other. 
In narrow streets, they whisper in each other’s ears, and in wide streets they have to shout 
to be heard. Some tall skyscrapers humiliate small huts and flats. Some have big windows 
to express what they have in their hearts and some hide secrets of the society behind their 
tall walls and bars in the absolute silence.  
 “Thus We settled Abraham at the site of the House saying [:" Do not associate anything with Me," and 159
purify My house for those who walk around it, and those who stand there] praying [, and those who bow 
down on their knees in worship. [Qur’an, 22: 26] “And proclaim unto mankind the pilgrimage. They will 
come unto thee on foot and on every lean camel; they will come from every deep ravine.”[Qur’an, 22: 27] 
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 But, in a desert, whatever a building says is actually a cry within silence, a cry 
that nobody answers. That is why, I believe, it has a secret in its heart. Normally, a house 
is where one lives; it is what gives an address, an identity to the dweller or the visitor. 
Your house is your address, your history and your place in the city. But, what about this 
house? It is the house of a question. The house of no-thingness, where no-thing can fill it. 
The house itself without any ritual is the annihilation of the economy of laws and a 
depiction of groundlessness. It is the negation of any kind of identity. 
 At the same time, an empty house, which is not like any other building, shrine or 
temple, may symbolize the source of creativity and productivity, like the womb of the 
universe. It actually is the center which gives meaning to the whole process of Hajj and 
yet it is itself empty. It is the symbol of that which organizes everything around it and yet 
itself is the hiding place of the secret, of the absolute other.  
 Upon arriving in Mecca, the pilgrims first circle around Kaʿbah seven times in a 
ritual called Tawāf. The very nature of the movement around an empty center 
deconstructs the economic structure of laws of religion. One may compare this place with 
Shia pilgrimage sites where followers of an Imām visit his shrine. The building is full of 
his symbols and his exact words are repeated by the pilgrims. His historical character is 
celebrated and the historical event of his death is mourned for. Even in his death, the 
Imam is still present and gives a center to the laws of conduct. And yet, Kaʿbah is the site 
of the presence of a primordial absence or lack.  
 Confrontation with Kaʿbah gives rise to the pilgrim’s understanding of her own 
existential incompleteness, one’s incapability to encounter God, or to appropriate any 
conception of Him. That is how the economic structure of laws and the identity of 
Muslims as present and actual are annihilated. The implication, I assume, is that the 
whole purpose of the trip is for the pilgrims to be awakened to this existential 
groundlessness or lack which sparks the urge of human beings to become complete, the 
fact that in the finite human world we are in-trouble and groundless. 
 From the annihilation of the center, the capital or the heading, the pilgrim is 
directed to the other of the heading, where there cannot be any present determined logos 
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or telos. All the actions and movements from here become nomadic. That is, they are 
attracted to temporary constellations/gatherings, where things seem to gather 
momentarily but never as an ultimate telos or completion. 
 This, as Ghazālī confirms, produces the impression of not simply the absence of 
God but rather a present-absence which necessarily refer humans to the heavens 
(malakūt). He declares that the absence produces a longing that bypasses the pilgrims’ 
sense of helplessness and desperation.  
As for longing, this results from understanding and from the realization 
that the House belongs to God Most High, that it was established on the 
analogy of a royal palaces such that whoever visits it is [in reality] visiting 
God Most High and whoever betakes himself to the House [while] in this 
life is worthy not to have his visit wasted, for the object of the visit, which 
is the vision of God Most High, will be granted to him in its fixed time in 
the Eternal Residence. (ibid., 143) 
That is, he argues that the very presence of an empty and not full house, plus the 
circumambulation around it as if there is something present, refers the pilgrim to the 
possibility of the Lord not present  here but present in the realm of the unseen (al-ǧayb) 
(ibid., 143). Everything in the revelation from that moment turns into an indication or a 
sign rather than a present or actual thing. Accordingly, the revealed law also loses its 
present and actual meaning. It does not become meaningless because it still refers to the 
event to come but its actual significance becomes deferred to the time, the Hour, when 
judgment becomes possible. 
 The present meaning of laws in this way are deferred and every word becomes a 
metaphor (meta-pherein literally meaning a carrying-over) a movement towards an 
originary sense. That is what according to Ghazālī the laws of heedful conduct (adab). 
Such a change in the meaning of the laws is evident in the process itself. As I will show, 
the lawful and unlawful (ḥarām), the guilt, and forgiveness for one’s sins gain completely 
new significations as a result of the exposure to the mystery of Kaʿbah. Instead of 
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referring to their apparent present and actual meanings in language, they are impregnated 
with the unexpected possibilities offered by the emptiness of the center.  
      
5.2.3.2.1.3. The Prophet, the Captain of the Journey 
 Finally, after the annihilation of the capital or the central organizing place, one 
may wonder if the historical life or the discourse of the prophet can be the source of 
presence and act as a measure. That is the question of the captain of the journey or the 
head or sovereign of the community. Perhaps to be a Muslim is to ‘follow’ and have faith 
in the historical character of the prophet Muḥammad and his life or the historical life of 
the saints and Imāms. This is the point of contention among Muslims and create 
sectarianism among them.  
 Different sectors and divisions within Islam tell different stories to deal with this 
groundlessness and offer possible alternatives that can fill the gap like the historic 
character of the prophet or the saints. An obvious easy way to circumvent this groundless 
moment is to bring in the authority of the prophet or saints. However, the Iranian 
prominent Qur’ān scholar Shabestari insists that in fact what is essential to Islamic laws 
(as opposed to the doctrine and the dogma of Catholic church) is “the essential openness” 
of the structure of the religion of Islam (Shabestari, 44).He writes: 
The essential structure of the religion of Islam is an open structure. From 
the very beginning the system of the Islamic religious thought was an open 
one… In such an open system, on one side there is the message of God 
and on the other there is human. Man as the one who is the ‘addressee’ [of 
the message]  is invited by God to understand [or rather to “tie together” 
or to “Knit,” “contemplate,” “gather together,” the word root in Arabic is “ 
‘, Q, L” meaning also to think and understand] His message. (Shabestari, 
43 my translation and my emphasis) 
He rejects any easy solution for the being-in-trouble of man. The nature of tying together 
and contemplating, arguably, for Shabestari, ends up confining the Message to the 
rational understanding of human language; but at this point his emphasis on the original 
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groundlessness and human responsibility in reference to the ‘address’ is significant and 
supports my claim.   
 This moment constitutes the place where all the controversy over the 
interpretation of the revealed laws originates. Some try to provide intellectualist 
responses and interpretations which, as I demonstrated, become impossible once entering 
the domain of revelation. Our rational anticipation is frustrated and negated right at the 
beginning and yet we are commanded to think and understand. Some other schools try to 
attach a literal interpretation to the message and follow it blindly as if it is possible to 
overcome the problem of the ‘address’ without accepting the responsibility of 
interpretation.  
With regard to the authority in interpretation, Shabestari cautions that “There is no formal 
authority (motewalli) for the interpretation and understanding of the message of God in 
the essential structure of Islam” (Ibid.). Interestingly, the term that Shabestari uses here 
for “authority” is a very politically charged word, motewalli meaning authority and leader 
but at the same time has the same root as the word “wali,” meaning “friend of God,” or 
“appointed by God.” Of the same root, wilāya is a prominent and mainstream Shia 
doctrine of authority that Shabestari is hereby challenging.  
 The pilgrimage by itself challenges the authority of the Prophet or any one person 
as the center. One may think that the Prophet and his property are the purposes of this 
trip. There are two clear evidences supporting my claim, firstly, according to the Qur’ān, 
the call to perform Hajj is performed by Abraham and not Muḥammad, not even 
addressing Muslims exclusively but all humankind (Qur’ān, 22:27). Therefore, before 
being Islamic at all, the trip is an Abrahamic one, that is associated with the mythical 
stories rather than a historical event.  
Secondly, none of the places associated with the prophet Muhammad’s historical 
presence or even the history of Islam as such are part of the ritual. Although most of the 
Muslims go visit the shrine of the prophet Muhammad in the city of Medina after or 
before Hajj, visiting that is not part of Hajj. In this regard, it is noteworthy, to compare 
Hajj with other pilgrimages in Islam.  
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For Shia Muslims, the pilgrimage sites are the places where the shrines of Imāms 
are located. In contrast to Hajj, in most of Shia gatherings and pilgrimages, the authority 
of an Imam is celebrated. In those pilgrimages all places, symbols, and characters are 
historical. The purpose of the visit is to pledge allegiance to the way of life of Imam. 
Shias literally mourn or celebrate the historical events of the life of Imāms and saints. As 
if the historical and real character of Imams or the prophet is the measure to interpret the 
revealed law. 
However, in Hajj none of these historical characters or their houses which are 
located around the same city are part of the ritual. Instead, pilgrims are invited to take 
part in the story of Abraham. It is noteworthy that the stories of the prophets in the 
Qur’ān are presented not as historical events but as mythical or figurative stories. They 
are not even told as complete events but as elliptical references throughout the Qur’ān as 
if they are part of the common culture that people shared. The pilgrimage of Hajj seems 
to imply that the faith in Islam entails going beyond the history of Islam and its laws as 
present. Therefore, although the narrative of Islam as another source of temporality 
associated with the place of mystery is indispensable to the pilgrimage, it is only through 
neutralization of the real and historical presence that new characters are formed and 
actions become significant. The significance of every character, object, and action is in 
gestation and making.  
 Thus, even to believe in the Prophet is to see in him what he is not. For example, 
he appears to be a man, a head of state, a historical figure whose acts are more or less 
contextually and historically determined. Hajj defies any identity, sexuality, or leadership 
as the characters of the head or captain of this journey. This journey begins and ends 
altogether with the defiance of authority. Like other principles in Islam, to believe in the 
Prophet consists in precisely the movement of going beyond his historical, contextual and 
literal character. The prophets as Ibn ʿArabi and other mystics depict in their works are to 
be understood as different approaches and comportments towards the mystery of life and 
creation and in response to the aporias of the revealed laws.  
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 Therefore, like the presence of the house of God which produces a presence-
absence effect rather than a complete presence or complete absence, here too, the 
guidance is provided not through the actual life history of the prophet Muḥammad but by 
participating in the story of the prophet Abraham. As a result of this present-absence, a 
new mode of indication, law, or logos is in gestation. This is the context in which the 
laws of revelation need to be understood. The laws of revelation are given in this sense 
not as actual commands but as a perpetual ‘address’ and perpetual reminder of one’s 
being-in-trouble in finding a criterion for interpretation of the revealed laws. 
 As I argue below, at this point, overwhelmed by the melancholic trouble of 
groundlessness and wandering, the ritual enters the process of encountering the second 
moment that is of ‘following’ the other and the ‘address’. As the head and the capital of 
the community are negated, pilgrims are ready to be introduced to the climax of the story 
and the authentic attitude towards the revealed laws and commands. Suddenly, the 
pilgrims who in confronting the emptiness of Kaʿbah and the lack of an authority were 
left wandering in the desert find themselves right in the middle of the story of 
Abraham.  The story of Abraham as depicted in Hajj is the manifestation of the ‘other’ 160
of the heading par-excellence.  
5.2.3.2.2. Nomadic Following as Being-in-Trouble  
 Little by little, entering the second characteristic moment, the ground for the 
foundation of the new ethical attitude is prepared. The laws of the nomadic ‘following’ 
are given by the revelation and perpetual consideration of the mystery itself. Without any 
capital, patience (intiẓār) in its full force imposes itself on the pilgrim. Of course, one 
could remain oblivious to his being-in-trouble, or simply follow the path of theology, 
 It is noteworthy that the structure of Hajj as a style of story-telling, is very much like the Qur’ān and the 160
way it tells stories. The Qur’ān rarely begins a chapter with a story nor does it tell stories from beginning to 
end. It gives stories very elliptically and pointing to a sign or a turn of events in a story as if everyone 
knows these stories and the Qur’ān is just offering a new reading of some of their events. The stories in the 
Qur’ān are also within one another, that is before one story ends another story begins. The same structure is 
emulated in the Mystic literature like that of Rumi’s works among others. This style in Hajj, one can say, 
intensifies the feeling of being always in the middle and incomplete. We are never actual writes of any new 
story as if constituting the world for the first time. But rather, we are always already in a hermeneutic 
situation and our existence is constituted by reading. 
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jurisprudence, or philosophy to give some general economic solution to the problem. 
Even worse, one can accept the authority of a leader in giving sense and measure to her 
actions. But this is to circumvent the problematic situation and to reduce the singularity 
of the ‘address’ to a general formula. This amounts to naive responses to a problematic 
situation that makes sense only as a problem.  
 It is worth remembering from Ghazālī in his autobiographical work that the ascent 
toward the level of independent investigation (ijtihād) for him comes to pass as a result of 
the melancholia that fell upon him he consented that he is trouble in finding a measure. It 
is noteworthy that for Ghazālī, too, the problem was not only about Islam, but the 
problematic situation of human beings in search of truth. That is to say, the problem is 
ontologically and existentially posed: we fall short of finding evidence for certainty and 
truth when the truth is supposed to defy our common sense and logic. The grace which 
put him on the path of independent investigation (ijtihād) came when he exercised 
patience. 
It is crucial to note a major difference in the story of Abraham as it is experience 
in Hajj with the one that is known in Christianity as in Kierkegaard. The major question 
for Kierkegaard seems to be the attitude of Abraham, the Knight of Faith. In Islam 
however, the story of Hajj and Abraham is not merely his story but as much and even 
more importantly the story of Hājar and Ismāʿīl, as the faithful followers. It is not only 
Abraham but also Hājar and Ismāʿīl who depict the authentic attitude towards the 
command. Kierkegaard does not seem to be concerned with the attitude or response of 
Isaac. Kierkegaard remarks in passing that, as a result of Abraham’s reticence in not 
sharing the command of God to sacrifice him, Isaac is just very hurt and has lost his trust 
in his father. Whereas in the Qur’ān, it is Ismāʿīl who tries to soothe his father after he 
shares the command of God with him. That is why I believe this story in Islam is about 
the authentic attitude of every follower with regard to the laws. Muslims are not only 
invited to keep faith while they intuit the command like Abraham. They are in trouble in a 
second sense as well. The question for them is to undergo the maladies and the 
consequences of the mediation to the prophet and still keep faith and remain ‘followers.’ 
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In this sense, the story of Abraham for Muslim pilgrims is more ethical and political 
question of dealing with the laws when we receive in language and mediation of the 
prophet.  
 Pilgrims, at the first scene of the story of Abraham, are in the same situation. They 
do not act as Abraham himself but as Hājar, who, according to the tradition, as a result of 
command of God to Abraham, and as a test of his faith, is left in the middle of a desert.  161
The Quran affirms that this was yet another test for Abraham (Qur’ān, 14:37). As I 
mentioned before, this confirms my observation that the laws are not to provide simple 
solutions and guidance. All laws regardless of the performative aspect of their language, 
unveil a fundamental human condition and question, or a “test.”  
  Hājar’s story is the depiction of the situation of all ‘followers’ in-trouble where 
they are not able to make sense of the Message. Every believer is like Hājar, frustrated 
with not understanding the laws, and finding themselves in a Kafkaesque situation 
“before the laws" while being compelled to follow them.  
 What the follower can or should do according to the narrative is very telling and 
significant. Acting as Hājar, the pilgrim has to stay for a couple of days in this desperate 
state, before the law, left in the middle of the desert with no hope or revelation. The 
pilgrim is in the state of Iḥrām, which unlike most of rules of conduct in Islam, including 
the holy war (Jīhād), the prayer, the “enjoining what is right and forbidding what is 
wrong, (amr bi l-maʿrūf wa nahyʿan l-munkar)”  stages a state of heedful indecision 162
rather than an active intervention.  
 “When Ishmael was still nursing, God yet again chose to test the faith of his beloved Abraham and 161
commanded him to take Hagar and Ishmael to a barren valley of Bakka 700 miles southeast of Hebron.  In 
later times it would be called Mecca.  Indeed it was a great test, for he and his family had longed for such a 
time for offspring, and when their eyes were filled with the joy of an heir, the commandment was enacted 
to take him to a distant land, one known for its barrenness and hardship.” Mufti, Imam Kamil. “The Story 
of Abraham (Part 5 of 7): The Gifting of Hagar and Her Plight.” The Religion of Islam, 3 Apr. 2006, 
www.islamreligion.com/articles/296/story-of-abraham-part-5/.
 The examples of this rule in the Qur’ān and Sunnah (tradition) are abundant. The rule commands 162
Muslim to intervene in the affairs of other fellow believers and invite them to do good or warn them of their 
bad actions. From the Qur’ān for example we read: “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to 
all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain 
felicity.” (3:104)
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 The state of Iḥrām continues for several days during which several actions are 
being performed by the pilgrims. Some of which are: 
1. Ṭawāf: circumambulating around Ka’bah 
2. Saʿy: which means “effort.” This practice commemorates the search for water made by 
Ḥājar when Abraham left her and her infant son Ismāʿīl in the desert.  
3. Taqṣīr: which means “to shave or to cut;” the pilgrims cut or shave their hair (women 
cut off only a small amount) and return to Mecca to repeat Ṭawāf and Saʿy.  
4. Iqāmat: which means sojourn or stay: pilgrims head to Minā, where they spend the 
day. Early the next morning they go to ʿArafah (or ʿArafāt) to spend the day.  
 It is noteworthy that every action from this list can be interpreted in different 
ways in accordance with the three narratives of Abrahamic, mythical (the Day of 
Resurrection) and the history of Islam. I focus on only one meaning which is related to 
the story of Hājar and her predicament. She has been left alone with a hungry and thirsty 
infant in the middle of the desert, literally “before the laws” having to way out but to 
obey and follow them. She is wandering and awaiting the sense and resolution of the 
command to come without being able to constitute a meaning to the problem or finding a 
way out of it.  
 All 4 actions intensify the follower's experience of helplessness and 
groundlessness, in addition to the need for patience and care toward the other. Moreover, 
in the background of all these experiences is the hope for the revelation to come. The 
actions that take place with this heading in view begin in the context of a complete 
absence and end in symbolic or mimetic presence.I explained the preliminary effect of 
Ṭawāf. The action (2) (Saʿy) which involves walking and running between two hills, after 
doing the circumambulation (Ṭawāf), simply depicts Hājar’s desperate attempt to find 
water for herself and her child before they die. After completely getting disappointed, she 
prays for help and a spring (Zamzam) opens up from the dry ground with which she 
quenches her son’s thirst. God’s mercy a sign of His presence comes in the form of pres-
absence again, what I called mimetic presence. Like the experience of Kaʿbah, here too 
the pilgrim is not left with absolute absence in a nihilistic fashion but with an indication 
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of a presence in heavens, a presence to come. The spring, the water, a heavenly material 
looks like something which is both of and not of the world. It has a quasi-presence. 
Ghazālī understands Saʿy along the same lines. He writes:  
As for the running between Safā and Marwa in the courtyard of the House: 
this resembles the movements to and fro of a slave in the courtyard of a 
king, coming and going time after time, [thus] showing his loyalty in 
service, hoping for a look of favor, in the manner of one who enters [the 
presence of] a king and goes out without knowing what the king has 
ordered with respect to his case, acceptance or repulsion, so that he keeps 
coming back to the courtyard time after time, hoping to be forgiven in the 
second [time] if not in the first. (Ghazālī & Omar, 150) 
 The very nature of a response from heaven is so important that pilgrims take 
bottles of water back home at the end of the journey as a souvenir of the trip.  It is one 163
single glimmer of hope that a Muslim is supposed to cling into. Yet, as it is clear from the 
nature of a miracle, it cannot be anticipated and does not point to any center or 
appropriation. It is a new kind of sense, and points to a new kind of law, the one which 
has the mystery of the place in view.  
 After the confrontation with the emptiness of the house, Saʿy is a natural effect 
which is a wandering out of despair although it ends with a taste of inspiration and hope 
for the woman of the story. It all seems to indicate that, should there be any redemption, 
on the way of ‘following,’ it is in the admitting the impossibility of the presence of the 
absolute and yet, despite this fact, to never become disappointed and to never lose faith. 
This means to live the conundrum of ‘following’ all the time instead of providing a 
philosophical or theological solution for it. This is what will effectively happen in action 
number 4 Iqāmat (Stay). Pilgrims have to stay in a desert for a certain time as if stuck 
“before the law.” They have nothing to do but to think why they are grounded there and 
ask for forgiveness. This welcoming the effect of the laws in patience, the active attitude 
 The graphic novel, Habībī, by Craig Thompson, is inspired by the revelation of Zamzam, to such an 163
extent that one of the two main characters of the novel is called Zamzam. In effect, the whole course of that 
story is in search or hope of finding Zamzam, the impossible and improbable revelation. 
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in waiting and ‘following’ like that of Ismāʿīl and Hājar promises some kind of hope, 
redemption, and creativity which is not the same kind as the one promised by the faithful 
following of the laws. Obedience to the laws is rewarded, too, but their reward comes 
economically in the afterlife. Hājar receives a glimmer of hope in a form of water which 
is a heavenly material in this world. Later, Ismāʿīl’s following the order of his father to 
accept the sacrifice exercises the same patience and follows the laws. His action brings 
about yet another miracle, another glimmer of hope in the form of a ram. Both of these 
revelations and rewards are granted as a result of the hope and trust in an unanticipated 
event, rather than the economic quid pro quo structure of laws. The actions of sacrificing 
(qaṣr) and shaving (taqṣīr) in both situations involve a kind of cutting, with words of the 
same root which connects them to one another. The patience (intizār) welcomes the 
contingency and a new mode of temporality which is in accordance with “the alternative 
worlds." I mentioned that patience was Ghazālī’s supplement to the laws of nature, the 
one that opens the organic natural world to “the possible worlds.” The introduction of the 
new temporality perfectly explains the subsequent ontological transformation of the laws. 
The present and actual laws from this moment transform to temporary constellations 
informed by the promised action of God, who is the ultimate source of all actions. 
5.2.3.2.3. Following the Law as Receiving “the Address” 
 One may object that the tradition (Qur’ān and Hadīth) and laws are given 
specifically as a substitute for the wandering that results from the exposure to the 
mystery. But in Hajj, laws crystalize the being-in-trouble of the follower. The follower 
this time is not just any ordinary one but Abraham. For him, this problem is looked at in a 
different way. He has the problem of communicating the orders as well as following 
them. On the other hand, what is revealed to the prophet as truth might make no 
reasonable sense to others. Nonetheless, this story, is a heroic attempt to overcome human 
limitations and make the laws present in human realm. As I mentioned, for Ismāʿīl and 
Hājar, the accurate attitude in facing the fact that they are “before the laws” was to 
exercise patience and to live the partial, nomadic life of following and keeping their 
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hopes up for a revelation to come. For Abraham, the one who have received the laws 
immediately, the attempt is to establish the laws, make them present and in fact make 
God as the absolute justice present in this world.  
Abraham wants to be the first person to overcome human limitations and 
overcome the problems of the ‘address.’ He is on the receiving end of the orders from 
God and yet has to somehow reconcile them with the language and understanding of the 
people to be able to bridge the gap between his intuition of God’s message and the public 
speech.  
  The complications with the address are not one but many, all of which are staged 
in the story of Abraham. Abraham is trying to understand God’s command to sacrifice his 
own son. The very transgressive nature of the command is supposed to underline 
Abraham’s malady and trouble. He is up to an impossible task for God’s laws and God’s 
intervention is necessarily un-worldly. God is the absolute other, the one that gives the 
laws in the first place. We remember from previous chapter and with Aristotle’s laws, that 
at the moment of the creation of a new law, it is the singular other that gives the law. The 
law that is phronetically established by looking at the examples in the past and by 
applying the universal to a new individual case still re-affirms the structure of the world 
as it has always been. In order to give a new law one has to try a calculation of a totally 
different kind. Now, the transgressive command that Abraham receives from God, the 
absolute other, is so monstrous and un-worldly that defies any intellectual understanding.  
Still Abraham intends to make the impossible possible. He has received the 
command and he has no doubt that is the command of the other. I would like to 
emphasize that the order to kill one’s own son, like most of the interventions of God in 
the stories of the prophets has to be transgressive. This is to emphasize the unworldliness 
and transgressive nature of absolute justice in the realm of human beings. The commands 
must necessarily defy commonsense or they are not absolutely innovative and new. In the 
previous chapter, I mentioned that this is the character of a kind of innovation and 
creation which goes beyond simple applications of a general or universal law of justice 
and tries to ‘address’ the otherness of the other.  
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The problem is not at all limited to the moral laws and goes back to the nature of 
innovation and the ‘stumbling block’ of individuation. I mentioned in chapter 4, that 
similar demonic and unworldly forces impose themselves upon Descartes when he is on 
the verge of the creation of something absolutely new. The difference is that for political 
reasons he has to ascribe the transgressive creations and commands to an evil demon as 
opposed to culturally and politically correct understanding of God as the absolute good. 
The nature of creation however is the same; that is, the creation of the absolutely new is 
to rip the structure of the commonsensical good world as we know it.  
  Abraham is up to the same task of trying to establish what he thinks is the most 
just laws, the one’s that do not have to abide by the rules of reason and common sense. 
He does not even try to speak to anyone but Ismāʿīl about what he is doing. His actions 
has to make no sense and judged as unjust in accordance with the established laws of the 
present and yet he has faith that he can establish God’s command in the human realm.   
 The commands are almost impossible to ‘follow.’ Abraham receives the order to 
leave his family stranded, but even worse he is asked to sacrifice his son to prove his 
faith. He performs the first order which makes the story more appealing to follow. He 
might be able to establish the presence of the absolute justice after all. But, as I 
mentioned above, that part of the story in Islam is not even about Abraham but about 
Hājar on her receiving end “before the laws.” 
The latter story of Abraham, the great sacrifice, for the pilgrims start with what is 
called the Bigger Hajj, which involves two major actions: Ramy al-Jamarāt (stoning of 
the pillars) and finally al-hady (sacrifice). At this stage, the pilgrims are still in the story 
of Abraham  grappling with the aporetic situation of following the laws. Yet, they must 164
begin again with the story not as a normal human being, but as the prophet Abraham 
trying to overcome the aporia once and for all.  Thus, should Abraham be able to 
establish the laws once and for all, he must deny and defy all partial, intellectual 
appropriations of the order. Abraham is not to be satisfied with anything but the final 
complete actualization of the laws, something that even Aristotle finally ended up 
 like Moses following the of Khiḍr 164
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admitting was impossible. Whatever comes to pass (as an intellectual idea, a 
psychological satisfaction, a sense of completion and appropriation) turns into an idol 
that has to be defied.  
All the signs so far tell the audience as and the pilgrims that Abraham can do what 
he sets out to do it. Pilgrims act out this attempts by first perform the Ramy al-Jamarāt 
(stoning the pillars).  The pilgrims throw pebbles at the stone pillars known as al-
Jamarāt. The practice commemorates Abraham’s stoning of Satan when Satan tried to 
tempt him to disobey God or to interpret His order otherwise. Satan’s suggestion to 
interpret the laws intellectually to a present or commonsensical meaning reduces the 
unworldly character of the command. In the ritual of stoning, Satan (the pillar) is 
symbolically defied by throwing stones. At this level, one can interpret the stoning of the 
pillars as the perpetual defiance of any interpretation and appropriation of the message in 
favor of the final fulfilment of God’s command.   
And finally comes al-hady (the sacrifice), the ritual commemorates Abraham’s 
willingness to sacrifice his son Ismāʿīl and God’s provision of a lamb as a substitute 
sacrifice. Sacrifice is the ultimate excess. Identifying with the character of Abraham, the 
pilgrim is ready to do everything she can to make the laws present and actual. 
However, with the offering of a ram, Abraham is about to learn a tragic lesson. 
The lamb or ram seems to be a reward more for Ismāʿīl than his father. As I mentioned, 
Ismāʿīl is being rewarded for his patience and remaining a ‘follower.’ But for Abraham, 
the story is his failed attempt to make the meaning of laws actual and present. The 
moment one assumes that he has found the truth, that he has actually performed the 
orders and established the truth and justice, the truth of the message has already 
transcended beyond the actual occurrence of it.  
We can see that the sacrifice, had it been done successfully, would reductively and 
superficially solve the problem of 'following' the law, turning the faith to a quid pro quo 
economy. That is, one could simply gather that absolute obedience to the literal word of 
God, to the singular address is possible for the ‘follower.’ 
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But, this magnificent story remains open for Abraham could not sacrifice Ismāʿīl 
and was given a lamb instead. The very “cut”  carries the pilgrim back to the aporetic 165
situation of ‘following’ again. The sacrifice of a lamb involves cutting, and returning to 
the realm of impossibility. That is how the story of the sacrifice highlights not only the 
trouble of understanding the law as the address that cannot be shared, but also the 
impossibility involved in its performance. It points to the fact that all laws in religion are 
temporary and strategic constellations in facing the trouble of ‘following’ and an 
invitation to a heedful conduct towards others. 
5.2.3.2.4.The Transformation of Laws and the Heedful Conduct 
 The final attempt of Abraham to found the laws fails and no grounding is 
established. From here all laws should be interpreted again having such an impossibility 
and groundlessness in view. In this light, from the very beginning the laws in Hajj had a 
curious negativity and indecision to them as a result of which being lawful and unlawful 
gains existential and ontological meaning above and beyond the ordinary meanings of 
guilt and sin. I believe this negative quality adds an additional significance to the strict 
laws of religion, and gives them a nomadic character.    
 A good example of this can be found in the strictest rules of Iḥrām. I mentioned 
that the first narrative, the story of Hājar, begins with the state of Iḥrām. The present laws 
of Islam already begin to make other senses at the stage of Iḥrām which begins at Mīqāt. 
This is evident in the fact that the unlawful act (ḥarām) gains an ontological meaning 
well beyond the ordinary sense of it. In the formal state of Iḥrām the pilgrims wear a 
costume. The word Iḥrāmis from the same root as an unlawful act (ḥarām) and also 
respect, awe, and care.  It seems to imply that the pilgrims enter the state of the heedful 166
conduct where their actions are determined only by the laws of the ritual and in attending 
to their aporetic situation and patience (intiẓār). Literally, the pilgrims cannot do many 
 And sacrifice bears undeniable similarity with the other cut I referred to in the process, taqṣīr. Both cuts 165
point to impossibilities involved in the human condition and as a result transform the meaning of the laws.
iḥtirām (m) verbal noun of iḥtarama, “to respect” (form VIII); respect166
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things that they can normally do. Therefore, all of the rules and regulations of the Iḥrām, 
stated below, start with negation. In the state of Iḥrām, the pilgrim cannot: 
1. Look at the reflection of one’s face or the body in anything like a mirror or even water.  
2. Wear one’s regular clothes and perfume 
3. Shave or trim  
4. Have marital relationships 
5. Argue or have any altercations 
6. Hurt, kill, or eat any kind of creature, including uprooting any plants.  
 In terms of identity, number 1 suspends one’s relationship to one’s image and 
disconnects her for some time from the image she has of herself from memory. Numbers 
2 to 4 intensify the situation and distort the image of one’s self and what one normally 
associates oneself with. So far, the effect, as I mentioned, is the defiance of identity as 
one remembers from everyday life. This brings about the suspension of the laws of the 
present as well. The pilgrim loses her everyday political body.   
 Although these orders are still more laws to be followed and failing to abide by 
them results in a retribution of some kind, the structure of negation, the fact that there is 
not much instruction as to what they should do other than asking for forgiveness leaves 
pilgrims in a state of suspension and indecision. In other words, these laws are more 
about what they “cannot” do, which make pilgrims wonder about their direction and 
place in regard to the laws. Numbers 5 and 6, in particular, make these more look like a 
heedful suspension of action rather than an affirmation of action as in an invitation to a 
holy war or prayer (Jihād and Ṣalāt).  
 The repetitive nature of laws which used to give a schedule to Muslims’ everyday 
life is interrupted by the dramatic actions which are associated with a mythical, 
apocalyptic as well as historical temporality. Such an interruption makes the participants 
wonder about the very constitution of their everyday life of faith in the light of the 
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narratives they are engaged in.  The ritual is introducing a shift in focus, a turn to the 167
very center that complicates the very existence of laws as present and repetitive. 
 The action of asking for forgiveness (tawba) for your sins is another aspect of the 
Hajj which surpasses everyday praying and other rites associated with the economy of 
Islam. It seems that the story of Abraham and the confrontation with the emptiness of 
Kaʿbah are supposed to give rise to one’s new understanding of the meaning of guilt and 
unlawfulness. One could have asked for forgiveness in one’s hometown as well, for a 
Muslim must believe that God is everywhere and always ready to listen to and forgive the 
believer. But, as I mentioned before, this emphasis on the place, that is the particular 
place dedicated to ask for forgiveness, marks a break with the temporality of everyday 
life as well as everyday faith. The “call,” referred to by the Qur’an, is not only for 
Muslims, but is that which asks all human beings to confess their existential guilt. 
Everyone is bound by some worldly laws or limitations and as a result guilty of some 
kind. We would like to be unconditionally hospitable to the other but that is virtually 
impossible due to our human condition. In other words, any judgment or decision needs a 
present measure. In the world, where the presence of the Absolute is defied, any decision-
making becomes a matter of being-in-trouble and confronting a steep path.  The new 168
meaning of the guilt is this existential lack, which is only remedied by the impossible 
presence of the Absolute. Under this new light, all actions turn into ethical comportment, 
or a kind of heedful indecision. We are always already guilty of having no ground and 
being in the state of economy, not hospitable enough to receive the ‘other’ 
In the language of Heidegger, it is only when the everyday familiarity with the world (what he calls 167
ready-to-hand (Zuhanden) understanding) is breached or interrupted, the whole structure of being-in-the-
world becomes manifest for Dasein. However, it is evident that the possibility for freedom, in an originary 
temporality and an authentic meaning of existence or possibility for Dasein, is not created in reference to 
death, but in identifying with the characters of the narratives in the pilgrimage. 
 The steep path is a Qurānic allusion that is al-ˀaqaba in the chapter al-Balad (The City) where the 168
question of ethical judgment is raised.
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unconditionally. And yet we are advised to exercise care.  Care and patience (ṣabr wa 169
al-marḥama) are the new laws of conduct (Qur’ān, 90:17).  170
 The situation is intensified with the symbolic “cut” in action number 3. The word 
taqṣīr is from the root “Q, Ṣ, R”, meaning the action of limiting, restricting, and cutting. 
From the same root, “muqaṣṣir” means delinquent or guilty. Both in asking for 
forgiveness in the stay (Iqāmat) and in reference to taqṣīr, besides the common 
signification of guilt, we are dealing with an invitation to admit our limitation in trying to 
make the absolute present. And that is in this context, the meaning of the existential guilt. 
It is not that one has done something wrong or one is responsible for something, but 
rather perhaps indicating that as 'followers,’ individuals are essentially limited not to have 
the knowledge of the absolute. Thus, the pilgrim would symbolically cut one’s hair, 
admitting that she is existentially limited and always in ‘following.’  
5.2.4. The Final Word 
 I have tried to show here that by studying the actions in the ritual of Hajj and 
stories associated with them, one finds that the main theme is not about Islam per se, but 
about the trouble of humans as ‘followers’ of the commands which are revealed in an 
incomprehensible and singular ‘address,’ which has to be necessarily transgressive to 
challenge the common sense. I intended to exploit the imaginative and mythical character 
of the story, to illustrate the point I was trying to make in the rest of the work. In other 
words, with the actual complication involved with the implementation of the religious 
This new meaning of the law and ethical comportment is inspired by an interpretation of Chapter 90 (al-169
Balad) of the Our‘ān. There, the whole discussion is about the place or the city (perhaps Mecca of the time) 
where the laws are defined in a new way. There, the decision-making is highlighted and choosing to do 
charity and other lawful actions are described in terms of a being at the juncture and standing before the 
Steep path. My point is that, if to figure out what to do, was as easy as following the laws, why is He 
talking about a steep path. The difficulty pointed out here, in my humble opinion is the existential difficulty 
in being a follower.    
“And what can make you know what is [breaking through] the difficult pass? It is the freeing of a slave. Or 
feeding on a day of severe hunger. An orphan of near relationship. Or a needy person in misery. And then 
being among those who believed and advised one another to patience and advised one another to 
compassion.” [Qur'ān, 90: 11-17]
 And then being among those who believed and advised one another to patience and advised one another 170
to compassion.(17)
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laws, I tried to shed light on the nature of laws in general and the inevitable radical 
transformation they have to go through when they encounter the singularity of the other. 
 I showed how Hajj is the best place to see this transformation and how Muslims 
in fact experience the troubles and the violence that plague the actual enforcement of the 
laws. The transformation began in Hajj with the radical defiance of authority and 
annihilation of the time as present. The actions, costumes, places, and symbols associated 
with the beginning of Hajj all target the pilgrims’ economic system of sense making and 
laws. They find themselves in a place where they have to abide by a totally different 
schedule, wear different clothes, completely forget what they know about themselves and 
their daily routine and act according to the laws of the particular place. The whole 
process puts the heading and authority of the laws into question. The actions, the 
practices, and stories behind them illustrate such defiance of authority in numerous ways. 
I analyzed the ritual to show how each and every movement is performed in defiance of 
the system of sense-making as present, from memory, or a central idea or a heading. 
What pilgrims used to have as present and economic laws is questioned as to its 
foundations. The major sign of this foundation and center is Kaʿbah, the house of God, 
which is the house of no-thing and symbolizes the groundlessness of humans in the 
world. It is a center, an authority whose writing and orders have to be obeyed in God’s 
absence and they consequently call for more interpretation. 
 From then on, the pilgrim is compelled to follow the authority of the prophets. 
But, the choice of the prophet and the stories are curious. It is not Prophet Muhammad 
that they have to follow, but Abraham. I argued the stories associated with Abraham are 
about the ‘address’ and following the laws. The whole story of Abraham is meant to put 
the messenger and the followers in a paradoxical situation. The transgressive nature of 
commands received and performed in these stories problematize all laws of religion for 
Muslims. The messenger is to bring the laws which are for “a people,” and yet the 
address is necessarily personal and private. The pilgrims, I suggested, experience this 
singular-plural nature of the address and experience the being-in-trouble of the follower. 
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Like Hājar or Abraham they find themselves “before the laws” and compelled to make 
decisions.  
 The message of the ritual, I argued, is this very suspension of decision and laws 
and the admission of the impossibility of the identity in following the laws. If there is 
such a thing as following the tradition, it is in the heedful indecision (ṣabr or patience in 
the Qurānic language) and in the exercise of care (marḥama) toward others with regard to 
the transgressive and mysterious origin of the laws. This is not a passive reaction to the 
laws but an active critical take on the tradition such that one considers oneself as the 
original addressee of an impossible address. This attitude involves a perpetual 
engagement with reading and interpreting the tradition instead of blindly following the 
commonsensical and ordinary understanding of it in public language. For the religion 
whose main book bears the title of the Qur’ān, meaning reading, following the tradition 
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Appendix 1: On Analogy of Being 
  There is a long-standing and controversial debate as to its nature and if there is such a 
thing as analogy of being in Aristotle. For example, as Aubenque argues, being is a 
homonymy which is hardly a form of unity. The tendency toward unity, unity pros hen, 
which Aubenque calls “unity of convergence” is not really unity at all. It is, rather, quasi-
unity. While unity kata genos is unity in virtue of something else (namely, falling under a 
substantial definition), so called “unity pros hen” is only “unity” in virtue of 
approximating unity, which is to say failing to achieve it. It is not as if things share some 
higher genus through which they form an identity. It is an analogical unity. Aubenque 
goes out of his way to argue that Aristotle has been persistently misinterpreted as 
advancing a theory of the “analogy of being” when, in fact, he develops a theory of 
being’s homonymy. Being is a homonym [homonymon]. Nonetheless, for Aristotle as far 
as entities are defined in their species and genera, also changing from one definition to 
another or establishing some form of relationship between them systematically, the unity 
as a whole is intact. The key idea, I think, is that such a relationship needs to be 
explicable for the analogy to work. That is because for analogy to work there should be a 
prior presence of species and genera and a clear systematic relation between them. This is 
evident in how he understands difference. “Difference” (diaphora) is distinct from 
“otherness” (heterōs). For that which is "other" than something need not be other in a 
particular respect, since everything which is existent is either "other" or "the same." But 
that which is different from something is different in some particular respect, so that that 
in which they differ must be the same sort of thing; i.e. the same genus or species. For 
everything which is different differs either in genus or in species—in genus, such things 
as have not common matter and cannot be generated into or out of each other, e.g. things 
which belong to different categories; and in species, such things as are of the same genus 
(genus meaning that which is predicated of both the different things alike in respect of 
their substance)” (Met., 10. 1054b23-30). 
Aristotle seems to believe that separate genera are basically “other” (heterōs) than each 
other and have nothing in common. Aristotle’s example of things that differ from one 
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another in the absence of a common genus are genera themselves. Genera among 
themselves are merely “other” (Met., 10. 1055a26-7), “too far distinct and 
incommensurable [asumblêta]” (Met., 10. 1055a 6-7). So, for example in the case of 
metaphor as transference (epiphora), as we will discuss in Chapter 3 and 4, there is a 
presumption of having established clear genera that are already present and complete 
which only later come into the relation of analogy. This should be contrasted with 
synonymy. Synonymy describes the relation of species (eidê) within a single genus—in 
other words, species are “said in one sense” of their genus (cats and dogs are animals 
synonymously and “animal” is univocal). In contrast, Aristotle thinks analogy describes 
the relationship between different genera. Genera themselves are not subordinated to a 
higher generic unity. There are no “super-genera”. Aristotle says genera are related to one 
another by analogy in terms of their properties. Biological genera, such as fish and birds, 
are related in terms of their analogous parts: birds’ feathers and fishes’ scales are 
analogous (PA 644a 16; cf. PA 653b 35). Although analogy means a relationship in the 
absence of a shared genus, Aristotle does talk about “unity by analogy” (hen 
kat’analogian) (Met., 1016b34-5), if only to contrast it with the unity of species within a 
genus. Even though there is a marked contrast between being, which is not a genus, and 
the genera (e.g., birds and fish) that are internally unified but only related to one another 
by analogy (since such genera are not themselves species of some super-genus), 
nevertheless both “unity in genus” and the “unity of analogy” are types of unity, even if 
the latter is rarefied and weak. Protevi calls this function a “vertical unity” (Protevi 39).  
To give an account of this unity, Aristotle proposes definition (horismos) as a valid 
way of capturing the being of entities in their multiple manifestations. He criticizes 
Plato’s method of division on the basis that it is unscientific; it doesn’t conform to 
Aristotle’s standards of theoretical science, which proceeds by demonstration (apodeixis) 
operating by means of deductions or syllogisms (An. Post. 71b 18-20). Division in 
Aristotle must conform to the standards of “specification,” a relation among species 
(eidê) and genera (genê), the inverse of generalization. He contends that we need to 
proceed through syllogisms based on immediate premises. As I mentioned before, the 
267
function of definitions are to establish such a relation between parts and wholes. In fact, 
they are Aristotle’s way to signify the “what-IS-Being” (Top. 102a3). Definitions in terms 
of categories are both the most immediate to entities and a bridge to what is the farthest 
and most universal. This is evident in the fact that they are, in fact, indemonstrable in the 
way that premises are supposed to be (An. Post. 92a5), and at least one way of 
understanding definition is as the “indemonstrable formula” (logos anapodeiktos) of 
essence (An. Post. 94a11; cf. 90b24). Aristotle’s word “diaphora,” is the word usually 
translated “differentia” in the logical treatises. Aristotelian differentiae are said relative to 
kinds or genê, in which capacity they are crucial for generating scientific definitions. The 
definition of x (finding the logos of the essence of x) is accomplished by isolating the 
appropriate genus and differentiae (An. Post. 96b25).  
For example, if cow is the object of a scientific demonstration, it will be correctly 
explained by isolating the appropriate kind (“horned animal”) and specifying essential 
differentiae (“the possession of a third stomach and only one row of teeth”) (An. Post. 
98a14-19). Scientifically, differentiae are differences relative to a kind. On the other 
hand, he does not deny that things might go wrong or things might not miss their targets, 
as we will see in the case of monsters. This would be considered  a cata-strophe. 
Catastrophe literally as “turning down” is an unexpected turn of events or unexpected end 
of motion. It refers to the generation which is not in the boundaries of genus and species. 
In this sense, we can say that analogy means a kind of higher-order form of identity, a 
way to tame the anomaly of the undetermined equivocity. We still have a capital that 
determines the organization of beings around it. In effect, this is Aristotle’s way of 
avoiding total dissemination of sense. In Derrida’s terminology, we may say that thinking 
of being as analogical will never get beyond treating differences as relative to already 
existent forms of identity. Derrida, on the other hand, highlights the possibility of a 
distribution which is so-called “nomadic,” because it doesn’t proceed as if the territory 
were already partitioned and appropriated. Rather, the occupants of the territory distribute 
themselves, forming such relations among one another that were inconceivable, or at least 
unpredictable, before the distribution occurred. 
268
Appendix 2: On Hexis 
 The key is in understanding the word, "characteristic," i.e. hexis. Hexis (ἕξις) is a 
relatively stable arrangement or disposition, for example a person's health or knowledge 
or character. It stems from a verb related to possession or "having," and Jacob Klein, for 
example, translates it as "possession." It is more typically translated in modern texts 
occasionally as "state" (e.g., H. Rackham), but more often as "disposition." Joe Sachs 
translates it as "active condition," in order to make sure that hexis is not confused with 
passive conditions of the soul, such as feelings and impulses or mere capacities that 
belong to us by nature. Sachs points to Aristotle's own distinction, explained for example 
in the Categories 8b, which distinguishes it with the word diathesis, normally 
uncontroversially translated as disposition. In this passage, diathesis only applies to 
passive and shallow dispositions that are easy to remove and change, such as being hot or 
cold, while hexis is reserved for deeper and more active dispositions, such as properly 
getting to know something in a way that will not be easily forgotten. Another common 
example of a human hexis in Aristotle is health (hugieia, or sometimes eu(h)exia), and in 
cases where hexis is discussed in the context of health, it is sometimes translated as 
"constitution." 
Apart from needing to be relatively stable or permanent, in contexts concerning 
humans (such as knowledge, health, and good character) hexis is also generally 
understood to be contrasted from other dispositions, conditions and habits, by being 
"acquired" by some sort of training or habituation. It is active like a second nature that 
affects one's immediate perception and desires; however, it is not automatically and 
almost passively engaged like a habit. Although it is translated correctly as habitus in 
Latin which refers to having  stable characteristics but does not have the same 
connotations of habit in English as passive conditioning. "Having" (hexis) means, then, a 
disposition (diathesis), in virtue of which (kath' ho) the thing which is disposed is 
disposed well or badly, and either independently or in relation to something else. Further, 
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any part of such a disposition is called a state (hexis); and hence the excellence (arete) of 
the parts is a kind of state (hexis) (Met. 5.1022b). 
Nonetheless, in perhaps the most important case, Aristotle contrasts hexis with 
energeia (in the sense of activity or operation) in Nicomachean Ethics (1.8.1098b33) and 
Eudemian Ethics (2.1.1218b). The subject there is “happiness" (eudaimonia), and hexis is 
contrasted with energeia (ἐνέργεια) in order to show the correctness of a proposed 
definition of happiness - "activity (ἐνέργεια) in conformity with virtue.”  
Now with those who pronounce happiness to be virtue, or some particular 
virtue, our definition is in agreement; for ‘activity (ἐνέργεια) in conformity 
with virtue’ (aretē) involves virtue. But no doubt it makes a great 
difference whether we conceive the Supreme Good to depend on 
possessing virtue or on displaying it—on disposition (ἕξις), or on the 
manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man may possess the 
disposition without its producing any good result, as for instance when he 
is asleep, or has ceased to function from some other cause; but virtue in 
active exercise cannot be inoperative—it will of necessity act (praxis), and 
act well (eu praxei). And just as at the Olympic games the wreaths of 
victory are not bestowed upon the handsomest and strongest persons 
present, but on men who enter for the competitions—since it is among 
these that the winners are found—so it is those who act rightly who carry 
off the prizes and good things of life. (NE. 1.8.1098b 8-20)  
Happiness then, is an energeia, but virtue of character (often translated as "moral virtue") 
is made up of hexeis. Happiness is said to deserve honoring like the divine if it actually 
achieved, while virtue of character, being only a potential achievement, deserves praise 
but is lower.  
The best way to talk about hexis as an intermediate state between energeia and 
dynamis, not completely actual and yet a stable holding of a disposition, is a state of 
perpetually having the telos in view. Aristotle would like to make sure that a courageous 
person has the golden mean in view all the time and is always driven actively towards 
figuring it out in every particular situation. Thus, in what follows, Aristotle is going to 
explain the driving force which makes people do just actions and want just things. This is 
how body-politics works for Aristotle. He talks about justice as an activity of the soul 
which forms and informs the corporeal matter so that one’s body turns into another body 
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with a different set of desires and inclinations as before. That is why to know what justice 
is, is not a mere "science (episteme), neither is it a mere capacity (dynamis)" waiting to be 
activated (NE, 5.1.1129a10-15). Justice is that characteristic that is actively seeking its 
telos.  
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Appendix 3: Saussure on the Economy of Language 
In his search for the best method of studying language, Saussure comes across similar 
forces involved in molding and folding the sense of linguistic signs in time (diachrony) as 
opposed to the social and systematic institution of signs that work through the fixation of 
their values in comparison to one another and the overarching system of language 
(synchrony). As Derrida points out, Saussure readily acknowledges that he has borrowed 
such a distinction from economic sciences and, in comparison with the function of 
money, “. . . that duality [between synchrony and diachrony] is already forcing itself upon 
the economic sciences” (Saussure, 79). Derrida underlines that Saussure is trying to 
advocate the value system for language, that is to say that any signifier in the system of 
language derives its meaning that is its value in reference to other signifiers in language 
in a differential system. Saussure compares the whole process with economy and the 
value of money. He mentions that the same problematic inflicts economic sciences: on 
the one hand the question is the historical or generative process by which the value of the 
capital is created and other hand the institutional, and political process by which these 
values are fixed “at the same time”, hence synchrony. He feels obliged to apply the same 
distinction to the linguistic sciences. In both cases he believes we are dealing with the 
notion of value and the question whether the value of the items comes from their relation 
to their history and historical processes or in a system and differentially for any particular 
era. He writes: “Proceeding as they have, economists are-without being aware of it-
obeying an inner necessity. A similar necessity obliges us to divide linguistics into two 
parts, each with its own principle. Here as in political economy we are confronted with 
the notion of value; both sciences are concerned with a system for equating things of 
different orders-labor and wages in one, and a signified and a signifier in the 
other” (ibid). But of course he does not stop here and continues to explain that in fact the 
synchrony-diachrony distinction must be applied in all sciences when the question of 
value is at stake. However, Derrida takes interest in that moment of diachrony that always 
already contaminates synchrony and in fact is the condition of its possibility. Derrida’s 
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brilliant discovery in the case of language, is metaphor and in the case of economy, the 
usury. But first, Derrida underlines the analogy that Saussure establishes between 
linguistics and economics. Saussure underlines that he would like to substitute an 
understanding of language as a mere “naming process” with a more sophisticated value 
system. “… we must clear up the issue [of the relation between value and signification] 
or risk reducing language to a simple naming process….To resolve this issue, let us 
observe from the outset that even outside language all values are apparently governed by 
the same paradoxical principle. They are always composed: (i) of a dissimilar thing that 
can be exchanged for the thing of which the value is to be determined; and (2) of similar 
things that can be compared with the thing of which the value is to be determined. Both 
factors are necessary for the existence of a value. To determine what a five-franc piece is 
worth one must therefore know: (i) that it can be exchanged for a fixed quantity of a 
different thing, e.g., bread; and (2) that it can be compared with a similar value of the 
same system, e.g., a one-franc piece, or with coins of another system (a dollar, etc.). In 
the same way, a word can be exchanged for something dissimilar, an idea; besides, it can 
be compared with something of the same nature, another word. Its value is therefore not 
fixed so long as one simply states that it can be “exchanged" for a given concept, i.e., that 
it has this or that signification: one must also compare it with similar values, with other 
words that stand in opposition to it. Its content is really fixed only by the concurrence of 
everything that exists outside it. Being part of a system, it is endowed not only with a 
signification but also and especially with a value, and this is something quite 
different” (Ibid., Part II, Ch. iv, §2, 114-15). 
 In Derrida’s view, however natural one may assume the process of naming, as 
soon as the signs enter the process of exchange their sense is supplemented by the terms 
of the exchange, and that is how Saussure compares signs’ value with the function of 
money. For Derrida, the most universal example for signs that has been a point of 
reference for philosophers from the very beginning of philosophy is “the sun.” Entering 
the idiomatic realm of language exchange, however, even the sun has to abide by the laws 
of “semantic exchange.” 
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An object which is the most natural, the most universal, the most real, the 
most clear, a referent which is apparently the most external, the sun- this 
object, as soon as it plays a role in the process of axiological and semantic 
exchange (and it always does), does not completely escape the general law 
of metaphorical value: The value of just any term is accordingly 
determined by its environment; it is impossible to fix even the value of the 
signifier 'sun' without considering its surroundings: in some languages it is 
not possible to say 'sit in the sun” (Derrida, 1982. 250). 
The important point in regard to Saussure and his system is that while the relationship 
between signifiers in language seems objective, the differential relationship between them 
gives rise to a ‘mystical foundation’ that make us be able to anticipate changes and 
predict events in language. This Mystical foundation that gives us such a power and 
authority Saussure calls “langue” as opposed to all empirical usages of language, 
“parole.” “Langue” never occurs in reality and yet everything is a particular example or 
manifestation of it. Under the guise an unbiased scientific system, Derrida shows how 
Saussure has produced another onto-theological system.  
 Heidegger offers the same critique in his reading of Aristotle’s double character of 
logos. As I mentioned before, logos is “used up” in averageness: “Everything expressed 
harbors the possibility of being used up, of being shoved into the common intelligibility.” 
I remarked earlier that he is adopting a Nietzschean language which connects truth, as 
bleached out metaphors on the one hand and the figures on the coins that are wiped out or 
worn out on the other. Derrida looks at different facets of the exhaustion of the value of 
money as in the expression, “usure” in French which has two meanings. Its first sense 
according to Derrida is “wear and tear”, erasure by rubbing, exhaustion or crumbling. 
(Derrida, Jacques, and Alan Bass. Margins of Philosophy. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 2009.) 
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Appendix 4: Derrida on the Gift 
 In Derrida’s analysis, conditions of possibility of the gift elaborated by both Marcel 
Mauss in his anthropological study of pre-economic societies, “The Gift”, produce, at the 
same time, the annulment of the gift.” In his view, the gift cancels itself by being part of 
an economy, a cycle of return. It cancels itself because as a present it is never completely 
free. Derrida rigorously investigates conditions of the possibility of the “Gift”, ‘if such a 
thing exists’; he analyzes these conditions with reference to each element of the gift 
formula: donor, recipient and gift object.  
 On the part of the donor, any recognition of the gift as gift anticipates some kind of 
return, either symbolically as a good feeling of satisfaction -intentionally or 
unintentionally- or materially in the form of gratitude, pleasure or a tangible gift. Even in 
the situation where one’s gift is rejected the very consciousness of oneself as a giver who 
is hurt would be a kind of reinforcement of one’s identity as a subject – and this in itself 
is a kind of return (albeit negative) which annuls the gift. He writes: “if he recognizes it 
as a gift, if the gift appears to him as such, if the present is present to him as present, this 
simple recognition suffices to annul the gift. why? Because it gives back, in the place, let 
us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic equivalent” (ibid., 13).  
 From the point of view of the recipient, any awareness of the intentional meaning of a 
gift places that person in the cycle of exchange. When I receive something I perceive to 
be a gift, I have already responded with recognition. Even if my response to the giver is 
one of indifference, it would be in my recognizing the gift as gift that I cancel it. Thus the 
gift is not the gift anymore because it is a burden one feels of being indebted to the other. 
“It cannot be a gift as gift except by not being present as gift… There is no more gift as 
soon as the other receives-and even if she refuses the gift that she has perceived or 
recognized as gift” (ibid., 14).  
 Considering the gift-object itself, we are faced with further difficulties. The gift-
object may be a real thing or it may simply be a value, a symbol, or an intention (ibid., 
12-13). Again, the problem is that of recognition, which always has a reference to 
perceiving subjects in the present. Therefore, the problem is not whether or not the gift is 
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phenomenal, but the fact that as soon as it appears as a gift, its gift-aspect disappears. As 
Derrida notes, “its very appearance, the simple phenomenon of the gift annuls it as a gift, 
transforming the apparition into a phantom and the operation into a simulacrum” (ibid., 
14).  
 For Derrida, then, the problem lies in his definition of time as that which gives. The 
Gift which is for Derrida always a gift to come, cannot be present. Therefore, when one 
recognizes something as a gift or oneself as a giver or recipient one is actually making it 
present for oneself. Yet, when something becomes present it is no longer the gift. For 
Derrida, the market economy is the present version of the gift, the gift which is fixated in 
the here and now and has lost its effectiveness in giving signification and identity to its 
participants’ life. Derrida provides a linguistic, sociological and anthropological analysis 
to show how the ambivalent meanings of the “gift” have always made it impossible for 
the gift to appear ‘as such’ and whatever is called a gift has already been reduced to a 
kind of economy which betrays the truth of the gift. (ibid., 36.)  
 On the other hand, as I mentioned in passing, there is a messianic dimension to 
Derrida’s idea of a gift to come or impossible gift (i.e. the drive within the impossible 
itself which drags everything towards the future). He calls it Khora which means: a 
radical otherness that "gives place" for being. Khora is a radical openness and otherness 
which gives. This event Derrida calls “Messianicity without messanism”, that is the 
possibility of the “Gift” as such, if such a thing exists; the possibility unactualizable and 
impossible; a pure gift involving the radical negation of any subjectivity; a writing 
without logos and without theos, a pure “gramme” whose transcription is inherently other 
than it ever pretends to be or other than that which it marks as its being.What is important 
in Derrida’s discussion for our analysis is primarily this: the radical annulment of the gift 
in the realm of possibilities in the historical world and for the historical Dasein. In other 
cases, also Derrida talks about for example of “Hospitality” to-come or “Justice” to-come 
which is the only way to keep these notions meaningful. Otherwise they would be present 
and remain fixed in idle, passive and infertile ideas, unable to give individualized, 
authentic identity to anybody. Secondly, Derrida never claims that we can go without gift, 
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and he insists on the circular movement and economy in it; nevertheless, he considers it 
necessary to acknowledge the impossibility [of the gift to turn] of turning the circular 
movement into a dialectical spiral. 
One should not necessarily flee or condemn circularity as one would a bad 
repetition, a vicious circle, a regressive or sterile process. One must, in a 
certain way of course, inhabit the circle, turn around in it, live there a feast 
of thinking and the gift, the gift of thinking, would be no stranger there. 
(Ibid. 9) 
Derrida claims that, if the figure of the circle is essential to economics, the gift must 
remain aneconomic. Not that it remains foreign to the circle, but it must keep a relation of 
foreignness to the circle, a relation without relation, of familiar foreignness. It is perhaps 
in this sense that the gift is the impossible. 
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Appendix 5: Derrida on the beast (Betise) 
 Derrida writes extensively and in multiple terms about this automatic force of 
generation, as the madness of the Gift, excess, transgression, etc., but most importantly as 
bêtise. He associates it with the creating power of “thought beyond calculation” even 
beyond a Lesbian measure. “Bêtise is a thought. Bêtise is thinking. It’s a thinking and 
thought freedom” (Derrida, 2007. 49). He explains it aptly with reference the character of 
judgement described by Descartes.  
For Descartes the motif of the beast and the possibility of the emergence of the beast, 
bestiality and also error in judgement arise in several places. But from the very beginning 
in Meditation one when he considers the lack of any ground and fathoms for a moment 
the possibility of not having the Divine ground or the common sense knowledge as 
ground, right away the beast finds its way to his thought.  
But perhaps, even though the senses do sometimes deceive us when it is a 
question of very small and distant things, still there are many other matters 
concerning which one simply cannot doubt, even though they are derived 
from the very same senses: for example, that I am sitting here next to the 
fire, wearing my winter dressing gown, that I am holding this sheet of 
paper in my hands, and the like. But on what grounds could one deny that 
these hands and this entire body are mine? Unless perhaps I were to liken 
myself to the insane, whose brains are impaired by such an unrelenting 
vapor of black bile that they steadfastly insist that they are kings when 
they are utter paupers, or that they are arrayed in purple robes when they 
are naked, or that they have heads made of clay, or that they are gourds, or 
that they are made of glass. But such people are mad, and I would appear 
no less mad, were I to take their behavior as an example for myself. 
(Descartes, René, ProQuest, and Cress, Donald A. Discourse on Method; 
& Meditations on First Philosophy. Fourth ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 
1998. 60) 
In considering insanity and nonsense, he is drawn into the world where he has no body 
and finally reaches a point where he meets the beast, the sovereign, and the possibility of 
unleashed thinking. It is at this point that he is struck by the strangest of the metaphors 
and thoughts, the most prominent of which is the evil genius. The evil genius of 
Descartes has all the motifs in one place. It is not just like a god but the most unjust, and 
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is not abiding by any rules even of mathematics and logic. The creative power of the 
beast is an undifferentiated, pure domain of force that is infinite. Later in Meditation six, 
when he seeks the justification for the error in judgment, the infinite force of the will acts 
in accordance with the infinity of the power of the beast.  
Descarets establishes that the faculty of judgement like all other faculties is given by 
God, “like everything else which is in [man], [he] certainly received from God [this 
faculty]” (ibid., 37). Thanks to the perfectness and goodness of God we cannot be 
deceived by wrong perceptions nor be endowed with poor faculties. Thus the error lies in 
the mismatch between the infinity of the will and the finitude of human intellect.  
Judgment implies, at the same time, perception and understanding, that is, 
intelligence and the intervention of the will, the voluntary decision, so 
that, according to this Cartesian terminology, la bêtise would be at the 
crossroads of the finitude of the intellect and the infinity of the will. So, 
the precipitation to judge, the excess of the will over understanding, 
intellect, would be proper to man and would lead to bêtises, that is to say, 
stupidities, out of precipitation, the precipitation of the will, which is 
disproportionate to the finitude of the understanding. That’s why there is 
an abyssal implication, a vertiginous one, of bêtise, which in this case 
always touches, or is touched and moved by, a certain infinity of freedom 
in a Cartesian sense. (Derrida, 2007. 46) 
It seems that the inability to calculate properly, or conversely to calculate too much and 
not to conceded to the finitude of the intellect will cause stupidities, mistakes. But then 
such a naiveté is aligned with a thinking that has the most creative power. It should be 
noted that this thinking is not simply associated with animals. As Derrida insists, “bêtise 
[is] proper to man.” A lion or wolf cannot be bêtises. There should be an intention to 
understanding involved for a making to happen.  
Derrida emphasizes time and again that bêtise 
is not a nonrelationship to judgment the way we could say a stone doesn’t 
judge. But it is a blunted, dulled faculty, a nonfaculty, but “non” by some 
fault, by some secret perversion of a faculty that is not very well oriented, 
that is debilitated or diverted in judgement. (ibid.) 
That is also where he points to the category of judgement involved in bêtise:  
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if this category doesn’t belong to the regime of the normal series of 
categories, if it is an exceptional category, a transcategorial category , then 
it corresponds to the first literal definition of the transcendental in the 
Middle Ages. Long before Kant, “transcendental” meant quid transcendi 
omni genus. It’s a category that transcends all the categories and doesn’t 
belong to the series or table of categories (ibid., 48-49) 
That is to say that, it is not simply an epistemological or conceptual mistake but an 
alignment with the pure movement of thought. This is still very much like the unformed, 
inorganic matter in Aristotle. 
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